JUDGMENT M.K. Chawla, J.
(1) In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Shri B. D. Ram. Joint Secretary, Home and Confidential, Department of Uttar Pradesh, passed three orders of detention on 9-8-86 affecting Toshi Bisht, Thondup Dorji and Dorji Wangchuc. All the three detenus, by separate writ petitions have challenged their detention. The habeas corpus petition of co-detune Dorji Wangchuc has since been accepted by this Court (Malik Shariefuddin, J.) on 4-2-1987, as a result of which he has been set at liberty.
(2) By this Judgment, I propose to dispose of Criminal Writ No. 90187-titled as Smt. Dechin Bisht w/o detenu Toshi Bisht Vs. State and Criminal Writ No. 128/87 titled Tashi Chambel, brother of detenu Thondup Dorji, as common questions of fact and law arise therein.
(3) The grounds of detention disclose that on 22-6-86 at about 4.30 A.M" the Customs Officers of Basti signalled a tourist bus coming from Nepal to stop near the bridge over river Kakrahi on Basti-Naugarh road. The bus did not stop. The Customs Officers noted the number of the bus and chased it. They were able to" over take the bus near the barrier. The Customs Officers noticed huge foreign goods over the roof as well as inside the bus. The bus was brought to the Office of' the Customs, at Basti and the entire foreign goods were unloaded.
(4) Shri Dorji Wangchuc, a guide by profession, disclosed that the foreign good loaded on and in the bus belonged to him as also to Shri Toshi Bisht and Shri Thondup Dorji. They were required to segregate their goods. Three lists were prepared. The Customs Officers then asked the said three persons to produce authority certificate of license for the import of the recovered contraband foreign goods into India, but no such authority was produced by any of them. Consequently, under the belief that the goods were being illegally smuggled into India from Nepal, were seized.
(5) Statements of the detenus were recorded on 24-6-86, 25-6-86 and 26-6-86 wherein they admitted having purchased the items from Kathmandu for being sold in India. On the basis of these facts, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that the detenus have indulged in and are likely to engage themselves in transporting, concealing and keeping smuggled goods, and with a view to prevent them from acting in the aforesaid manner, it has become necessary to detain them. The order of detention is dated 8-9-86.
(6) The counter version of the petitioners is that on 20-6-86, they Along with 51 other passengers were traveling in the bus from Kathmandu to Delhi. After crossing the Indo-Nepal Border, the bus was stopped at Kakrahi by the Customs Officials. On examination of the luggage of the passengers, they discovered several contraband items. The Customs Officials demanded a sum of Rs. I lakh from the bus passengers as illegal gratification to which they did not agree. The bus was brought to the Customs Office Basti where the contraband items were unloaded. At that point of time, the Customs Officers suggested that all the passengers should pay Rs. 3000 each, otherwise, they would be detained. Some of the passengers under fear of arrest started collecting the amount from the passengers. They were able to arrange a sum of Rs. 72,000. The Customs Officers, however, insisted the payment of the total amount of Rs. 1 lakh.
(7) The petitioners were carrying a very small amount of money. They were threatened either to arrange the requisite amount of Rs. 3000 each or suffer the consequences. All of them were later 09 threatened and confined to a room. They were denied food, water and other facilities at night. They were also not allowed to sleep. Sometimes they were given beating on the soles of their feet with a thick stick. On the early hours of 24-6-86, the detenus were forced to confess the smuggling of foreign goods and sign on the dotted lines of the list prepared by the officers. They refused to comply with the said directions.
(8) During the day the family members of the petitioners reached there. They were Deale the right to meet their spouses and relations. During the intervening night of 24th- 25th June, 1986, the petitioners were again tortured. They in fact became mental and physical wreck. They could barely stand or walk on the next day. The family members again tried and sought interview with the petitioners but the Customs Officers demanded a sum of Rs. 50,000 for arranging the meeting. In this way, the petitioners were deprived of their right to meet their relations who by that time had camped outside the office. ' On 26-6-86, the wife of Dorji Wangchuc obtained an order for interview from the Court of Judicial Magistrate Basti but in spite of that, the petitioners could not unfold their miseries as the officers present there insisted that they should converse in Hindi and not. in Tibetan. language.
