Chattisgarh High Court
Raju @ Devendra Choubey vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 23 March, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:13625-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPCR No. 153 of 2026
Raju @ Devendra Choubey S/o Rajend Kumar Choubey Aged About 45 Years
R/o Purana Bus Stand Simga, Thana And Tahsil Simga, Distt. Raipur, Present
Distt. Balodabazar Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Additional Secretary, Home (Jail)
Department, Government Of Chhattisgarh, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar,
Nawa Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2 - Director General (Prisons And Rehabilitation Services) Jail Department, Jail
Headquarters, Sector 19, Nava Raipur, Atal Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Jail Superintendent Durg, Central Jail, Durg, Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Vikas Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
VED PRAKASH 23/03/2026 DEWANGAN
1. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.03.25 Constitution of India challenging the legality and validity of the order 11:26:53 +0530 2 dated 12.12.2025 (Annexure P/1), whereby the application preferred by the petitioner for grant of remission/premature release has been rejected by the respondent authorities, primarily on the basis of an adverse opinion furnished by the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, without assigning cogent reasons and without due consideration of the relevant factors governing such exercise.
2. The petitioner has filed the present petition with the following prayer:-
"10.1 The Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 12/12/25 (Annexure P/1) passed by the respondent authorities and direct the Respondent State to prematurely release the petitioner, in accordance with law, in the interest of justice.
10.2 This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to grant any other relief as it may deem fit in the interest of justice."
3. The facts of the case in brief are that, the petitioner was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 34 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment along with fine by the learned trial Court. As per the prosecution case, the co- accused Shashi Tripathi, who was the step mother-in-law of the deceased Bhawna Tripathi, allegedly conspired with other accused persons, including the present petitioner, to commit the murder of the deceased due to domestic disputes, and in furtherance of such conspiracy, the deceased was murdered on 25.11.2003. The conviction 3 and sentence of the petitioner have attained finality, as the appeal preferred before this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 244/2005 was dismissed vide judgment dated 17.09.2010, and the further appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal Diary No. 822/2012 was also dismissed vide order dated 21.08.2014. ******* It is the case of the petitioner that he has undergone more than 14 years of actual imprisonment and has earned remission during his incarceration. Upon completion of the requisite period, the petitioner preferred an application seeking premature release/remission, which was recommended by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Durg, and forwarded to the competent authority. The matter was processed in terms of Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C., wherein opinion of the concerned authorities was sought; however, the respondent State, vide impugned order dated 12.12.2025, rejected the application solely on the basis of an adverse opinion furnished by the authorities, without independently considering the relevant parameters governing grant of remission, thereby leading to filing of the present writ petition.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that, the impugned order dated 12.12.2025 is wholly arbitrary, cryptic and suffers from non- application of mind, inasmuch as the application for remission has been rejected solely on the basis of an adverse opinion furnished by the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, without independent consideration of relevant factors as mandated under law. It is contended that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration and has earned remission, and his case was duly recommended by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Durg. However, 4 the respondent authorities have failed to consider the petitioner's conduct in jail, his reformation, likelihood of recidivism, and the object of premature release. In this regard, reliance is placed on Laxman Naskar v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that while considering premature release, the appropriate Government must examine factors such as (i) whether the offence affects society at large, (ii) the probability of the crime being repeated, (iii) the potential of the convict to commit crimes in future, (iv) whether any fruitful purpose would be served by keeping the convict in prison, and (v) the socio-economic condition of the convict's family. ******* It is further submitted that the respondent authorities have failed to adhere to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., AIR 2022 SC 2017 : (2022) 4 SCR 1103, wherein it has been reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect objective consideration of the aforesaid factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence. Further reliance is placed on Rajo v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1068, wherein it has been held that the opinion of the Presiding Judge is only one of the inputs and cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the circumstances of conviction, and that the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic view including post-conviction conduct of the prisoner. Learned counsel has also relied upon State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1 to contend that remission powers must be exercised in a fair, reasonable and non-arbitrary manner. It is thus submitted that the impugned order, being contrary to 5 the settled principles of law, deserves to be set aside and the matter be remitted for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State/ respondents while opposing the petition, submits that the impugned order dated 12.12.2025 has been passed strictly in accordance with law and after due consideration of the relevant materials available on record. It is contended that the petitioner has been convicted for a heinous and grave offence under Sections 302, 34 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, involving a well-planned conspiracy to commit murder, and therefore, the nature and seriousness of the offence are relevant considerations while examining a case for remission. It is further submitted that the competent authority has considered the opinion of the District Magistrate, the Senior Superintendent of Police, as well as the Presiding Judge, as required under Section 432(2) of Cr.P.C., and upon due evaluation of such inputs, has arrived at a conscious decision to reject the application for premature release. Hence, no interference is warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
******* It is further argued that grant of remission is not a matter of right, but lies within the discretionary domain of the appropriate Government, to be exercised on the basis of relevant considerations including public interest and societal impact. In this regard, reliance is placed on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Union of India v. V. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 1, to contend that the power of remission must be exercised cautiously, keeping in view the gravity of the offence and its impact on society. Learned State counsel would submit that merely because the petitioner has completed a certain 6 period of incarceration or earned remission, he does not become entitled to premature release as a matter of right. It is thus submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the present petition deserves to be dismissed.
