JUDGMENT P.V. Kakade, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for both parties.
2. The present petition arises out of an order dated 24-4-2006 passed by the C.J., S.D., Nanded in Special Civil Suit No. 44 of 2006, which is sought to be quashed and it is further requested that the counter-claim be rejected as untenable under the law.
3. The petitioner-original plaintiff preferred R.C.S. No. 629 of 2005 for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from obstructing and disturbing the possession and construction of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property located at Vazirabad, Nanded. The defendant filed written statement and counter-claim pertaining to the property valued at Rs. 1,40,000/-. The defendant prayed for declaration of title and possession. The respondent-defendant filed an application (Exh.21) praying that the suit be transferred to the C.J., S.D. because the counterclaim pertains to the property valued at Rs. 1,40,000/-, which is beyond pecuniary jurisdiction of C.J., J.D. Therefore, the C.J., J.D. took the matter on Board and passed an order below Exh.21 stating that the counter-claim filed by defendant was valued at Rs. 1,40,000/- whereas, the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court was Rs. 1,00,000/- only and hence, the matter be referred to the Court of C.J., S.D., Nanded for proper adjudication. On 4-2-2006, the C.J., J.D., Nanded addressed a letter to the District Judge, Nanded informing this position whereupon, the District Judge thought it fit to take cognizance of the relevant aspect and transferred the suit to the Court of C.J., S.D., Nanded for adjudication, according to law.
4. Therefore, the impugned order is challenged on the ground that in judicial matter when the question of jurisdiction was involved, the suit could not be transferred by the District Judge administratively to the Court of C.J., S.D., who may have pecuniary jurisdiction. It was also submitted that patent illegality was committed by the District Judge in transferring the matter by administrative order to the Court of C.J., S.D., whereas the proper course for the Court of C.J., J.D. was to dismiss the counter-claim as it was filed knowing well that it was exceeding the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court.
5. The respondent obviously, challenged the contentions on various grounds. It is brought to my notice that the learned District Judge has obviously followed the provisions of Chapter IX, paragraph 233 of the Civil Manual issued by the High Court of Judicature, Bombay, Appellate Side, For Guidance of the Civil Courts and Officers subordinate to it. Paragraph 233 of the Civil Manual reads thus:
233. When a suit assigned for disposal by a Civil Judge of the Senior Division to his Joint Civil Judge of the Junior Division is found by the latter to be beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction, he should request his District Judge to transfer the suit administratively to the Civil Judge of the Senior Division, and not return the plaint to the plaintiff for being judicially presented to the proper Court or return it to the Civil Judge of the Senior Division.
6. Therefore, it is apparent that the District Court was within its powers to transfer the matter administratively to the Court of C.J., S.D., on the ground that C.J., J.D. had no pecuniary jurisdiction and the proper Court would be the C.J., S.D., Nanded. Even, perusal of the provisions of Section 22 as well as 23 and 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure would show that it was within the powers of the District Court to transfer the suit in this manner when pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of C.J., J.D. was limited to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000/- only.
7. The learned Counsel for respondent also sought to put reliance on various rulings of this Court as well as the Apex Court with regard to the stage to raise objection regarding jurisdiction. However, I need not go into those aspects especially, when the administrative order passed by the District Judge appears to be perfectly legal and valid.
8. At this juncture, it may also be noted that subsequently, the suit came to be withdrawn and, therefore, the entire exercise becomes, more or less, academic. Be as it may, the fact remains that there is no substance in the present revision application and hence, the revision application stands dismissed with no order as to costs.