* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on:30.05.2012
Judgment delivered on:01.06.2012
+ C.R.P. 777/1999
ANAND SWAROOP VOHRA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vishal Jain, Adv.
versus
BHIM SEN BAHRI & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.J.P.Sengh, Sr.Adv. with
Ms.Gurkamal, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1 The impugned judgment is dated 20.05.1998; eviction petition filed by the landlord Anand Swaroop Vohra under Section 14-C of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) had been dismissed.
2 Record shows that an eviction petition had been filed by the landlord against his tenant Bhim Sen Bahri. His case was that he has retired as an employee of the Central Government i.e. Area Manager Canteen Store Department, Ministry of Defence on 30.04.1987; the premises which are the subject matter of dispute (ground floor of CRP No.777/1999 Page 1 of 25 property bearing No. 65/11, New Rohtak Road, New Delhi) had been let out to the aforenoted tenant for a residential purpose and was being used by him accordingly. Contention is that the he along with his brother G.S. Vohra (respondent No. 2) are the joint owners of this property; his brother was also an employee of the Central Government and he had retired from the Ministry of Food and Supply in 1982; he has shifted to the first floor of the building; their third brother Anil Kumar Vohra along with his wife and son was also residing on the second floor; after the retirement of the present petitioner Anand Swaroop Vohra, he started living with his brother on the first floor as there was no other accommodation available with him; his family comprised of himself, his wife and two daughters; elder daughter was 25 years of age and younger daughter was undergoing a B.Ed. qualification. On the first floor, where the other brother with his family are living there are only three bed rooms, one dining room and one drawing room which is an insufficient accommodation for their families; their sister who is living abroad also visits them often; the petitioner along with his family has only one room and a kitchen on the barsati floor; accordingly grounds under Section 14-C of the DRCA had been pleaded.
CRP No.777/1999 Page 2 of 253 The tenant had denied these submissions. Contention was that the premises had been let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes and the ground under Section 14-C of the DRCA which is only for a residential purpose was not available to the landlord. Further contention being that there are in fact five bed rooms on the first floor and the two bed rooms on the second floor are also lying vacant. Further submission being that the petitioner Anand Swaroop Vohra has not retired from the Central Government; accommodation available with the petitioner is even otherwise sufficient.
4 Oral and documentary evidence was led. PW-1 had come into the witness box and proved Ex. PW-1/2 which was his retirement order; his pension order was proved as Ex. PW-1/3; he had on oath deposed that on the first floor, there were three bed rooms, one store, one study room where his brother (other co-owner) G.S. Vohra and the family of Anil Vohra are residing. The accommodation presently available with him is only one bed room on the first floor with an improvised kitchen on the barsati floor; contention being that his wife has to cook in this open space in the improvised kitchen; accommodation available with his is highly insufficient.
CRP No.777/1999 Page 3 of 255 Per contra, two witnesses had been examined on behalf of the tenant. RW-1 is the son of the tenant; his contention was that they were living in the disputed premises since the year 1959; the draftsman RW-2 has proved the site plan.
6 Before dealing with the aforenoted contentions, relevant would it be to extract the provisions of Section 14-C of the DRCA which inter- alia reads as follows:-
"14-C. Right to recover immediate possession of the premises to accrued to Central Government and Delhi Administration employees.- (1) Where the landlord is a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration, and the premises let out by him are required for his own residence, such employee may, within one year from the date of his retirement or within a period of one year from the date of commencement of the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1988 whichever is later apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises (2) Where the landlord is an employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration and has a period of less than one year preceding the date of his retirement and the premises let out by him are required by him for his own residence after his retirement, he may, at any time within a period of one year before the date of his retirement, apply to the Controller for recovering the immediate possession of such premises.
