JUDGMENT Mahinder Narain, J.
(1) The petitioners Gurdip Singh, Mrs. Har Sharan Mishra and Mrs. Har Kiran have filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on. 23-4-1986, praying that the notifications for acquisition issued for planned development of Delhi under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter called as "the Act"), being dated 25-11-1980 and 7-6-1985 respectively, in relation to the land of the petitioners in village Chhatarpur in the Union Territory of Delhi, be quashed.
(2) The petitioners asserted that they are the owners and in possession of land in khasra No. 70411, 706j2, 70611, 706,3, 70712, 714, 71512, 90912, 1012 and 693, all situated in the revenge estate of village, Chhatarpur in the Union Territory of Delhi. It was also asserted that the aforesaid lands are allotted to Major General Sujan Singh Uban in lieu of agriculture lands left behind in. West Pakistan. It was further asserted that this land was allotted to Major General Sujan Singh Uban by Sanad dated 27-9-1963. The petitioners became owners of the land as a result of an arbitration award of Shri Ram Singh Uban.
(3) The aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act, dated 25-11-1980 purported to exclude certain categories of land from acquisition although they were within the villages land whereof was acquired. These were : (a) Government lands; (b) Land already notified either under Section 4 or under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; and (e) the land in respect of which layout plans building plans had been sanctioned by the M.C.D. before 5-11-1980.
(4) The petitioners also stated that although objections under Section 5A of the Act were invited, but they had not filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act.
(5) It was also contended that in view of the provisions of Section 6 of the Act, no declaration could be made after expiry of three years from the dale of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Act, (this period has since been reduced to one year by subsequent amendments).
(6) The petitioners further contended that in view of the fact that the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued after five years and eight months, the issuance of the notification under Section 4 of the Act on 25-11-1980 was nullity in the eyes of law in view of the aforesaid amended Section 6 of the Act, and as a consequence of Section 6 notification being a nullity, and as the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was not issued within a period stipulated by that Section, the land of the petitioners covered by the Section 4(1) Notification, dated 25-11-1980, stood automatically released from the operation of Section 4 Notification.
(7) The petitioners also contended that they were filing this petition on becoming aware that the respondents were contending that the notification under Section 6 of the Act was valid, inasmuch as a stay order had been issued by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, restraining the respondents from issuing any declaration under Section 6 of the Act, in Civil Writ Petition No. 426 of 1981 Munilal & Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others, allowing time taken to get it vacated, the Section 6B Notification was within time.
(8) The petitioners further stated that they became aware of difference of opinion between Division Benches of the High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 2850 of 1985, filed by Hemant Sharma and others, and in Civil Writ Petition No. 1639 of 1985-Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India, etc., which difference of opinion led to directions by the Court that Balak Ram Gupta's case be heard by a larger Bench, which larger bench was yet to hear the said reference.
(9) In the aforesaid circumstances, it is clear that the petitioners in their own right, had questioned the Sections 4 and 6 Notifications during the pendency of Civil Writ Petition No. 1639 of 1985 (Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India etc.).
(10) The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court decided the Civil Writ Petition No. 1639 of 1985 by its judgment and order dated 25-7-1987. This was reported as Air 1987(1) Delhi 239. Ranganathan, J. speaking for the Full Bench, observed as follows as regards the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. We, therefore, think that, in proceeding to interpret the scope of the explanation, we should keep in mind the nature of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and the nature of the proceedings in which stay orders are obtained. So far as the first of these expects is concerned, while it is possible for the Government to issue notifications under S. 4 in respect of each plot of land sought to be acquired. It is not feasible or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It is common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other capital cities, vast extents are being acquired for planned development or public projects. The acquisition as generally part of an integrated scheme, or plan and though, technically speaking, there can be no objection to individual plots being processed under Ss. 5A, 6, 9, 12, etc., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least up to the stage of the declaration under S. 6. To give an example, if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal, the scheme itself cannot be put put operation unless the whole land can be eventually made available. If even one of the land owners anywhere along the line applies to Court and gets a stay of the operation of the notification under S. 4 , in practical terms, the whole scheme of acquisition will fall through, it is of no consolation to say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the scheme. To compel the Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the S. 4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands (see Sheonoy Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, , and Gauraya Vs. Thakur. ). Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position- is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which can not but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceeding the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on- general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter partip's simpliciter it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothin.g personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds, common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group, of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same con.tentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S. 4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, for some reason that falls and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended.
