JUDGMENT I.D. Dua, J.
(1) The only point raised in this case is whether the present suit is governed by Article 36 or Article 49 of the Indian Limitation Act Ix of 1908.
(2) Facts giving rise to the present controversy broadly stated are that on 12th March, 1958, bus No. Dld 7222 owned and driven by a driver of the Delhi Transport Undertaking was passing across Malka Gar] and Frobyn Road crossing when truck No. Dld 5066 belonging to Vijay Goods Carriers (P) Ltd., defendant No. 1, and driven by Tilak Raj, defendant No. 2, employed in the course of employment of defendant No. 1, wrongfully and negligently struck against the bus of the Delhi Transport Undertaking causing to it serious damage. The plaintiff in the present suit claimed a sum of Rs. 563.91 nP. for wrongful loss to it on account of the rash and negligent act of the agent of defendant No. 1.
(3) The Court below has applied Article 36 holding that Article 49 would be applicable only to those cases where the property which is the subject matter of a wrongful injury, is in the possession of someone toher than the planitiff. Relinance in the trial Court was placed for this view on a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court (Admiralty JurSisdiction) in Essoo Bhaya J. v. The Steamship 'Savitri' (4) On revision, the learned counsel for the plaintiff has submitted that this view is nto correct. According to him, the expression "injuring" used in Article 49 is wide enough to cover injury to the specific moveable property in all circumstances irrespective of its possession, whether with the plaintiff or with a third party. In support of his submission. the learned coannsel has failed to draw my attention to any precedent, and of course no principle has been cited before me.
(5) I may at this stage appropriately read Article 49 :- "49.For toher specific Three When the property is moveable property or for years, wrongfully taken or incompensation for wrongfully jured, or when the detaking or injuring or wrong. tainer's possession befully detaining the same. comes unlawful." The toher Article on which the lower Court has placed reliance is Article 16 which may also be read :- "36.For compensation Two When the malfeasance for any malfeasance, misfe- years, misfeasance or nonfesa- asance, or non-feasance indesnce takes place." pendent of contract and nto herein specially provided for. In the current Limitation Act 86 of l963. the corresponding Article is Article 91 which may also be reproduced ;- "91.For compensation Three When the person having (a) for wrongfully taking or years, the right to the posses- detaining any specific movsion of the property first able property lost, or acquilearns in whose possesred by theft, or dishonestsion it is ; misappropriation or conversion. (b) for wrongfully taking Three When the property is or injuring or wrongfully years. wrongfully taken or indetaining any toher specific jured detainer's possession movable property, becomes unlawfull."
In my opinion, the very fact that the word "injuring" has been used along with the words "taking" or "detaining", suggests that the word "injuring" was presumably intended to be used when the property is in possession of someone who has either wrongfully taken it from the plaintiff or wrongfully detained the same. This view also finds support from a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kirpa Ram v. Kunwar Bahadur, as also from a more recent decision of a learned Single Judge of the same Court in Dominion oj India v. Central Aerating Gas Company, Ambala Cantt., Rajamannar, C.J. in Corporation of Madras v. B. D. Ktokandapani, has also taken the same view following the Bom bay decision in the case of Essoo Bhayaji. In the absence of any con1. trary Judicial precedent I fell inclined as at present advised to take the same view as has been taken in these decisions. It is true that in the third column the terminus a quo is inter alia also the point of time when the property is injured but that may nto govern the meaning of tha language used in the first column of Article 49.
(6) Rejecting the plaintiff's petitioner's argument, therefore, .I am inclined to dismiss this revision which I hereby do, but as the respondents are nto represented before me, there will be no order as to costs.