JUDGMENT R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
Page 2191
1. Admit. Heard forthwith by consent. The appellant challenges the judgment and order dated 25-10-2005 passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No. 7404 of 2005. By the impugned order, the learned single Judge has set aside the order dated 18-10-2005 passed by the respondent No. 2. By the said order dated 18-10-2005 the respondent No. 1 was permitted to open bank account and to collect milk in the specified area.
2. The challenge to the impugned order is two-fold; firstly, that the order which was sought to be impugned in the said writ petition was an administrative order and, therefore, the petition could not have been entertained by the learned single Judge in view of the provisions comprised under Chapter XVII, Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, hereinafter called as "the said Rules". Secondly, that a fraud was sought to be practised upon the Court in as much as that it was sought to be represented by the respondent No. 1 that it had submitted the proposal to the Registrar of Taluka Dudh Sangh complete in all respects as long back as 24-8-2005 when factually the affidavits of 152 primary milk societies were submitted much later. Being so, the application filed by the respondent No. 1 was not a complete proposal in accordance with the provisions of law on the day when it was allowed by the respondent No. 2.
Page 2192
3. On the other hand, it is the case of the respondent No. 1 that the order passed by the respondent No. 2 was in exercise of powers under Section 4 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as "the said Act" rule with the Government Resolution dated 15-9-2005, hereinafter called as "the Government Resolution" and therefore it was a quasi-judicial order. In view of the said policy directives, in order to register a new taluka dudh sangh in Daund Taluka, the respondent No. 1 collected resolutions from various primary milk societies in the Taluka of Daund. There are about 202 registered primary village level societies in the Taluka and the respondent claims to have received support from 160 societies and about 148 societies having executed their affidavits in support of the respondents. On the basis of those documents, the respondent No. 1 submitted its proposal. In September, 2005 the respondent No. 1 came to know that the appellant herein had also submitted its proposal for registration for taluka dudh sangh for Daund Taluka. They learnt about attempt on the part of the Government to consider the application of the appellant and therefore an application was filed by the respondent No. 1 for intervention pointing out that they have majority of support as compared to the appellant from the primary societies. On 20-10-2005 the respondent No. 1 received an information that without hearing the respondent No. 1 or the other concerned parties, the respondent No. 2 through the Under Secretary, Government of Maharashtra, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Dairy Development and Fisheries Department had passed an order dated 18-10-2005 permitting the appellant to collect milk and to open bank account. Since the said order was in total breach of the principles of natural justice and in violation of the provisions of the said Act read with the said Government policy directives issued under Section 4 of the said Act, they filed the Writ Petition bearing No. 7404 of 2005 which came to be allowed by the impugned order directing the respondent No. 2 to consider the matter afresh and to pass appropriate order in accordance with the provisions of law, after hearing the parties, while setting aside the order of the respondent No. 2 passed on 18-10-2005. As the authority had passed the said order without considering the proposal submitted by the respondent No. 1, the non-compliance of the basic principles of natural justice was apparent and hence the learned single Judge was justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction. As regards the second ground of challenge in the petition, it is the case of the respondent No. 1 that there was mistake in stating the dates of events in the synopsis but it was purely unintentional and by oversight, besides being not relevant for decision in the matter and in any case, the same had not in any manner influenced the learned single Judge in arriving at the finding which has been arrived at in the impugned judgment to warrant interference against the order which was challenged in the petition.
4. We have heard at length Sri A.V. Anturkar, Advocate for the appellant, Sri N.V. Walawalkar, Senior Advocate for the respondent No. 1 and Sri A.A. Kumbhakoni, the learned Associate Advocate General for the respondent Nos.2 to 4. We have perused the records.
5. The following questions arise for determination in the present appeal:
(1) Whether the order dated 18-10-2005 passed by the respondent No. 2 is an administrative order or a quasi-judicial order?
Page 2193 (2) Whether the learned single Judge can hear and decide the writ petition arising out of quasi-judicial orders passed by the executive or administrative authorities?
(3) Whether the disparity between the statement in the petition regarding the completion of application before a particular date and narration of facts in the synopsis in that regard would amount to a fraud upon the Court warranting dismissal of the petition?
6. The contention of the appellant is that the order dated 18-10-2005 was not passed under any of the provisions of the said Act but merely in furtherance of the Government policy revealed from the said Government Resolution. Referring to Clause Nos.10 to 13 r/w Clause 6 of the said Government Resolution, it was argued that the acts of opening of the bank account and the collection of milk in the specified areas are in terms of the Government policy comprised under the said Government Resolution and have nothing to do with the statutory provisions comprised under the said Act. The provisions of the above referred clauses apparently disclose the policy of the Government in relation to registration of the milk producers' society. Besides the Clause 10 of the said Government Resolution specifically refers to the permission to be in consonance with the policy of the Government and not on the basis of the objective appreciation of the materials placed before such authority. Besides, at times there could be only one applicant before the authority and there may not be a contest in the form of 'lis' between two parties for the purpose of registration of the milk producers' society. Therefore by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the order passed in such proceedings would be said to be a quasi-judicial order.
7. In R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee reported in 1952 Vol.1 All England Reports 480, it was held that when the decision of an administrative body is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at such decision. Thus, if, in order to arrive at a decision, though the authority can entertain proposals and objections, but has to consider evidence, then there is a duty to act judicially in the course of such inquiry. It was specifically observed in the said decision that an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of and are not in accordance with the practice of a court of law. At the same time, it was also observed that, if an administrative body in arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any stage to act judicially.
8. In the Province of Bombay v. K.S. Advani , it was held that "the procedure for investigation of facts or for reception of evidence may vary according to the requirements of a particular case. There need not be any hard and fast rule on such matters, but the decision which the authority arrives at, must not be his 'subjective', 'personal' or 'private' opinion. It must be something which conforms to an objective standard or criterion laid down or recognised by law, and the soundness or otherwise of Page 2194 the determination must be capable of being tested by the same external standard. This is the essence of a judicial function which differentiates it from an administrative function; and whether an authority is required to exercise one kind of function or the other depends entirely upon the provisions of the particular enactment."
9. In Radeshyam Khare and Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. , it was held that three requisites are to be satisfied in order to classify an act of a body to be a judicial act and they are: the body must have legal authority, it must be to determine the questions affecting the rights of the parties and it must have the duty to act judicially. The Apex Court clearly ruled that the determining test to ascertain whether an act authorised by statute is a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially. The question whether or not there is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case with reference to the facts and circumstances of that particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in judicial decisions.
10. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta and Ors. , it is held that though there is no express provision in the U.P. Intermediate Education Act or the Regulations framed thereunder casting a duty on the Examination Committee to act judicially, the manner of the disposal, which requires it to be on the basis of the materials placed before it, and considering the serious effects of the decision of the Examination Committee on the examinee concerned, it leads to the conclusion that a duty is cast on the Examination Committee to act judicially, particularly as it has to decide objectively certain facts which may seriously affect the rights and careers of examinees, and therefore, though there are no two parties, apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority would yet be a quasi-judicial act.
11. In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. Lakshmi Chand and Ors. , it was held that:
The authority may have to invite objections to the course of action proposed by him, he may be under a duty to hear the objectors, and his decision may seriously affect the rights of citizens but unless in arriving at his decision he is required to act judicially, his decision will be executive or administrative. Legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of citizens, does not make the determination judicial: it is the duty to act judicially which invests it with that character. What distinguishes an act judicial from administrative is therefore the duty imposed upon the authority to act judicially.
Page 2195
12. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, D-Ward, Kanpur and Anr. , it was held that:
The provisions of a statute may enjoin on an administrative authority to act administratively or judicially. If the statute expressly imposes a duty on the administrative body to act judicially, it is a clear case of a judicial act. But the duty to act judicially may not be expressly conferred but may be inferred from the provisions of the statute. It may be gathered from the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used, the nature of the power conferred, of the duty imposed on the authority and other indicia afforded by the statute. In short, a duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances and it is not possible or advisable to lay down a hard and fast rule or an inflexible rule of guidance.
13. In State of Gujarat and Anr. v. M/s. Krishna Cinema and Ors. , the power to issue, revoke or suspend a licence conferred upon the District Magistrate under the Bombay Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1953 and the Rule of 1954 made there under was held to be exercisable on satisfaction of the concerned officer of certain objective conditions and being plainly quasi-judicial in nature.
14. In Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and Ors. , while dealing with the question as to whether the Election Commission, in exercise of powers under Section 29-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, acts administratively or quasi-judicially, after taking stock of the decisions in R. v. Dublin Corporation (1878) 2 Ir R 371, R. v. Electricity Commrs. (1924) 1 KB 171 : 1923 All ER Rep 150, Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani held that the legal principles, laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforesaid decisions are that (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act, (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject, (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.
15. While dealing with the question as to whether the principles of natural justice would apply to administrative proceedings similar to the cases relating to the service matters, the Apex Court in A.K. Kraipak and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , held that if the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. It Page 2196 was further held that what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. This ruling was reiterated in D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. , holding that there can be no distinction between a quasi judicial function and an administrative function for the purpose of principles of natural justice, as the aim of both the enquiries is to arrive at a just decision.
16. It is thus clear that it is not mere authority to determine the questions affecting the rights of a party or the parties that it would make the determination to be of a quasi-judicial nature. But when such determination is coupled with the duty to act judicially which is essential concomitant to invest or encrust the authority with the character of quasi-judicial nature, it would be a quasi-judicial order.
17. The Section 4 of the said Act, dealing with the types of the societies which would be registered under the said Act, provides that a society, which has as its objects, the promotion of the economic interests or general welfare of its members or of the public, in accordance with the co-operative principles or a society established with the object of facilitating the operations of any such society, may be registered under the said Act, provided that, no society shall be registered if it is likely to be economically unsound, or the registration of which may have an adverse effect on development of the co-operative movement, or the registration of which may be contrary to the policy directives which the State Government may, from time to time, issue. While Section 6 of the said Act prescribes certain conditions of registration of a co-operative society under the said Act, Section 7 empowers the Government to exempt certain societies or class of societies from any of the requirements of the said Act as to registration subject to such conditions as may be imposed. The Section 8 requires the application for registration to be made in the prescribed format along with the necessary annexures. It further specifically provides that the applicant shall furnish such information in regard to the society, as the Registrar may require. The Section 9(1) of the said Act provides that if the authority is satisfied that the proposed society has complied with the provisions of the said Act and the Rules or any other law for the time being in force, or the policy directives issued by the State Government under Section 4 of the said Act, the authority can grant the registration of such society.
18. The Rule 4(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961, hereinafter called as "the said Rules" provides that every application for registration of a co-operative society under the said Act shall be made in Form 'A' to the said Rules and should be accompanied by the things enlisted thereunder including a certificate from the Bank or Banks stating the credit balance therein in favour of the proposed society.
19. Clearly therefore, Section 4 of the said Act enjoins the Government to formulate and issue policy directives, bearing in mind the need for a healthy and Page 2197 economically sound development of co-operative movement in the State. In fact, the preamble to the said Act clearly states that the said Act has been enacted with a view to provide the orderly development of the co-operative movement in the State in accordance with the relevant directive principles of State policy enunciated in the Constitution of India. Further, the Section 9 of the said Act requires the concerned authority to ensure that the proposed society is in compliance with the policy directives issued by the Government and is economically sound and that it would not adversely affect the co-operative movement in the State.
20. It is an undisputed fact that some time back the system of milk collection in the State of Maharashtra had three tier system i.e., primary milk society at the village level which used to supply their milk to the taluka level dudh sangh or directly to the district level dudh sangh and than the State level co-operative milk federation. The Government policy in that regard was formulated under the Government Resolutions dated 6-1-1990, 4-1-2000 and the other decisions taken from time to time. Various writ petitions came to be filed in this Court, either at Mumbai or at Aurangabad challenging the said policy mainly on the ground that granting of recognition to the taluka level dudh sangh would affect the existence of the district level committee. All these petitions were considered by the Full Bench of this Court and had issued directions to the Government by order dated 12-12-2003 to reconsider the policy regarding the formation of the taluka level dudh sangh. By the Government Resolution dated 15-9-2005, therefore, the Government came out with a fresh policy directives. Accordingly, the three tier system established earlier has been reconfirmed including the Primary Society at village level and the Taluka and District Level Co-operative Sanstha to be recognized as Sangh and the State Level Society to be recognized as Mahasangh. The Taluka level Doodh Sangh are to be divided into three categories i.e. (a), (b) and (c), depending upon their milk collection. 'A' category requires milk collection of 20,000 and above liters per day. 'B' category requires milk collection of 15,000 liters and 'C' category requires 10,000 liters. There would be only one Taluka Sangh in a Taluka. The existence of District Level Doodh Sangh has been maintained and the primary village Societies are given the liberty to join either the Taluka Sangh or the District Sangh directly. Further, as far as Western Maharashtra is concerned, the criteria of 20,000 liters per day collection was fixed for being eligible to open the Bank Account and to collect the milk. The Applications for registration of new Sanghs are to be submitted before the District Deputy Registrar, who in turn would send the same to the Government for consideration. The Government is expected to hear all the concerned parties and then take proper decision. For registering a Taluka Dudh Sangh, at least 51% of Primary Milk Societies in the Taluka should have passed Resolution in support of such proposed Taluka Dudh Sangh. Such support should be submitted by the Affidavits by the Primary Milk Societies. It is made compulsory to give opportunity of being heard to all concerned at each stage of grant of permission i.e. for opening of Bank Account, for collection of milk and then the final decision to be taken, and the same provision has been made in view of the decision of this Court (Aurangabad Bench) in Writ Petition No. 941/2000 dated 3.3.2000.
Page 2198
21. Plain reading of the said Government Resolution would reveal that it speaks of policy directives by the Government in relation to the criteria to be adopted for deciding about the claim for registration of the milk producers' societies at different levels. It also prescribes the guidelines to be followed while arriving at the decision to allow the claim for registration of the society under the provisions of the said Act. It specifically provides for the necessity to hear the concerned parties before arriving at any decision on the point of registration of a society of milk producers. It also prescribes the criteria to be followed while allowing the applicant to perform the prerequisites for registration of the society i.e. opening of Bank account and collection of milk.
22. Bare reading of Sections 4 and 9(1) of the said Act would reveal that though the actual registration of a co-operative society is contemplated under Section 9, the Government enjoins a duty to formulate the guidelines for the purpose of registration of co-operative societies under the said Act. Bearing the same in mind, the said Government Resolution, which reveals the policy directives in relation to the co-operative societies relating to milk producers in the State, one is left with no alternative than to conclude that the policy directives revealed from the said Government Resolution are in furtherance of the obligation of the Government under Section 4 of the said Act. Any order passed in furtherance of the compliance of the policy directives laid down under the said Government Resolution would therefore be in furtherance of the object of Section 4 of the said Act and, therefore, any order passed permitting to open bank account or to collect the milk with the intention to ascertain whether the society of the proposed applicant should be allowed to be registered as a co-operative society under the said Act or not, would be an order in exercise of powers under Section 4 r/w the guidelines comprised under the policy directives embodies in the said Government Resolution.
23. The contention that the order permitting to open bank account in the name of the proposed society is de hors the said Act is totally devoid of substance. The Rule 4 of the said Rules clearly requires the application for registration of society to be accompanied by a Bank certificate disclosing the amount to the credit of the account of such proposed society with the Bank. Obviously therefore, unless the process of registration is preceded by opening of the Bank account, it would not be possible for the applicant to have a certificate from the Bank regarding the amount to the credit of the account of the proposed society. Obviously therefore, the opening of the Bank account in the name of the proposed society much prior to the registration formalities are completed is a statutory requirement. The registration of the society being under the provisions of the said Act, and the approval thereof by the concerned authority under the said Act, obviously the concerned authority's permission would be necessary to open Bank account in the name of the proposed society. Undoubtedly, such permission will have to be given on being satisfied by the authority about the fact that the proposed society is in consonance with the requirement of law including the policy directives issued by the Government specified under Section 4 of the said Act. Any order relating to the pre-requirement for the registration of the society including the opening of the Bank account would be in the process of the registration of the society under the said Act. The same can be termed as "prelude to the registration", Page 2199 as was described by the Division Bench of this Court in an unreported decision in Writ Petition No. 1180 of 1989 on 21-4-1989 in the matter of Shri Hanuman Dudh Utpadak Sahakari Sanstha Ltd. and Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
24. Any order granting permission to open Bank account or to do anything in the process of registration of co-operative society under the said Act would be required to be passed after hearing the applicant and taking into consideration the policy directives embodied in the said Government Resolution. Bearing in mind the object of Section 4 of the said Act, the question of permitting any party to open bank account or to collect milk for the purpose of ascertaining whether such applicant would be entitled for registration as a co-operative society under the said Act or not, would imply a decision on objective application of mind to the materials placed before the authority deciding such issue and more so when there are more than one person to claim such registration for the same Taluka. Even when there is only one applicant, the authority cannot grant such application mechanically. It has to ascertain whether all the requirements of law are satisfied and whether the society would be in consonance with the Government directives issued under the said Government Resolution. Therefore, there is a duty cast upon the authority to decide about the right of the party seeking registration of co-operative society under the said Act and the decision in that regard to arrive at judicially. The requirement of hearing the concerned party before any decision is taken in relation to an application for registration of society of milk producers in the State, which will obviously involve ascertainment of the eligibility for registration, has been specifically included in the policy directives issued by the Government under the said Act. Being so, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the order which was passed by the respondent No. 2 was purely an administrative order. It had to be and was a quasi-judicial order. Such an order has to disclose the determination of the question of necessity to grant permission to open bank account and to collect the milk. Such determination must be upon the investigation by application of objective standards to the facts and materials placed before the authority, bearing in mind the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act and the policy directives embodied in the said Government Resolution. Such an order declares the right to open Bank account and to collect the milk which are "prelude" to the registration of the co-operative society of milk producers in the State. The entire process implies investigation with opportunity of presenting the case by the claimant as well as by an objector, if any, or the competitor. It requires ascertainment of the facts by means of evidence placed before the authority irrespective of the fact whether there is competition or not, and adjudication of the claim in that regard based on such facts and materials before the concerned authority by application of law comprised under Section 4 and other relevant provisions of the said Act r/w the said Government Resolution. Therefore, the order dated 18-10-2005 has to be held as a quasi-judicial order.