(9) During the night, the detenus were tied up in a dark room and again tortured. In this way, the Customs Officials and others forced the detenus to make the confessional statement and accept the items of the goods recovered from their possession. At about 4.30 P.M. on 16-6-86, that they were produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate Basti who directed them to produce the detenus on the next morning. After the remand, they were removed to Central Jail, Allahabad. The bail applications were moved before the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad which were ultimately accepted on 14-10-86, but before that they were served with the order of detention.
(10) The counter version of the petitioner has been incorporated as it will have some bearing vis-a-vis the grounds urged for the quashing of the impugned order of dtention.
(11) Even though the petitioners have enumerated number of goods but during the course of hearing arguments laid stress only in three of them. Before dealing with the grounds, it is relevant to keep in mind that the habeas corpus petition of Durji Wangchuc has already been accepted and he has been set at liberty. The grounds which weighed with the Court in that case are :-
(1)That the detenu was denied his constitutional right of examining witnesses in rebuttal of the grounds of detention by the Advisory Board.
(2)Though the petitioners were arrested on 22-6-86 but were in judicial custody from 27-6-86 till they were served with .the order of detention, on 9-8-86. During this period their fresh bail application was dismissed, while the second was pending. This fact though in the knowledge of the sponsoring authority was suppressed from the detaining authority, and it has not shown any awareness about it while passing the detention order. If this fact had been brought to the notice of the detaining authority, this might have affected its decision either way.
(12) This Judgment according to the learned counsel fully cover the case of the present.co-detunes. In support of the first contention, the submission is, that all the three detenus made a collective representation to the Advisory Board on 23-9-86, seeking permission to be represented by a counsel or the next friend Shri S. N. Rajul who were present. In the .second collective representation, they asked for the examination of the three detenus, Shri Damdul Searing, one of the co passenger in the bus to depose about the collection of money from the passengers, and its payment to Shri R.C. Srivastava, the Customs Inspector, and Smt. Tsering Yundon, W/o Detenu Dorji Wangchuc,Smt. Dwachin Bisht W/o Detenu Toshi Bisht to narrate the story of the illegal detention of the petitioners from 22nd to 26th June, 1986, at Basti, and the physical condition. It was also mentioned that these witnesses are present outside the Board room, for their evidence.
(13) The stand of the respondent in the counter of Shri Khulbe, is that the combined representation of the detenu is not available in the record of the State government. It was, however, within the discretion of the Advisory Board to allow the appearance of the detenus,his friends and other persons on their behalf. In the additional affidavit of Dr. S. Asthana, Joint Secretary to the Government of U.P., the defense is, that the petitioners, next friend S. M. Rajul as well as Shri Damdul were examined and their statements were duly considered by the Advisory Board.
(14) The filing of the collective representations is not in dispute. The petitioners asked for the examination of at least 7 persons out of which only two were examined. There is no explanation from the side of the respondents as to why and under what circumstances the remaining witnesses were left out. At this stage, the production of the wives of the detenus Dorji Wangebuc and .Toshi Bisht assumes importance. They were expected to depose about their attempts to meet their husbands from 24th to 27th June, 19.86 which facility was denied to them. Smt. Dwachin Bisht was able to meet her husband on 26th June, 1986 while Tsenng Yundon saw her husband from a distance. The evidence of these two witnesses was material to prove the illegal detention of their husbands and their mental and physical condition at that time. This evidence has been shut out without assigning any reason. What is its effect ?
(15) It is not disputed that the detenu has a right to be represented by a friend of his choice. He has also the right to examine witnesses to rebut the allegations made against him as disclosed in the grounds of detention. The only embargo is- that the witnesses sought to be examined before 'the Advisory Board must be present as there is no duty cast on the Advisory Board to summon the witnesses of the detenu. This right has been declared in the nature of' a constitutional safeguard under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and if this right is denied to the detenu, the order of detention is liable to be- quashed and others.
