Chattisgarh High Court
Smt. Chandrakala Devi vs The State Of Mp on 11 March, 2026
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
1 / 19
2026:CGHC:11753
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 2660 of 1999
PAWAN
KUMAR Reserved on: 02.02.2026
JHA
Digitally Delivered on: 11.03.2026
signed by
PAWAN
KUMAR JHA
Uploaded on : 11.03.2026
• Smt. Chandrakala Devi W/o Hariram Agrawal, aged 45 years,
Housewife, R/o Jail Durga Auto Centre Saraipali, Police Station
Saraipali, District Mahasamund (M.P.) (now C.G.)
--- Appellant/Defendant
versus
1. State of Madhya Pradesh through the C.B.I.
---Respondent/Plaintiff
____________________________________________________________ For Appellant : Mr. Ravindra Sharma, Advocate For Respondents : Mr. Vaibhav A. Goverdhan, Adv and Ms. Anuja Sharma, Adv Hon'ble Shri Justice Parth Prateem Sahu C.A.V. Judgment
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 30.09.1999 passed by learned Fifth Additional Sessions Special Judge (CBI), Jabalpur in Special Case No. 2/96, convicting and sentencing the appellant in following manner.
CONVICTION SENTENCE
U/s 420/120B of IPC R.I. for 2 years and fine of ₹ 5000 in
default, R.I. for 6 months
U/s 468/471/120B of IPC R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 3000 in
2 / 19
default, R.I. for 6 month
R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 3000 in
U/s 477A/120B of IPC
default, R.I. for 6 month
U/s 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the R.I. for 1 year and fine of ₹ 4000 in
Prevention of Corruption Act read default, R.I. for 6 month
with Section 120B of IPC
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that accused B.P. Rautre was posted as Clerk/Special Assistant at the Central Bank of India, Saraipali Branch, in April 1992. He entered into a criminal conspiracy with co- accused/ appellant Chandrakala Devi to defraud the said bank. In pursuance of the alleged conspiracy, on 30.04.1992, accused B.P. Rautre withdrew a sum of ₹ 20,000/- from H.S.S. Account No. 2442 belonging to Surendra Kumar Saluja and ₹10,000/- from H.S.S. Account No. 4978 belonging to Upendra Kumar Bhoi. Out of the said amounts, ₹20,000/- was transferred, through a transfer voucher, to H.S.S. Account No. 3666 standing in the name of accused Chandrakala Devi. It is alleged that, despite having knowledge of balance of only ₹460.57/- in her account, accused Chandrakala Devi issued Cheque No. 3963 dated 30.04.1992 for ₹40,000/-. Before detection of the alleged irregularities, she closed the said account. According to the prosecution, by issuing the cheque and receiving the amount which had been transferred through illegal means, accused Chandrakala Devi dishonestly induced the bank to part with ₹40,000/- and thereby committed fraud.
3. Upon receiving information regarding the fraud at the Saraipali Branch, Shri C.K. Pandey conducted a preliminary inquiry on the directions of the Chief Internal Auditor and submitted his report. Thereafter, the 3 / 19 matter was handed over to the CBI. On the basis of the information received, the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Jabalpur registered FIR bearing RC No. 54(A)/92 dated 30.11.1992 and entrusted investigation to Inspector Devendra Singh. During investigation, various documents were seized, witnesses were examined, and specimen handwriting and signatures of concerned persons ie., Tulsiram Sahu, N.K. Meher, Umeshchand Guchhayat, Upendra Kumar Bhoi and accused Chandrakala Devi, Narsingh Sahu etc., were obtained and sent to the Government Examiner of Questioned Documents, Central Forensic Institutes, Calcutta. After completion of investigation and receipt of the expert report, investigating agency concluded that the accused persons had committed offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 468, 471, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. As accused/ appellant Chandrakala Devi was not a public servant and accused B.P. Rautre had already been separated from service, no sanction for prosecution was obtained, and a charge-sheet was filed before the competent court.
4. During trial, accused B.P. Rautre remained absconding and was declared so by the court. Charges were framed against accused Chandrakala Devi for the offences under Sections 420, 468, 471, 477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
5. Appellant denied the charges, pleaded innocence and falsely implicated and prayed for trial. Prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses on its behalf namely P.C. Lunia, Retd. Senior Manager 4 / 19 (P.W.-1), Umeshchand Gucchayat, Probationary Officer in Central Bank of India (P.W.-2), Sureshchand Gupta (P.W.-3), Upendra Kumar Bhoi (P.W.-4), T.R. Sahu, Branch Manager (P.W.5), Surendra Kumar Saluja (P.W.6), C.K. Pandey, Internal Auditor (P.W.-7) and Devendra Singh, Inspector (P.W. 8). Statement of appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which she denied all incriminating evidence appearing against her and pleaded innocence and false implication. No witness was examined in defence on her behalf.
6. Trial Court upon appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record, held that prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused/appellant had committed the offence under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471, 477-A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and accordingly, convicted and sentenced her in the manner as described above.
7. Learned counsel for appellant submits that learned trial court erred in accepting the case of prosecution that the co-accused B.P. Rautrai, employee of the Bank, has withdrawn amount of ₹ 30,000 from the other account holders and deposited in the account of appellant on 30.04.1992 and on the same date the amount had been withdrawn and the fact of withdrawal of ₹ 40,000 from appellant was admitted by appellant in her statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC. He would submit that the learned court below fell into error in not considering that the ledger account which is produced and proved as Ext. P-3, which would show that the amount of ₹ 20,000 was deposited on 22.04.1992 and 23.04.1992 and subsequently it has been 5 / 19 withdrawn on 30.04.1992. It is contention of learned counsel for appellant that from the nature of allegation and the documents, prosecution could not able to prove in clear terms the deposit of the amount of ₹ 40,000 in the account of appellant, which is stated to be deposited on 30.04.1992, as there is no documentary evidence specifically mentioning the date of deposit to be 30.04.1992. He would also submit that document Ext. P-3 (ledger) has been proved by two witnesses ie., PW-2, Umeshchand Gucchayat, and PW-7, Shri C.K. Pandey. Both the witnesses have not made any submission with regard to the date appearing in Ext. P-3 as 22/23.04.1992 on which date ₹ 20,000 each was deposited in the account of appellant. Appellant has taken specific defence and made categorical statement in her statement recorded under Section 313 of CrPC that amount of ₹ 40,000 was deposited by appellant in her account prior to 30.04.1992, however, after signing the cheque, she handed over the cheque to the bank employee trusting upon him to withdraw the same. Accordingly the amount was withdrawn on 30.04.1992. There is no other evidence in record to suggest that the alleged amount of ₹ 40,000 which is stated to be withdrawn by co-accused B.P. Rautre from the accounts of other account holders of bank was deposited in the account of appellant on 30.04.1992. In absence of such evidence, prosecution could not able to prove withdrawal of amount of ₹ 40,000 fraudulently from the account of others by B.P. Rautre and its deposit in the account of appellant in connivance with the appellant and further withdrawn the said amount by hatching conspiracy with the co-accused. Appellant in this case has been convicted for offence under Sections 420, 468, 471, 6 / 19 477-A read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
8. Learned counsel for respondent-CBI would oppose the submission of learned counsel for appellant and would submit that learned Trial court upon appreciating the evidence brought on record by the prosecution has rightly convicted appellant. He contended that document Ext. P-3 is a document seized by prosecution agency from the bank and the witnesses proved it ie., PW-3 and PW-7 who categorically made statement before the court that deposit entry made are of 30.04.1992.
9. I have learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record of trial court.
10. The core question involved in this appeal is whether the prosecution has proved offence of criminal conspiracy against appellant for punishing her under Section 120-B IPC, beyond reasonable doubt.