(3) Whether the landlord referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) has let out more than one premises, it shall be open to him to make an application under that sub-section in respect of only one of the premises chosen by him." CRP No.777/1999 Page 4 of 25 7 Proceedings under Section 14-C can be initiated by a landlord who is in the service of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration and the premises are required by him for his own residence; the landlord has to plead and show that after his retirement or is likely to retire within one year from his employment with the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration, the premises are bonafide required by him; the need must be real and genuine. Section 14-C thus classifies two categories of the landlords who seek immediate possession of the premises; the first category is of those who are retired employees of the Central Government or of Delhi Administration and the second category consists of those landlords who are likely to retire and have a period of less than one year preceding the date of their retirement. Such class of landlords are entitled to immediate possession of the premises let out by them if they are able to show that the premises are required bonafide for their own residence.
8 Present petition has been filed within one year from the date of the amendment i.e. of the incorporation of Section 14-C which was added into the Statute w.e.f. 01.04.1988; the documentary evidence Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/3 also evidence the fact that the petitioner has CRP No.777/1999 Page 5 of 25 retired from the service of the Central Government and he is drawing a pension.
9 The ARC vide his judgment and decree dated 20.05.1988 had dismissed the eviction petition; it was held that the premises are not required bonafide by the landlord; the accommodation already available with him on the first and second floor of the disputed premises is sufficient; on this ground alone, the petition was dismissed. 10 Arguments have been addressed at length by learned senior counsel appearing for both the parties. Written submissions have also been filed by both the parties.
11 Record has been perused. The landlord Anand Swaroop Vohra has on 22.01.2005 during the pendency of this revision petition died; his brother G.S. Vohra (admittedly a co-owner) has also died during the pendency of this petition on 05.12.2005; this eviction petition has been pursued by their widows namely Smt. Satya Vohra and Rukmani Vohra; both of them are in their late 70‟s; they are suffering from old age ailments and feeble health; there is no dispute to the factum that the husbands of both the aforenoted ladies namely Satya Vohra and Rukmani Vohra have retired from Government service; at the time when CRP No.777/1999 Page 6 of 25 the eviction petition was instituted by Anand Swaroop Vohra which was on 11.04.1989, the cause of action under Section 14-C of the DRCA was admittedly available to him; the fact that he has died during the pendency of the eviction petition does not in any manner make any difference to the pendency of these proceedings and the submission of the tenant that the eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA has become infructuous carries no weight. The bonafide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings. The Apex Court in (2004) 5 SCC 772 Shakuntala Bai and Others Vs. Narayan Das and Others had inter alia held as follows:
"........ The bona fide need of the landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceedings and if a decree for eviction is passed, the death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal preferred by the tenant will make no difference as his heirs are fully entitled to defend the estate."
In this case, the eviction petition had been filed under Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA; the Apex Court had noted that merely by reason of death of the original landlord, bonafide need would not come to an end and the eviction suit was liable to be continued. In 155 (2008) DLT 681 Dharam Pal Gupta Vs. Anand Prakash a Bench of this Court had noted CRP No.777/1999 Page 7 of 25 that where during the pendency of the revision petition which had taken eight long years, the father of the landlord had died because of the progress of the litigation at a snail‟s pace, it would be unfair that a defendant‟s trial should de-novo start again and the petition cannot come to an end merely because of this event which has taken place in this intervening period.
12 Thus this Court is in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the date of filing of the eviction petition is the relevant date for deciding the controversy between the parties; admittedly as on date of the filing eviction which was on 10.04.1989 (which was an eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA); Anand Swaroop Vohra had retired as a Government servant from the Central Government and he was drawing pension; this fact finding returned by the ARC is even otherwise not in challenge as no cross- appeal/objections have been filed by the tenant. The retirement order of Anand Swaroop Vohra and his pension order Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW- 1/3 had been proved before the ARC. Present eviction petition was filed within one year from the date when this provision was introduced. Eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA was fully CRP No.777/1999 Page 8 of 25 maintainable on this count. The right which had accrued to the erstwhile landlord namely Anand Swaroop Vohra under Section 14-C of the DRCA which was a special right for a special class of landlords and which right was available to him on the date of institution of the petition, would continue in favour of his legal representative who is his widow. Proceedings would not abate.
13 Next submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is advanced upon a judgment reported as 155 (2008) DLT 658 Ranjit Kumar Chopra Vs. Virinder Khosla to support an argument that where the premises are lying locked and sealed for a long period of time as is so in the instant case such a tenant cannot be permitted to take advantage of the technicalities of law and should not be allowed to pervade the rule of law; justice demands that such a tenant who has a palatial house of his own and tenanted premises have been kept under his lock and key only for some kind of a perverted pleasure should not be permitted to further retain the premises; it would otherwise amount to a travesty of justice. For the same proposition, reliance has also been placed upon 156 (2009) DLT 760 P.C. Jain & Others Vs. J.K. Son. 14 This submission has force. The Rent Control Act is a piece of CRP No.777/1999 Page 9 of 25 social legislation which has been enacted to protect tenants from frivolous eviction petitions but at the same time justice also has to be meted out to the landlord and a balanced approach must be maintained. RW-1 (Om Kumar, the son of the original tenant Bhim Sen) in his cross-examination has admitted that he is one of the co-owners of property No. 59/27, Prabhat Road, Karol Bagh; he has admitted the photographs Ex. RW-1/P-1 to Ex. RW-1/P-2 which are photographs of the aforenoted property and a perusal of these photographs show that this building which has been described in the words of the learned senior counsel as a „palace‟ appears to be no short of it. The original tenant Bhim Sen has expired and the petition is now being contested by his legal representatives primary of whom is Om Kumar, (the son who was also present in Court at the time of hearing). He has admitted that he is the owner of the property and is presently residing there. It is also not in dispute that there was another property which had also been created by Bhim Sen (the original tenant) which is property bearing No. 11/35, Punjabi Bagh, which is now owned by his second son namely D.K. Bali; photographs of this property Ex. RW-1/P-3 to Ex. RW-1/P-4 have also been proved in the version of RW-1 who has admitted that this property CRP No.777/1999 Page 10 of 25 belongs to his brother D.K. Bali; this is also a beautifully structured two floor house. This being the admitted factual position, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the eviction petition is liable to be decreed under Sections 14 (1)(h) and 14 (1)(hh) of the DRCA also carries weight.
15 In this context, a Bench of this Court in 155 (2008) DLT 658 Ranjit Kumar Chopra Vs. Virinder Khosla while considering the factual matrix of a petition filed by the landlord under Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA where there was a categorical submission that the tenant was keeping the premises locked and was only occasionally using them, the Court had disregarded this fact that the petition had been filed under Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA and had ordered eviction under Section 14 (1)(h) of the DRCA. The observations made therein are relevant and read as under:-
"The intent and purpose of Rent Control Legislation was to see that the because of shortage of accommodation in a city like Delhi, the tenants are not made to shuttle from one house to other. The purpose was not to give a tool in the hands of tenants to exploit the landlords. That is why, the legislation categorically provided under Section 14(1)(h) that if the tenant acquires the residential accommodation, the landlord has a ground for his eviction. It is settled law that merely non mentioning of the provisions of law, is not a fatal defect and the Court can take note of correct CRP No.777/1999 Page 11 of 25 provision of law and give relief. Despite the fact that the landlord had not mentioned provisions of Section 14(1)(h), I consider that it was a fit case where learned ARC should have given benefit of Section 14(1)(h) to the landlord and should have ordered eviction because the tenant had acquired a farm house in Ludhiana for his own and his family's requirements and had been keeping the premises in question under his lock and key just for his visits to Delhi."
