Chattisgarh High Court
Mukesh Satnami vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 24 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
Digitally
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
2026.03.25
10:25:39
+0530 1
2026:CGHC:13948-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1286 of 2021
Mukesh Satnami S/o Shri Govind Satnami, Aged About 23 Years R/o
Village Bandoura, Police Chowki Bazar Charbhantha, P.S. Kawardha,
District Kabirdham Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Kawardha, District
Kabirdham Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Appellant : Mr. Abhishek Banjarey and Mr. Veer Verma, Advocates For Respondent-State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 24.03.2026
1. Heard Mr. Abhishek Banjarey and Mr. Veer Verma, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent. 2
2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.08.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Kabirdham (Kawardha), (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.63/2019, by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "IPC") and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional rigorous imprisonment for one month.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 09.09.2019 at about 08:00 PM, at village Kherjhiti, the deceased Ramesh Dhruve, after having dinner, had lain down in his house. At that time, an information was received by PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve that Ramesh Dhruve had been stabbed with a knife near Ganesh Pandal. Upon receiving such information, PW-5 immediately rushed to the spot and found Ramesh Dhruve lying on the road with a grievous injury on the left side of his chest, from which blood was oozing. At the spot, PW-6 Pradeep @ Chhotu Dhruve, PW-11 Kamlesh Dhruve, PW-12 Purushottam, PW-8 Ramman @ Bheem Nishad and other villagers were present. These witnesses disclosed that due to prior enmity, the accused Mukesh Satnami along with a juvenile co-accused had assaulted the deceased with a knife and fled from the scene.
3
4. Thereafter, the injured was taken to the District Hospital, Kawardha, by Dial-112 and 108 vehicles, where PW-13 Dr. Madhusudan Dongre examined him and declared him dead. The intimation of death (Ex.P/23) was sent to the police. On the basis of the said information, merg intimation (Ex.P/10) was registered. During the course of merg inquiry, on 10.09.2019, PW-15 Nitin Kumar Tiwari issued notice (Ex.P/3) to the panch witnesses and prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/4) over the dead body of the deceased. The dead body was sent for postmortem vide application (Ex.P/25), and constable PW-14 Ishwari Sahu carried the body to the District Hospital. The postmortem was conducted by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who submitted the report (Ex.P/7), opining that the death was homicidal in nature caused by a sharp- edged weapon injury. PW-15 Nitin Kumar Tiwari also inspected the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/11).
5. Based on the statement of PW-5 Shatruhan Dhurve, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/14) was recorded, and thereafter formal FIR (Ex.P/27) was registered against the accused persons. From the spot, one motorcycle, slippers and blood-stained as well as plain soil were seized vide seizure memos (Ex.P/21 and Ex.P/22). During investigation, memorandum statement of the accused Mukesh Satnami was recorded (Ex.P/6), pursuant to which a knife was seized at his instance vide seizure memo (Ex.P/1). Sealed packets containing the clothes of the deceased and blood sample were also seized from the hospital vide Ex.P/24. The accused 4 Mukesh was arrested on 10.09.2019 (Ex.P/32), and information of his arrest was given to his relatives (Ex.P/33). Identification proceedings were also conducted (Ex.P/36). Further, on 19.09.2019, requisition (Ex.P/29) was sent for preparation of a detailed spot map, which was subsequently prepared by the Patwari (Ex.P/12 and Ex.P/13). The seized articles were sent for chemical examination to the Forensic Science Laboratory, and the FSL report (Ex.P/39) was obtained.
6. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 15 witnesses including PW-5 Shatrughan Dhruve, PW-6 Pradeep, PW-8 Bhim, PW-11 Kamlesh and PW-12 Purushottam, who have supported the prosecution case as well as exhibited 40 documents vide Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/40. In order to defence, appellant/accused has examined DW-1 Shakti Kosle, but not exhibited any document.
7. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed against the accused before the jurisdictional criminal Court for the offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. After committal, the case was registered as Sessions Trial No. 63/2019 and was thereafter transferred to the Court of Sessions, Kabirdham (Kawardha) for hearing and disposal in accordance with law.