6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the pleadings, annexures and the material available on record.
7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 12.12.2025 cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The rejection of the petitioner's application for premature release is founded primarily on adverse opinions of the District Magistrate and the Senior Superintendent of Police, without any independent application of mind by the competent authority to the relevant statutory and judicially settled parameters governing remission.
8. It is well-settled that while exercising powers under Sections 432 and 433 Cr.P.C., the appropriate Government is required to take a holistic and reasoned decision. The law on the subject has been succinctly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Laxman Naskar (supra), wherein the Court identified the guiding factors for grant of premature release. The relevant portion reads:
"The following factors are required to be
considered: (i) whether the offence is an
individual act of crime without affecting the society at large; (ii) whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime; (iii) whether the 7 convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime; (iv) whether any fruitful purpose is being served by keeping the convict in prison; and (v) socio-economic condition of the convict's family."
9. In the present case, there is no discussion whatsoever of the aforesaid parameters in the impugned order. The authority has failed to evaluate the petitioner's conduct during incarceration, his reformation, or the likelihood of recidivism.
10. Further, in Ram Chander (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has emphasized that the opinion sought under Section 432(2) Cr.P.C. must be based on objective assessment and not merely on the nature of the offence. The Court observed:
"The opinion of the Presiding Judge must reflect due application of mind to the relevant factors and cannot be a mere reiteration of the nature of the offence or the findings recorded at the time of conviction."
11. Similarly, in Rajo (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the opinion of the Presiding Judge or other authorities is only one of the inputs and cannot be treated as determinative. It was held:
"The appropriate Government is required to take an independent decision based on all relevant considerations including post-conviction conduct;
the opinion of the Presiding Judge cannot be given primacy if it merely reiterates the 8 circumstances of conviction."
12. In the present case, the impugned order reflects a mechanical reliance on adverse opinions without independent evaluation. Such an approach defeats the very purpose of remission, which is rooted in the reformative theory of punishment.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jagdish (supra) has held:
"The policy of remission is a reformative measure and should be applied in a fair and reasonable manner. The decision must not be arbitrary but based on relevant considerations."
14. Likewise, in V. Sriharan (supra), it has been observed:
"Though the power of remission is discretionary, it must be exercised in a just, fair and reasonable manner, and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations."
15. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the respondent authorities have failed to discharge their statutory obligation. The impugned order is cryptic, non-speaking, and suffers from non-application of mind, as it does not reflect consideration of the petitioner's long incarceration, jail conduct, reformation, or other relevant factors.
16. It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner has undergone more than the requisite period of incarceration and his case was duly recommended by the Jail Superintendent. There is nothing on record to 9 indicate any adverse conduct during incarceration or any likelihood of threat to society upon release.
17. In view of the foregoing analysis and the settled legal position, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 12.12.2025 (Annexure P/1) is arbitrary, unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.12.2025 is hereby quashed.
19. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has undergone substantial period of incarceration, has earned remission, has maintained satisfactory conduct in jail, and there is no material indicating likelihood of recidivism, this Court deems it appropriate to direct the respondent authorities to grant the benefit of premature release to the petitioner.
20. The respondents are, therefore, directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other case, in accordance with law.
21. No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved