* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 250/2009 & CM Nos. 7734-36/2009
UNION OF INDIA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sachdeva and
Mr. Preet Pal Singh, Advocates.
versus
J. DAULAT SINGH & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: None.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL
ORDER
% 25.05.2009
1. The present appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 4th December, 2007, passed by the learned single Judge.
2. The predecessor-in-interest of the respondents (original petitioners in the writ petition) was allotted/granted a perpetual lease in respect of 16.5 acres of land being a plot on Aurangzeb Road, New Delhi. Various conditions were incorporated in the lease deed. Subsequently, the plot was sub-divided into two parts. This sub- division was carried out with the concurrence of the Lessor. The division was necessitated by the death of the original Lessee and understanding/arrangement between the legal representatives.
3. The Lessee approached the Land and Development Officer (in short 'L&DO') with a proposal to sell Plot No.11A i.e. smaller sub- LPA No.250/2009 Page No.1 of 5 divided plot and with its proceeds re-develop the other plot, to construct separate flats in terms of the Group Housing Scheme, then prevalent, after approval by the concerned Municipal Authorities i.e. New Delhi Municipal Corporation (in short 'NDMC'). This was granted and the legal representatives of the Lessee paid Rs.60,00,000/-, in terms of the demand then made by the L&DO, for such sale.
4. The Central Government /L&DO issued a 'no objection certificate' for obtaining completion certificate after re-development from the NDMC. Accordingly, the above certificate was issued.
5. On 9th September, 1994, the respondent acting for himself and for other co-owners/Lessees wrote to the L&DO seeking for execution of supplementary lease deed. The understanding then was that the supplementary lease deed would be executed with a restrictive condition that the Lessee could not sell the property without prior approval and payment of unearned increase/ conversation charges.
6. In response to the request, L&DO replied on 8th May, 1995 stating that a sum in excess of Rs.1.42 crores was payable which included additional premium as well. This demand was repeated from time to time. Being aggrieved, the respondent preferred a writ petition in this Court, out of which the present appeal arises.
7. The L&DO justified its demand before the learned single Judge on the ground that permission to construct upon the sub-divided plot was on the basis that the co-owners/Lessees would reside in the LPA No.250/2009 Page No.2 of 5 property. However, the respondents constructed 24 flats out of which only 6 flats were retained for occupation and 18 were rented to outsiders. It was also claimed that 3 flats were being misused for office by the tenants in violation of the terms of the lease and master plan.
8. As per the L&DO, since the respondent and other co-owners/ Lessees agreed to use the premises themselves, the L&DO did not insist for additional payment initially.
9. The learned single Judge has rightly held that the original lease did not contain a clause for payment of unearned increase. Keeping in view the respondents and the co-lessees approached the appellant, which led to the smaller sub-divided plot being sold upon payment of unearned increase. The learned single Judge rightly observed that however, when the permission was sought for constructing Group Housing in the year 1985 that was granted; the letter evidencing 'no objection' of the L&DO was on record and that they did not in any manner reserve the right to claim additional premium for construction of Group Housing in the event the premises were not used by the co-lessees/co-owners. Thus, the learned single Judge rightly held that in the absence of any material to support the submission that at the relevant time permission could be granted only upon payment of additional premium and that the respondents were treated differently because of their claim to use the premises, the demand of the appellant in that regard was not well founded. The learned single Judge also took note of the fact that as far as the LPA No.250/2009 Page No.3 of 5 justification by the L&DO regarding the claim for additional amounts on account of alleged misuser was concerned, there was no material to show as to how the premises were misused and for what period. The learned single Judge correctly held that mere letting out of the premises by itself did not amount to violation of lease deed and other conditions unless there was material to show that such renting of the premises was a camouflage for sale. As per the learned single Judge, if such unauthorised sub-letting in terms of the Act or any condition had taken place, the appellant ought to have followed some procedure by putting the respondents on notice about the extent and duration of such violation. Accordingly, the learned single Judge rightly quashed the demand and issued a direction to the appellant to take steps and ensure that the supplementary lease deed is executed in respect of the sub-divided plot.
10. The learned counsel for the respondents during the course of hearing before the learned single Judge had submitted that the respondents were willing to furnish an undertaking that in the event of supplementary lease deed being executed they would abide by its terms including the demand for payment of unearned increased in this regard. The learned single Judge also rightly held that this did not preclude the L&DO from inspecting the premises and raising such demands as may be raised by them if they found that any of the terms and conditions in the lease deed has been violated.
11. We may also mention that there is delay of more than 416 days in filing of the present appeal. We find no infirmity in the order of the LPA No.250/2009 Page No.4 of 5 learned single Judge to warrant any interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. However, it is made clear that this order will not be treated as a precedent in any other matter. It is ordered accordingly. All pending application stand disposed of as well.
CHIEF JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL, J.
MAY 25, 2009 sb LPA No.250/2009 Page No.5 of 5