* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 28.02.2012
+RC.REV. 49/2012, CM Nos.2034-2035/2012 & Caveat No.112/2012
SMT RAJ RANI ARORA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Subhash Chand, Advocate.
versus
SMT KAILASH SHARMA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.L.C.Chopra, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
1. Impugned judgment is dated 08.11.2011; the eviction petition filed by the landlord under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act (in short 'DRCA') had been decreed; this judgment was modified on 14.12.2011; modification was to the effect that in a petition under Section 14-D of the DRCA no period of six months is required to be awaited for the purpose of execution. Vide earlier order dated 08.11.2011, period of six months was to be awaited by the landlord RCR No.49/2012 Page 1 of 6 before he could get the decree executed.
2. Record shows that the present eviction petition has been filed by the landlady-Kailash Sharma on the ground of Section 14(D) of the DRCA; she is a widow. There is no dispute to this factual position. She is the owner and landlady of the property bearing No. XV-372, Gali Chandi Wli, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055 which had been let out to the tenant in the year 1982 on a oral agreement. Premises comprise of two rooms with cement sheets, latrine, bath room and verandah common on ground floor of the premises. The family of the petitioner comprises of herself, her son, his wife and two children i.e. five persons. The petitioner and her family were living on the first floor of the premises which consists of two small rooms, one big rooms, verandah, kitchen and bath room; one room on the ground floor was also in their occupation which is a store room. Two rooms on the second floor with small bath room is also in their occupation. Contention of the landlady is that she is suffering from Rheumatoid Arthritis and knee joint pains and unable to climb stairs. Further contention being that she has undergone an operation for hernia in 1990 and the accommodation presently available is unsuitable and insufficient for their needs. The RCR No.49/2012 Page 2 of 6 premises which are with the tenant on the ground floor are accordingly bonafide required by her for her residential purpose.
3. Application for leave to defend was filed. Relationship of landlord and tenant was denied; it was denied that the premises are required by the landlady for a bonafide need for herself and her family members. Further contention being that a security of `50,000/- has been given to the landlady which is liable to be refunded; further contention being that there is a concealment of fact that the present property was originally of 300 sq. yards and out of which 150 sq. yards had already been sold by the landlady to one Rajeshwardass Verma; the need of the landlady in these circumstances has not been made out to be bonafide.
4. Corresponding paras of the reply to the application seeking leave to defend have also been perused. It was denied that any refundable security of `50,000/- has been taken by the landlady or by her husband at the time when the premises were let out; this submission made by the tenant in his application for leave to defend has in fact admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and as such the objection raised in the trial court that there was no such relationship of landlord and tenant is negatived by this submission itself. Landlady RCR No.49/2012 Page 3 of 6 also denied the contention that the premises originally comprised of 300 sq. yards out of which 150 sq. yards was sold to one Rajeshwardass Verma; contention was that in May 1999, 62 sq. yards had been sold. Present eviction petition has been filed on 27.4.2009 i.e. after more than a decade.
5. This is by and large the case as set up by the tenant. No triable issue appears to be arisen and this has been rightly noted by the trial court. The tenant has in fact admitted that her husband Kishan Lal was the original tenant who had paid a sum of `50,000/- as a refundable security to the landlady. Water connection was also in the name of the tenant. The landlady had also placed on record documents of title i.e. the sale deed of the suit property showing that she is the owner of the suit property. These facts were noted in the correct perspective; it was rightly noted that an eviction petition under Section 14-D is not a suit for title; the prima facie ownership and title of the suit premises had been established by the landlady; she is landlady of the suit premises. It is also not in dispute that the landlady is a widow. The only requirement which was further sought to be proved by the landlady was that she needed the premises for herself. It is not in dispute that the RCR No.49/2012 Page 4 of 6 landlady is a senior citizen aged about 80 years; she is living on the first floor of the premises; it is also not in dispute that she is suffering from Rheumatoid Arthritis, knee joint pains and she had undergone a hernia operation. In this factual scenario her submission that she cannot climb stairs to reach the first floor of the premises and the portion in occupation of the tenant (which is on the ground floor) is more suitable and thus bonafide required by her for her own accommodation has been prima facie established. Medical record has also been filed to substantiate her age and medical condition. It was in these circumstances that the court had noted that no triable issue has been raised by the tenant.
6. The object of Section 14-D is to assist a vulnerable and needy section of the society to recover possession of suit premises as expeditiously as possible and without the usual trials and tribulations. What the landlady is required to prove under this Section is :
(i)- to show that she is a widow; (ii) premises are required by her for her own residence. The Supreme Court in V.Rajaswari Vs. Bombay Tyres International Ltd. reported in (1995) Supp (3) SCC 172 had noted that an averment the fact that the landlady/widow is living with RCR No.49/2012 Page 5 of 6 her daughter or any other person is no ground to say that the premises in question are not required for her residence. The Apex Court in order to make this provision more reasonable had read into it that the need to substantiate the request of the widow to recover possession of the premises for her own residence should be bonafide; the word 'bonafide' being missing from the provisions of Section 14-D, her need and request for the premises even in the absence of a specific stipulation to that effect should be read as a bonafide need.
7. The impugned order dismissing the application seeking leave to defend thus suffers from no infirmity. Petitioner is without any merit; dismissed.
INDERMEET KAUR, J FEBRUARY 28, 2012 nandan RCR No.49/2012 Page 6 of 6