IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 4524 OF 2008
Ganesh Rambhau Khalale ..... .... Petitioner
V/s
The State of Maharashtra Ors.... .... Respondents
Mr.Anil Mardikar, Adv. For the petitioner.
Mr.Abhay Patki, AGP for the State.
CORAM: S.B.MHASE, A.P.DESHPANDE
ig AND
P.B.VARALE, JJJ.
DATED: 7th JANUARY, 2009.
ORAL JUDGMENT:(per A.P.Deshpande, J.)
Having noticed divergent views expressed in two judgments delivered by co-ordinate Benches of this Court the instant writ petitions are referred to this bench of three Judges which involve a common question of law. The reference is in relation to grant or refusal of protection to candidates appointed or admitted prior to 20.11.2000 against the posts reserved for scheduled tribe/scheduled caste category of the backward class on cancellation of their 1 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: caste/tribe certificates pursuant to the verification of caste claim by the Scrutiny Committee. Before we proceed to deal with the relevant issue it would be appropriate to refer to the views taken in the two judgments. The judgment first in point of time is in Writ Petition No.853 of 2007 (Union of India & Ors. V/s Deepak Y.
Gotefode ) 2008 (1) Mh.L.J. 790. The respondent in the said writ petition was appointed as lower division clerk against a post reserved for scheduled tribe. In clause 20 of the letter of appointment issued to the respondent it was specifically stated that the appointment was provisional and was subject to caste/tribe verification. The letter of appointment made it further clear that if the caste certificate is found to be false, the services of the respondent would be liable to be terminated without assigning any reason. A copy of the caste/tribe certificate was forwarded to the Caste Scrutiny Committee, Nagpur and despite repeated demands from the Committee the respondent did not produce the original certificate. Hence ultimately on consideration of all the relevant factors the caste/tribe certificate came to be cancelled and confiscated, on the basis of which the 2 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: respondent had sought the appointment. Aggrieved thereby the respondent filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Central Administrative Tribunal having allowed the same, the Union of India preferred writ petition in the High Court which in turn was allowed by the High Court quashing the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal. While reversing the judgment of the Tribunal the High Court held that the respondent had sought the appointment by mis-representation and hence cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. It is also held that as the appointment was procured by playing fraud by producing false caste certificate the respondent cannot be said to be holding the post within the meaning of article 311 of the Constitution of India. The said appointment has been held to be void since its inception. While allowing the application the Tribunal had placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State of Maharashtra v/s Milind & Ors., 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 1 - AIR 2001 SC 393 and had held that the respondent (before the High Court) was entitled to the relief prayed for.
3 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 :::2. The later Division Bench judgment is in Writ Petition No.3980 of 2006 along with batch of other connected writ petitions in the case of Prashant Haribhau Khawas v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors.
2008(2) Mh.L.J. 322 wherein the Division Bench has considered the issue of grant of protection to number of petitioners in relation to appointments in the light of the observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v/s Milind & Ors. The Division Bench has decided the question in favour of the petitioners before it and granted protection to the appointments by placing reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the said judgment. The Division Bench after noticing the fact that all the petitioners were appointed prior to the date of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v/s Milind it held that the petitioners are entitled to the protection sought for. The Division Bench has also held that observations made in para 36 of the said judgment is `Law declared by the Supreme Court' and hence proceeded to follow the same. Thus in substance two fold findings are recorded:
4 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 :::(1) That the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 36 is the ratio decidendi hence construed the same as `Law declared by the Supreme Court' and followed it.
(2) That the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v/s Milind operates prospectively and not retrospectively and hence all admissions and appointments that have become final on the date of the judgment shall remain unaffected and thus need to be protected.
For proper understanding of the dispute we reproduce Para 36 in the case of State V/s Milind herein below:
"36. Respondent No.1 jointed the medical course for the year 1985-86. Almost 15 years have passed by now. We are told he has already completed the course and may be he is practicing as doctor. In this view and at this length of time it is for nobody's benefit to annul his admission. Huge amount is spent on each candidate for completion of medical course. No doubt, one Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived of joining medical course by the admission given to respondent No.1. If 5 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: any action is taken against respondent No.1, it may lead depriving the service of a doctor to the society on whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall not affect the degree obtained by him and his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes Order any further or for any other constitutional purpose. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C)No.16372/85 and other related affairs, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment."
3. Three writ petitions are placed before this Full Bench, two of which pertain to seeking protection of appointments whereas one relates to admission. It is undisputed that all the three petitioners are appointed/admitted prior to the date of the Supreme Court judgment, 6 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: the date being 28.11.2000. Besides deciding the above referred question the later Division Bench has also considered the question of grant of protection to appointments made or admissions granted prior to 15.6.1995 in the light of the Government Resolution but this issue has not been argued before us as in the facts of the present petitions it does not arise for consideration, as the petitioners are appointed/admitted after 15.6.95, viz. the cut of date, hence we are not called upon to decide the said question.
4. The Division Bench has held that the Supreme Court has made its judgment prospectively operational and has protected all the admissions and appointments which had attained finality. In other words, what has been held in the judgment is that the observations made in para 36 by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is the ratio decidendi which would bind all the Courts in view of the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, it being the law declared by the Supreme Court. Before we proceed to examine the correctness of the said finding we formulate the question that needs an adjudication.
7 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 :::(1) Whether the observations made or directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 in the case of State of Maharashtra v/s Milind, reported in 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 1 (para 38 SCC) is declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India which is binding on all the Courts or are the said observations made/directions issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 which only protect the petitioners in that case in the facts and circumstances therein.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have submitted that all the petitioners have secured employment prior to 28.11.2000 on which date the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court delivered the judgment in Milind' s case (supra) over ruling the judgment of Division Bench of the Bombay High Court delivered on 4.9.1985. The petitioners had obtained the caste/tribe certificates showing them to be belonging Halba scheduled tribe. However said certificates are invalidated by orders passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committee as stated herein above. It is contended that based on the observations made in para 36 of the judgment in Milind's case (supra) 8 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: various orders are passed by this Court extending protection to the appointments interpreting the said observations as laying down the law. Our attention is also invited to many orders passed by the Supreme Court as well, protecting the appointments and/or admissions granted to the candidates. The basic issue which arises for consideration is as to whether the observations made/directions issued by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra V/s Milind is declaration of law by Supreme Court which shall be binding on all Courts or whether the said observations are in exercise of discretionary powers vested under article 142 of the Constitution of India. If the observations in para 36 are held to be law declared by the Supreme Court the present petitioner' s appointments/admissions would stand protected. However if the said observations/directions are held to be issued pursuant to the exercise of jurisdiction under article 142 which power is only available to the Supreme Court, the petitioner's appointments/admissions cannot be protected by this Court. Let us examine the Supreme Court judgments which favour the submissions 9 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: made on behalf of the petitioners, interpreting the judgment in State of Maharashtra v/s Milind. The first judgment is in the case of R.Vishwanatha Pillai v/s State of Kerala & Ors., reported in (2004) 20 SCC 105. In this case the Supreme Court was considering the cases of appointments so also admissions which were disposed of by a common judgment by the High Court. Dealing with the appointments the Supreme Court has held that a person procuring an appointment in the post meant for reserved category candidate on the basis of false caste certificate is not a person holding a civil post within the meaning of article 311 and as such the appointment has been held to be no appointment in the eye of law. While dealing with admissions the Supreme Court observed in para 28 thus:
"28. In this case we find that the appellant had joined Regional Engineering College in the year 1992. He completed the course of his studies in the year 1996 under the interim orders of (sic the High) Court which were subject to the final orders to be passed in the writ petition. No purpose would be served in withholding the declaration of the result on the basis 10 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: of the examination already taken by him or depriving him of the degree in case he passes the examination. In terms of the orders passed by the Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Milind we direct that his result be declared and he be allowed to take his degree with the condition that he will not be treated as a Scheduled Caste candidate in future either in obtaining service or for any other benefits flowing from the caste certificate obtained by him. His caste certificate has been ordered to be cancelled. Henceforth, he will be treated as a person belonging to the general category for all purposes."
6. The next judgment is in the case of Sanjay Madhusudan Punekar v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2002 (2) Mh.L.J. SC 300.
The order passed by the Supreme Court is very short and the same reads thus:
"Leave granted.
This Court has now decided the question of law against the appellant. At the same time it has taken notice of passage of time and, therefore, made its order prospective, keeping 11 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: unaffected appointments that had become final. This is an appropriate case in which to apply the same principle having regard to the fact that the appointment of the appellant was made long back. Therefore, the only order that needs to be made is to say that the judgment of this Court in State v/s Milind & Ors, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. SC (1) = 2001 (1) SCC 4 shall not affect the appointment of the appellant.
Order on the appeal accordingly.
No order as to costs."