(16) In the recent judgment of the Supreme Court reported as Harbans Lal v. M.L. Wadhawan & Others, the controversy as to the right of the detenu to produce oral evidence as against the filing of the affidavits has been set at best. During the course of the judgment, it was held as under :-
"THE law laid down by the Supreme Court recognises the right in a detenu to lead evidence in rebuttal of the allegation against him, before the Advisory Board. All that is necessary is that the detenu should keep the witnesses ready for examination at the appointed time. There is no obligation cast on the Advisory Board to summon them. The law recognises a right in the Advisory Board to regulate its own procedure Within the constraints of the Constitution and the statute and this procedure is referable to the time limit within which the Advisory Board must complete its enquiry.
THE constitutional safeguards embodied in Art. 22(5) of the Constitution as understood by the Supreme Court must be read into S. 8(b) of the Cofeposa Act. Therefore, the right in a detenu to adduce oral evidence in rebuttal, being a right in the nature of a constitutional safeguard embodied in Art. 22(5) of the Constitutional was necessarily to be read into S. 8(b) and (c) of the Cofeposa Act. There is nothing in S. 8 prohibiting oral evidence of the witnesses tendered by a detenu being taken. The concept of enquiry by the Advisory Board takes within its admit this aspect of hearing also.
WHEREthe Advisory Board denies the right to examine witnesses produced before it by the detenu it violates the law and renders the continued detention bad.
This very ratio was adopted by this Court in a Judgment reported as Munna Lal Jain vs. U.O.I, and Others, 1987(1) Crimes, 327(2) and affirmed by me in case .Criminal Writ No. 59187 re: Jugal Kishore Mosum vs. Union of India, decided on 1.4-1987 and Cr. Writ No. 113-S. Venketraman vs. U.O.I., decided on 22-5-1987.
(17) Applying the ratio decidendi of the Judgments referred to above to the facts of the present case, it is quite clear that in their representations, the detenus have given the names of their witnesses which they wanted to produce in rebuttal. They have also stated that they were present outside the room. Presumably they had brought the witnesses with them to prove their innocence. There was no question of their not availing of this opportunity. Even if it be presumed for the sake of arguments that the detenu did not make any oral request but this by itself is not a ground for the Advisory Board to deprive him of his right of rebuttal when it is brought to their notice through the representation that his witnesses are present and are willing to depose the real facts.
(18) The very aspect came in for consideration in a judgment of the Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar Arora vs. Union of India and others. Criminal appeal 55186 decided on 14-1-86(3) The relevant portion of' the Judgment reads as under :- "THAT the detenu was a right to be represented by a friend of his choice and that he has the right to examine witnesses to rebut the allegations made against him has been held by this Court in A.K. Roy v. Union of India . It does not appear from the record placed before us that the written request of the detenu was ever considered. The High Court glossed over this fact with the statement that there was nothing in the record to indicate that the detenu had orally made any request that he wanted his friend to represent his case to the Advisory Board and that the request contained in the written representation was brought to the notice of the Board. We do not think that this approach of the High Court is correct. The request was made in writing and was made in the? representation which was presented by him in person to the Advisory Board at the time of the nearing by the Advisory Board. He specifically mentioned in the representation that his friend and his witnesses were waiting outside. We do not think that the High Court was justified in brushing aside the submissions made on behalf of the detenu on the ground that the record does not indicate that any request was made. In these circumstances, and others we have no option but to allow the appeal and direct the detenu to be set at liberty."
(19) This Judgment fairly and squarely applies to the facts of the present case. Taking an overall view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the oral request coupled with the written representation of the detenus for the examination of their witnesses could not have been ignored by the Advisory Board. The detenus have been deprived of their right to rebut the allegations made against them.
(20) LD. counsel for the respondent tried to get out of this difficult situation by taking up the stand that the petitioners have not submitted any collective representation before the Advisory Board, wherein the request for the examination of witnesses was made inasmuch as the record of the Advisory Board does not show the filling of such a representation. Prima facie, this stand is devoid of any substance if one peruses the additional counter-affidavit of Dr. S. Asthana ana Shri R. P. Furoria. In both these affidavits, they admit that the statements of S. N. Rajul and Damdul were recorded. The name of Damdul appears only in the second joint representation while Rajul figures in the first. It comes to that both the representations were before the Advisory Board. Secondly, Id. counsel for the petitioner states at the bar which is affirmed in the rejoinder, that these collective representation were drafted by him and typed by Shri P. S. V. Ramni at his residence, and that he was personally present Along with the witnesses mentioned in the representations outside the Board Room. Believing the statement of the counsel as a true one, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioners have 'been deprived of their constitutional right to rebut the allegations levelled against them in the grounds of detention. This ground, by itself is weighty enough to nullify the order of detention.