8. The charges under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of IPC was framed against the accused, which was read over and explained to him. The accused denied the charge and pleaded innocence. 5 The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he claimed himself to be innocent and alleged false implication. The accused did not adduce any defence evidence.
9. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 06.08.2021 convicted the accused-appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC and sentenced him as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment. Hence, this criminal appeal has been filed.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant, most respectfully submits that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the facts and circumstances of the present case in their entirety and in the correct legal perspective. It is submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction is illegal, erroneous, perverse, and contrary to law. The learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the evidence available on record, resulting in erroneous findings and grave miscarriage of justice. The conviction has been recorded on mere conjectures and surmises, despite the prosecution having failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that there are material inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which strike at the root of the prosecution case. The learned trial Court has also erred in convicting the 6 appellant without any specific and incriminating question being put to him under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., thereby causing serious prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, the case of the present appellants falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) IPC. Further, as appellant is in jail since 10.09.2019 and therefore, considering the period he had already undergone, he be awarded the sentence of the period already undergone by him. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part.
11. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence and submits that the prosecution has proved the offence beyond reasonable doubt by leading evidence of clinching nature. He further submits that in view of statements of the prosecution witnesses coupled with other material available on record, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. It has been contended that appellant has committed heinous crime of murder and in such circumstances, it is not the case where conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC requires to be altered to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC. Thus, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. 7
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection.
Points for Determination • Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the death of deceased Ramesh Dhurve was homicidal in nature?
• Whether the prosecution has further proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant/accused caused the homicidal death of the deceased, and if so, whether the conviction recorded under Section 302 of the IPC warrants interference?
Answer to Point No.1
13. This Court has bestowed its anxious consideration upon the entire oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, particularly the medical evidence, inquest proceedings, FSL report and the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, for the purpose of determining the nature of death of deceased Ramesh Dhruve and the role attributed to the present appellant.
14. At the outset, it is evident that upon receipt of information regarding the incident, the injured Ramesh Dhruve was immediately taken to District Hospital, Kawardha, where PW-13 Dr. Madhusudan Dongre examined him and declared him dead. 8 The intimation of death (Ex.P/23) was promptly forwarded to the police, on the basis of which merg intimation (Ex.P/10) was registered without delay.
15. The inquest proceedings (Ex.P/4) were conducted on 10.09.2019 in the presence of independent panch witnesses. The inquest report clearly indicates the presence of a stab injury on the left side of the chest of the deceased. Thereafter, the dead body was sent for postmortem examination to ascertain the exact cause and nature of death.
16. The postmortem examination was conducted by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who has duly proved the postmortem report (Ex.P/7). As per his deposition, on external examination, a stab wound measuring about 2 x 1 cm with a depth of approximately 14 cm was found on the left side of the chest. A corresponding cut mark was also noticed on the shirt of the deceased, clearly indicating the use of a sharp-edged weapon.
17. On internal examination, the injury was found to have penetrated the chest cavity, causing rupture of the heart and extensive internal damage, leading to profuse hemorrhage. The doctor has categorically opined that the injury was ante-mortem in nature and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The cause of death has been opined to be shock due to injury to the heart. It has also been stated that the death occurred within 12- 24 hours prior to the postmortem and the nature of death was 9 homicidal, thereby ruling out any possibility of accidental or suicidal death. The medical evidence stands fully corroborated by the ocular version of prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-12 Purushottam, PW-6 Pradeep and PW-11 Kamlesh, who have consistently stated that it was the present appellant who inflicted the knife blow on the chest of the deceased. Their evidence remains consistent and trustworthy, and no material contradiction has been elicited in their cross-examination so as to discredit their testimony.
18. Further corroboration is found from the recovery of the knife at the instance of the appellant pursuant to his memorandum statement (Ex.P/6), which was seized vide Ex.P/1. The FSL report (Ex.P/39) confirms the presence of human blood on the seized weapon and articles. The appellant has not furnished any explanation regarding the presence of blood on the seized articles, which constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance against him. Though PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve is not an eyewitness, his testimony regarding the immediate aftermath of the incident supports the prosecution case. The defence witness DW-1 Shakti Kosle does not inspire confidence and fails to probabilize the defence version.
