Chattisgarh High Court
Parameshwar Vishwakarma vs Nirmala Sharma on 13 March, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:12014
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 581 of 2025
Parameshwar Vishwakarma S/o Late Mundhar Vishwakarma Aged
About 40 Years R/o Village Karli (Thothapara), Tehsil- Geedam,
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI
District Dantewada C.G.
... Appellant(s)
JYOTI SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
2026.03.13
17:28:30
+0530
versus
1. Nirmala Sharma D/o Late Mundhar Vishwakarma, W/o Mr. Lalan
Sharma Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Karli (Thothapara),
Tehsil- Geedam, District Dantewada C.G.
2. State Government, Through Collector, District Dantewada C.G.
3. Gaya Prashad S/o Late Mundhar Vishwsakarma Aged About 60
Years R/o Village Chitalanka Tehsil And District- Dantewada C.G.
4. Smt. Durgadevi W/o Shri Mulchand Vishwakarma Aged About 56
Years R/o Village- Jagannathpur, District Jaunpur (U.P.)
5. Smt. Saroj Sharma W/o Mr. Sitaram Sharma Aged About 52
Years R/o Garividi, District Vijaynagram (A.P.)
6. Smt. Laxmi W/o Mr. Omprakash Sharma Aged About 37 Years
R/o Frejarpur Behind Bus Stand, Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G.
7. Smt. Priya Vishwakarma W/o Parmeshwar Vishwakarma Aged
About 40 Years R/o Karli, District- Dantewada C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. T.K. Jha along with Mr. Tapan Kumar Chandra, Advocate 2 For State : Mr. Malay Jain, P.L. For Private : Mr. Aditya Dhar Diwan along with Ms. Respondent Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge Judgment on Board 13.03.2026
1. The defendant/ appellant has preferred this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated 25.07.2025 passed by the Learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Dantewada, Dist South Bastar in Civil Appeal No. 07- A/2023 (Parameshwar Vishwakarma Vs. Nirmala Sharma & Ors.) affirming the judgment and decree dated 08.11.2024 passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 02-A/16 ( Nirmala Vs. Patameshwar & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has partly allowed the suit of the plaintiff/ respondent. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per their status before the learned trial Court.
2. The plaintiff preferred the suit for declaration, permanent injunction and partition pleading inter alia that the suit property originally belonged to Late Munghar Vishwakarma (father of the plaintiff) and the same was his self-acquired property. It is pleaded that after the death of Munghar 3 Vishwakarma and his wife Smt. Shanti Devi Vishwakarma, the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 remained in possession of the suit property and were using and enjoying the same in equal shares since the lifetime of Munghar Vishwakarma. It is further pleaded that Munghar Vishwakarma was residing with the plaintiff during his lifetime and had handed over the original patta of the suit land to her. The plaintiff claims to be in possession of the northern portion of the suit property where she has constructed a double-shutter shop and a residential house consisting of three rooms with a tube-well installed therein and is carrying on a grocery business, whereas defendant No. 1 is in possession of the southern portion where he has constructed a single-shutter shop and four rooms and is also carrying on a grocery business. It is further averred in the plaint that disputes and business rivalry exist between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and proceedings in respect of the suit land were also initiated before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dantewada under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1, on the false pretext that the original patta had been lost, moved an application before the Sub- Divisional Officer for issuance of a duplicate patta and by misrepresenting himself as the sole legal heir of Late Munghar Vishwakarma and in collusion with the revenue authorities, managed to obtain a duplicate patta in his name 4 and in the name of his wife (defendant No. 7), which according to the plaintiff is illegal and liable to be cancelled. On the aforesaid pleadings, the plaintiff instituted the suit. The cause of action is stated to have arisen after the death of Munghar Vishwakarma on 28.08.2014 and also on account of the subsequent proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Officer and the continuing dispute between the parties regarding the suit property.
3. Defendants No. 1, 3 and 5 filed a joint written statement and, while admitting the admitted facts, denied the averments made in the plaint paragraph-wise. Their principal contention is that defendant No. 1 is the exclusive owner of the suit land and no other person has any legal right over the same. It is further pleaded that in Revenue Case No. 291/4-121/2014- 15, by order dated 19.02.2024 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dantewada, the original forest rights patta issued in favour of Munghar Vishwakarma has been cancelled and a patta has been issued in favour of defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 7. On the said grounds, dismissal of the suit has been prayed for. Defendant No. 7 has also filed a separate written statement reiterating the same averments as made by defendants No. 1, 3 and 5 and has likewise prayed for dismissal of the suit.