7. The third judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the case of Central Warehouse Corpn. V/s Jagdishkumar Vitthalrao Panjankar & Anr. in SLP (C) No.25644/2004 wherein it was observed as under :
"The appellant claims that though he belongs to a Koshtis, the sub-caste of the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The question came up before the Bombay High Court that whether Koshtis is a sub-
caste of Halba or not, this question was decided by the Bombay High Court and it was held that Koshtis is sub-caste of Halba 12 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: (ST) and every Koshtis may be treated as a Halba (1987 Maharashtra Law Journal 572). This matter came up in special leave petition before this Court and this Court reserved the judgment and took the view that the Koshtis is not a sub-caste of Halba. However, while disposing of that appeal their Lordships said in last two lines which reads:
"We make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment."
The Constitution Bench made it very clear that those who have been given benefit of being as a Koshtis sub-caste of Halba ST category their appointments though bad shall not be disturbed. Thereafter, many matters followed and learned counsel invited our attention to various orders passed by this Court from time to time wherein liberal view had been taken that those who have been given benefits shall not be revoked but they will not be entitled to benefit in future. Similar is the position here also in the present case."13 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 :::
8. The next judgment is in the case of Punjab National Bank & Anr. V/s Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade & Anr., 2007 (3) Mh.L.J. SC
805. This judgment needs to be dealt with more elaborately. In the facts of the said case the respondent was a bank employee who was appointed in the year 1989 on a reserved post of scheduled tribe. The respondent was claiming to be belonging to Halba Scheduled Tribe.
On in-validation of his caste certificate by the Scrutiny Committee he was terminated from the service in the year 2002. The said respondent filed writ petition in the High Court challenging the order passed by the Scrutiny Committee invalidating his tribe claim. The bank employee had put forth two contentions viz; (i) that he is protected by the Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995 the decision wherein is reiterated in the subsequent Government Resolution dated 30.6.2004 and (ii)that his appointment stands protected by the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of State v/s Milind. Reliance is placed primarily on the observations made in para 36. The Bench comprised of two learned Judges who have delivered separate judgments. Justice H.K. Sema has held that 14 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: the appointment of the bank employee is protected by Government Resolution dated 15.6.95. However the said judgment does not deal with the binding nature of the observations made in the case of State v/s Milind. The other learned Judge Shri V.S.Sirpurkar has refrained from deciding the question, as to whether the bank employee stands protected under the Government Resolution dated 15.6.95 but has concluded that the concerned employee's appointment stands protected in view of the observations made in the case of State v/s Milind. It is observed thus:
"5. It is not necessary for us to consider the question as to whether protection provided in the Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995 is applicable to a bank employee like the respondent since the protection is provided in Milind's case in no uncertain terms. This court has very specifically observed at the end of para 38 as under :
"Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C)No.16372/85 and other related affairs, 15 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:47 ::: we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment."
(This was of course after discussing the factual situation in that case and particularly nothing the prejudice that could be caused to the respondent-Milind in view of the period of 15 years spent in finalizing the issue of his caste status.)
7. ....... ...... ..... Therefore it was tried to be suggested before us that the observations were applicable to that particular case and the facts therein. Ordinarily we would have been persuaded to accept the argument. However fortunately for respondent this observation was later on relied upon by this Court in another decision in Civil Appeal No.3375/2000 (arising out of SLP (C) No.6524/88) dated 12.12.2000 wherein this Court observed:
" The appellant having belonged to Koshti caste claimed to be included in the Scheduled tribe of Halba and obtained an appointment as Assistant Engineer. When his 16 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: appointment was sought to be terminated on the basis that he did not belong to scheduled tribe by the Government in a writ petition was filed before the High Court challenging that order which was allowed. That order is questioned in this appeal. The questions arising in this case are covered by the decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind & Ors.
2000 (7) Scale 628 and was got to be allowed, however, the benefits derived till now shall be available to the appellant to the effect that his appointment as Assistant Engineer shall stand protected but no further. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
8. The situation is no different in case of the present respondent. He also came to be appointed and/or promoted way back in the year 1989 on the basis of his caste certificate which declared him to be Scheduled Tribe. Ultimately it was found that since a "Koshti" does not get the status of a Scheduled Tribe, the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated the said certificate holding that respondent was a Koshti and not a 17 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: Halba. I must hasten to add that there is no finding in the order of caste scrutiny committee that the petitioner lacked in bona fides in getting the certificate. I say that to overcome the observations in para 21 in Sanjay Nimje's case. "But it is not a case where the respondent pleaded and proved bonafide."
9. Under such circumstances the High Court was fully justified in relying on the observations made in Milind's case.
The High Court has not referred to the judgment and order in Civil Appeal No.3375 of 2000 decided on 12.12.2000 to which a reference has been made above. However, it is clear that the High Court was right in holding that the observations in Milind's case apply to the case of the present respondent and he stands protected thereby."
It is vehemently contended on the basis of above referred judgments that the judgment in the case of State v/s Milind has only prospective operation and all appointments and admissions which had attained finality prior to the date of delivery of the judgment in the said case stand protected.
18 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 :::9. Now, let us examine the judgments which take the contrary view. In the case of Bank of India v/s Avinash Mandvikar, 2005 (4) Mh.L.J. SC 409. An appeal was carried to the Supreme Court by Bank of India aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court granting protection to the respondent-employee on equitable considerations and by placing reliance upon the decision in the case of State v/s Milind. The employee had joined the bank in the year 1976 in a post that was reserved by scheduled tribe candidate. The caste certificate of the employee was referred to the scrutiny committee for verification and the scrutiny committee had rejected the caste claim of the employee. Thereafter various proceedings were taken up including writ petitions in the High Court at the behest of the employee and the matter was remanded twice to the Caste Scrutiny Committee. Ultimately the Committee invalidated the claim of the employee. Acting on the said decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committee charges of misconduct were framed against the employee and a departmental inquiry was conducted which culminated in his dismissal from service which order was challenged before the High 19 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: Court successfully. Reversing the judgment of the High Court the Supreme Court has in no uncertain terms held that the employee had obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to scheduled tribe and when the Scrutiny Committee has recorded clear finding that he did not belong to scheduled tribe, the very foundation of his appointment collapses and his appointment is no appointment in the eye of law. The relevant observations find place in para 6 of the judgment which read as under:
"6.
Respondent No.1-employee obtained appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to Scheduled Tribe.
When the clear finding of the Scrutiny Committee is that he did not belong to Scheduled Tribe, the very foundation of his appointment collapses and his appointment is no appointment in the eyes of law. There is absolutely no justification for his claim in respect of post he usurped, as the same was meant for reserved candidate."
In the said case the employee had put in nearly three decades of service and had only left about three years for his retirement. Despite 20 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: the same the Supreme Court has allowed the appeal by holding that a person who has obtained an appointment by illegitimate means cannot be permitted to enjoy the same as he has no iota of right even to be considered for the appointment. The Supreme Court has distinguished the judgment in State v/s Milind in recording the above referred findings.
10. The next judgment is in the case of Additional General Manager, Human Resource, BHEL Ltd.
v/s Suresh Ramkrishna Burde., 2007 (4) Mh.L.J. 1. The said judgment is also in the same set of facts wherein the employee was appointed on the basis of false caste certificate and the question was as to whether could such an employee be permitted to retain the benefit of wrong committed by him. Answering in the negative the Supreme Court held that such an employee is liable to be terminated from service. In this case as well the employee had claimed to be belonging to Halba scheduled tribe and had got the appointment on submission of a caste certificate to that effect. The caste certificate was referred to the Caste Scrutiny Committee and the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated that 21 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: certificate submitted by the employee. While allowing the petition of the employee the High Court had held that the judgment of the Supreme Court in State v/s Milind is not the judgment pertaining to that case but is a settled law. While dealing with the said judgment in State v/s Milind the Supreme Court in para 7 observed thus:
"7. The High Court has granted relief to the respondent and has directed his reinstatement only on the basis of Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Milind and others, 2001 (1) Mh.L.J. (SC) 1 = (2001) 1 SCC 4 in our opinion the said judgment does not lay down any such principle of law that where a person secures an appointment by producing a false caste certificate, his services can be protected and an order of reinstatement can be passed if he gives an undertaking that in future he and his family members shall not take any advantage of being member of a caste which is in reserved category.
In the concluding part of para 7 the Supreme Court observed:
"The law declared by the Constitution Bench does not at all 22 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: lay down that where a person secures an appointment by producing a false caste certificate, his services can be protected on his giving an undertaking that in future he will not take any advantage of being a member of the reserved category."
