JUDGMENT Sunanda Bhandare, J.
(1) This revision petition is directed against the judgment and order of the Additional Rent Controller dated 25th August 1989. A petition for eviction was filed by the respondent against the petitioner under Section 14D of the Delhi Rent Control Act seeking eviction of the petitioner from house built on Plot No. B-428 New Friends Colony, New Delhi. It was alleged in the eviction petition that the premises were let out to the petitioner on 7th December 1976. The reasons for letting out the premises on that date have been stated in paragraph 18 (a) (iii) of the petition. The respondent has stated that her husband died on 5th November 1976 when there was a decoity in the house and the premises were let out to the petitioner under unfortunate circumstances. The respondent has averred that the premises were let out to the petitioner for residential purpose and she required them for her residence. An application for leave to defend was filed by the petitioner before the Additional Rent Controller. However, leave to defend was rejected and the Additional Rent Controller by the impugned order passed the eviction order. Though the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on various grounds, the main ground raised by the petitioner today is regarding the maintainability of the petition by respondent under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Learned counsel submitted that since the premises were let out by the respondent after she had become a widow, she was not entitled to get summary eviction of the petitioner under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Learned counsel relied on a Division Bench judgment of this court reported as P.P. Kapur v. Union of India & Others, , and submitted that Section 14-D can apply only when the premises were let out at the time when the husband of the landlady was alive.
(2) I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner on the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition under Section 14-D. I have also perused the petition filed by the respondent before the Additional Rent Controller. It is the respondent's own case that the premises were let out to the petitioner on 7th December 1976 after her husband died on 5.11.76. This Court in P.P. Kapur's case (supra) has observed as follows: "In our opinion section 14-D can apply to only such a case where the premises were let out at the time when the husband of the landlady was alive. If the contention of Mr. Sehgal and Mr. Sahni is correct it would not have been necessary to use the words let out by her, or by her husband' in Section 14-D. The contention of these counsel essentially would have the effect of taking the cases of widow landladies out of the purview of Section 14-D. This was certainly not the intention of the Legislature. The intention of the Legislature was that with a view to give benefit to certain class of persons special provision should be enacted and this was done with the promulgation of Sections 14-B, 14-C and 14-D. While interpreting Section 14-C we had in Chanana's case (supra) came to the conclusion that Section 14-C will apply where the premises have been let out by a Government employee prior to his retirement and not after he had retired. Similarly, Section 14-D would apply to a case where the premises have been let out prior to the landlady becoming a widow and not thereafter. The reason for this is obvious. The landlady may suddenly become a widow and may have urgent need for the premises in question. It was therefore necessary to provide for a situation where speedy relief can be granted. The use of the expression 'immediate possession' in Section 14-D clearly indicates that the said provision is to apply where the widow is in urgent need of premises for her residence. When an unexpected event like the death of her husband occurs, a need for residence may arises immediately or after sometime. Section 14-D is meant to cater to such situations where such a need arises. On the other hand when a widow lets out the premises after the death of her husband, she is aware that her right to get back the premises will depend upon her being able to bring about a successful action under Section 4 of the Act. If She bonafide requires the premises she will have to apply under Section 14(1)(e). Therefore, it is not as if a widow, who requires the premises for her residence after they had been let out by her after her husband's death, is without any remedy. The remedy of such a widow is not under Section 14-D but is Section 14(1)(e). The provision of Sub-Section (2) of Section 14-D also seems to indicate that the right which was to exercised under Section 14-D was meant to be exercised only once. Under sub-section (2) she has to choose, if she has let out more than one premises, as to which premises she wants. Once that option has been exercised her right to invoke Section 14-D would come to an end. If, on the other hand, the contention of Shri Sehgal is accepted and it is held that Section 14-D applies to a widow who lets out the premises even after she becomes a widow then it would mean that Section 14(2) cannot be given effect to. That could certainly not be the intention of the Legislature. Once in a life time chance was given to the landladies falling under Section 14-D and this is evident from Section 14(2) of the Act.
(3) It is therefore clear that a widow who has let out the premises to a tenant after she had become a widow is not entitled to get summary eviction of a tenant under Section 14-D of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since the maintainability of the eviction petition goes to the very root of the matter, I do not consider it necessary to go into other questions raised by the petitioner. In the circumstances, this petition is allowed and the order dated 25th August 1989 passed by the Additional Rent Conroller, Delhi is set aside on the ground of maintainability..,