16 The present premises (as noted supra) is a ground floor of property bearing No. 65/11, New Rohtak Road, New Delhi. This is on a 130 square yard plot; the first floor and the second floor are with the landlord where the families of three brothers i.e. Anand Swaroop Vohra, G.S. Vohra and Anil Vohra are residing; it is an admitted fact that the families of Anand Swaroop Vohra and G.S. Vohra are residing in these premises; dispute has been raised by the tenant about the residence of Anil Vohra. Be that as it may, even assuming that Anil Vohra is not residing there, families of the other two brothers comprise of themselves and their wives. Unfortunately the two brothers have died. They have two widows and each of the two brothers have two adult children. Anand Swaroop Vohra has two married daughters who visit him often with their husbands and their children. The other brother and co-owner G.S. Vohra also has two children, one son and one married daughter. It is also not in the dispute that both the widows Satya Vohra and Rukmani CRP No.777/1999 Page 12 of 25 Vohra are in the evening years of their life being more than 70 years of age and it is but obvious that they are suffering from accompanying old age ailments which includes difficulty in climbing up to the first floor; accommodation available with the landladies as on date is on first and the second floor; all these are admitted facts. Petition had been dismissed only for the reason that the bonafide need of the landlord has not been established. Accommodation presently available on the first floor (as is evident from the site plan) (Ex.RW-2/1) is five rooms; there is one room on the second floor. Requirement of the Staya Vohra (widow of the petitioner) is one room for herself, one guest room for her two visiting married daughters, one drawing cum dining room and one kitchen. The widow of the other co-owner namely Rukmani Devi is also admittedly a resident of the first floor; her requirement is also the same. No doubt the eviction petition has been filed by Anand Swaroop Vohara (deceased husband of Satya Vohra) but the need of Rukmani Devi (widow of the other co-owner and already living in a portion thereof) cannot be ignored. The fact that both the ladies are aged more than 70 years and suffering from age old ailments including knee and joint pains and cannot climb the first floor (which is the only CRP No.777/1999 Page 13 of 25 accommodation presently available with them) are also facts which can neither be overlooked and nor brushed away. For the sake of argument even presuming that the need of Rukmani Devi is not to be looked into, are cannot loose sight of the fact that the demised premises are on the ground floor; these premises alone can serve the need of the widow Satya Vohra i.e. her need to set up her residence on the ground floor of her house in her sunset years. Her need is a bonafide and a genuine need. In fact it would be highly unfair to deny to such a landlord the comfort and convenience of her residence on the ground floor merely because of a recalcitrant tenant who has locked the premises and is admittedly living at 59/27, Prabhat Road, Karol Bagh in a property owned by him. His other brother D.K. Bali is also the owner of the two storeyed house at 11/35, Punjabi Bagh. All these facts have been admitted by RW-1 in his cross-examination. This litigation has even otherwise expansed over a period of three decades; nothing more is required to be said about the rigmaroles in which a litigant is caught in fighting for her right.
17 In this background the submission of the respondent that the proceedings filed by Anand Swaroop Vohra have abated; on his death as CRP No.777/1999 Page 14 of 25 the requirement of Section 14-C of the DRCA stands frustrated is an argument without merit.
18 The second submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the premises had been let out for a residential-cum-commercial purpose and not for a residential purpose alone and this is evident from the order passed the then ARC on 14.02.1992 in E.P. No. 240/1970 (titled as Bhim Sen Bahri Vs. G.S. Vohra) and as such the present petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA (which is for a residential purpose alone) would not be maintainable is again an argument without merit.
19 Record shows that the present eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA had been filed on 11.04.1989; it was summarily rejected by the ARC on 14.02.1992 holding that the petition is not maintainable against which the civil revision was also dismissed in limine on 27.04.1992. The Apex Court on 21.07.1994 had allowed the petition holding that the petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA was maintainable and the matter had been remanded back to the Rent Controller wherein the petition was decided and has now finally come up before this Court. Thus this argument of the respondent that the CRP No.777/1999 Page 15 of 25 premises had not been let out for a residential purpose is an argument no longer available to him; it is accordingly rejected. 20 The last submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is bordered on an argument that subsequent events would have no relevance; submission being that it is the case of the petitioner himself that it is on the date of institution of the petition that the rights of the parties crystallize and no subsequent events can be looked into thereafter.
21 In VIII (2007) SLT 629 = 2007 (2) RLR 481, Carona Ltd. vs. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, the Supreme Court had considered the impact of subsequent events on an eviction decree and had held as under:
"37. In our judgment, the law is fairly settled. The basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit. Thus, if the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the filing of the suit, ordinarily, he will not be allowed to take advantage of the cause of action arising subsequent to the filing of the suit. Conversely, no relief will normally be denied to the plaintiff by reason of any subsequent event if at the date of the institution of the suit, he has a substantive right to claim such relief." 22 Cause of action was admittedly available to the landlord on 08.01.1988 when this eviction petition was filed. Events which have CRP No.777/1999 Page 16 of 25 occurred during the pendency of the revision petition i.e. the fact of the death of the landlord; the fact that over this period of 25 years when this litigation remained pending the widow of the landlord had aged and reached the sunset years of her life; are changes of nature which have occurred over the passage of time and over which no one has control; these cannot be ignored.
23 Alternate submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner being that in the other eventuality if this Court is of the view that the petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA has to die for one reason or the other, the same petition can be converted into a petition under Section 14-D of the DRCA which is a right available to a widow to seek eviction of a tenant under the same summary procedure as is contained for a landlord under Section 14-C of the DRCA; further submission being that all the essential ingredients of Section 14-D of the DRCA stand proved. For this proposition reliance has been placed upon 1995 Supp (3) SCC 172 V. Rajaswari Vs. Bombay Tyres Intl. Ltd.; contention being that in this case which was an unfortunate case of the landlord having filed an eviction petition under Section 14 (1)(e) of the DRCA on which she could not succeed; the Apex Court in its wisdom CRP No.777/1999 Page 17 of 25 had converted the eviction petition into a petition under Section 14-D of the DRCA and the essential ingredients of Section 14-D of the DRCA having been made out, had decreed the petition under Section 14-D of the DRCA. However since this Court has held that the right to continue the eviction petition under Section 14-C of the DRCA can be availed of by the widow of the landlord, this arguments need not now be answered. 24 It can thus safely be summed up that this beneficial legislation which has been engrafted under Section 14-C of the DRCA for the benefit of a retired employee of the Central Government or of the Delhi Administration or a person who is on the verge of retirement would also be a benefit which must enure in favour of his legal representative; this would only be his right to continue the litigation which had been initiated by the deceased which in this case was more than a quarter of a century ago i.e in the year 1988. Needless to state that this right is only a right to continue the litigation; the necessary ingredients encompassing Section 14-C of the DRCA would still have to be proved. In this context, the word "own residence" as occurring in Section 14-C also gains relevance. The word "own" residence in fact appears in all the sections i.e.. Sections 14-B to 14-D; this word "own" necessarily CRP No.777/1999 Page 18 of 25 implies an individual need i.e. the need for one‟s self; this self is however not restricted to the landlord/landlady himself/herself; it necessarily encompasses those family members who were dependent upon him for their need for accommodation. A Bench of this Court in AIR 1990 (Del) 290 P.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India had the occasion to expound upon the expression „own residence‟ in the context of Section 14-D of the DRCA. The observations returned therein are relevant and read as under:-
"The use of the expression 'own residence' must mean residence of the landlady with such person without whom she cannot be expected, in normal circumstances, to live. In a sense, Section 14-D is wider than Section 14(1)(e). Whereas under Section 14(1)(e) it is only the requirement of the members of the family, other than the landlord, which are to be taken into consideration but for the purpose of Section 14- D what is to be seen is the requirement of the widow who may need a companion, who may be an old friend, relative or a trusted servant, without whom it is not possible for her to reside alone. A widow may be able to set up residence only if she has other person's to live with her. A widow, in this country, needs social as well as emotional security plus she may have obligations towards her near and distant relations, without whom she cannot live. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case as to who are the other persons whose residence in the premises is to be regarded as the need or requirement of the landlady herself, while applying the provision of Section 14-D".