19. From the cumulative appreciation of evidence, it is established that on 09.09.2019 between 08:00 PM to 08:30 PM, the appellant came to the spot, called the deceased and, during the course of 10 interaction, inflicted a forceful knife blow on the chest of the deceased, which proved fatal. The nature of injury, the vital part of the body targeted, the weapon used and the force employed clearly demonstrate the intention of the appellant to cause death or at least to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
20. In view of the inquest report (Ex.P/4), postmortem report (Ex.P/7), medical evidence of PW-3, FSL report (Ex.P/39) and the reliable testimony of prosecution witnesses, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully established that the death of Ramesh Dhruve was homicidal in nature.
21. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered in the affirmative. Answer to Point No.2
22. In the present case, the prosecution rests its case primarily on direct ocular evidence of eyewitnesses, duly corroborated by medical and forensic evidence. It is therefore required to be examined whether such evidence inspires confidence and proves beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant is author of the crime.
23. This Court shall, therefore, examine the material evidence and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. (A) Ocular Testimony of Eyewitnesses
24. The prosecution has examined PW-12 Purushottam, PW-6 Pradeep @ Chhotu Dhurve and PW-11 Kamlesh Netam as 11 eyewitnesses to the incident. PW-12 Purushottam has categorically deposed that on the date of incident at about 08:00- 08:30 PM, he was present near Ganesh Pandal along with other villagers when the appellant arrived, called the deceased and during the course of interaction, inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased. His testimony clearly attributes a specific overt act to the present appellant.
25. PW-6 Pradeep has also supported the prosecution case and has deposed that the appellant took out a knife and inflicted a blow on the chest of the deceased. His presence at the spot is natural, and his testimony remains consistent and trustworthy. Nothing material has been elicited in his cross-examination to discredit his version.
26. Similarly, PW-11 Kamlesh has corroborated the version of the aforesaid witnesses and has stated that the appellant assaulted the deceased by means of a knife on his chest. The testimonies of these witnesses are consistent, cogent and inspire confidence. Minor discrepancies, if any, do not affect the core of the prosecution case.
27. Though PW-8 Ramman @ Bheem Nishad has not fully supported the prosecution, he has admitted the presence of the appellant at the spot. His partial hostility does not dent the prosecution case in view of the reliable and consistent testimony of other eyewitnesses.
12(B) Medical and Scientific Evidence
28. The ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses finds full corroboration from the medical evidence. PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who conducted the postmortem (Ex.P/7), has found a deep penetrating stab injury on the left side of the chest, which caused rupture of the heart and resulted in death. The injury is consistent with the use of a sharp-edged weapon like a knife.
29. The FSL report (Ex.P/39) further corroborates the prosecution case by confirming the presence of human blood on the seized knife and clothes of the appellant. The appellant has failed to offer any explanation regarding the presence of blood on these articles. (C) Recovery of Weapon and Articles
30. Another significant incriminating circumstance against the appellant is the recovery of the weapon of offence at his instance. The prosecution has proved that during the course of investigation, the memorandum statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ex.P/6 in the presence of independent witnesses, wherein he disclosed that he had concealed the knife used in the commission of the offence along with his blood-stained clothes at a particular place. Pursuant to the said disclosure, the appellant led the police and witnesses to the indicated spot and got recovered a knife, which was seized vide Ex.P/1. The recovery has been duly proved by the seizure witnesses as well as the Investigating Officer (PW-15), and nothing substantial has been 13 elicited in their cross-examination to render the recovery doubtful.
31. The evidentiary value of such recovery is further strengthened by the medical evidence. PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, who conducted the postmortem, has opined in his query report (Ex.P/8) that the injury sustained by the deceased could be caused by the seized knife. The dimensions, nature and depth of the injury, particularly the penetrating stab wound on the chest reaching up to the heart, are consistent with the use of the said weapon. Thus, the recovery of the knife is not a mere formal circumstance, but one which directly connects the appellant with the commission of the offence.
