Chattisgarh High Court
Santram vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 27 March, 2026
Author: Narendra Kumar Vyas
Bench: Narendra Kumar Vyas
1
2026:CGHC:14529
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 487 of 2005
Judgment reserved on 10.03.2026
Judgment delivered on 27.03.2026
1. Santram S/o Ramu Satnami Aged About 28 Years Occupation
Agriculture, R/o Village Dandan P/s Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
2. Sukhiram S/o Ramu Aged About 26 Years Occupation Agriculture, R/o
Village Dandan P/s Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
3. Sambhu S/o Ramu Aged About 20 Years Occupation Agriculture, R/o
Village Dandan P/s Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
4. Panchu S/o Ramu Aged About 25 Years Occupation Agriculture, R/o
Village Dandan P.S. Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
5. Munni Bai W/o Sant Ram Aged About 25 Years Occupation Agriculture,
R/o Village Dandan P/s Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
... Appellants (s)
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station - Takhatpur Distt. Bilaspur
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant (s) : Mr. Dheerendra Pandey, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Anant Bajpai, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas CAV Judgment
1. This criminal appeal under Section 374 (4) of Cr.P.C. has been filed against the judgment dated 26.04.2005 passed by Additional Sessions Digitally signed by SANTOSH SANTOSH KUMAR KUMAR SHARMA SHARMA Date:
2026.03.27 13:08:45 +0530 2 Judge, Bilaspur District Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No. 64 of 2004, whereby the appellants have been convicted and sentenced in the following manner:-
Conviction Sentence
U/s. 307/149 of the IPC RI for 5 years and fine of Rs.
500/-in default of payment of
fine to further undergo
additional RI for 6 months.
U/s. 323/149 of the IPC RI for 6 months
U/s. 323/149 of the IPC RI for 6 months
U/s. 323/149 of the IPC RI for 6 months
U/s. 147 of the IPC RI for 6 months
U/s. 148 of the IPC RI for 1 year.
(Fine amount has already been deposited. Both sentences are directed to run concurrently).
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief is that on 12/10/2003 at 7:00 AM, complainant Horilal Satnami lodged a report at Police Station Takhatpur alleging that Appellant No.1/Santram Satnami had taken illegal electricity connection from main electricity pole by a tree which is standing on his courtyard and he wanted to disconnect the illegal connection, therefore, before cutting the tree, he informed the appellants about disconnection of electricity wire, as such he went to house of Santram and told him to remove electricity wire from the tree standing on the courtyard. On this Appellant No.1 refused to remove the said cable from the tree.
3. It is alleged that while the complainant and his elder brother were trying to cut the tree, at about 8:00 AM, Setram, Sukhiram, Ballu, Panchu, Sambhu 3 and Munni Bai with an object to commit murder of the complainant reached the house and started abusing them by saying as to why they were cutting the tree and Santram assaulted on the head of Kunwardas with tabbal, Sukhi, Bablu, Panchu assaulted his brother with lathi, when he tried to save his brother then Sukhi and Santram assaulted on his right head, arm, leg and thigh causing injuries to him. It is also case of the prosecution that Santram and Sukhiram assaulted his wife Ramkali and sister-in-law and incident of assault to the victims has been seen by Ramkhilawan and Subhas. On the basis of report, FIR (Ex.P-22) was registered under Section 147, 148, 147 and 307 of the IPC against the appellants. Injured was sent to hospital for examination. Statements of the witnesses were recorded. Spot map Ex.P-23 was prepared. The blood stained and plain soils were seized. The appellants were arrested by seizure memo Ex.P-24 to P-28. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate Bilaspur, who in turn committed the case to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur which was registered as Sessions Case No. 64 of 2004.
4. The prosecution in order to prove the guilt of the appellants examined 12 witnesses Horilal (PW-1), Kuwanrdas (PW-2), Ramkhilawan (PW-3), Chain Bai (PW-4), Dr. V.K. Soni (PW-5), Harprashad (PW-6), Patwari Lakhanlal Tande (PW-7), Ramkali Bai (PW-8), Hiradas (PW-9), Inspector J. Toppo, (PW-10), Dr. Sanjay Kumar (PW-11), Assistant Inspector J.P. Yadav (PW-12), and exhibited the documents from Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-42. Statements of the accused/appellants were recorded under Section 313 4 CRPC in which they denied the allegations made against them and pleaded their innocence and false implication in the case on account of old enmity. The appellants examined Markhande (DW-1) in their support.
5. After hearing the parties, learned Sessions Judge on the basis of material on record and upon considering the statements of the witnesses has passed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence against the appellants as mentioned above. Being aggrieved with the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellants preferred this Criminal Appeal. This Court vide order dated 15.07.2005 has released the appellants on bail.
6. Complainant Horilal (PW-01), in his statement has stated that for burn firewood he wanted to cut the Babul tree, as such he told Santram to remove the wire but Santram did not react, therefore, he and his brother began to cut the tree and after some time the accused persons came there armed with lathi, tabbal. He has further stated that Sukhiram assaulted on his right arm with lathi, Sambhu assaulted with lathi on his thigh and Panchuram assaulted with lathi on his left wrist. He stated that Sukhiram assaulted multiple on his head with lathi, as a result of which he fell down on the ground. The accused assaulted Kunwar Das due to which he became unconscious. This witness has further stated that Chainbai and Ramkali informed him that accused Santram assaulted Kunwardas with tabbal and other accused assaulted him with lathi. This witness has stated that he and his brother were admitted in the hospital for 10-12 days. 5
7. Kuwardas (PW-2) in his statement has stated that Santram was having tabbal in his hand and Munnibai was having sword in her hand and other accused namely Shambhu, Sukhiram, Panchu were having lathi in their hands. This witness in his examination in chief has stated that before assault Santram had argued and left the place but they have no idea that he would return with his family members for assaulting the complainants.
8. Chainbai (PW-4) has supported the case of the prosecution and reiterated the stand taken by the (PW-1 and PW-2) in the FIR.
9. Dr. V.K. Soni (PW-5) examined the Horilal (PW-1), Kunwar (PW-2), Chainbai (PW-4) were subjected to medical examination and noticed following injuries which are as under:-
Injured Horilal:-
(i) Lacerated wound on the right side forehead parietal area vertical 5cm linear scalp deep.
(ii) Bruise on the right shoulder anterior vertical measuring 9x 1.5 cm.
He was complaining pain several times but there was no external injury on his left side. The injury was caused by hard and blunt object within six hours of his examination. For injury No.1 and 2, he advised for x-ray (Ex.P-
6).
Injured Kuwardas:-
(i) Lacerated wound on parietal area of head left side vertical 4 cmx vertical scalp deep, horizontal hematoma of 3x3cm present.
(ii) Injured was unconscious. His pulse was regular at 78 beats per minute.
His blood pressure was 120/82. His eye was normal. The injury was 6 caused by hard and blunt object within 12 hours of his examination. He advised for x-ray (Ex.P-7).
Injured Chainbai:-
(I) Bruise on distal posterior part of right finer 3 middle in the size 1x1cm each vertical.
No tender. Injury caused by hard and blunt object was simple in nature (ExP-8).
Injured Ramkali Bai:-
(I) till right supraclavicular area no external injury seen on chest, wrist on hip (Ex.P-5) Dr. Sanjay Kumar (PW-11) examined injured Horilal in CIMS Hospital, Bilaspur wherein he has advised him for x-ray of his head and right shoulder. After x-ray report, he has not seen fracture on the head and right shoulder of Horilal and submitted his reported Ex.P/41. On the same day, this witness examined injured Kunwardas and has not seen fracture on the head and wrist of Kunwardas and submitted his reported Ex.P/42 wherein he has opined that injuries caused to the injured were simple in nature.
10. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellant Santram had also suffered injuries, which has not been explained by the prosecution. He would further submit that seizure and independent witnesses Ramkhilawan (PW-3), Harprasad and Hiradas have reverted their memorandum statement; therefore conviction order deserves to be set aside. He would further submit that the doctor who examined the 7 complainant has not examined before the Court, as such the case of the prosecution becomes doubtful. He would further submit that there are lot of omissions and contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses, therefore, the trial Court has erred in analyzing the evidence produced before it. He would further submit that injuries sustained by appellants have not been explained by prosecution which was produced before the trial Court vide ExP-6 and Ex.P-7. The case of prosecution is based on interested witnesses who are known to each other, as such their testimonies contain material contradictions and improvements, hence their evidence cannot be said to be trustworthy. Hence, prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence awarded under Section 307 IPC is not made out.