The Supreme Court has further observed in para 8 that:
"8. After interpreting the relevant constitutional or statutory provisions and laying down the law, it is always open to a Court to mould the relief which may appear to be just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
Thus the observation made in para 36 of judgment in the case of State v/s Milind have been read and explained in this judgment as moulding of relief in view of the facts of the said case obviously in exercise of discretion under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
11. The next judgment is in the case of Union of India v/s Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar & Ors., 2008 (2) Mh.L.J. 720. This three Judges judgment goes to explain the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of State v/s Milind and concludes that the said judgment has no application to the cases relating to securing 23 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: employment by wrongly seeking benefit of reservation meant for scheduled tribe. It also held that in such cases the proper course to be followed is to cancel the appointment obtained on the basis of false certificate so that same can be filled in by a candidate entitled to the benefit of reservation. After narrating the circumstances in which the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court protected the degree obtained by the candidate it is explained thus:
"In these peculiar circumstances, this Court held that the decision will not affected the degree secured by respondent or his practice as a doctor but made it clear that he could not claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. But the said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefit of reservation meant for Scheduled Tribes. When a person secures employment by making a false claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate candidate belonging to scheduled caste/tribe, of employment. In such a 24 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: situation, the proper course is to cancel the employment obtained on the basis of the false certificate so that the post may be filled up by a candidate who is entitled to the benefit of reservation."
The judgments in the case of Bank of India v/s Avinash Mandvikar and Additional General Manager, Human Resource, BHEL Ltd. v/s Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (supra) have been quoted with approval and relied upon. The last judgment on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent is in the case of Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(3) All MR 835. This judgment of the Supreme Court directly considers the question raised in the present writ petitions in as much as the Supreme Court has categorically held that the observations in para 38 (SCC) (Para 36 in Mah. L.J.) in the case of State v/s Milind are in the nature of moulding the relief in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The said observations in State v/s Milind have been held not to be the ratio decidendi but issuance of direction after considering the equities by having recourse to the 25 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court after referring to the judgment in the case of State v/s Milind has observed thus:
"5. In Milind, the question was whether the first respondent who belonged to `Koshti' caste could claim the benefit of ST reservation on the ground that it was a sub-tribe of `Halba' (Entry No.19 in Part IX of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 195). This Court held that `Koshti' was not a part of the Scheduled Tribe of Halba and that the entires in the Scheduled Tribes Order could not be amended or expanded by any Authority. As a consequence, the State's appeal was allowed and the claim of first respondent therein that he belonged to a scheduled tribe was rejected. Having allowed the State's appeal, this Court moulded the relief in exercise of its power under Article 142 by permitting the first respondent therein to retain the benefit of his degree (for the reasons extracted above). Vishwanatha Pillai merely followed Milind.
In Milind, there was a bona fide doubt as to whether `Halba-26 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 :::
Koshti' could be considered as `Halba'.
In Vishwanatha Pillai,
the candidate's
caste certificate was cancelled merely as a
consequence of cancellation of his father'
s caste certificate.
Thus in Milind and Vishwanatha Pillai, the candidates apparently believed that they belonged to a scheduled tribe/caste when they sought admission and were admitted.
Further, their caste certificates showing them as belonging to a scheduled tribe/caste had not been invalidated when they were admitted to the course. The direction in both cases permitting retention of degree was in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution.
6. There may however be cases where it will not be proper to permit the student to retain the degree obtained by making a false claim. One example is where the candidates secure seats by producing forged or fake caste certificates.
There may be cases, where knowing full well that they do not belong to a scheduled tribe/caste candidates may make a false claim that they belong to a scheduled tribe/caste. There may 27 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: also be cases where even before the date of admission, the caste certificates of the candidates might have been invalidated on verification of the Scrutiny Committee. There may be cases where the admissions may be in pursuance of interim orders granted by courts subject to final decision making it clear that the candidate will not be entitled to claim, any equities by reason of the admission. The benefit extended in Milind and Vishwanatha Pillai cannot obviously be extended uniformly to all such cases. Each case may have to be considered on its own merits. Further what has precedential value is the ratio decidendi of the decision and not the direction issued while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142 on the special facts and circumstances of a case. We are therefore of the view that Milind and Vishwanatha Pillai cannot be considered as laying down a proposition that in every case where a candidate' s case claim is rejected by a caste verification committee, the candidate should invariably be permitted to retain the benefit of the admission and the consequential degree, 28 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: irrespective of the facts.
(emphasis supplied)
12. After careful consideration of the judgments referred to herein above it is noticed that three of the judgments need elaborate consideration as they clearly deal with the question raised in these writ petitions. The first judgment is in the case of Punjab National Bank & Anr. V/s Vilas s/o Govindrao Bokade & Anr. In the said case the respondent was a bank employee appointed in the year 1989 in a reserved post for scheduled tribe. The respondent was claiming to be belonging to `Halba' scheduled tribe. On invalidation of his caste certificate by the Caste Scrutiny Committee he was terminated from service. Aggrieved by the termination the order of the Caste Scrutiny Committee was challenged by filing writ petition in the High Court and two fold submissions were made (i)that he was protected by the Government Resolution dated 15.6.95 and (ii)that his appointment was protected by the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State v/s Milind. The Bench comprised of two learned Judges who delivered separate judgments. Justice H.K.Sema 29 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: has held that the appointment of the bank employee is protected by Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995. However said judgment does not deal with the binding nature of the observations made in the case of State vs. Milind. The other learned Judge Shri V.S.Sirpurkar has refrained from deciding the said question as to whether the bank employee stands protected under the Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995 but has concluded that the concerned employee' s appointment stands protected in view of the observations made in the case of State vs Milind. The learned Judge in his separate judgment observed thus:
"Therefore it was tried to be suggested before us that the observations were applicable to that particular case and the facts therein. Ordinarily we would have been persuaded to accept the arguments. However ....... ....... ......."
In the concluding part of para 9 the learned Judge held that the High Court was right in holding that the observations in Milind's case applied to the case of present respondent and he stands protected thereby. It is thus clear that one of the learned Judge in Punjab 30 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: National Bank's case has by necessary implication held that the observations made by the Supreme Court in para 36 in the case of State vs Milind is a declaration of law within the meaning of 141 of the Constitution of India and thus binding. The next judgment is in the case of Union of India vs Dattatraya Namdeo Mendhekar & Ors.
The said judgment is delivered by the Division Bench of three Judges of the Supreme Court which goes to explain the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of State vs Milind and it is categorically stated therein that the judgment in State vs Milind has no application to the cases relating to securing employment by wrongfully seeking benefit of reservation meant for scheduled tribe. It is further held that the proper course to be followed in such cases is to cancel the appointment obtained on the basis of false caste certificate. It is held in this judgment that having allowed the State's appeal (in State vs. Milind) the Court moulded the relief in exercise of powers under Article 142 by permitting the first respondent to retain the benefit of the degree. Had the observations/directions contained in para 36 in State vs Milind been a declaration of law by the Constitution Bench of 31 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: the Supreme Court three Judges Bench would not have diluted the ratio laid down in State vs. Milind, as it is observed in the case of State vs. Milind that the admissions and appointments that have become final shall remain unaffected by the said judgment. The very fact that those observations have been explained so as to mean that they would only apply to the cases of admissions and not the appointments it is implicitly made crystal clear that the observations/directions in State vs. Milind as having been issued in exercise of discretionary power and jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The last judgment is in the case of Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. This judgment is the only judgment which directly deals with the question raised in the present writ petition. In this case the Supreme Court has in no uncertain terms held that the directions issued in the case of State vs Milind and in the case of R.Vishwanatha Pillai vs State of Kerala & Ors. have been so issued in exercise of powers under article 142 of the Constitution of India. It is also held that the said observations/directions do not constitute ratio decidendi but are the 32 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: directions issued while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142 on the special facts and circumstances of the case. This judgment in Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi's case puts the controversy beyond any peril of doubt and concludes the question raised.
13. Having regard to the legal position that emerges from the above referred judgments we record the following conclusions and answer the question framed:
1)The observations/directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State V/s Milind reported in 2001(1) Mah. L.J. SC 1 is not the `law declared by the Supreme Court' under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
2)The said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.
3)The said observations/directions have no application to the cases relating to appointments and are restricted to the cases relating to admissions.
4)The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and 33 ::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:12:48 ::: circumstances of the case would depend upon the exercise of discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not available to the High Court no protection can be granted by this Court even in cases relating to admissions.
14. In the result we hold that the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Union of India vs. Deepak Y. Gotefode, 2008 (1) Mh.L.J.
790 lays down correct position of law and we further hold, with due respect to the learned Judges that the judgment in the case of Prashant Haribhau Khawas v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(2) Mh.L.J. 322 does not lay down the correct law. The reference is answered accordingly. The writ petitions be placed before the respective Division Benches for hearing and final disposal in the light of this reference Judgment.
S.B.MHASE, J.
A.P. DESHPANDE, J.
P.B. VARALE, J.
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