(21) On the second aspect also, the petitioners have a case. It is the common case of the parties .that on the intervening flight between 21st and 22nd June, 1987, the bus in which the present petitioners were traveling was intercepted and brought to the Customs Office, Basti for checking. It is the case of the petitioners that since that time they were kept in illegal custody by the Customs Officers and produced before the C..T.M. Basti at 2 P.M. on 26-6-87 for the first time. Their bail application filed on the same day was dismissed and the petitioners were remanded to judicial custody. Immediately, thereafter they were taken to Central Jail Naini, Allahabad. On 2-7-86, the petitioners again moved the Special C.J.M. at Allahabad for their release on bail. These applications lingered on for quite sometime and vide order dated 14-8-86, the bail application of Thondup Dorji was rejected, whereas the applications of the other accused Dorji Wangchuc and Toshi Bisht were accepted and they were ordered to be released on bail in the sum of Rs. 40,000 each with two sureties in the like amount to be furnished by the local residents who will also furnish a certificate of their being Indian nationals and whose immovable properties are situated in District Allahabad or the two sureties of other places, provided they produce , certificate of the District Magistrate verifying he ownership of the immovable properties. The conditions imposed were so harsh and unreasonable that it negatived the order of release. The sponsoring authority and the detaining authority were fully aware of the effect of this order, that the petitioner will never be able to furnish the sureties asked for and will never come out of the jail; till the disposal of the criminal complaint.
(22) However, in the meantime, the order of detention dated 9-8-1986 was served on the petitioners. On these facts, the contention is that if the petitioners were already in custody and there was no imminent possibility of their release, the power of preventive detention should not have been exercised. From the counter-affidavit, it does not appear that either the prospect of immediate release of the detenu or other factor which can justify the detention of the petitioner were properly considered by the detaining authority. It shows that there was a no application of mind at the time of passing of the impugned order. What is its effect ? The Judgment reported as Binod Singh Vs. District Magistrate Dhanbad and ors., is a con.p'ete answer to this query. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under:- "IT is well settled in our constitutional framework that the power of directing preventive detention given to the appropriate authorities must be exercise in exceptional cases as contemplated by the various provisions of the different statutes dealing with preventive detention and should be used with great deal of circumspection. There artist be awareness of the facts necessitating preventive custody of a person for social defense. If a man is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released, the power of preventive detention should and others not be exercised. In the instant case when the actual order of detention was served upon the detenu, the detenu was in jail. There is no indication that this factor or the question that the said detenu might be released or that there was such a possibility of his release, was taken into consideration by the detaining authority properly and seriously before the service of the order. A bald statement is an ipse dixit of the officer. If there were cogent materials for thinking that the detenu might be released then these should have been made apparent. Eternal vigilance on the part of the authority charged with both law and order and public order is the price which the democracy in this country extracts from the public officials in order to protect the fundamental freedoms of our citizens.
(23) It is no doubt true that a preventive order can be made against a person already confined to jail, but in such a situation it must be present to the mind of the detaining authority that keeping in view the fact that the person is already detained a preventive detention order is still necessary. The subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority must comprehend the very fact that the person sought to be detained is already in jail and yet a preventive detention order is a compelling necessity. If the subjective satisfaction is reached without the awareness of this very relevant fact. the detention order must be quashed. (Biru Mahato Vs. District Magistrate, Dhanbad. ) (24) This principle appears to have not been kepi in mind by the detaining authority at the time of the passing of the impugned order. In fact, there is no indication of it. Had the detaining authority been aware of the fact that in spite of bail orders, the detenu could not have managed to corns out. the order of detention must not have been passed. This material ignorance has proved fatal and the impugned order could not be allowed to stand.
