Bombay High Court
Avinash S/O Ambadas Kothale vs State Of Maharashtra, Thr. Secretary, ... on 21 May, 2026
(1) WP4331.26.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 4331 OF 2026
Avinash S/o Ambadas Kothale
VS
State of Maharashtra through its Secretary, Corporation department,
Maharashtra, State, Mantralaya, Mumbai and ors.
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Office Notes, Office Memoranda of Coram, Court's or Judge's orders
appearances, Court's orders of directions
and Registrar's orders
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Mr. G.R. Sadar, counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. K.R. Lule, AGP for the respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4/State.
Mr. K. P. Mahalle, counsel for the respondent no. 5.
Mr. P. Chavhan, counsel for intervenor.
CORAM : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.
DATED : 21.05.2026 Heard.
2. Issue notice to the respondents, returnable on 12.06.2026.
3. The learned AGP waives service of notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner is permitted to serve the respondent No. 2, by all modes permissible in law, in addition to the regular mode of service.
Shubham (2) WP4331.26.odt
5. Mr. K.P. Mahalle, learned counsel waives service of notice on behalf of respondent No. 5.
6. The present petition is taken up urgently, since the challenge in the petition is to the election program declared by the respondent No. 2, to fill up the post of Chairman of the respondent No. 5 Bank, which is scheduled for tomorrow, i.e., 22.05.2026.
7. I have heard Mr. G. R. Sadar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K. R. Lule, learned AGP appearing for respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4/State, and Mr. K. P. Mahalle, learned counsel for the respondent No. 5, Mr. P Chavhan appears on caveat, but it is his grievance that the caveator / applicant has not been impleaded as a party to the present petition.
8. As stated supra, the present petition challenges the election to be held tomorrow for the post of Chairman. It is the case of the petitioner that he was elected as the Chairman of the respondent No. 5 bank and took charge with effect from 31.12.2023 for a period of five years, i.e., till 30.12.2028. However, for some reasons, he tendered his resignation on 02.04.2026, but stated therein that it would come into effect from 30.04.2026. It is further his case that thereafter, he chose to withdraw the said resignation on 24.04.2026 and accordingly intimated respondent No. 5 on even date, i.e., 24.04.2026.
Shubham
(3) WP4331.26.odt
9. It is the grievance of the petitioner that, in spite of this position, and even according to him, there is no vacancy as contemplated under Rule 74 of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Societies (Election to Committee) Rules, 2014, the respondent No. 2 has chosen to declare election, which is to be held on 22.05.2026. He, therefore, prays for quashing the said election program or at least for keeping the said program in abeyance, since according to him, the office has not fallen vacant as contemplated by the aforesaid rule.
10. In rebuttal, Mr. K. R. Lule, learned AGP appearing for the respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 4/State, states that even though the resignation was withdrawn vide communication dated 24.04.2026, it was already accepted by the Managing Committee of the respondent No. 5 bank on 09.04.2026, itself and his application for withdrawal of resignation was also rejected by the Managing Committee on 06.05.2026. He, therefore, submits that thus there is a vacancy and, therefore, the statutory Rules and the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act would come into force. He, therefore, supports the action of the respondents in declaring and conducting the elections tomorrow.
11. Mr. K. P. Mahalle, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 5, also supports the contentions raised by the learned AGP. He has a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the petition. He states that a bare perusal of the prayer clause, and more particularly Shubham (4) WP4331.26.odt prayer clause (1) of the petition, would show that it prays for a declaration that, due to withdrawal of resignation by the petitioner to the post of Chairman of the respondent No. 5 bank, there is no vacancy arising for the post. He, therefore, submits that essentially a mandamus has been claimed against the Co-operative Bank, which cannot be issued in view of the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 479, Vassudev, Madkaikar and others v. State of Goa and others.
12. He also tenders across a bar copy of the attendance sheet of the meeting of the Managing Committee of the respondent No. 5 bank held on 09.04.2026 to show that the petitioner herein was present and has signed the proceedings in which his resignation was accepted. He, therefore, submits that there is no merit in the petition. He also places reliance on Rule 78, of the Rules supra stating that there is a bar for entertaining a writ petition in election matters except in an election petition presented in the Co-operative Court, as laid down in Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Society Rules. He further submits that no extraordinary case has been made out by the petitioner so as to warrant interference in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13. I have considered the contentions canvassed by the learned counsels for the parties and also gone through the record.