32. Apart from the weapon, the prosecution has also proved the seizure of blood-stained articles, including the clothes of the deceased as well as those of the appellant, along with blood- stained and plain soil from the place of occurrence. These articles were sent for forensic examination, and the FSL report (Ex.P/39) confirms the presence of human blood on the seized knife and other articles.
33. Significantly, the appellant has failed to offer any explanation as to how human blood came to be present on the weapon and his clothes. In absence of any plausible explanation, this circumstance assumes great importance and provides strong corroboration to the prosecution case, thereby forming a vital link in the chain of incriminating evidence against the appellant. 14 (D) Conduct of the Appellant
34. The conduct of the appellant immediately after the incident assumes significance and constitutes a relevant circumstance under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The evidence on record clearly indicates that after inflicting the fatal knife injury on the chest of the deceased, the appellant did not remain at the spot nor did he make any effort to provide medical aid or assistance to the injured. Instead, he fled from the place of occurrence. Such conduct is not only unnatural but also indicative of a guilty mind, as an innocent person would ordinarily attempt to help the victim or report the matter to the authorities. The act of absconding immediately after the incident lends support to prosecution case.
35. Further, the conduct of the appellant during the course of investigation and trial also deserves consideration. Despite the recovery of the weapon at his instance and the seizure of blood- stained articles, the appellant has not offered any explanation regarding these incriminating circumstances. His silence in the face of such material evidence, particularly when the facts were within his special knowledge, assumes importance and permits an adverse inference to be drawn against him.
36. In his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., the appellant has merely denied the prosecution case and claimed false implication, without furnishing any plausible or reasonable explanation for the circumstances appearing against him, such as 15 the presence of human blood on the seized knife and his clothes, or his presence at the place of occurrence at the relevant time. It is well settled that though the statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not evidence, the failure of the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances can be taken as an additional link in the chain of circumstances. In the present case, such failure on the part of the appellant further strengthens the prosecution case and lends assurance to the conclusion regarding his guilt. (E) Cumulative Assessment of Evidence
37. From the foregoing discussion, the following facts stand firmly established:
• The deceased suffered a homicidal death due to a stab injury on the chest;
• The appellant was present at the spot at the relevant time;
• The appellant inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased, as deposed by reliable eyewitnesses; • The medical evidence fully corroborates the ocular version;
• The weapon of offence was recovered at the instance of the appellant;
• Human blood was detected on the seized articles; • The appellant has failed to explain the incriminating 16 circumstances.
38. The evidence led by the prosecution is consistent, cogent and trustworthy, and clearly establishes that the appellant is the author of the crime. There is no material on record to probabilize any other hypothesis consistent with innocence. (E) Completion of Chain of Circumstances
39. From the above discussion, the following circumstances stand conclusively proved:
• Homicidal death of the deceased, • Motive for commission of the offence, • Deceased last seen alive in the company of the accused, • Recovery of blood-stained bamboo stick at the instance of the accused, • Medical corroboration connecting the weapon with injuries, • Failure of the accused to explain incriminating circumstances.
40. The evidence on record, particularly the consistent and reliable testimony of the eyewitnesses duly corroborated by the medical and forensic evidence, clearly establishes that it was the present appellant who inflicted the fatal knife injury on the chest of the 17 deceased. The prosecution has successfully proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, and the evidence excludes any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Thus, this Court holds that the appellant is the author of the crime.
41. Accordingly, Point No. 2 is answered in the affirmative.
42. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant ?
43. While dealing with The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan v. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:-
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 18 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter.
The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.
(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not 19 amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC.
Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of 20 Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.
To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its 21 not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This 22 ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.
(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.
(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the 23 victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
44. The prosecution case in the present matter is founded primarily upon direct ocular evidence, duly supported by medical and scientific corroboration. Unlike a case resting purely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has examined material eyewitnesses, namely PW-12 Purushottam, PW-6 Pradeep @ Chhotu Dhurve and PW-11 Kamlesh Netam, who have consistently deposed regarding the manner of occurrence. Their testimonies clearly establish that on the date of incident, the appellant along with the juvenile co-accused came to the spot, called the deceased Ramesh Dhruve and, during the course of interaction, the co-accused restrained the deceased while the appellant inflicted a knife blow on his chest. Their presence at the spot is natural, their version is consistent and nothing substantial 24 has been elicited in cross-examination to discredit their testimonies.
