JUDGMENT R.C. Chopra, J.
1. This order shall dispose of plaintiff's application under Order 12 Rule 6 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a decree of possession in view of the admissions made by the defendants.
2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this application, briefly stated, are that the plaintiff has filed a suit for recovery of possession of property No.G-80, Preet Vihar, Delhi and damages in the sum of Rs.1,30,16,976/-. The case of the plaintiff, briefly stated, is that the predecessor of plaintiff had leased out the aforesaid property to the defendants vide an unregistered Lease Deed dated 1.11.1991 for a period of five years. This Deed expired on 31st October, 1996 and as such, the tenancy came to an end by efflux of time. The defendants vide their letter dated 28th October, 1996, requested the plaintiff for extension of Lease but it was not extended. The plaintiff served a notice also to the defendants to vacate the premises and hand over the possession but the defendants failed to do so. Hence this suit.
3. In the application under consideration, the plaintiff submits that since the defendants have unequivocally admitted that the Lease had come to an end on 31st October, 1996, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of possession on the basis of the admission.
4. The defendants have filed a reply to the application admitting that the premises were leased out to them by an unregistered Lease Deed but have pleaded that since the Lease Deed was not registered, the tenancy had not come to an end. It is submitted that even after the expiry of the Lease Deed, the plaintiff has been accepting rent from the defendants and as such, the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties continues. In the course of the arguments, learned counsel for the defendants has raised an additional plea by arguing that the suit filed by the plaintiff for a decree of possession is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure on account of the fact that the plaintiff had filed an earlier suit for mandatory in a unction which was decreed but in the said suit, no relief for possession was claimed. It is submitted that the plaintiff is now precluded from claiming a decree of possession.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. I have gone through the records.
6. The law is well settled that in case a suit is capable of final determination or any controversy raised in the suit can be finally adjudicated upon on the basis of an admission made by a party, the Court would be well within its rights to pass a decree on the basis of the admission so made. The admission need not be necessarily in the pleadings but may be otherwise also in Court or outside the Court. The only requirement is that the admission should be clear, unambiguous and capable of acting upon by the Court. In this case, the defendants had written a letter dated 28th October, 1996, reproduced in para 4 of the application, which reads as under :
''To M/s. Ashoka Promoters Pvt. Ltd., E-152, Preet Vihar, Vikas Marg, Delhi.
Sub: Extension of Lease Agreement in respect of Property situated at G-80: Preet Vihar, Delhi Dear Sirs, The premises situated at G-80, Preet Vihar, Vikas Marg, Delhi was leased out to the Department vide lease Agreement dated 1.11.91 by the previous owners Smt. Usha Miglani and others. This office was, vide letter dated 19.6.96 informed by the aforesaid landlords that the premises have been sold to you. You have been collecting the rent from the Department since May, 1996 onwards at the rate of Rs.1,30,084 after deducting T.D.S.
The Department's rent agreement with the previous owners expires on 31.10.96. You are requested to extend the lease of the premises for a further period on the same terms and conditions on which the premises were let-out to the department by the previous owners- Smt. Usha Miglani and others.
Yours faithfully, Sd/-
Assistant Commissioner Central Excise MCD-IV, Delhi.''
7. This letter has not been disputed by the defendants in their reply to the application. It is, therefore, a categorical admission of defendants that Lease in favor of defendants had come to an end on 31.10.1996 by efflux of time.
8. The plea of the defendants that they had become tenants by holding over cannot be sustained for the reason that mere acceptance of rent after the expiry of Lease does not ipso facto result in renewal of the Lease. In ''Firm Sardari Lal Vishwa Nath and others Vs. Pritam Singh'' , it was clearly held by Apex Court that where a Lease gets determined by efflux of time but the tenant continues to be in possession, the mere acceptance of rent from the tenant without proof of extension of Lease cannot be taken as a case of creation of fresh tenancy. It was also held that in case a lease comes to an end and is determined by any of the modes prescribed under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord can exercise is right of re-entry and there is no question of terminating the contract which has already come to an end. Thus, the plea of the defendants that by merely remaining in possession or by paying rent a fresh tenancy was created in their favor or that the had become tenants by holding over cannot be accepted. Their admission, thus, is that the Lease in their favor had expired by efflux of time and no fresh Lease Deed was executed in their favor.
9. Coming to the question as to whether the relief of possession as claimed by the plaintiff is barred or not under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court finds that Rule 2 of Order 2 of the CPC prescribes that in every suit the plaintiff must include the whole of the claim to which he is entitled in respect of a cause of action and in case he omits to sue or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he shall not afterward sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. This rule is aimed at preventing multiplicity of suits in respect of the same cause of action so that a party against whom a cause of action has arisen is not vexed more than once on the basis of the same cause of action. However, in case the plaintiff has more than one cause of action arising out of the same transaction, he is under no obligation to claim in the same suit all the reliefs. Privy counsel in the case of ''Saminathan Chetty and another Vs. Planaiappa Chetty'' reported in 26 Indian Cases 1915 P-228 laid down in no uncertain terms that this rule is directed to secure inclusion of all the reliefs in respect of same cause of action but not for the inclusion of all the claims in one action if based on different causes of action even if they rise out of the same transaction.
10. The suit for mandatory injunction which was earlier filed by the plaintiff was in regard to the misuse of the suit property and even if at that time a cause of action for relief of possession had already arisen in favor of the plaintiff but was not claimed, it does not preclude the plaintiff from filing a separate suit on the basis of the said cause of action provided it is within limitation. The cause of action for mandatory injunction against the defendants was entirely different from the cause of action in favor of the plaintiff on account of the expiry of the Lease Deed by efflux of time. It, therefore, cannot be said that the present suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession is hit by Rule 2 of Order 2 of the CPC. A Division Bench of this Court in ''M/s. U.K. Paints Sales Vs. M/s. Madho Ram Budh Singh'' (FAO(OS) No.350/2001) had considered the implications of Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC and had held that Order 2 Rule 2 CPC gets attracted only when different reliefs are claimed on the basis of same cause of action. This Court, therefore, is unable to agree with the submissions made by learned counsel for the defendants that the relief for decree of possession of the suit premises is barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the CPC.
11. In view of the forgoing reasons, this Court has no hesitation in holding that in terms of Order 12 Rule 6 of the CPC, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of possession in respect of the suit premises. A decree for possession is, therefore, passed against defendants in respect of suit property.
12. The application stands disposed of.