* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No.7383/2009
% Judgment delivered on: 09.2.2010
Shri Kuldeep Raj Sharma ...... Petitioner
Through: Ms. Sumedha Sharma, Advocate
Versus
General Manager, Canara Bank ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Naveen R. Nath
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH GAMBHIR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may Yes
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in the Digest?
KAILASH GAMBHIR, J. (ORAL)
* W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 1 of 8
1. By this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to direct the respondents to treat the suspension period of the petitioner from 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 as period spent on duty for all intents and purposes and to direct the respondents to grant the consequential benefits including monetary benefits and to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 20.7.2002 vide which the suspension period of the petitioner has been treated as period not spent on duty and the same shall not be reckoned for any purpose whatsoever and order dated 28.10.2004 and 16.9.2008 vide which the representations of the petitioner were rejected by non-speaking order and without application of mind.
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for deciding the present petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a cashier in August, 1965 in Laxmi Commercial Bank, Balimaran, Delhi. Later on Laxmi Commercial Bank merged into Canara Bank in 1988. The petitioner has two sons named Pradeep Sharma and Manish Sharma. His second son Manish Sharma married one Anita Sharma in the year 2000, but she died on 1.8.2000 and a case FIR No. 1643/2000 under Sections 498A/304B, W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 2 of 8 302/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act was registered against all the family members of the petitioner. After the incident, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the Dy. General Manager Canara Bank vide its officer order No.DC/DAL/700/2000 dated 5.8.2000. The petitioner and his wife were granted bail by Session Court of Ghaziabad (U.P.) on 30.09.2000. Consequently the suspension order of the petitioner was revoked by respondent No. 2 vide officer Order No. DC/DAC/1173/2002 dated 20.7.2002 but his suspension period was treated as period "not spent on duty" and it was further ordered that the same shall not be reckoned for any purpose whatsoever. The learned Session Court finally acquitted the petitioner as well as his family members from the charges vide order dated 19.1.2004. The petitioner made a representation against the order dated 20.7.2002 for treating his suspension period as spent on duty for all purposes and intents. The representation of the petitioner was rejected, hence the present writ petition.
3. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was placed under suspension as he was arrested in a criminal case registered under Sections 498A, 304B, 302/34 IPC and under Section W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 3 of 8 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Counsel further submitted that the petitioner was granted interim bail vide orders dated 30th September, 2000 by the Session Court of Ghaziabad and thereafter his suspension order was revoked by the respondent vide order dated 20th July, 2002 and he was restored back in his service. Counsel further submitted that the petitioner was honourably acquitted by the Court vide orders dated 19.1.2004. With the said acquittal, which has attained finality, the petitioner is entitled to claim the difference of the salary amount for the suspension period w.e.f. 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 and for treating the said period as spent by the petitioner on duty for all intents and purposes. Cousnel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is entitled to the said full salary for the said suspension period under Rule 15 of Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976. In support of her arguments counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in General Manager, UCO Bank and Anr. vs M. Venuranganath AIR 2008SC 732 .
4. Refuting the said submissions of counsel for the petitioner, counsel for the respondent on the other hand, resisted the claim of the petitioner submitting that the petitioner has not been honourably W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 4 of 8 acquitted from the charges leveled against him which were very serious in nature. Inviting the attention of this Court to the operative para of the judgment, the counsel pointed out that it was because of the failure of the prosecution that the petitioner could succeed in the case and, therefore, the petitioner cannot be considered to be honourably acquitted. Placing reliance on sub-Clause (b) Clause 3 of Rule 15 of the Canara Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations 1976, the counsel submitted that the period of absence from duty cannot be treated as a period spent on duty unless a decision is taken by the competent authority to specifically record reasons for treating such continuous period as spent on duty. Counsel for the respondent further submitted that if such a prayer of the petitioner is allowed then it will set a wrong precedent in the administration of bank to grant such similar relief to many other employees facing prosecution under the penal statutes and for other serious offences.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length.
6. The petitioner was placed under suspension under Rule 12 of the Canara Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulations 1976 as he was W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 5 of 8 found involved in a criminal offence registered against him under Sections 498A, 304B, 302/34 IPC and under Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The said suspension of the petitioner was revoked by the respondent bank when the petitioner was granted bail by the Sessions Court, Ghaziabad and it is not in dispute that thereafter the petitioner remained in service and ultimately superannuated in December, 2004. It is not in dispute that vide orders dated 19.1.2004 the petitioner has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Court and the said order has already attained finality. Perusal of the said order clearly shows that the learned Session Court made an observation that the petitioner remained on duty in the bank from morning till 5.30 in the evening on 1st August, 2000 and, therefore, in such a situation it was held that presence of the petitioner at the site at 5 O'clock does not arise. It was a categorical finding given by the learned Session Court that the petitioner was not present on the spot and his role in killing the deceased by burning her does not arise. In view of such observation made by the learned Session Court, I do not find any merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that it was not a case where the petitioner was not honourably acquitted. W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 6 of 8
7. A bare perusal of the order of the competent authority dated 28.10.2004 would show that no reasons have been given as to why the request of the petitioner for treating the period of suspension as period spent on duty was not acceded to. The said non-reasoned order smacks of arbitrariness besides being passed without application of mind. The competent authority while exercising its powers under the Canara Bank Rules & Regulations could not winnow black from white and see that the petitioner was honorably acquitted by the court and should not be made to suffer unnecessary consequences. Taking into consideration the judgment of the Apex Court in General Manager, UCO Bank and Another (Supra) and the aforesaid position,I am of the considered view that the impugned orders dated 20.7.2002 and 28.10.2004 are liable to be set aside.
8. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is entitled to the difference of salary for the period 5.8.2000 to 20.7.2002 and that the said period shall be treated as the period "spent on duty" by the petitioner for all intents and purposes.
W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 7 of 8
9. The present petition is allowed in terms of the above directions.
FEBRUARY 09, 2010 KAILASH GAMBHIR,J
rkr
W.P.(C) No. 7383/2009 Page 8 of 8