11. Undisputedly, when Internal Audit department received information under instructions of Chief Internal Auditor of Central Bank, of some irregularities committed by B.P. Rautre, Clerk/ Special Assistant at Central Bank of India, Saraipali Branch, Shri C.K. Pandey PW-7, conducted enquiry at Central Bank of India, Saraipali Branch. In the enquiry, he found that B.P. Rautre, Clerk, by forging withdrawal forms, withdrew an amount of ₹ 40,000/- (₹ 20,000 each) from bank accounts of Surendra Kumar Saluja and Upendra Kumar Bhoi. This information was forwarded to the CBI, based upon which, crime was registered. Initially, FIR was registered only against Bank employees and during the course of investigation, appellant was also arrayed as an accused. After completion of investigation, in 7 / 19 charge-sheet, only two persons were made accused, ie appellant and B.P. Rautre, Clerk, at Branch, Saraipali.
12. Shri C.K. Pandey was examined before trial Court as PW-7. In his evidence, he stated that in January 1992, he was posted as Internal Auditor in Saraipali Branch of Central Bank of India. He stated names and account numbers of the account holders from which B.P. Rautre had withdrawn amount by forging withdrawal forms/vouchers. He further stated that H.S.S. Account No. 3666 belonged to appellant Smt. Chandrakala Devi.
13. PW-2, Umesh Chand Gucchayat, Probationary Officer in his evidence, stated that he is well known to B.P. Rautre as he worked with him in the bank, he is also aware of his handwriting and his signature. Vide Ext. P-3, ledger of account No. 3666 of appellant-Smt. Chandrakala Devi, there are entries of depositing ₹ 20,000 twice on 30.04.1992 by transfer. He further stated that Ext. P-5 and Ext. P-6 are the ledger of H.S.S. Account No. 4978 of Mr. Upendra Kumar and H.S.S. Account No. 2442 of Mr. Surendra Kumar Saluja. In both the accounts there are entries of withdrawing of ₹ 20,000 each on 30.04.1992. The said entries were made by B.P. Rautre. In his cross-examination also, he stated that on 30.04.1992, vide Ext. P-5 & P-6, H.S.S. account, there are entries of withdrawing ₹ 20,000 each made by B.P. Rautre, and there is no signature or handwriting of Chandrakala Devi.
14. Appellant is punished with aid of Section 120-B of IPC alleging that she is party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence, as committed by other co- accused (absconding). Section 120-A of IPC defines criminal conspiracy and Section 120-B IPC provides punishment for criminal 8 / 19 conspiracy. Elements of criminal conspiracy have been stated to be (a) an object to be accomplished; (b) a plan or scheme embodied means to accomplish that object; (c) an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons, whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or any or by any effectual means and; (d) in the jurisdiction, where the statute required an overt act. Conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not indictable.
15. Undoubtedly, in cases involving the offence of criminal conspiracy, direct evidence of agreement between the accused persons is seldom available. The very nature of the offence is such that it is generally hatched in secrecy. The essential ingredient of the offence is the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an illegal act, or to commit a lawful act by illegal means. The gravamen of the charge lies not in the accomplishment of the object, but in the unlawful agreement itself. Such agreement may be established either by direct evidence, if available, or more commonly, by circumstantial evidence, or by a combination of both. It is a matter of common judicial experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely forthcoming.
16. It is equally well settled that there must be a meeting of minds between the alleged conspirators, culminating in a conscious decision to commit the unlawful act. Where the prosecution seeks to infer the existence of conspiracy from surrounding circumstances, the circumstances relied 9 / 19 upon must be of such a nature that they give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit the alleged offence. Mere knowledge, association, or similarity of conduct does not by itself establish conspiracy unless it is shown that there was prior consensus or concert.
17. Like any other criminal offence, the burden lies squarely upon the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must prove that the circumstances, taken cumulatively and viewed in their entirety, clearly indicate a meeting of minds between the conspirators for the purpose of committing an illegal act or achieving a lawful object through illegal means. The inference of conspiracy must flow naturally and logically from the proved facts, and not from conjectures or surmises.
18. Though conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, each incriminating circumstance relied upon must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Further, the circumstances so established must form a complete and unbroken chain of events, leading only to the hypothesis of guilt of the accused and ruling out every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. If the chain is incomplete, or if two views are possible, the benefit must necessarily go to the accused.
19. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI and other cases reported in (2003) 3 SCC 641 has categorically held that the essence of criminal conspiracy lies in the agreement and that such agreement may be proved either by direct or circumstantial evidence, 10 / 19 though direct evidence is seldom available and has held as under:
(paras 343, 344, 345 and 346) "343. No doubt, in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal act or for doing by illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore, the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused.
344. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58), the English law as to conspiracy has been stated thus:
"58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the discretion of the court. The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is 11 / 19 necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in communication with every other."
345. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of conspiracy and that of any other offence. It can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. [See : Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 608] (AIR at p.
686).]
346. It was held that the expression "in reference to their common intention" in Section 10 is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to give it a wider scope than the words "in furtherance of" in the English law;
with the result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy or after he left it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant fact only.
"... 'as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it'. ... In short, the section can be analysed as follows : (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co- conspirator and not in his favour." (AIR p. 687, para 8) 12 / 19 We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inferences are normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2 SCC 665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy, there must be evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances give rise to a conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for the intended object of committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala reported in (2005) 12 SCC 631 has reiterated that the unlawful agreement is the sine qua non of the offence and that suspicion, 13 / 19 however strong, cannot substitute proof of meeting of minds and held as under: (para 13, 14, 15) "13. To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the court to keep in mind the well-known rule governing circumstantial evidence viz. each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. Criminal conspiracy is an independent offence in the Penal Code. The unlawful agreement is sine qua non for constituting offence under the Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement.
14. Suspicion cannot take the place of legal proof and prosecution would be required to prove each and every circumstance in the chain of circumstances so as to complete the chain. It is true that in most of the cases, it is not possible to prove the agreement between the conspirators by direct evidence but the same can be inferred from the circumstances giving rise to conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons to commit an offence. It is 14 / 19 held in Noor Mohd. Mohd. Yusuf Momin v. State of Maharashtra [(1970) 1 SCC 696 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 274 : AIR 1971 SC 885] , that: (SCC pp.
699-700, para 7) "[In most cases proof of conspiracy is largely inferential though the inference must be founded on solid facts. Surrounding circumstances and antecedent and subsequent conduct, among other factors, constitute relevant material."
15. It is cumulative effect of the proved circumstances which should be taken into account in determining the guilt of the accused. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution. While speaking for the Bench it is held by P. Venkatarama Reddi, J. in State (NCT of Delhi) v.
Navjot Sandhu [(2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715 : JT (2005) 7 SC 1] (p. 63) as follows:
(SCC pp. 691-92, para 103) "103. We do not think that the theory of agency can be extended thus far, that is to say, to find all the conspirators guilty of the actual offences committed in execution of the common design even if such offences were ultimately committed by some of them, without the participation of others. We are of the view that those who committed the offences pursuant to the conspiracy by indulging in various overt acts will be individually liable for those offences in addition to being liable for criminal conspiracy; but, the non-participant conspirators cannot be found guilty of the offence or offences committed by the other conspirators. There is hardly any scope for the application of the principle of agency in order to find the conspirators guilty of a substantive offence not committed by them. Criminal offences and punishments therefor are governed by the statute. The offender will be liable only if he comes within the plain terms of the penal statute. Criminal liability for an offence cannot be fastened by way of analogy or by extension of a common law principle."
21. In the present case, the principal allegations of forgery and fraudulent withdrawal are directed against the co-accused, a bank employee, who 15 / 19 is alleged to have committed offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code, as well as under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
However, the said co-accused was neither apprehended nor tried, having been declared an absconder. The trial, therefore, proceeded and concluded only against the present appellant, who is not a bank employee but merely an account holder of the concerned branch.
22. It is significant to note that the appellant has been convicted only with the aid of Section 120-B of the IPC, i.e., on the allegation of criminal conspiracy. The appellant is a housewife residing at Saraipali, where the concerned branch of the Central Bank of India is situated. She maintained a savings bank account, the details of which are borne out from the evidence of PW-2, Umesh Chand Guchhayat. The sole circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to implicate the appellant is that the co-accused bank employee allegedly transferred ₹20,000/- each from H.S.S. Account No. 4978 of Upendra Kumar and H.S.S. Account No. 2442 of Surendra Kumar Saluja, by forging vouchers, into the appellant's account, and that the said amount was subsequently withdrawn through a cheque issued in her name. It has also come on record that the cheque in question was filled up by the co-accused himself, who is presently absconding.