45. PW-5 Shatruhan Dhruve, though not an eyewitness to the actual assault, has supported the prosecution case to the extent that he immediately reached the spot upon receiving information and found the deceased lying in an injured condition with a bleeding chest injury. His testimony lends assurance to the prosecution version regarding the time and place of occurrence and the condition of the deceased immediately after the incident. The prompt lodging of Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/14) and registration of FIR (Ex.P/27) further strengthens the prosecution case and rules out the possibility of false implication or concoction.
46. During investigation, the memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/6) was recorded, pursuant to which a knife was recovered at his instance vide seizure memo (Ex.P/1). The recovery has been duly proved by the prosecution witnesses and the Investigating Officer. The medical opinion (Ex.P/8) clearly establishes that the fatal injury sustained by the deceased could be caused by the said weapon. Further, the FSL report (Ex.P/39) confirms the presence of human blood on the seized articles, including the weapon and the clothes of the appellant. The appellant has failed to offer any explanation regarding the presence of blood on these articles, thereby providing an additional incriminating link in the chain of evidence. 25
47. The place of occurrence has been duly established by the spot map (Ex.P/11) and the Patwari map (Ex.P/12 and Ex.P/13). The seizure of blood-stained soil and other articles from the spot further corroborates the prosecution version. No material contradiction has been brought on record to dispute the situs of the incident. The defence witness DW-1 Shakti Kosle has not supported the defence in a reliable manner and his testimony does not create any dent in the otherwise cogent and consistent prosecution evidence.
48. The medical evidence, as proved by PW-3 Dr. Swapnil Tiwari, fully corroborates the ocular version. The postmortem report (Ex.P/7) reveals that the deceased sustained a stab injury on the left side of the chest, which penetrated deep into the body and caused rupture of the heart, leading to death. The injury was ante-mortem and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The nature, location and depth of the injury clearly support the prosecution case that a forceful blow was inflicted by a sharp- edged weapon.
49. The cumulative effect of the consistent eyewitness account, corroborative medical evidence, recovery of the weapon at the instance of the appellant, and the scientific evidence in the form of FSL report, leads to an irresistible conclusion that it was the appellant who inflicted the fatal injury to the deceased. The defence has failed to probabilize any alternative version or to 26 create any reasonable doubt in the prosecution case. However, upon careful consideration of the entire factual matrix, this Court finds that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment. There is no clear evidence of premeditation or prior concert to commit murder. The evidence on record indicates that the appellant and the deceased entered into an altercation immediately prior to the incident, and in the course of such interaction, the appellant inflicted a single blow with a knife. It is also significant that only one injury was inflicted, though on a vital part of the body. There is no material to indicate that the appellant acted in a cruel or unusual manner or that he took undue advantage of the situation. The act appears to have been committed in the heat of passion during a sudden quarrel.
50. In such circumstances, though the appellant must be attributed with the knowledge that inflicting a knife blow on the chest is likely to cause death, the element of intention to cause death, as required for an offence under Section 302 IPC, is not established beyond reasonable doubt. The case thus falls within Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.
51. Consequently, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The evidence on record indicates that the act was committed in the course of a sudden altercation, without premeditation, and with 27 only a single blow inflicted, though on a vital part of the body. While the appellant can certainly be attributed with the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause death, the intention to cause death, as required for an offence under Section 302 IPC, is not established beyond reasonable doubt. The case, therefore, falls within the ambit of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC.
52. Accordingly, while affirming the finding that the appellant is the author of the injury which resulted in the death of deceased Ramesh Dhruve, the conviction recorded under Section 302 IPC is set aside and is hereby altered to one under Section 304 Part-I IPC.
53. Resultantly, the conviction of the accused under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is convicted under Section 304 Part-I IPC. Considering the gravity of the offence, the manner of its commission, and all attending circumstances, the accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a term of 10 years. The fine imposed by the trial Court shall remain intact. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 10.09.2019 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above.
54. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove.
55. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment along 28 with the original record of the case to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if so advised, with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu