Chattisgarh High Court
Arun Vasant Bapat vs Union Of India Th. C.B.I on 13 March, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:12098
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09.12.2025 13.03.2026 -- 13.03.2026
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Judgment reserved on: 09.12.2025
Judgment delivered on: 13.03.2026
CRA No. 299 of 2006
1 - Arun Vasant Bapat, S/o Vasant Vinayak, Aged about 42 years, R/o
C-6, Parijat Colony Nehru Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.).
---Appellant
Versus
1 - Union of India Though C.B.I. Anti Corruption Br. Jabalpur, M.P.
--- Respondent(s)
For Appellant : Ms. Sareena Khan, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. Gopa Kumar, Advocate
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
CAV Judgment
2
1. The present appeal, preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 04.04.2006 passed by the learned Special Judge (Central Bureau of Investigation), Raipur, Chhattisgarh, in Special Criminal Case No. 21/2004. By the said judgment, the appellant was convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 468, 471, 420 read with Section 511 and Section 477-A of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for each offence. In default of payment of fine, the appellant was directed to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period of two months for each offence.
2. According to the prosecution (CBI), during the relevant period the appellant dishonestly fabricated documents relating to three LIC policies bearing Nos. 380912503, 380910103 and 380503062 in the names of Ku. Anju Pandit, Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ku. Vibha Jagum. It is alleged that he forged policy papers, transfer records and signatures, falsely showing the policies as transferred to the Bilaspur Branch, with intent to obtain LIC loans amounting to Rs.1,85,096/-. Although the loans were sanctioned by the Branch Manager, the amounts were never disbursed. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against 3 the appellant and the learned Trial Court thereafter framed charges against him accordingly to which, appellant abjured his guilt and claimed to be tried.
3. To establish its case, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses. The statement of the accused/appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein he denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and claimed innocence as well as false implication. He did not adduce any evidence in his defence.
4. The learned trial Court, upon appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record convicted and sentenced the appellant as detailed in para 1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the learned Trial Court has gravely erred in law and on facts in holding the appellant guilty. The appellant, being merely an Assistant Clerk, had no authority or capacity to sanction or secure LIC loans and has been falsely implicated as a scapegoat to shield the real offenders. The findings of conviction are against the weight of evidence and rest on conjectures and surmises, with no proof of mens rea. Material facts were ignored, including the lack of authority of the Branch Manager to sanction loans of such amount and the handwriting expert's opinion, which does not support the prosecution case. The impugned judgment is therefore unsustainable and liable to be set aside.
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6. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the learned Trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence on record and recorded findings of guilt based on proved acts of fabrication, forgery, and conspiracy. The Trial Court has duly considered all material aspects and no perversity or illegality is shown. The impugned judgment is reasoned, lawful and calls for no interference.
7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.
8. It is evident from the record of the learned Trial Court that charges were framed against the appellant under Sections 468, 471, 420 read with Section 511 and 477-A of the IPC as well as under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available on record, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 468, 471, 420 read with Section 511 and 477-A of the IPC and under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
9. It was not in dispute before the learned Trial Court that the appellant/accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was posted as an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Branch Office, Bilaspur, during the year 1994-1995.
10. M. Karketta (P.W.-3), the then Senior Branch Manager of the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bilaspur, deposed that the 5 accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was posted as an Assistant at the said Branch Office. He further stated that the policy forms pertaining to Ku. Anju Pandit, Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ku. Bibha Jagam Hudko were placed before him for the purposes of loan and surrender. Upon verification and enquiry, it was revealed that the said policies had never been transferred from Ambikapur and that the policies in the names of Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ku. Bibha Jagam Hudko had, in fact, never been issued. He further deposed that Ex. P-19 was the payment voucher relating to policy document Ex. P-11, on the basis of which cheque Ex. P- 20 was drawn and issued on 30.05.1995 in the name of Ms. Vibha Jagam. However, the payment of cheque Ex. P-20 was subsequently stopped after verification revealed that the policy shown to have been transferred had not actually been transferred.
In his cross-examination, he stated that,"..... मैं बिलासपुर क्र. 1 में था यह कहना गलत है कि बिलासपुर क्र. 1 में पांच शाखा थी फिर साक्षी से बचाव पक्ष द्वारा पूछा गया कि बिलासपुर क्र. 1 में पाँच अलग अलग सेक्शन थी तब साक्षी ने कहा कि हाँ सेक्शन अलग अलग थी उन सेक्शनों में अकाउंट, पालिसी सर्विसिंग, ओ.एस. डिपार्टमेंट, न्यूबिजनेस डिपा., सैल्स डिपार्टमेंट थे। यह बात सही है कि इन पांच विभागों में लिपिक के पद पर कार्यरत् असिस्टेन्ट अलग अलग पोस्टिंग होती है कि कौन सा असिस्टेन्ट किस विभाग में कार्य करेगा । यह बात भी सही है कि असिस्टेन्ट के तबादले लिखित में होते हैं। यह बात भी सही है कि असिस्टेन्ट के उक्त आदेश सम्बंधित शाखा से ही पारित किये जाते हैं। अभियुक्त बापट कब तथा किस विभाग में कार्य किया है इसका लेखा जोखा बिलासपुर कार्यालय में होना चाहिये। साक्षी ने स्वतः कहा कि मैं जब से आया हूँ तब से अभियुक्त बापट पालिसी सर्विसिंग 6 विभाग में है।, he again stated that, मैं रिकार्ड देखे बिना नहीं बता सकता कि मैंने अभियुक्त बापट का ट्रांसफर सितम्बर 94 में इन एण्ड आउट विभाग में किया था या नहीं ।"
In para 9, he stated that, "यह बात सही है कि लेजर पोस्टिंग विभाग अलग है और उसका असिस्टेन्ट लिपिक भी अलग होताहै। यह बात भी सही है कि एक ही असिस्टेन्ट को सभी काम एक साथ नही सौंपे जाते और अलग अलग विभाग में अलग अलग असिस्टेन्ट कार्यरत हैं। यह सही है लेजर प्रीमियम जमा करने की प्रविष्टि लेजर सेक्शन में होती है। यह सही है कि हरेके पालिसी की लेजर में अलग अलग प्रविष्टि होती है। "
In para 12, he stated that, " इस प्रकरण में जो पालिसी बॉन्ड पेश है उनके बारे में मैंने बिलासपुर ऑफिस से जानकारी नहीं लिया कि यह कब और किसको इशू किये गए है। जानकारी क्यों नहीं लिया इसका कोई कारण नहीं है। यह कहना गलत है कि सभी पालिसी बॉन्ड के निरंक प्रोफोर्मा मैने स्वयं प्राप्त किया था, इसलिए मैंने इसके बाबत जानकारी प्राप्त नहीं किया था। प्र. पी. 14, प्र. पी. 3 ए, प्र. पी. 7 ए, आदि में जो मोनो ग्राम है वह जब से एल. आई. सी. बनी है तब से चालू है। "
In para 33, he admitted that,"....... यह बात सही है कि 912 नं. की पालिसी, में मैंने जिन तीन दस्तावेजों का उपर वर्णन किया है सिर्फ वे ही दस्तावेज उक्त पालिसी डॉके ट में थी और यह भी सही है कि शेष सभी दस्तावेज जो डॉके ट में होना चाहिए डॉके ट में नहीं थी और यही मैने बांदे साहब को बतलाया था। मुझे इस बाबत कोई जानकारी नहीं है कि 912 नं. की पालिसी के शेष दस्तावेज कहाँ पर चले गए। मैंने उक्त मिसिंग दस्तावेजों को ढूंढने का प्रयास किया था लेकिन वे दस्तावेज मुझे नहीं मिले। जब सी. बी. आई. वाले दस्तावेज जप्ती करने आये तब भी मुझे उक्त 912 की पालिसी के गुमे हुए कागजात नहीं मिले थे और मैंने उक्त तीनो कागजात को डॉके ट में सी. बी. आई. को दे दिए थे। "7
In para 37, he admitted that, "यह सही है कि सीनियर ब्रांच मैनेजर होने के नाते मुझे के वल 75,000/- का ऋण सैंक्शन करने का अधिकार है। यह भी सही है कि 75,000/- से ज्यादा का ऋण है तो उसे डिविशनल हेडक्वार्टर स्वीकृ ति के लिए भेजा जाना चाहिए। 75 हजार रु. तक ए. ओ. (प्रशासनिक अधिकारी ) कर सकता है। और उसके ऊपर का डिविशनल ऑफिस भेजा जाता है। ब्रांच मैनेजर भी 75 हज़ार तक स्वीकृ त कर सकता है। मैंने अंजू पंडित का एक लाख का लोन सैंक्शन कर दिया था। जो मुझसे गलती हो गयी थी जिसके लिए मुझे मंडल कार्यालय से वार्निंग भी मिली थी। यह कहना गलत है कि मैं एक लाख रूपए का ऋण स्वीकृ त कर दिया था क्योंकि मैं भी इस फोर्जरी में शामिल था। "
In para 38, he stated that, " कै लकु लेशन सीट नितिनलाल ने बनाया था या नहीं मैं बिना दस्तावेज देखे नहीं बता सकता। यह कहना गलत है कि मैंने डॉक्यूमेंट दुबारा तैयार करवाया था। यह भी कहना गलत है कि नितिन लाल ने दुबारा कै लकु लेशन सीट बनवाने से इंकार कर दिया था। इसलिए 912 में कै लकु लेशन सीट नहीं लगा है। यह कहना गलत है कि हमारे सारे ऑफिसर मिलकर यह प्लान बना लिया था कि बापट को फ़साना है बाकी सब अधिकारी को बचाना है। यह भी गलत है कि अधिकारियो को बचाने के लिए एवं अधिकारियो को बचाने के लिए सारी पुलिसिया बापट से भरवाई थी। "
11. Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted his signatures on the loan surrender review slip (Ex. P/2), the payment voucher (Ex. P/22) and the policy document of Anju Pandit (Ex. P/15). He further admitted his signatures on the loan surrender review slip of Jagdish Prasad Tiwari (Ex. P/6) and the payment voucher (Ex. P/16).
In para 6 of his deposition, he stated that on the basis of the written information (Ex. P/15) submitted by him to the Senior Branch Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Bilaspur 8 Branch, the Senior Branch Manager had sought information from the Ambikapur Branch regarding Policy No. 380912503 as to whether the said policy had been issued from that Branch. He further stated that the information received from the Ambikapur Branch revealed that the said policy had neither been issued nor transferred in the name of Anju Pandit from the Ambikapur Branch.
In para 8, he further stated that whenever a policy was submitted for surrender value or loan approval, there was a prescribed procedure for processing the same. He stated that the Corporation had a printed proforma for loan applications for both purposes, although the policyholder could also submit an application on plain paper. He clarified that it was not the practice that the policyholder's application was first taken on plain paper and thereafter the policyholder was called to the office to fill up the printed proforma. He further stated that the application form was initially submitted to the dealing clerk, and in the absence of the dealing clerk, the same was submitted to the Higher Grade Assistant (HGA). He also stated that when both the policies relating to Anju Pandit were submitted for loan surrender and loan approval, he was the dealing clerk and Mr. Basing was the HGA. He further stated that every policy submitted for surrender value or loan approval had a docket.
In para 14, he stated that prior to taking action regarding the approval of a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- in favour of Anju Pandit, he 9 had called for the docket and perused it. However, he admitted that he had not verified the documents in detail and had only seen whether the documents were attached to the docket or not. He further stated that most of the documents were available in the docket, though he had neither counted the documents nor examined them individually.
In para 20 of his deposition, he stated that he was not certain as to whether the docket relating to the approved loan of Rs.1,00,000/- had been lost. He further stated that it was not correct to say that the docket had been lost and, therefore, his calculation sheet and the duplicate policy were not available in the branch case. However, he admitted that the documents presently available on record did not contain either the said calculation sheet or the duplicate policy.