25. As regards the second point for consideration, referring to the explanation clause of Rule 18 of Chapter 17 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 hereinafter called as "the Appellate Side Rules", it was argued Page 2200 that the jurisdiction of the learned single Judge is restricted to the orders passed by judicial or quasi-judicial authorities and not by administrative or executive authorities. The order of 18-10-2005 having been passed by the administrative authority, the respondent No. 2, the learned single Judge could not have entertained the petition.
26. In terms of Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules, the petitions under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution against orders passed under the various statutes enumerated under the said Rule may be heard and finally disposed of by a single Judge, provided that when the matter in dispute is in relation to the challenge to the validity of a statute or any rule or regulation made thereunder, such petition shall be heard and decided by a Division Bench. The said Rule has an explanation clause which reads thus:
Explanation:-The expression "order" appearing in Clauses 1 to 41 means any order passed by any judicial or quasi-judicial authority empowered to adjudicate under the above mentioned statute.
What is the meaning of "quasi-judicial authority" is the short point for consideration in the matter. According to the Black's Law Dictionary the term "quasi-judicial" is applied to the action, decision etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of judicial nature. The term "quasi" is said to be used to make a resemblance and supposes a difference between two objects. It implies that conception to which it serves as index is connected with conception with which comparison is instituted by strong superficial analogy or resemblance. Moreover, it negates the idea of identity, but points out that the conceptions are sufficiently similar for one to be classed as the equal to the other. The expression "quasi-judicial" has been defined in the Black's Law Dictionary to mean a judicial act performed by one not a Judge.
27. In Radeshyam Khare's case (supra) it was held that when a statutory authority has power to do an act which will affect the rights of a subject then although there are no two parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject, the final determination of the authority will be a quasi-judicial act provided the statute requires the authority to act judicially. It was further held that a writ of certiorari will lie to control a statutory body which by statute is vested with powers and duties that resembled with those vested in ordinary inferior Courts and such statutory bodies in such circumstances can be said to be quasi-judicial bodies entrusted with quasi-judicial functions.
28. In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and Ors. v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. , it was held that the concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial. It describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform the norms of judicial procedure in performing the acts in exercise of its power.
Page 2201
29. In Thakur Das (Dead) by L.Rs. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. , it was held by the Apex Court that the expression "judicial authority" indicates the authority on whom the judicial power has been conferred. In Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India and Ors. , it was held that the holder of "judicial office" under Article 217(2)(a) of the Constitution of India means a person who exercises only judicial functions, determines the causes of the parties and renders decisions in judicial capacity.
30. In short, it is not a mere obligation to act judicially that will make an 'authority' to be "judicial" but its functioning in 'judicial capacity' would only clothe it with 'judicial' character, and the duty to act judicially would make its decision quasi-judicial and therefore its function being of quasi-judicial nature, consequently it would be a quasi-judicial authority, irrespective of the fact that otherwise, it is an administrative or executive authority.
31. Since the order dated 18-10-2005 was a quasi-judicial order passed by a quasi-judicial authority, therefore, it was the order which could have been subjected to judicial review before learned single Judge in terms of the explanation clause to Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules and therefore no fault can be found with the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the learned single Judge in relation to the order dated 18-10-2005.
32. The third point for consideration which arises in the matter is whether there had been suppression of material fact and whether it has influenced in any manner the process of judicial review in the matter in hand while passing the impugned order. In this regard, apart from the allegation, nothing is brought to the notice of this Court which could be said to have in any manner influenced the process of judicial review of the order dated 18-10-2005 by the learned single Judge while disposing the writ petition. It is not that every discrepancy of howsoever trifle nature in the pleadings that could be said to amount to play fraud upon the Court. The discrepancy in the pleadings should be of such a nature that it should mislead the Court to believe the case of the petitioner to be true and should result in passing an order on the basis of such belief. In the case in hand, the alleged discrepancy was not even in the pleadings but in the synopsis to the petition as compared to the pleadings in the petition. In any case, as the same has not played any role in the adjudication process or judicial review, and therefore is of no consequence. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the third point for consideration is to be answered in negative.
33. For the reasons stated above, there is no case made out for interference in the impugned judgment and therefore the appeal fails and is dismissed, with no order as to costs.