(11) From what is stated in para 27, it is clear that the Full Bench has held that the contention that an order quashing Sections 4 and 6 notifications shall ensure only for the benefit of the person who had filed the writ petition, is futile contention, and that litigation of this nature is not inter-party simpliciter it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interest. There after the Full Bench directed that the matter be laid before the appropriate Division Bench for disposal.
(12) The Division Bench of this Court by its order dated 18-11-1988 observed. "A careless and mindless exercise of powers by Land Acquisition Collectors and the Administrator in these cases had left us with no option, but to quash all land acquisition proceedings in regard to eleven villages. It is to be noted that the proceedings of acquisition of land in 11 villages, land of which villages was sought to be acquired by the notifications in question in the instant writ, as also the notification which was in question in Balak Ram Gupta's case, were the same.
(13) The Division Bench in Civil Writ Petition No. 2838 of 1985 (C. L. Goel Vs. Union of India). Civil Writ Petition No. 2781 of 1985 (Deepak Vaid Vs. Union of India), and Civil Writ Petition No. 1444 of 1986, allowed the aforesaid three writ petitions, questioning the acquisition of land under the notifications for acquisition of land which were the same notifications as the notification in this case, despite the fact that in those two petitions Section 5A objections had not been filed by the petitioners. The Division Bench while, disposing of the aforesaid writ petitions, relied upon its own judgment in Civil Writ Petition No. 1639 of 1985, decided on 18-11-1988. Counsel for the petitioners, therefore, contends that in view of the judgment of this Court (Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India, the judgment of Division Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India, reported as 37(2), (1989) Dlt 150, and the judgments of this Court in Civil Writ Petitions No. 2838 of 1985, 2781 of 1985 and 1444 of 1986 this petition questioning the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act which was questioned in Balak Ram Gupta's case and the other three cases, mentioned above, be also allowed.
(14) Ms. Geeta Luthra, learned counsel for Union of India. despite the Full Bench judgment of this Court in Air 1987 Delhi 239, to the effect that when large scale of acquisition of land is undertaken, it cannot be said that the quashing of the notification under Section 4 of the Act which initiates the process of acquisition of a large scale of land, shall ensure for the benefit of a particular case in which that notification is quashed. and despite the three writ petitions decided by the Division Bench of this Court, being Civil Writ Petitions No. 2838 of 1985, 2781 of 1985 and 1444 of 1986, has asserted that inasmuch as Section 5A objections had not been filed by the petitioners, they are not entitled to the benefit of quashing of Section 4 notification with respect to their land.
(15) We are not at all able to appreciate such a contention in face of the aforesaid authorities.
(16) Learned counsel asserts that she is supported by some judgments of Courts. We have examined the judgments which she has referred to.
(17) The case reported as , (Shyam Nandan Prasad and Others Vs. State of Bihar and Others, was a case which did not quash Section 4 proceedings under the Act. The High Court had directed remand of the case for a fresh hearing regarding Section 5A objections. The judgment of the Supreme Court was also to the same effect. Being a case of remand for hearing under Section 5A, such a case has no application' to a case where notification under Section 4 of the Act has been quashed, and we do not think it helps the counsel for the respondent at all.
(18) Another case which has been relied upon by counsel for the respondent is (Ashwani Kumar Dhingra Vs. State of Punijab)(4). The learned counsel for the respondent has built up her arguments on the basis of the observations made in this judgment, which have no application to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. In that case one of the persons who was not party to an action, sought the same benefits regarding compensation which had been allowed to his co-owners. The Supreme Court had denied that on the basis of the facts of that case. The important fact in that case was that in the High Court itself the Senior Advocates of the co-owners had made a concession, that the orders regarding the case be specifically confined only to the co-owners before the Court. In view of the fact that the High Court decided the case of the co-owners on the basis of the concession of their counsel, such a case based upon concession, cannot be a precedent for the proposition which is sought to be advanced in the case before us. There is no such concession by any counsel in the Balak Ram Gupta's case.
(19) The concession which was made in Balak. Ram Gupta's case by the counsel for the respondent, was to the effect that after perusal of the entire record of the case regarding the hearing of Section 5A objections, he was not in a position to support the proposition that a hearing had been granted to each of the petitioners as required by law, contained in Section 5A of the Act. A concession such as the one which was made in Balak Ram Gupta's case, made on the basis of official record, cannot be regarded as a concession- which would not create a precedent inasmuch as in Balak Ram Gupta's case hundreds of files of acquisition, and hundreds of objections were required to be dealt with, could not possibly have been dealt with in the manner the respondent alleged that they had dealt with. The whole acquisition- proceedings had to be quashed because of breach of statutory provisions regarding acquisition of land. That acquisition could not have been according to the authority of law, as contemplated by Article 300A of the Constitution.
