JUDGMENT Deskpande D.G., J.
1. Heard learned Advocate for the petitioner. Though the respondents were served, nobody is present for them. The applicant, who was an injured person, had filed an application before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Pune vide M.A.C.P. No. 4 of 1991. It was an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. He also applied therein for condonation of delay. The accident had occurred on 24/11/1989 and his application for condonation of delay under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, [herein after referred to as the M.V. Act, came to be filed on 20.10.199.1.
2. The M.A.C.T. Pune, treating this application as Exhibit 12, rejected the application on the ground that there was no provision for condoning the delay or after coming to the conclusion that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the application for condonation of delay filed after one year of the accident. It is against this order of the M.A.C.T. dated 28.4.1992 the present petition has been filed.
3. Mr. Deshpande, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, firstly, contended that when an application under Section 140 is made under Chapter X of the M.V. Act, no limitation is prescribed. It is a summary enquiry where the applicant has not to prove any negligence. The amount of compensation is fixed by Legislature which is Rs. 50,000/- in case of death and Rs. 25,000/- in case of permanent disability. The learned advocate Mr. Deshpande pointed out that similarly such section under Old Act was 92-A which was introduced by way of Amendment of 1982 in the M.V. Act, 1939 and very object of introducing Section 92-A was to give benefit to the victims of the accident. The Legislature meant to help all destitutes who are affected by the motor accident and not only to those who are pedestrians or their legal representatives and, the object of this section is to speed up payment of compensation on no fault principle. Therefore, Section 92-A was treated as a piece of beneficial legislation, providing for an immediate aid to claimants on account of death in an accident and, it should not be allowed to circumvented on technical pleas of joinder, non-joinder or misjoinder of parties.
4. The learned Advocate for the petitioner also pointed out that Chapter XII regarding compensation after inquiry is totally different chapter wherein under Section 166 an application was required to be made to the Tribunal for claiming compensation. Sub-section (3) of Section 166 prescribed limitation. But Sub-section (3) was deleted in 1994 meaning thereby at present there is no limitation prescribed for making an application under Chapter XII. The advocate for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hintendra Vishnu Thokur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. , and on the basis of para 26 contended that if the provisions relating to limitation are amended, then they are to be treated as procedural amendment and to be made applicable retrospectively. The Supreme Court in para 26 held thus:
The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the Court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statue which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.
4-A. Then my attention was drawn by the learned Advocate for the petitioner to Section 144 of the M.V. Act, 1988 which states that, "The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force." In view of this legal position, the Advocate for the petitioner contended that firstly no limitation was prescribed for filing application under Section 140 and, the MACT erred in not condoning the delay. He contended that in fact the application for condonation of delay was not at all necessary, and in any case if it was filed, particularly when the law did not prescribe any limitation, the court ought to have condoned the delay or should have regarded that application as superfluous and entertained the main application for compensation under Section 166 of the M.V. Act. Secondly, he argued that, in view of Section 144, giving overriding effect to the provisions of this Chapter X, the MACT should not have applied provisions of limitation. Thirdly, he contended that the provisions of Chapter XII could not have been applied mutatis mutandis to the application under Section 140 or Chapter X because the object of both Chapter X and Chapter XII was totally different. When Chapter XII, at one hand, prescribed procedural law for fixing compensation after discharging burden of proof. On the other hand the application under Chapter X i.e. under Section 140 of the M.V. Act did not require any proof to be given by the applicant because it was summery inquiry for fixing no fault liability being a part of social beneficial legislation.
In support of his contention the learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Aurangbad Bench of this. Court in the case of Nazir Ahmed v. Kishan Nandlal Bhardia, reported in 1988 A.C.J. 1097 wherein in paras 3 and 4 this Court held thus:
There thus being no period of limitation involved, there cannot be any question of delay in the filing of the application beyond any statutory period of limitation, much less would a question of condoning or not condoning delay in that behali arise or survive. The petitioner's application under Section 92-A was, therefore, required to be heard and decided on its own merits and in accordance with law.
However, by way of abundant caution and assuming that there is a period of limitation, I am, in the facts and circumstances of the case, inclined to condone the same. In a matter such as this, where a fatal accident occurs, relief cannot be denied on a mere ground of delay. Better concept of justice requires condonation of delay in such cases and passing orders on merits rather than dismissing claims on technicalities. The whole object and spairity of the Amending Act of 1982 indicating, inter alia, liability to pay compensation on the principle of no fault would stand defeated if claims thereunder are disallowed or rejected on a ground of limitation, all the more when the said claim arises as a result of a fatal accident as in this case.
5. I find considerable force in these submissions made by Mr. Deshpande, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner. It is true that Chapter X does not prescribe any limitation. It is also true that Section 144 has given overriding effect to all the provisions of Chapter X. Therefore, when Section 140 was a beneficial piece of legislation as introduced earlier by way of Section 92-A of the Old Act, that section should have been liberally interpreted. It is found from the order of the MACT that the provisions of limitation prescribed in Chapter XII, as were existing at that time, were wrongly applied to the application of the present petitioner under Section 140 and as a result, the MACT came to a wrong conclusion that it has no jurisdiction to condone the delay.
6. It is to be seen that even at that time when the application under Section 140 of the M.V. Act was filed, there was no limitation under Section 140 and, even if the applicant has bona fide applied for condonation of delay, it was open to the tribunal to disregard that application and entertain the main application. If at all the provisions of Limitation Act are to be applied, then limitation has to be specifically prescribed by it. It cannot be permitted applied by one's own views. Therefore, when neither Chapter X nor Sections 140 to 144 of the M.V. Act prescribe any period of limitation and the MACT erred in applying the provisions of Chapter XII to the application of the petitioner under Section 140 of the M.V. Act and committed a grave error in rejecting that application, this petition of the present petitioner, has therefore, to be allowed.
7. The learned Advocate for the petitioner also stated that since now Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the M.V. Act has been deleted, the petitioner gets rights to apply under Chapter XII and, therefore, he should be given liberty to do so. He also contended that the report under Section 158(6) can also be treated as an application as per new provision. Whatever that may be, if the petitioner has right now, after deletion of Sub-section (3) of Section 166 of M.V. Act, he may apply under Chapter XII, but so far as his application under Chapter X is concerned, that has to be treated as an existing application on the file of M.A.C.T. Pune. In the result, I pass the following order:
ORDER The impugned order dated 28.4.1992 passed by the M.A.C.T. Pune under is set aside. The M.A.C.T. Pune to decide that application as early as possible say within a period of three months from the date of appearance of the petitioner before it. The petitioner to appear before the M.A.C.T., Pune on 18th October 2006 along with certified copy of this order. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. Petition is disposed of.