(25) The last but riot the least submission is that the detenus sent a collective representation Along with the additional averments dated 15-9-86, to the sponsoring detaining authority for the supply of material documents, including the Individual statements ]of the detenus recorded on different dates statement of Dharam Pal, the driver of the bus, dated 22-6-86 and the inventory dated 24-6-86 of the goods allegedly found in possession of the detenus. The collective representations were sent to Shri R. S. Asthana, Joint Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lacknow on 18-9-86 by registered post. The said representations were received in the Department on 29-9-86. These representations according to the Id. counsel has not yet been disposed of, inasmuch as the order of rejection, if any, has not been communicated. This has prevented the petitioner? to make an effective and purposeful representation against the order of detention.
(26) The defense is that no representation dated 15-9-86 was ever received in the office of the sponsoring detaining authonty. However, according to the record, a collective representation dated 15-9-86 bearing the signatures of the petitioners with date 8-10-86, was handed over to Jailer, Central Prison, Naini, who forwarded the same to the Government. The said representation on consideration was rejected on 25-10-86, the information of which was conveyed to the detenus through the Superintendent, Central Jail, Naini. No other representation was received by the State Government.
(27) This stand on the face of it is against the record before this Court. From the rejoinder, it stands established that the representation dated 15-9-86 addressed to Shri R. S. Asthana was sent by registered post receipt no. 1799 dated 18-9-86. In view of the bare denial of the respondents, the petitioner embarked upon an enquiry to ascertain tire fate of their representation. Counsel for the petitioner directed an enquiry to the postmaster, G.P.O.. Civil Lines, Allahabad, asking for the certificate of delivery of the said registered letter vide Ex. R-2: By letter dated 25-2-87 (Ex. R-3) the Postmaster, Allahabad informed the learned Advocate that said registered letter was delivered to the addressee on 20-9-86. Ex. R-3/A is the original delivery certificate.
(28) In spite of the receipt of the Collective representation the detenus have been kept in dark and its fact is not known to them till today.
(29) It may be that the petitioner might have submitted a copy of this very representation dated 15-9-86. to the Jailer with his signatures on 8-10-86. It is lost possible that this very representation was rejected-on 25-10-86. "But this fact does not- go or run counter to the stand of the petitioner inasmuch as their representation was sent to the detaining authority by registered post whereas the second communication is by hand to the and others Jailer. Even here, the respondents have not been able to show from record that the rejection dated 25-10-86 was ever communicated to the petitioners. On their record there is no acknowledgement.
(30) From these facts, three alternatives emerge. Firstly, the representation of the detenues even though received by the detaining authority on 29-9-86, its fate was not communicated to the detenus at all. Secondly, even if lit be assumed for the sake of arguments that on 25-10-86, the representation was rejected then there is an unexplained delay of 35 days; and lastly, if we go by averments of the respondents, that the said representation dated 8-10-86 was received in the Department and was rejected on 25-10-86, then there is a delay of 17/18 days. Such long delays have always been looked upon with suspicion by the courts. The right to know the fate of the representation is based on the principle that the Article 22(5) enjoined upon 'the detaining authority to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity to make a representation must implicitly mean that such a representation must when made, be considered and disposed of as expeditiously as possible. For, otherwise, the obligation to furnish the earliest opportunity to make -a representation would lose both its purpose and meaning . The delay of 17/18 days has been considered to be fatal incase reported as Prof. Khaidam Ibocha etc. Vs. State of Manipur, . The unexplained delay of 17 clays is passing the order on representation made by the detenu was held sufficient for holding that the order of detention is illegal. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are as under :- "IF,as a matter of fact there has been an unexplained delay of 17 days, Mr. Sachthey, also could not controvert the legal position that Article 22(5) is violated under such circumstances. In fact, he cannot argue to the contrary in view of the decision of this Court. In Durga Show V. State of West Bengal, (1969) Writ Petn. Nos. 198, 205 and 206 of 1969, D-2-9-1969 (SC), this Court had to consider the effect, on the order of detention of a delay between the receipt of the representation from the detenu and its consideration and rejection by the Government. In particular, in one of the Writ Petitions therein, namely, Writ Petition No. 206 of 1969, the representation was received on June 28. 1969 and was considered and rejected on July 14, 1969, which means there was a delay of 16 days. In the other two petitions, the delay was very much more. This Court held that the unexplained delay of 16 days which is the minimum, out of three cases, is a long delay where a person is being detained without trial under special law relaying to Preventive Detention. After referring to the previous decisions of this Court, it was emphasised that it was necessarily implicit in the language of Article 22(5) the State Government, to whom the representation is made, should properly consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. It was also stressed that the constitution of an Advisory Board does not relieve the State Government from the legal obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as soon as it is rece'ved by it. On this basis, this Court ultimately held that the requirement of Article 22(5) has not been satisfied as the State Government had failed to consider and dispose of the representations made by the detenus as expeditiously as possible and. in consequence, the detention of the petitioners therein was held to be illegal."
