Bombay High Court
Apeksha D/O Prakashrao Bangare And ... vs State Of Mah. Thr. Pso Ps Hudkeshwar ... on 25 November, 2025
2025:BHC-NAG:12868-DB
J-APL 83-2021.odt 1/8
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
CRIMINAL APPLICATION (APL)NO.83 OF 2021
1. Apeksha D/o Prakashrao Bangare
Aged about 27 years,
Occupation:-Service,
R/o. C/o. Hansdas Rangari,
Near Pachnal Sq. Rambag, Ajni,
Nagpur.
2. Rupali W/o Dhiraj Bangare
Aged about 31 years, Occ:-NIL,
R/o. C/o. Hansdas Rangari,
Near Pachnal Sq. Rambag, Ajni,
Nagpur
Currently residing at C/o.Sanjay
Maske, Plot No.488, near 50
Quarters, Jabalpur.
... APPLICANTS
...VERSUS...
1. State of Maharashtra,
Through its Police Station Officer,
Police Station Hudkeshwar,
District: Nagpur.
2. Ramkrishna Lahanuji Shete
Aged about 64 Years, Occ-Retired,
R/o. Ghate Layout, Behind
Mendhekar Hospital, Hudkeshwar,
Nagpur.
...NON-APPLICANTS
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shri A.M. Sharma, Advocate for applicant
Ms S.Z. Haidar, APP for non-applicant No.1/State
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J-APL 83-2021.odt 2/8
CORAM : URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE AND
NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, JJ.
RESERVED ON : 11.11.2025
PRONOUNCED ON : 25.11.2025
JUDGMENT (PER : NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.)
Heard. Admit. Heard finally with the consent of learned Counsel for both the parties.
2. This is an application filed under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking quashing and setting aside the First Information Report No. 0096/2020, registered with non-applicant No.1, Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur, on 15.03.2020, against the present applicants, amongst others, for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
3. As per the report lodged by the non-applicant No.2, with the non-applicant No.1, the accused No.1 in the present matter, namely Dhiraj Bangare, has taken a shop No. 6, at Rupesh complex, belonging to the non-applicant No.2 on rent, and Rs.3,500/- was the rent which was decided to be paid by the main accused. The J-APL 83-2021.odt 3/8 said accused, namely Dhiraj, has opened a jewellery shop in the said rented premises. According to the non-applicant No.2, the said Dhiraj was ready to pay Rs.50,000/- as a deposit, but has not given the said amount instead, he told the non-applicant No.2 that he will pay Rs.50,000/- along with interest and will also pay Rs.4500/- as monthly rent instead of Rs.3,500/-. It is the case of the non- applicant No. 2, in the First Information Report, that said Dhiraj has not paid the money as agreed between the non-applicant No.2 and him, instead demanded an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- for investment in the shop. It is further alleged in the First Information Report that the non-applicant No.2 on 31.10.2017 gave the said amount by way of cheque. It is further stated in the First Information Report that the main accused Dhiraj also agreed to sell his plot to the non- applicant No.2 for Rs.10,00,000/-, as the non-applicant No.2 has already paid Rs.5,00,000/- to him. Thereafter, certain monetory transactions also ensued between the non-applicant No.2 and Dhiraj. However, the amount remained to be unpaid. This prompted the non-applicant No.2 to lodge the First Information Report in question, which is challenged in the present application. J-APL 83-2021.odt 4/8
4. We have heard Shri Ayush Sharma, learned Counsel for the applicants, and Ms S.Z. Haidar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the non-applicant No.1/State.
5. None present for the non-applicant No.2 though served.
6. The learned Counsel for the applicants submits that even if the allegations in the First Information Report are taken to be true, no offence is made out as against the present applicants. While taking us through the First Information Report in question, learned Counsel for the applicants submits that the only allegation against the present applicants is that the non-applicant No.2 demanded the money, which he owed to Dhiraj, from them, and they assured him of the said amount on behalf of Dhiraj. It is therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the applicants that the continuation of the proceedings qua the present applicants would be an abuse of the process of the Court, and he therefore prays for quashing of the First Information Report to the extent of the present applicants.
7. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, while J-APL 83-2021.odt 5/8 vehemently opposing the contentions canvassed by the learned Counsel for the applicants and stated that the main accused has also cheated other persons, and therefore, this would not be a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
8. We have carefully perused the contents of the First Information Report and the record of the matter. As can be seen from the First Information Report in question, the offences alleged are punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment of Delhi Race Club (1940) Limited and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2024) 10 SC 690, has held under :
"41. The distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating is a fine one. In case of cheating, the intention of the accused at the time of inducement should be looked into which may be judged by a subsequent conduct, but for this, the subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right from the beginning of the transaction i.e, the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore, it is this intention, which is the gist of the offence.J-APL 83-2021.odt 6/8
42. Whereas, for the criminal breach of trust, the property must have been entrusted to the accused or he must have dominion over it. The property in respect of which the offence of breach of trust has been committed must be either the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be of some other person. The accused must hold that property on trust of such other person. Although the offence i.e the offence of breach of trust and cheating involve dishonest intention, yet they are mutually exclusive and different in basic concept,
43. There is a distinction between criminal breach of trust and cheating. For cheating, criminal intention is necessary at the time of making a false or misleading representation I.e. since inception. In criminal breach of trust, mere proof of entrustment is sufficient. Thus, in case of criminal breach of trust, the offender is lawfully entrusted with the property, and he dishonestly misappropriated the same. Whereas, in case of cheating, the offender fraudulently or dishonestly induces a person by deceiving him to deliver any property. In such a situation, both the offences cannot co-exist simultaneously.
44. At the most, the Court of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could have issued process for the offence punishable under Section 420 IPC i.e. cheating but in any circumstances no case of criminal breach of trust is made out. The reason being that indisputably there is no entrustment of any property in the case at hand. It is not even the case of the complainant that any property was lawfully entrusted to the appellants and that the same has been dishonestly misappropriated. The case of the complainant is plain and simple. He says that the price of the goods sold by him has not been J-APL 83-2021.odt 7/8 paid. Once there is a sale, Section 406 IPC goes out of picture. According to the complainant, the invoices raised by him were not cleared. No case worth the name of cheating is also made out."
9. Thus, it can be seen that there is no entrustment of the property, which is a sine qua non for committing an offence under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, there is no inducement as contemplated under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, as far as the present applicants are concerned.
10. If the facts of the present case are appreciated in the light of the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reproduced supra, the role of the present applicants is only confined to the assurance on behalf of the main accused. Nothing more has been attributed to the present applicants in the First Information Report in question. We are therefore of the considered view that the situation would squarely fall within the well laid down parameters in the case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajanlal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and more particularly Clause 1, 3, and 7 thereof :
"102.................
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against J-APL 83-2021.odt 8/8 the accused.
(2) ...
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or com- plaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) ...
(5) ...
(6) ...
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
11. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order:
ORDER
i) The application is allowed.
i) The First Information Report No. 0096/2020, registered with non-applicant No.1, Police Station Hudkeshwar, Nagpur, on 15.03.2020, for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, is quashed and set aside to the extent of the present applicants.
iii) The application is allowed and disposed of as such.
12. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. (NANDESH S. DESHPANDE, J.) (URMILA JOSHI-PHALKE, J.) Jayashree..