(20) The next case relied upon by the counsel for the respondent is a judgment of this Court (DB), reported as (Chhota & Ors. Vs. Union of India) (5). We have perused this judgment, and we find that this judgment is dated 28-5-1992, whereas the judgment of the Full Bench ins Balak Ram Gupta's case Air 1987 Delhi 239 (FB) is dated 27-5-1987. The later judgment reported in the Delhi Law Times has not noticed the judgment by the Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case, and has made some observations contrary thereto, relating to the public nature of the exercise in the matter of considering the validity of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. In connection with large scale acquisition of land, and to the extent of inconsistently per incuriam." Also the Division Bench of this Court did not notice that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case Ashwani Kumar Dhingra Vs. State of Punjab alone and could not have laid down the proposition of general and universal B application-
(21) The next case which is relied upon by Ms. Geeta Luthra. learned counsel for the respondent, is the judgment reported as . (Farid Ahmed (6) Abdul Samad and another Vs. The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and another), when she has picked up an observation of the Supreme Court to the effect that hearing to the objections under Section 5A of the Act to be granted under the Act, is a personal hearing in isolation. This observation torn out of the context, cannot lead to the inference that the judgment of the Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case, and the judgment of the Division Bench in Balak Ram Gupta's case, was not of universal application to all lands which were covered by the notifications, and large scale acquisition proceedings which were quashed in Balak Ram Gupta cases.
(22) Another case which has been cited before us, is (State of Tamil Nadu and (7) others Vs. 1. Krishnan and others), at page 507, wherein para 40 it is stated by the Supreme Court that, the petitioners in that case. not only did they fail to file objections under Section 5A of the Act. but they also failed to act soon after the declaration under Section 6 was made.
(23) As stated above, declaration- under Section 6 was made in 1978, and the present writ petitions were filed sometime in the year 1982-83 when awards were about to be made. The Court held that laches of this kind. are fatal. We do not sec how this helps the respondents. The Supreme Court did not say that non-filing of Section 5A objections are fatal, but it stated that delay in filing the writ petition is fatal. This case does not help the respondent. We cannot attribute to the Supreme Court something which it did not decide.
(24) The next case cited by the respondent is 1995(8) Supp (1) Supreme Court Scc 34 (State of Haryana & others Vs. Sukhdev & others). This judgment nowhere states flint quashing of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are personal. We do not sec how this judgment supports the proposition advanced by the respondent.
(25) The next case cited by the respondent is (Munshi Singh and others Vs. Union of India), wherein the words used by the Supreme Court regarding quashing of the acquisition proceedings with regard to the land of the "appellant" therein, can be extended to imply that when large scale acquisition notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act, are quashed, the notification survives, and continues to operate .".gainst those who were not before the Court. To our mind, no such law can be stated to have been laid by the Supreme Court in .
(26) Ms. Geeta Luthra next cited the case reported as (Rambhai Lakhabhai ( 10) Bhakt v. State of Gujarat and others). This case does not help- the respondent, inasmuch as in para 6 and 7 of the judgment, what the Supreme Court said was that a party who had chosen not to appear in person, or through pleader, but had already chosen to send the objections through post, cannot be heard to protest, if he is not heard in person and "no fault can be laid at the door of the Land Acquisition Officer for not given opportunity of hearing". The implication to our mind, is that if a person chooses not to do a Thing, and he cannot put blame on somebody else. This case docs not help the Respondent at all, (27) "THE petitioner. have urged before us that the judgment in balak Ram Gupta's case has received the seal of approval of the Supreme Court in 45 (1991) Dlt (II) 602 (SC) (Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Single & others) in para 4, wherein the Supreme Court has also said that the notifications with respect not to Ii villages, but 12 villages have been quashed.
(28) In the light of the specific seal of approval by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, it is difficult to see how the Full Bench judgment of the High Court in Balak Ram Gupta's case and Division Bench judgment in Balak Ram Gupta's case is not applicable to the instant case. particularly in view of the fact that "notification" are specifically treated as "law", as contemplated by Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India. Tt has been so held in . (Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and others v. Union of India & others). The notifications being law, law having been quashed, and made nugatory it enures for the benefit of all persons who arc likely to be affected by such law notification. Besides this, counsel for the petitioners have also pointed out a short order of this Court, passed in Civil Writ Petition No. 3291 of 1982, wherein a Division Bench (Mahinder Narain and Jaspal Singh, JJ) has held that judgment by which notifications are quashed, are not judgment in personam. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition succeeds, and rule is made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case; the petitioners are entitled to their costs.