ORDER Markandeya Katju, C.J.
CM 17779/2005
1. Allowed.
LPA 518/2004
2. This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of a learned Single Judge dated 5.2.2004. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and find no merit in this appeal.
3. It appears that the appellant was working in a project known as Postmortem Project in the AIIMS. A decision was taken that this project will not continue at the AIIMS, but will be started at Safdarjung Hospital. The service of the appellant in AIIMS was accordingly terminated on 16.12.1987. The appellant alleged in the writ petition that he was not allowed to join at Safdarjung Hospital.
4. It appears that some other persons went to the Supreme Court, which directed that such persons working in the Postmortem Project in AIIMS would be taken in Safdarjung Hospital as fresh employees, but they would be granted pay protection and their services rendered at AIIMS would be counted only for the purpose of leave, pension and other retirement benefits.
5. In our opinion, there is no law that a person whose service is terminated is entitled as of right to get an alternative employment. When the service of a person is terminated then in certain circumstances he may get reinstatement e.g.if he is a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act and his termination is found to be illegal by the Labour Court or Tribunal. However, there is no requirement that he must get alternative employment. For instance, when an industry is closed the workmen can only get closure compensation, under Section 25FFF but there is no absolute right to get an alternative employment except under the conditions mentioned in Section 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. The order of the Supreme Court was, therefore, passed on humanitarian considerations.
6. Often the Supreme Court passes orders on humanitarian considerations and not on any principle of law. Such directions do not amount to a precedent but they are orders passed under Article 142 of the Constitution and they are not binding on the High Courts. Only a principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding and not a mere direction vide Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Pre-paid Taxi/TSR Workers Association, LPA 2615-17/2005 decided on 15.12.2005 (paragraphs 16 and 17).
7. The direction of the Supreme Court was, therefore, passed on humanitarian grounds and the Supreme Court has already taken a liberal view of the matter.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that certain Government directives have been violated. It is well settled in law that ordinarily no writ of mandamus lies to enforce a non-statutory Government or executive order vide G.J. Fernandez v. State of Mysore, , J.R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P., , Rowther R. Abdulla v. S.T.A.T., A.I.R. 1959 SC 896, Jt.Chief Controller v. Aminchand, , State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar Sharma, , etc.
9. There are no doubt certain exceptions carved out to this rule e.g. in the case of Government service where there is no service rule under Article 309, but there are Government orders which fill in the gap and prescribe conditions of service, (in which case such Govt. orders can be enforced by mandamus) or the principles of promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, etc. However, these are exceptions to the normal rule that no mandamus is ordinarily issued to enforce a non statutory government order.
10. Hence, we cannot accept the submission of learned counsel for the appellant. The appellant has already got more than what he could legally claim having been employed in Safdarjung Hospital (when he could have been simply thrown out) and hence we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed.