Ram Gopal vs Commissioner Of Police, Delhi & ...

Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 1062 Del
Judgement Date : 15 February, 2012

Delhi High Court
Ram Gopal vs Commissioner Of Police, Delhi & ... on 15 February, 2012
Author: Badar Durrez Ahmed
*      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                            Judgment delivered on 15.02.2012
+      W.P.(C) 890/2012
       RAM GOPAL                                              ..... Petitioner
               versus

       COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, DELHI & ORS.                     ..... Respondents
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner   :   Mr S.C. Sagar
For the Respondent   :   Mr Jagdeep Kumar Sharma

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K.JAIN

                             JUDGMENT

BADAR DURREZ AHMED (ORAL)

1. The petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 19.09.2011, passed in OA No. 888/2011 by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner had challenged the order dated 03.12.2008 passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order dated 07.01.2011 passed by the Appellate Authority. The Disciplinary Authority had awarded the punishment of forfeiture of one year's approved service temporarily for a period of one year entailing reduction in pay from Rs.8810/- to Rs.8480/-. This was done pursuant to a regular departmental inquiry in so far as the petitioner was concerned under the Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal), Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as "the said Rules"). We may also point out that the findings of the Inquiry Officer had been concluded on 17.08.2000. However, the final order was kept in abeyance inasmuch as the proceedings emanating from FIR No. W.P(C) 890/2012 Page 1 of 4 362/1999 under Section 419/420/468/471 IPC read with Section 12 of the Passport Act, 1967, was pending. In those proceedings, the petitioner had been placed in column two of the charge-sheet. We also note that he was not summoned nor was he tried in the said proceedings. On 13.04.2007, the main accused, namely, Gurmeet Kaur alias Amarjeet Kaur in that case was acquitted. On 07.10.2008, the departmental inquiry was re-opened and the findings of the Inquiry Officer were supplied to the petitioner on 07.10.2008.

2. A representation was submitted by the petitioner and the Disciplinary Authority passed the said order on 03.12.2008. The Appellate Authority, by an order dated 29.05.2009, enhanced the punishment to forfeiture of two years' approved service permanently entailing reduction in his pay. Being aggrieved by that order, the petitioner filed an Original Application No. 524/2010 before the Tribunal, which was disposed of by the Tribunal by an order dated 16.11.2010, remitting the matter to the Appellate Authority for passing a fresh, reasoned and speaking order after considering all the contentions taken by the applicant in his appeal. Pursuant thereto, the Appellate Authority passed the said order dated 07.01.2011 concurring with the Disciplinary Authority's decision as also the punishment awarded by it. It is at this stage that the petitioner approached the Tribunal once again by virtue of the Original Application No. 888/2011 in which the impugned order dated 16.09.2011 has been passed.

3. The petitioner took four points before the Tribunal. The first point taken by the petitioner was that the order of punishment inflicted upon the petitioner was against Rule 12 of the said Rules. The Tribunal considered this contention of the petitioner and W.P(C) 890/2012 Page 2 of 4 concluded that Rule 12 would not be applicable inasmuch as it was not a case where the petitioner was tried and acquitted by the Criminal Court. The petitioner had been placed in column 2 and, therefore, there was no question of any trial. Consequently, there was no question of acquittal and, therefore, the provisions of Rule 12 of the said Rules were not applicable.

4. The second point before the Tribunal was that his defence evidence was not considered. This was also repelled by the Tribunal by referring to the specific discussion by the Inquiry Officer in his report. The Tribunal also pointed out the references in the Disciplinary Authorities' order

5. The third point taken by the petitioner was that no personal hearing was given to the petitioner on the second round before the Appellate Authority after remission of the matter by the Tribunal as mentioned above. This point was also rejected by the Tribunal by holding that there was no need to hear the applicant in person once again, as there was only a mistake in the earlier order passed by the Appellate Authority, for which reason alone the matter was remitted to it. We also find that there is no specific rule, requiring the Appellate Authority to give a personal hearing to an appellant. The learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any rule which would indicate that giving of a personal hearing was a requirement. We also asked the learned counsel for the petitioner as to whether any request had been made by the petitioner for a personal hearing in the second round before the Appellate Authority. He fairly conceded that no such request has been made.

W.P(C) 890/2012 Page 3 of 4

6. In these circumstances, we are of the view that the Tribunal did not err at all in rejecting the petitioner's plea that he has not been granted a personal hearing as the Rules do not prescribe a personal hearing and in such an eventuality, unless and until an appellant asks for a personal hearing, there is no question of a personal hearing being given. In any event, when the Rules are silent, it would be at the discretion of the Appellate Authority to give or not to give a personal hearing to the appellant.

7. The last and final point raised by the petitioner before the Tribunal was that there was a delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings for about 08 years inasmuch as the inquiry had been kept pending and this would vitiate the proceedings. The Tribunal has rightly concluded that the inquiry had, in fact, been concluded and only the decision had been kept in abeyance due to the pendency of the criminal case. No prejudice was caused to the petitioner and, in fact, the decision to keep the proceeding in abeyance was for the benefit of the petitioner.

8. On all the four points raised before the Tribunal, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be faulted. There is no reason for us to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal.

The Writ Petition is dismissed.

BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J V.K.JAIN, J FEBRUARY15, 2012 BG W.P(C) 890/2012 Page 4 of 4