25 On the same analogy, in the facts of the instant case also, the CRP No.777/1999 Page 19 of 25 word „own residence‟ as appearing in Section 14-C must necessarily include the widow of the original landlord.
26 Sections 14-B to 14-D have been incorporated in Chapter III of the DRCA is a summary procedure available only to a special class of landlord; it is a uniform procedure for disposal of all applications under this Chapter for a classified class of landlords. These sections intend to provide a home to a landlord/landlady who has become homeless for one reason or the other. Pleas available to a tenant (under such a class) to defend his case are also limited pleas.
27 In this context, the Apex Court in AIR 1998 SC 1639 M/s Rahabhar Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra K.Tandon has inter-alia held as under:-
Concentrating on Section 14C alone and not travelling to other cognate Section, namely, 14A, 14B and 14D, a tenant while seeking permission of the Controller to defend the eviction proceedings, under Section 25B of the Act, can legitimately raise the plea, for example, that the landlord has either not retired or was not likely to retire from service within one year of the initiation of proceedings or that the landlord, after retirement, has taken up employment elsewhere or has been given any other lucrative assignment including the facility of a "Quarter" or an assignment commensurate with his earlier status and, therefore, may say that the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation. The tenant may also indicate that the landlord, in order to augment CRP No.777/1999 Page 20 of 25 his income after retirement, wanted only to let out the premises again on higher rent and to save sufficient portion of rental earnings, the himself had chosen or might chosen to live in a tenanted accommodation on cheaper rent. These pleas (may be, many more such pleas, as human ingenuity knows no bounds) would definitely touch the "bona fides" of the landlord and, therefore, cannot be denied to a tenant on the ground that the landlord, having retired from service or likely to retire, has to be presumed to require the accommodation for his own occupation.
27. Integrating these two factors together, namely, the right of the landlord to recover immediate possession and the right available to a tenant to raise pleas in defence to indicate that the premises, in spite of retirement of likely retirement of the landlord, are not required by him, what emerges out is that while the landlord has to establish his "requirement", which means "real" and not "feigned", the tenant can show that it is not so.
28 In Busching Schmitz Private Limited vs. P.T. Menghani, (1977) 2 SCC 835, the Supreme Court while dealing with the scope of Section 14-C of the Act had inter-alia held:-
"...... Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).
31. The Court thus restricted the defence of the tenant to the parameters of Section 14C and placed a further restriction that the tenant cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).
The legal position relating to eviction in proceedings by a CRP No.777/1999 Page 21 of 25 landlord under Section 14-C was thus summarized as under : (1) Proceedings under Section 14C can be initiated by a landlord who was in the service of the Central Government or Delhi Administration and has retired from service or is likely to retire within one year of the initiation of proceedings, but the retirement or likely retirement of the landlord does not give rise to a presumption that the premises are bona fide required by him. The landlord has also to plead and show that after retirement or likely retirement, no fresh assignment has been taken up or is likely to be taken up by him with the facility of a residential "Quarter".
(ii) Possession can be recovered by the landlord only for real, genuine and bona fide need and not for "feigned" need.
(iii) Proceedings under Section 14C can be contested only when leave to contest is granted by the Rent Controller; whether leave would be granted or refused would depend upon the nature of pleas raised of circumstances shown by the tenant in his affidavit filed before the Rent Controller.