Shubham
(5) WP4331.26.odt
14. Mr. G. R. Sardar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance on the judgment reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1, Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai and others, and more particularly the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 14 and 15 thereof, as also paragraphs 20 and 21 of the said judgment. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other statutory provision. By taking aid of this judgment, he submits that the jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be circumscribed by any statutory remedy.
15. However, in the said case, the factual context was regarding a trademark dispute between two business entities. Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on paras 14 and 15 cannot be disputed. However, they are too general in nature and have to be read in the context of the case in which it is made.
16. As far as the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is concerned, the Full Bench of this Court was required to deal with the issue framed in para 1 of Vassudev, Madkaikar and others v. State of Goa and others, which reads as under:-
"The cleavage of opinions between the two sets of perspectives on the issue as to whether a 'Goa State Cooperative Bank' is a 'State' within the Shubham (6) WP4331.26.odt meaning of Article 12 and whether the said Bank is discharging any public function, so as to render it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is the issue placed for consideration of this Full Bench."
17. The answer to this issue is found in para 72, which reads as under:-
"72. ......
.............
1) The Goa State Cooperative Bank Ltd. is not a 'State' or an instrumentality thereof nor does it fall within the ambit of 'Any other authority' for the purposes of Article 12 of Constitution of India.
2) The GSCB does not discharge any public functions, which would warrant issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus in discharge of its performance of public functions."
18. It is thus clear that the State Co-operative Bank would not be within the ambit of Article 12, i.e., "State" within the meaning of the Constitution of India. Having said so, if prayer clause (1) of the petition is perused, it essentially prays for a writ against a co-operative bank, which, in my considered opinion, would not be maintainable.
19. Furthermore, dealing on the merits, it is an admitted position on record that a resignation was tendered Shubham (7) WP4331.26.odt on 02.04.2026, which, even according to the petitioner, was to come into effect on 30.04.2026. However, for reasons best known to him, he chose to withdraw the same on 24.04.2026 and intimated the respondents accordingly. But what is relevant and interesting to point out here is that, during the interregnum period, i.e., before communicating the withdrawal of resignation on 24.04.2026, the Managing Committee of the respondent No. 5 bank has already accepted the said resignation on 09.04.2026 by conducting a meeting to which the petitioner was a signatory, a fact which is clear from the attendance sheet placed on record by the learned counsel for respondent No. 5. Therefore, the exercise of the petitioner subsequently choosing to withdraw his resignation, in my view, would not take his case any further and would be an exercise in futility.
20. Having said so, it is also relevant to point out that, even according to the petitioner, the resignation would come into effect from 30.05.2026. A bare perusal of the communication dated 14.05.2026 made by the respondent No. 4 would reveal that there is a reference of the communication dated 06.05.2026 made by the respondent No. 5 intimating the respondent No. 4 about the resignation. It, therefore, follows that the resignation stood accepted on 09.04.2026 and came into effect on 30.04.2026. It was in these circumstances that the respondent No. 5 bank chose to intimate the respondent No. 2 on 06.05.2026.
Shubham
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21. The learned counsel for the petitioner made an attempt to show the proceedings book of 05.05.2026 of the respondent No. 5 bank. However, after perusal of the proceedings of the Managing Committee, it is clear that nothing concrete has been said in the said proceedings except for an opinion expressed by some of the directors that, once the resignation is accepted, it ought to have been forthwith processed further.
22. As far as the contention raised by the petitioner regarding the resignation of the other three directors is concerned, the contention seems to be misconceived, in as much as it is clear from the proceedings of the Managing Committee that it has recorded that those three directors have not resigned out of their own volition and that the resignation was tendered behind their back. The case of the petitioner is distinct from that of those three directors and, therefore, cannot be equated therewith.
23. Furthermore, Rule 78 impliedly bars writ petition except in an election petition to be presented under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. It, therefore, follows that no case is made out for any ad- interim relief.
24. Ad-interim relief is rejected.
(NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) Shubham