This view was affirmed in case Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal, . In this case, the delay of 19 days by the 'Government in disposing of the detenu's representation was considered fatal and the detention held illegal. Looking the case from any angle, the respondents to my mind have failed to furnish a valid explanation for the undue delay in consideration and rejection of the representation even ii their stand is taken on its face value. In this way, the respondents have deprived the petitioners of their constitutional right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to have their representation considered as expeditiously as possible.
(31) In a passing reference, Id. counsel for the respondents tried to dislodge the petitioner by taking the stand that this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition inasmuch as the incident took place in the State of U.P. The detenus were arrested and detained in Allahabad. The order 3f detention was issued from the Central Secretariat. Lucknow. The representations of the detenus were considered and disposed of by the detaining authority as well as the State Government at Lucknow. The orders of detention were also confirmed by the Advisory Board sitting at Allahabad. No part of the cause of action has arisen at Delhi and as such the petitions cannot be entertained. Here also, the respondents have missed the bus inasmuch as they do not dispute the fact that the petitioners' representation u/s. 11(1) of the Cofeposa Act was made to the Central Government at New Delhi. Copy of one such representation is dated 10-11-1986. It is addressed to the Government of India, Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue), North Block, New Delhi. In the counter of Shri I. C. Ranjan, Under Secretary, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, this part of the case is not disputed. As per his affidavit, the detenus' representation dated 10-11 -86 was received in the Cofeposa Section of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue on 11-11-86. As there were allegations against Detecting Officers, the representation was sent to the Collector of Customs, Patna for their parawise comments on 14-11-86. Subsequently, a reminder telegram was issued on 28-11-86. The representation Along with the comments were put up before Shri Tarun Ray, Joint Secretary to the Government of India on 5-12-86 who has been empowered with the powers under Section 11 of the Cofeposa Act. He considered and rejected the representation on 9-12-86. The Memorandum rejecting the representation was sent to the detenu on the same day. In view of the admission, our own High Court in a case reported as Harish Taneja vs. U.O.I, and ors. 1983 Dlt 276(8), held as under:- "IT is apparent from the facts of this case that the representation of the petitioner to the Central Government challenging the continued detention was rejected at Delhi. In view of this fact, the jurisdiction of this Court is not ousted" although there is no doubt that the Bombay High Court would also have jurisdiction to entertain 'this petition. The preliminary objection is thus rejected being misconceived."
(32) The Judgment reported as Nasiruddin vs. State of Transport Appellate Tribunal, 1976 S.C. 331(9), relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is entirely on a different aspect. It was a case of interpretation of the "United Provinces High Court (Amalgamation Order, 1948. wherein the powers of the Chief Justice to increase or decrease the areas in Oudh and the cause of action for filing the petitions arising there under, was considered. While deciding the territorial" jurisdiction, the court also held that : "IF the cause of action in part arises in the specified Oudh areas and part of the cause of action outside and others the specified areas, it will be open to the litigant to frame the case appropriately to attract the jurisdiction either at Lucknow or at Allahabad."
This observation does not go contrary to the view of this court as laid down in the above noted case. This dispose of the preliminary objection.
(33) No other point has been urged nor requires going into. The Result is abvious. The petition succeeds and the orders of detention in both the cases, are hereby .quashed. The petitioners be set at liberty if not required to be detained under the orders of a competent court or authority.