12. Babulal Bande (P.W.-7) deposed regarding the procedure relating to the transfer of policies from one branch to another and the manner in which a policy was surrendered and a cheque was prepared. He further stated that the policy of Ms. Anju Pandit had also been directly processed by the accused Bapat without obtaining approval from any competent authority. He stated that his report was Ex. P/28 and that Ex. P/28A was the statement given to him by the accused Bapat.
In his cross-examination, he admitted that, to his knowledge, a stop payment advice had been sent only with regard to the policy of M.R. Sahu. He stated that he had seen the stop payment 10 document but could not say whose signature appeared on the stop payment letter that had been sent. However, he stated that since Bapat was working in that section, it could be presumed that Bapat must have sent the said letter.
In para 19, he stated that he was not earlier aware that Bapat had detected fraud in all four policies, but M. Karketta had informed him about the said fraud during the course of the investigation. He further stated that, as per the rules, the Raipur Divisional Office had not been informed regarding the fraudulent policies, and that he came to know about the fraud only when he visited the Bilaspur Branch, where M. Karketta had informed him about the same.
In para 20, he stated that he had asked M. Karketta as to why, despite the irregularities in all four policies having been reported in August 1994, the information had not been sent to the Divisional Office. He stated that M. Karketta informed him that he had sent a letter to the Senior Divisional Manager, Raipur, in June 1995.
In para 28, he stated that there were separate stationery sections in both the Divisional Office and the Branch Offices. He stated that a register of issued forms was maintained and entries were made therein. He further stated that policies were issued by the New Business Section and that blank policy forms were issued to the Officer on Special Duty (OSD) of the New Business 11 Section. He stated that generally such blank policy forms were not issued to other sections; however, officials in the Insurance Department (PS) who were required to issue duplicate policies were also supplied with policy bond forms. He further stated that policies in respect of which duplicate policies were issued were also entered in the register. He admitted that he had not checked the register maintained in the stationery section as he did not feel it necessary to do so. He further stated that he had been serving in LIC for 28 years and that his first appointment was as an Assistant. He also stated that the LIC monogram remained printed on every bond.
In para 31, he stated that, as per the rules, loan applications and other applications were required to be forwarded to the concerned clerk through the Branch Manager or Supervisor. However, during the course of his investigation, he found that such instructions were not being followed in the Bilaspur Branch. He stated that loan applications were being forwarded directly to the concerned clerk, who then took action thereon directly. He further stated that since the aforesaid loan procedure was not being followed, the policies of Jagdish Prasad Tiwari and Ms. Anju Pandit had also been processed directly without obtaining permission from any higher or competent authority. However, he admitted that he had not specifically mentioned that Bapat had taken direct action without the permission of a senior officer with respect to Policy No. 503 relating to Anju Pandit. 12
13. Anju Pandit (P.W.-8) stated that she had not taken any policy from the Life Insurance Corporation in her name and that she had never signed any such documents.
In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not know whether her father had any insurance policy or not. She further stated that she did not remember whether any documents relating to the investigation had been shown to her and also did not remember whether the CBI had obtained her signatures on any papers.
14. Vibha Jagam (P.W.-11), the wife of Arun Bapat, stated that she had taken a policy in her name in the year 1989 and had submitted Ex. P-40 in relation to the said policy for tax purposes. She further stated that she did not remember the policy number; however, the said policy was Ex. P-11.
She further stated that the handwriting appearing on the policy surrender application (Ex. P-12) was not her handwriting.
In her cross-examination, she stated that her husband had again been called the next day and was released at about 3:00 a.m. She further stated that, according to her, her husband had been forced to fill out certain forms.
15. Upon close scrutiny of the statements of the witnesses, it appears that the policy surrender forms and calculation sheets were admitted by Nitin Lal (P.W.-5). M. Karketta (P.W.-3) also admitted that he had sanctioned a loan of Rs.1,00,000/- though he 13 did not possess the authority to sanction such an amount. However, the charge-sheet was filed only against the accused Arun Bapat.
