JUDGMENT R.C. Chavan, J.
1. This petition is directed against petitioner's termination ordered by respondents on 13th May,1992.
2. The petitioner was appointed as Kindergarten Worker (Anganwadi Karyakarti) by an order dated 13-9-1982 on honorarium of Rs. 125/- per month. She was working as such at village Murzari Tahsil and District Yavatmal. On 21-3-1992, a notice was issued to her to show cause as to why action should not be taken against her for several delinquencies listed in the notice. The petitioner replied this notice on 30th March, 1992. However, by the impugned order dated 13th May, 1992 the petitioner was discharged from the post of honorary Kindergarten Worker.
3. The petitioner assails this order on the ground that the order was mala fide, inasmuch as it was contrived by the Police Patil to have the petitioner discharged to make room for Police Patil's wife, for being appointed as Kindergarten Worker. The petitioner claims that she had discharged her duties properly and that there was no substance in the allegations made against her. She submitted that the impugned order was arbitrary and illegal, inasmuch as principles of natural justice were not followed and no enquiry whatsoever was conducted before issuing the impugned order. She, therefore, sought quashing and setting aside of the impugned order, with a prayer for reinstatement with backwages.
4. Submissions on behalf of the respondents do not dispute the fact that no enquiry was held in respect of the allegations against the petitioner. However, according to respondents, since the petitioner was not regular employee on regular salary, but was only engaged as an honorary Kindergarten Helper, that too on a part-time basis, no such enquiry was contemplated. Respondents contend that principles of natural justice were duly followed by informing the petitioner of the allegations against her and giving her a chance to furnish her explanation in respect of those allegations. The respondents, therefore, sought dismissal of the petition.
5. We have heard both learned Advocates for respective parties.
6. There is no dispute that the petitioner had worked for almost ten years before she was relieved of the post of honorary Kindergarten Worker. Likewise, there is no dispute that no enquiry of any sort was conducted into the allegations against the petitioner which are enumerated in the notice dated 21-3-1992. This notice at Annexure 3 would show that most of the irregularities are of minor nature. The petitioner seems to have been also rendering duty as Home-Guard and was stated to be on Home-Guard Training between 12th and 22nd February, 1992 and yet had shown to have made some home visits as Kindergarten Worker on 21st February, 1992. The petitioner has duly explained that since her training had come to an end on 20th February itself, she had made home visits on 21st February and, therefore, could not be held guilty of making false entries. One of the allegations made against the petitioner pertained to her being found in the company of a stranger on the night of 28-1-1992. According to petitioner, the person was not a stranger but her own husband. The record of the proceedings which was carried out by respondents was made available for our perusal by learned Advocate for respondents and it shows that the Sarpanch of the village had himself filed on 11th March 1992, a xerox copy of the Marriage Register which shows that the petitioner had married one Sunil Nathuji Ambagade on 28-1-1992, had given intimation to the Gram Panchayat office on the same day. It is indeed strange that in spite of receipt of such information for the purpose of registration of marriage in the very Gram Panchayat, the villagers should have alleged that the petitioner was found in the company of a stranger on the same night. However, we do not wish to express ourselves either way on the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made.
7. Learned Advocate for petitioner submitted that even while terminating services of a person in the position of petitioner on serious allegations of the type made, an enquiry was warranted. Learned Advocate submitted that Integrated Child Development Scheme under which the petitioner was appointed is a scheme fully funded by the Central Government and elaborate directions have been issued from time to time for appointment of person/s in the position of petitioner for running the Scheme. He, therefore, submitted that the position held by the petitioner was similar to that of an employee of the Government, and, therefore, notwithstanding absence of any express Rules to govern the conditions of petitioner's employment, she was entitled to be treated at par with Government employee/s while terminating her services. His learned adversary pointed out that the terms on which the petitioner was employed categorically provided for termination of petitioner for any reason whatsoever without being required to communicate such reason to the petitioner and, therefore, so long as the respondents were in position to show that they had a good reason for terminating the petitioner's association with them, the order could not be faulted. He submitted that as the record of proceedings in respect of petitioner's termination would show several villagers had complained about the conduct of the petitioner and, therefore, petitioner's continuation as a Kindergarten Worker in the village was found to be unwarranted.
8. After having heard learned Advocate for the respondents and having gone through the record made available by learned Advocate for our perusal, we find that serious allegations casting stigma on the petitioner were the cause of termination of petitioner's employment. Whether any Service Rules warranting a full-fledged enquiry into the allegations exist or not, principles of natural justice demand that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity to meet the allegations made against her before putting an end to her engagement with respondents, which has resulted in stigmatising her after having put in 10 years of work as Kindergarten Worker. It should have been seen by respondents that the material collected against the petitioner, particularly the material casting aspersions on her personal character, should have been made available to the petitioner and, if necessary the petitioner should have been permitted to rebut the same. Therefore, in our view, the action taken does not fulfil the requirement of compliance to the principles of natural justice and, therefore, cannot be sustained.
9. Learned Advocate Shri Walthare, appearing for the petitioner placed reliance on various judgments. The first judgment relied upon is, Smt. Chozhulu Kikhi and Ors. v. State of Nagaland and Ors. reported in 1992 Lab. I.C. 926. This judgment is relied upon to demonstrate that the persons employed under the Integrated Child Development Scheme which is entirely financed by Central Government and, therefore, rights of such employee are justiciable in writ jurisdiction. Other judgments relied upon by learned Advocate Mr. Walthare are on the point of right of employee on part-time basis or casual or temporary and observance of principles of natural justice in the matter of termination of their services. These judgments are as follows:
(1) Gurdarshan Grewal v. State of Punjab (1984) 1 Serv. L.R. 570; (2) Basudevpur (R and B) N.M.R. Employees Association and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. 1992 Lab. I.C. 970; (3) Changunabai Paslkar v. Kahau Makanji Mills Ltd. and Ors. 1992 Lab. I.C. 138; (4) Glaxo Laboratories (P) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut ; (5) Managing Director U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee .
In view of what this Court has found and recorded herein-before, admittedly, no departmental enquiry was conducted nor show cause notice was given and, thus, principles of natural justice are violated. In this background, this Court finds that it would not be necessary to discuss the precedents cited at Bar, at length.
10. We are conscious that the petition is being decided fifteen years after the impugned action. In these 15 years, the petitioner would not have remained idle. In any case, what she was entitled to is a position on an honorarium. In these 15 years respondents would have obviously posted a substitute in petitioner's place. In view of this, it may not be appropriate to direct respondents to pay the petitioner the entire arrears of honorarium from the date of her discharge till the petitioner is reinstated in her former position. We are also conscious of the fact that petitioner's immediate reinstatement in her former position may warrant ouster of someone who may be holding such position, without any fault on the part of such a person. We, therefore, expect the respondents to reinstate the petitioner at the first available opportunity should a vacancy be immediately unavailable, and, not necessarily at the place of her former positing. In fact, the petition shows that the petitioner had herself sought a transfer when she made a representation against the impugned order.
11. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned order dated 13th May, 1992 terminating petitioner's appointment is quashed and set aside. We direct the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with continuity of service, but without arrears of honorarium, immediately, if a vacancy is available, or, at the first possible opportunity, and, in any case, within a period of three months from the date of this order.
12. Rule is made absolute in above terms, with no order as to costs.