(iv) Section 25B does not place any restriction on the right of the tenant to raise pleas in defence within the parameters of Section 14C, namely, that he can plead and prove that notwithstanding the retirement or likely retirement of the landlord, the premises are not required by him for his own residence. No plea regarding the size of the landlord's family or the tenant's own family, whether it was likely to increases with son's marriage or decrease with daughter's marriage, can be raised by the tenant nor can be raise any plea as to the extent of accommodation or floor area or comparative hardship of partial eviction etc. as these are considerations which are not relevant under Section 14C. If, however, the landlord is already in occupation of his own house, part of which is in occupation of a tenant (as in the instant case) or where whole of the hose, owned by the landlord, is in his personal occupation and he makes an application for eviction of a tenant occupying CRP No.777/1999 Page 22 of 25 another house, the need of the landlord, with reference to his family strength and the extent of accommodation, at his disposal, will have to be examined vis- a-vis his requirement.
(v) Expeditious enquiry need be held or else the landlord, if he has already retired from service will be literally on the "street" during the pendency of the proceedings which, undoubtedly, take long to conclude particularly as one party, namely, the tenant, is inherently interested in delayed disposal. If the tenant was allowed to contest Section 14C application also with that attitude, giving him the liberty to place all possible obstacles to retard the pace of the proceedings, legislative intent of providing immediate possession of the house to a retired, or likely to retire landlord, would be frustrated". 29 In this case the record in fact shows that the Rent Controller had dismissed the eviction petition filed in the year 1988 on 14.02.1992; revision petition against this petition was dismissed by the High Court on 27.04.1992. The appeal was preferred before the Apex Court and the matter was remanded back to the trial Court for disposal of the case in accordance with law. Eviction petition was dismissed by the ARC on 18.08.1998. Revision petition was filed in the High Court on 07.09.1998. During the pendency of this revision petition, the original tenant Bhim Sen died; petition was dismissed in default on 08.09.2004. Anand Swaroop Vohra died on 22.01.2005; the co-owner G.S. Vohra also expired on 05.12.2004; the legal representatives of both Anand CRP No.777/1999 Page 23 of 25 Swaroop Vohra and G.S. Vohra were brought on record on 21.08.2006 pursuant to an application under Order 22 Rule 3 of the Code; on the same date, the revision petition which had been dismissed in default on 08.09.2004 had also been restored. This litigation has thus spread itself over for almost 25 years; to say the least, it has progressed at a snail pace. In this factual scenario, the right which was available to the original landlord to contest the revision petition is a right which must continue to his legal representatives as well. Petition would not abate. 30 The bonafide need of the landlady has also clearly been established. As noted supra, the accommodation presently available with Satya Vohra is one room and a common drawing-cum-dining room which she is sharing with Rukmani Devi (widow of other co-owner). Both the ladies have two married children; Satya Vohra has two married daughters who along with their children and husbands visit her often; Rukmani Devi has one married daughter and one son. Old age ailments are hard facts qua both the ladies; the accommodation on the ground floor which is presently lying locked with the tenant is the suitable need for Satya Vohra; she cannot be denied the same; she is the best judge of her requirement; her requirement and need is to stay on the ground floor CRP No.777/1999 Page 24 of 25 in the later years of her life; she cannot climb stairs; the accommodation available with the tenant on the ground floor is three rooms, a kitchen and toilet which is the only suitable and alternate residential accommodation which the landlady has at present; the accommodation on the first and second floor is almost impossible to access for this senior citizen who has a weak fraling health; this accommodation is even otherwise falling short; PW-1 had specifically averred that his wife was sharing the drawing-cum-dining room with the family of Rukmani Devi who also has two adult children of whom one is a married daughter; the need to have an independent space and live according to her own life style in these circumstance can in no manner be said to be not a genuine need; it can in no manner be termed as malafide; it necessarily is an honest, genuine and a bonafide need. Petition must succeed on all counts.
31 Eviction petition stands decreed. Petition disposed of.
INDERMEET KAUR, J JUNE 01, 2012 A CRP No.777/1999 Page 25 of 25