11. He would further submit that the prosecution is unable to prove the essential ingredients of offence under Section 307 IPC as the prosecution is unable to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt as the prosecution is unable to prove the intention or knowledge of the appellants to commit such offence. He would further submit that the medical opinion does not substantiate case of the prosecution for conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC. He would further submit that even offence under Section 326 is not made out against the appellants as all the injuries are simple in nature and not grievous hurt. He would further submit that there is no fracture or dislocation of bone or tooth was seen and the prosecution is unable to prove the ingredients of section 147 and 148 IPC. He would further submit that the prosecution has not 8 able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was common object of such assembly therefore, all the members of assembly cannot be held guilty for committing the offence of rioting.
12. He would further submit that offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out as the injuries sustained by the victims are simple in nature and the prosecution is unable to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants have any intention to commit the offence under Section 307 IPC, as such the finding recorded by learned trial Court in para-40 of the judgment that with the common intention to commit the offence of attempt to murder the offence was committed by the appellants is perverse, contrary to the evidence on record, thus he would pray for acquitting the appellants from the charges leveled against them for commission of offence under Section 307 IPC.
13. Alternatively he would submit that the appellants have already remained in jail during the trial as well as after conviction as detailed below and since from appreciation of evidence, material on record, it is quite vivid that offence under Section 307 IPC or 326 IPC are not made out, therefore, he would pray for reducing the sentence already undergone by them. Name of During trail Bail granted by this Total incar-
the Court ceration pe-
accused riod
Santram From 13.10.2003 From 26.04.2005 to 6 months 14
to 06.02.2004 15.07.2005 total 2 days
total 3 months 25 months 19 days
days
Sukhiram From 13.10.2003 From 26.04.2005 to 6 months 14
to 06.02.2004 15.07.2005 total 2 days
total 3 months 25 months 19 days
days
9
Sambhu From 13.10.2003 From 26.04.2005 to 6 months 04
to 27.01.2004 15.07.2005 total 2 days
total 3 months 15 months 19 days
days
Panchu From 13.10.2003 From 26.04.2005 to 6 months 28
to 21.02.2004 15.07.2005 total 2 days
total 4 months 9 months 19 days
days
Munni Bai From 13.10.2003 From 26.04.2005 to 2 months 28
to 21.10.2003 15.07.2005 total 2 days
total 9 days months 19 days
14. Per contra, learned counsel for the State would submit that merely because the witnesses are related, therefore, their evidence cannot be rejected. The complainant/injured have sustained injuries, which clearly establishes their presence on the spot. The ocular evidence is fully supported by the medical evidence. The appellants were members of the unlawful assembly and in pursuance of their common object, they had assaulted the injured persons and, accordingly, each and every appellant is vicariously liable for the act of others. It is also contended that this is not a fit case for reduction of sentence to the period already undergone by them, inasmuch as the prosecution has proved the incident beyond reasonable doubt by the cogent and reliable testimony of the victim duly corroborated by medical evidence. The victims have clearly deposed regarding the manner in which the accused assaulted the victims. Accordingly, he prays for dismissal of the appeal.
15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records of the trial Court.
16. Now this Court is examining whether in the given facts situation, the offence under Section 307 IPC is made out or not.
10
17. Considering the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the injuries sustained by Horilal and other victims are simple in nature and the dispute arose between the appellants and the complainants for removing the tree which was standing on the courtyard of the victim from the evidence brought on record, it is quite vivid that the victim Horilal (PW-1) has requested Santram to remove the tree as the electric wire went to the house of Santram but Santram has not reacted on his request, therefore, Horilal and Kunwardas started cutting the tree which has provoked the appellants to assault the victims, in such circumstances it cannot be said that there was any intention to commit the offence which was done without any preparation and pre-meditation and on sudden provocation between the appellants and the victims assault was committed.
18. Even the injury which has been caused to the injured Horilal, Kunwardas, Chain Bai and Ramkali would demonstrate that the said injuries have been caused to the victims unintentionally as the injury which has been caused is not on the vital part of the body which are sufficient to commit murder of the victims. From the evidence, it is quite vivid that the incident taken place due to sudden provocation and spur of moment on cutting of tree which are not grievous in nature as per report of doctor (PW-
5), thus essential ingredients to attract offence under Section 307 IPC has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivmani and another vs. State Represented by Inspector of Police, reported in 2023 SCC 11 Online 1581. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the ingredients to attract the offence under Section 307 IPC in following terms. Section 307, IPC reads as under:
'307. Attempt to murder.--Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts.--When any person offending under this section is under sentence of imprisonment for life, he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.
Illustrations
(a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to punishment under this section.
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a child of tender years, exposes it in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though the death of the child does not ensue.
(c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and, if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z, by poison, purchases poison and mixes the same with food which remains in A's keeping; A has not yet committed the offence in this section. A places the food on Z's table or delivers it to Z's servants to place it on Z's table. A has committed the offence defined in this section.'
9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v Saleem, (2005) 5 SCC 554, the Court held that to sustain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, it was not necessary that a bodily injury capable of resulting in death should have been inflicted. As such, non-conviction under Section 307, IPC on the premise only that simple injury was inflicted does not follow as a matter of course. In the same judgment, it was pointed out that '...The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.' The position that because a fatal injury was not sustained alone does not dislodge Section 307, IPC conviction has been reiterated in Jage Ram v State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 and State of Madhya Pradesh v Kanha, (2019) 3 SCC 605. Yet, in Jage Ram (supra) 12 and Kanha (supra), it was observed that while grievous or life-
threatening injury was not necessary to maintain a conviction under Section 307, IPC, 'The intention of the accused can be ascertained from the actual injury, if any, as well as from surrounding circumstances. Among other things, the nature of the weapon used and the severity of the blows inflicted can be considered to infer intent.'1
10. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and submissions of learned counsel for the parties, this Court is convinced that the Impugned Judgment of the High Court requires to be interfered with. Admittedly, there is no allegation of repeated or severe blows having been inflicted. Even the injuries on PW1 and PW2 have been found to be simple in nature, which is an additional point in the appellants' favour.
20. The evidence led before the trial Court would clearly prove that the incident taken place due to sudden provocation and spur of moment on account of cutting of tree and the appellants who were carrying lathi which is normal phenomena or practice in the village have committed assault by means of lathi causing injuries to the victims which are not grievous in nature as per report of doctor (PW-5). Thus it is quite vivid, that the prosecution is unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant for commission of offence under Section 307 IPC against the appellants, therefore, they are deserves to be acquitted from the charges leveled against them for commission of offence under Section 307 IPC accordingly they are acquitted from the offence under Section 307 IPC.
21. But from the evidence of injured person duly supported by the medical evidence (PW-5) that the victims have suffered simple injuries by means of lathi and one of appellant Kunwardas became unconscious by the assault made by the appellants, as such overt act done by the appellant will fall within the ambit of Section 324 IPC.
13
22. From perusal of Section 324 IPC;- the essential ingredients of this Section is hurt which has been defined in Section 319 IPC not under Section 324 IPC and it would mean " performing an act which leads to physical pain, injury or any disease to a person". The Section 324 IPC further provides that the hurt may be caused voluntarily or it can by caused by using dangerous weapons or mean. A person will be liable to have caused hurt voluntarily through dangerous weapons and means as provided in Section 324 IPC. The section 324 IPC reads as under:-
Section 324. Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means.--Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
23. Thus to establish an offence under Sec 324 IPC, the presence of following ingredients is a must which are as follows:-
1. Voluntary hurt caused to another person by the accused, and
2. Such hurt was caused:
(A). By any instrument used for shooting, cutting or stabbing, or any other instrument likely to cause death, or, (B). By fire or other heated instruments, or (C). By poison or other corrosive substance, or, (D). By any explosive substance, or , (E). By a substance that is dangerous for the human body to swallow, inhale, or receive through blood, or (F). By an animal.14
24. Section 324 IPC has come up for consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anuj Singh @ Ramanuj Singh @ Seth Singh vs. The State of Bihar reported in AIR 2022 SC 2817 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
22. In the case at hand, it is evident from the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the two appellants have caused hurt on the body of the informant, PW-6 by using firearm on account of an altercation which took place between the appellants and the informant PW-6. It also stands corroborated from the evidence of the prosecution witness that there existed previous enmity between the parties due to a land dispute and the same can be perceived from their acts. Thus, the charge of Section 324 IPC stands established against the two appellants. Once the charge against the appellants under Section 324 IPC of voluntarily causing injuries by firearm, which is a dangerous weapon stands established, they cannot escape the punishment for using arms prescribed by Section 27 of the Arms Act.
25. From the analysis of the above facts and circumstances, it is quite vivid that the prosecution has rightly proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant for commission of offence under Section 324 IPC, as such the appellants are liable to be convicted for commission of offence under Section 324 IPC instead of offence under Section 307 IPC.