16. The allegation against the accused Arun Bapat was that while he was posted as an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, he had entered into a criminal conspiracy and had prepared forged and fictitious insurance policies. It was alleged that he had utilized the policy numbers of lapsed ("dead") policies and, on that basis, had fraudulently prepared fake payment vouchers, some of which were later subjected to stop payment. However, from the record it appears that the prosecution did not produce any document to establish in which section the accused Arun Vasant Bapat was posted at the relevant time, in what capacity he was working, or how he was responsible for preparing the alleged forged documents.
17. Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted his signatures on the calculation sheets and vouchers. He also admitted that when the CBI had seized certain documents, some of the documents were found to be missing.
18. M. Karketta (P.W.-3) also admitted that the documents relating to Policy No. 912 were missing. He further admitted that he was the Senior Branch Manager and had the authority to sanction loans only up to Rs.75,000/-, but he had sanctioned a loan of 14 Rs.1,00,000/-. He stated that the said loan had been sanctioned by him by mistake.
19. In his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused Arun Vasant Bapat, while replying to Question No. 187, stated that he had not committed any offence. He further stated that he had filed a complaint against the Branch Manager Karketta, Nitin Lal and Shri Ghosh and, due to this reason, they had reported the matter to the CBI with the intention of falsely implicating him in the present case. He also alleged that the CBI had harassed him and his wife..
20. In Indrajeet Singh Solanki and other connected matters decided in Criminal Appeal No. 712/2007, this Court, vide judgment dated 12.12.2025, held in paras 34, 35 and 37 as under:-
34. In the matter of Sheila Sebastian (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has, in paras 26 to 30 of the judgment, held as under:-
"26. The definition of "false document" is a part of the definition of "forgery". Both must be read together. "Forgery" and "fraud" are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts. In the case in hand, there is no finding recorded by the trial court that the respondents have made any false document or 15 part of the document/record to execute mortgage deed under the guise of that "false document". Hence, neither Respondent 1 nor Respondent 2 can be held as makers of the forged documents. It is the imposter who can be said to have made the false document by committing forgery. In such an event the trial court as well as the appellate court misguided themselves by convicting the accused. Therefore, the High Court has rightly acquitted the accused based on the settled legal position and we find no reason to interfere with the same.
27. A reasonable doubt has already been thoroughly explained in Latesh v. State of Maharashtra wherein "reasonable doubt" has been enunciated by this Court as (at SCC p. 83, para 46) "a mean between excessive caution and excessive indifference to a doubt, further it has been elaborated that reasonable doubt must be a practical one and not an abstract theoretical hypothesis".
28. In this case at hand, the imposter has not been found or investigated into by the officer concerned. Nothing has been spilled on the 16 relationship between the imposter and Respondent 1. Law is well settled with regard to the fact that however strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast upon the courts to ensure that suspicion does not take place of the legal proof. In this case, the trial court as well as the appellate court got carried away by the fact that accused is the beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to prove the first transaction i.e. PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by the standard of preponderance of probability.
29. This case on hand is a classic example of poor prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. The investigating officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his duties. He has to be fair, transparent and his only endeavour should be to find out the truth The investigating officer has not even taken bare minimum care 17 to find out the whereabouts of the imposter who executed the PoA. The evidence on record clearly reveals that PoA was not executed by the complainant and the beneficiary is the accused, still the accused could not be convicted. The laches in the lopsided investigation goes to the root of the matter and fatal to the case of prosecution. If this is the coordination between the prosecution and the investigating agency, every criminal case tend to end up in acquittal. In the process, the common man will lose confidence on the criminal justice delivery system, which is not a good symptom. It is the duty of the investigating officer, prosecution as well as the courts to ensure that full and material facts and evidence are brought on record, so that there is no scope for miscarriage of justice.
30. Although we acknowledge the appellant's plight who has suffered due to alleged acts of forgery, but we are not able to appreciate the appellant's contentions as a penal statute cannot be expanded by using implications.
Section 464 IPC makes it clear that only the one who makes a false document can be held liable under the aforesaid provision. It must be 18 borne in mind that where there exists no ambiguity, there lies no scope for interpretation The contentions of the appellant are contrary to the provision and contrary to the settled law. The prosecution could not succeed to prove the offence of forgery by adducing cogent and reliable evidence. Apart from that, it is not as though the appellant is remediless. She has a common law remedy of instituting a suit challenging the validity and binding nature of the mortgage deed and it is brought to our notice that already the competent civil court has cancelled the mortgage deed and the appellant got back the property."
21. Further in Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paras 18 to 20 as under:-
"18. We are unable to accept her submission on this score too. There is nothing on record to show the appellant had manufactured the alleged fake document which is a sine qua non to attract Section 465 IPC [punishment for forgery]. In fact, the original fabricated document had not been recovered.
19. In Sheila Sebastian v. R. Jawaharaj [(2018) 7 SCC 581, para 25], this Court held to attract 19 Section 464 IPC [Making a false document], the prosecution must establish that the accused had made the fake document. No material connecting the appellant to the making of the fake document has been adduced in the impugned charge sheet.
20. Similarly, offences under Section 468 IPC [forgery for purpose of cheating] and Section 471 IPC are not attracted, as the requisite mens rea, i.e., dishonest intention to cause wrongful loss to the Education Department and wrongful gain to himself has not been demonstrated as the issuance of the recognition was not dependent on the production of the alleged forged NOC."
22. In light of the above discussion, it appears that the prosecution has only been able to establish that at the relevant time the accused, Arun Vasant Bapat, was working as an Assistant in the Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). It has further been established that certain cheques were issued in favour of policyholders in respect of policies shown to have been transferred. However, upon enquiry it was revealed that several such policies had never been transferred from the Ambikapur Branch to the Bilaspur Branch.
23. M. Karketta (P.W.-3) and Nitin Lal (P.W.-5) admitted that they had signed the calculation sheets and payment vouchers. Babulal Bande (P.W.-7) also admitted that M. Kerketta (P.W.-3) had not 20 informed the Divisional Office, Raipur about the alleged fraud. He further admitted that, as per the prescribed rules, loan applications were required to be processed through the proper channel, i.e., through the Branch Manager and Supervisor before being dealt with by the concerned clerk.
24. The defence of the accused is that both senior and junior officers of the LIC had conspired among themselves and when certain irregularities and illegalities came to light, the accused was falsely implicated in the present case.
25. The evidence adduced by the prosecution itself indicates that the procedure followed in the LIC office involved several stages of scrutiny and verification, with multiple safeguards before any policy transaction could be completed. Despite the existence of such procedural safeguards, the prosecution has merely assumed that the payment vouchers were prepared by the accused. A careful reading of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses does not disclose how the appellant, Arun Vasant Bapat, had entered into any conspiracy or participated in the preparation of forged policies or other forged documents. The prosecution witnesses have admitted the suggestion that the accused had attempted to stop the payment of certain vouchers. It has also been admitted that important documents were found missing at the time of seizure by the CBI. Although LIC officials have acknowledged the existence of several internal checks and 21 safeguards, no specific, reliable or legally admissible evidence has been produced to establish that the appellant had bypassed such safeguards or had played any role in the alleged acts of forgery. On the contrary, M. Karketta (P.W.-3) admitted that he had mistakenly sanctioned a loan in excess of his authorized limit. Thus, in the absence of clinching or admissible documentary evidence from the LIC records, the prosecution has failed to prove its case, whereas the defence put forth by the accused that the superior officers conspired among themselves and falsely implicated the appellant in order to shield themselves appears to be a probable defence.
26. It is a well-settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In the absence of cogent, reliable and legally admissible evidence establishing conspiracy or any active role of the appellant, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts necessary to sustain the charges under Sections 468, 471 and 420 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 477- A of the Indian Penal Code, and Sections 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
27. In view of the foregoing analysis and upon appreciation of the entire evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. The case rests merely on suspicion without any 22 cogent, reliable or legally admissible evidence establishing forgery, conspiracy, or involvement of the appellant.
28. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside and the appellant is hereby acquitted of all the charges levelled against him.
29. Appellant is reported to be on bail and, therefore keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. (481 of the B.N.S.S.), appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which shall be effective for a period of six months along with an undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
30. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for information and necessary action if, any.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
JUDGE
Ruchi
RUCHI YADAV Digitally signed by RUCHI YADAV