23. In her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellant offered an explanation that the banking transactions relating to deposits and withdrawals were generally handled by the co-accused B.P. Rautre. According to her, she had signed the cheque at his instance and entrusted it to him for withdrawal 16 / 19 of the amount, as she seldom visited the bank personally. This explanation, though denied by the prosecution, forms part of the record and must be evaluated in light of the surrounding circumstances.
24. Considering the facts of the case, the appellant, being a housewife and a customer of the bank where the co-accused was employed, stood in a relationship of consumer and banker with him. The explanation furnished by her cannot be said to be inherently improbable or unnatural in such circumstances. More importantly, the prosecution evidence itself reveals that the co-accused had allegedly withdrawn amounts fraudulently from 10-12 different accounts, and the total amount so withdrawn by committing forgery was stated to be ₹3,22,000/-, as per the testimony of prosecution witnesses including PW-7. Out of this total amount, only ₹40,000/- is alleged to have been transferred to and withdrawn from the appellant's account. There is no allegation that the remaining substantial amount was deposited in or routed through the appellant's account.
25. The prosecution has not placed on record any material explaining the manner in which the remaining ₹3,12,000/- was dealt with or appropriated. The evidence of PW-2, particularly Ext. P-3, shows that on 30.04.1992, ₹20,000/- each was withdrawn from Account Nos. 4978 and 2442 and deposited in the appellant's account. The entries were admittedly in the handwriting of co-accused B.P. Rautre. On the same date, the amount was withdrawn through a cheque. However, mere fact of deposit and withdrawal on the same day, without independent evidence of prior agreement between the appellant and the co- 17 / 19 accused, does not by itself establish the essential ingredients of conspiracy, namely, meeting of minds.
26. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 while acquitting the accused therein, holding that the prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances leading unerringly to guilt, laid down principles governing circumstantial evidence in criminal trials, clarified courts should assess chains of circumstances when direct evidence is absent, setting enduring standards for proof beyond reasonable doubt and held thus:
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should"
and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, 18 / 19 (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
27. It is not the prosecution case that the bulk of the amount allegedly withdrawn by the co-accused through forged vouchers was deposited in the appellant's account. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that except for the transaction relating to ₹40,000/- on a single day, no other amount out of the alleged fraudulent withdrawals from 10-12 different accounts was transferred to or routed through the appellant's account. When the prosecution itself asserts that the co-accused had withdrawn a total sum of ₹3,22,000/- by committing forgery from several accounts, and only ₹40,000/- is connected to the appellant, the absence of any link between the appellant and remaining transactions assumes significance. This selective connection weakens the inference of a broader conspiratorial arrangement.
28. In the aforesaid factual background, there is no material to suggest that there existed any agreement or meeting of minds between the appellant and the co-accused to commit the alleged offences. The sole circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that ₹40,000/- was deposited into the appellant's account by the co-accused and was withdrawn on the same day through a cheque filled up and processed by him. This circumstance, standing alone and uncorroborated by independent evidence of prior concert or common design, does not constitute a complete chain of circumstances leading to the only irresistible conclusion of guilt. The prosecution has thus failed to 19 / 19 establish the essential ingredient of criminal conspiracy, namely, an unlawful agreement supported by a meeting of minds, beyond reasonable doubt.
29. In view of the foregoing discussion, and in light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions referred to hereinabove, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The conviction of the appellant rests solely upon the application of Section 120-B of the IPC, without adequate proof of conspiracy. Accordingly, the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court convicting the appellant for offences under Sections 420 read with 120-B, 468 read with 120-B, 471 read with 120-B, 477-A read with 120-B of the IPC, and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B IPC, cannot be sustained in law.
30. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentence of appellant for offences under Sections 420 read with 120-B, 468 read with 120-B, 471 read with 120-B, 477-A read with 120-B of the IPC, and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 120-B IPC are hereby set aside. Appellant is acquitted of all the charges. Appellant is reported to be on bail. Therefore, her bail bonds are discharged.
Sd/-
(Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge pwn