26. Further submission of the counsel for the appellants is that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt regarding conviction under Section 147 and 148 of the IPC are being considered by this Court.
27. From the evidence of all the injured, it is quite vivid that the accused person with common object have assaulted Ramkali, Chainbai, Kuwandas and Horilal with lathi and presence of the all the accused at the place of incident has been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. The 15 memorandum statements (Ex.P-11, Ex.P-13, Ex.P-15, Ex.P-17, Ex.P-19 further proved beyond reasonable doubt regarding their presence at the place of occurrence. Thus it is quite vivid, that the commission of offfence was done by the appellants with common object by using means i.e. lathi, therefore, the appellants have rightly been convicted by the learned trial Court under Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC as the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt has proved that the appellants sharing common object has assaulted victims by means causing simple injuries, thus all the ingredients of Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC i.e. joining of unlawful assembly have committed the offence of rioting and the rioting has been done by means i.e. use of lathi have been proved before the trial Court, as such the finding drawn by the trial Court regarding conviction of appellants under Sections 147, 148 and 149 IPC does not suffer from perversity, illegality warranting interference by this Court.
28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the provisions of Section 149 IPC in case of Zainul vs. The State of Bihar {2025 INSC 1192 } has examined the provisions of Section 149 of the IPC as under:-
45. Albeit the essentials of Section 149 of the IPC are oft-repeated and firmly established, they are reiterated herein for the sake of convenience:
i. There must be an assembly of five or more persons; ii. An offence must be committed by any member of that unlawful assembly;
iii. The offence committed must be in order to attain the common object of that assembly, or iv. The members of the assembly must have the knowledge that the particular offence is likely to be committed in order to attain the common object.16
46. Section 149 of the IPC stipulates that if an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly (of 5 or more persons) in prosecution of the common object (as defined in Section 141 of the IPC) of that assembly, or if the members of the assembly knew that the said offence is likely to be committed in prosecution of the said common object, every person who, at the time of committing that offence, was a member of that assembly, will be guilty of that offence.
47. The first limb of the provision envisages the commission of an offence by a member of an unlawful assembly in order to attain the common object of that assembly. Whereas, the second limb of the provision encapsulates knowledge on the part of a member of the unlawful assembly qua the likelihood of such offence being committed in order to attain the common object.
48. The distinction between the two limbs of Section 149 of the IPC was elucidated in the decision of Mizaji vs. State of U.P., reported in 1958 SCC OnLine SC 95. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:-
"6. This section has been the subject-matter of interpretation in the various High Courts of India, but every case has to be decided on its own facts. The first part of the section means that the offence committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. It is not necessary that there should be a preconcert in the sense of a meeting of the members of the unlawful assembly as to the common object; it is enough if it is adopted by all the members and is shared by all of them. In order that the case may fall under the first part the offence committed must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused were members. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 149 if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. The expression 'know' does not mean a mere possibility, such as might or might not happen. For instance, it is a matter of common knowledge that when in a village a body of heavily armed men set out to take a woman by force, someone is likely to be killed and all the members of the unlawful assembly must be aware of that likelihood and would be guilty under the second part of Section 149. Similarly, if a body of persons go armed to take forcible possession of the land, it would be equally right to say that they have the knowledge that murder is likely to committed if the circumstances as to the weapons carried and other conduct of the members of the unlawful assembly clearly point to such knowledge on the part of them all. There is a great deal to be said for the opinion of Couch, C.J., in Sabid Ali case [(1873) 20 WR 5 Cr] that when an offence is committed in 17 prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part, but not within the first. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149, Indian Penal Code cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined whether the offence committed falls within the first part of Section 149 as explained above or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part." (Emphasis supplied).
49. The expression "in prosecution of the common object" means that the offence committed must be directly connected with the common object of the assembly, or that the act, upon appraisal of the evidence, must appear to have been done with a view to accomplish that common object. In Charan Singh vs. State of UP, reported in (2004) 4 SCC 205, this Court held that the test for determining the "common object" of an unlawful assembly must be assessed in light of the conduct of its members, as well as the surrounding circumstances. It can be deduced from the nature of the assembly, the weapons carried by its members, and their conduct before, during, or after the incident. The relevant observations read as thus:-
"13. [...] Section 1249 IPC has its foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section
141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word "object"
means the purpose or design and, in order to make it "common", it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons, who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed 18 at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression "in prosecution of common object" as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to "in order to attain the common object". It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly.
14. "Common object" is different from a "common intention" as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The "common object" of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful. In other words, it can develop during the course of incident at the spot eo instanti." (Emphasis supplied).
50. To put it briefly, Section 149 of the IPC makes all the members of an unlawful assembly constructively liable when an offence is committed by any member of such assembly with a view to accomplish the common object of that assembly or the members of the assembly knew that such an offence was likely to 19 be committed. However, such liability can be fastened only upon proof that the act was done in pursuance of a common object. The essentials of Section 149 were succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench in the decision of Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 174. It reads thus:-
"8. The true legal position in regard to the essential ingredients of an offence specified by Section 149 are not in doubt. Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or constructive criminal liability for all members of an unlawful assembly where an offence is committed by any member of such an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. It would thus be noticed that one of the essential ingredients of Section 149 is that the offence must have been committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, and Section 141 makes it clear that it is only where five or more persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course, the other requirements of the said section as to the common object of the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. In other words, it is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five or more.[...]"
(Emphasis supplied).
51. Undoubtedly, once the existence of a common object amongst the members of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not imperative to prove that each member committed an overt act. The liability under this provision is attracted once it is certain that an individual had knowledge that the offence committed was a probable consequence in furtherance of the common object, thereby rendering him a "member" of the unlawful assembly.
29. Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Dablu ETC. vs. State of Madhya Pradesh {2026 INSC 224 } has examined the provisions of Section 149 of the IPC as under:-
13. It is settled in law that in view of Section 149 IPC, every member of the unlawful assembly is vicariously liable for acts done by anyone of them to achieve a common object.
Therefore, two things are essential to attract Section 149 IPC. The first is "unlawful assembly" and the second is "common object". The presence of the accused persons as part of the unlawful assembly is sufficient for conviction even if no overt act is imputed to each one of them individually. In the case at hand, all the accused persons had alighted from the bus together armed with firearms, thus, they were part of the unlawful assembly and had arrived at the bus stand with a 20 common object. The movement of the accused persons in the above manner is sufficient enough to draw an inference that they had a common object. Therefore, the presence of the accused persons in the unlawful assembly to achieve a common object makes all of them vicariously liable for the acts of the unlawful assembly.
30. From the evidence as discussed above, it is quite vivid that the victims have suffered injury which is simple in nature, therefore, the appellants' conviction under Sections 323/149 cannot be held to be suffer from perversity or illegality warranting interference by this Court. Accordingly, they are affirmed.
31. Considering the injuries sustained by the victim and also considering the fact that the appellants have been acquitted from the offence under Section 307/149 IPC and they have been convicted under Section 324/149 in place of offence under Section 307 /149 IPC and no minimum sentence has been prescribed under Section 324/149 IPC, looking to the fact that the incident took place on 12.10.2003 and about 23 years has already been lapsed, the appellants have not misused the liberty granted by this Court, therefore, I am of the view that for commission of offence under Section 324/149 IPC the appellants Santram, Sukhiram, Sambhu, Panchu are sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 9 months and they are entitled to get set off as provided under Section 428 of CrPC/468 of BNSS. So far as conviction of the appellants namely Santram, Sukhiram, Sambhu, Panchu are concerned, the sentence awarded under under Section 148 IPC is reduced to 6 months.
32. So far as Munni Bai /appellant No. 5 is concerned, she remained incarceration for 9 days during trial and she was released on bail by this 21 Court on 15.07.2005, after incarceration of 2 months and 28 days, thus she remained incarceration for 3 months and 7 days, therefore, her sentenced is reduced for commission of offence under Sections 323/149 and 324/149 IPC to the period already undergone by her. So far as conviction of Munii Bai under Section 148 IPC is concerned, the sentence awarded under Section 148 IPC is reduced to the period already undergone by her as no minimum sentence is prescribed under the said section.
33. Resultantly, the appeal is partly allowed. The appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds and surety bonds shall stand discharged. They are directed to surrender before the trial Court within two months from the date of judgment passed by this Court to serve out the remaining part of jail sentence as reduced by this Court. Set off, of the period of sentence already undergone will be given by trial Court at the time of preparation of supersession's warrant against the appellants. In case, the appellant No. 1 to 4 fail to surrender, the Police Authorities are directed to arrest them and send a compliance report to this Court.
Sd/-
(Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge santosh