4. Defendant No. 6 filed a written statement and, except for the 5 admitted facts, denied the averments made in the plaint paragraph-wise. It is mainly contended that although the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are in possession of the suit land, the plaintiff and the defendants, being the children of Late Munghar Vishwakarma, are all entitled to equal rights and shares in the suit property. It is further pleaded that Late Munghar Vishwakarma had not made any transfer of the suit land in favour of either the plaintiff or defendant No. 1. According to this defendant, he is also entitled to a 1/5th share in the suit property.
5. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff is only entitled for 1/6th share over the disputed property. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree dated 08.11.2024, the defendant No. 1 preferred a First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the present appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the Courts have committed grave illegality and perversity in 6 holding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. It is contended that the dispute in question arises out of proceedings under the provisions of the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (for short Act, 2006) and the Rules framed thereunder. Referring to Chapter IV of the Act and Rules 12 to 16 of the Rules, 2006, it is submitted that a complete mechanism and procedure has been provided for adjudication of claims relating to forest rights. According to the learned counsel, against the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Level Committee, the appropriate remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach the District Level Committee under Rule 15 of the Rules, 2008. It is further submitted that in view of the statutory scheme providing a specific forum and procedure for redressal of grievances, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred. Therefore, both the Courts have erred in entertaining and deciding the suit. It is thus contended that the decree passed by the Civil Court without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law and is liable to be set aside. He placed his reliance in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukum Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2841.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees 7 passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First Appellate Court have been carefully examined.
8. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission made by learned counsel for the appellant. So far as the procedural provisions contained in the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder are concerned, the said procedure is primarily meant for a situation where a claim over forest land is made for the first time by a forest dweller. In the present case, however, the forest rights patta over the suit land had already been granted in favour of Late Munghar Vishwakarma. After his death, the devolution of such forest rights can only take place in accordance with Section 4(4) of the Act.
9. In the instant case, the plaintiff has instituted the suit challenging the legality and validity of the second modified forest rights patta issued in favour of defendant No.1 and seeking the reliefs of declaration, partition and permanent injunction. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those which are either expressly or impliedly barred. The defendants have not been able to point out any specific provision under the Act of 2006 or the Rules framed thereunder which expressly or impliedly bars the jurisdiction 8 of the Civil Court in matters relating to succession to forest rights or in respect of challenge to the validity of such patta.
10. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukum Singh and Ors. is also of no assistance to the appellant. In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with a situation where the statute contained a clear and specific bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In the present case, however, no such specific statutory bar has been shown to exist under the provisions of the Act of 2006 or the Rules framed thereunder. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the contention raised by the appellant regarding lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not acceptable. It is held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the present suit. Consequently, the said contention stands rejected.
11. Further, in the present case, both the learned Trial Court as well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due appreciation of the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the provisions of the Act, 2006, that the suit land was not the self- acquired property of Late Munghar Vishwakarma but a forest rights patta granted by the Government under the said Act. It has been held that such patta confers only a right of use and 9 enjoyment and, in view of Section 4(4) of the Act 2006, the same is not transferable. The Courts have further concurrently found that the order dated 19.02.2016 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Dantewada, on the basis of which a modified second copy of the forest rights patta was issued in favour of defendant No.1 and defendant No.7, was passed without following the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and in violation of the principles of natural justice, and therefore the said modified patta was illegal and void. It has also been concurrently held that after the death of Munghar Vishwakarma, all his legal heirs are entitled to succeed to the rights of use and enjoyment of the patta land; however, since the land is Government/forest land granted only for use and enjoyment, the same is not capable of partition. At the same time, the house and shops constructed over the suit land by the family members are divisible properties and each of the six legal heirs is entitled to 1/6th share therein. The Courts have further held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred under the Act in respect of disputes relating to succession to forest rights. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Trial Court partly decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court, upon reappreciation of the material on record, affirmed the said findings and dismissed the appeal filed by defendant No.1. 10
12. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
13. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/ defendant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.
14. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do not give rise to any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
15. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
16. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating 11 the settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
17. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
18. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial 12 question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC. In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in the same and they does not call for any interference.
19. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti