JUDGMENT B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.
1. In all these Writ Petitions challenge is to the order passed by the respondent No. 3 Divisional Joint Registrar in proceedings under Section 78(1) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" for short). The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that all these petitions are identical. Initially when the petitioners were heard on 25-10-2005, challenge in this all these petitions was to order dated 24-10-2005, and by the said order the respondent No. 3 did not permit the petitioners to adduce evidence of Chairman of the District Central Co-operative Bank, Chandrapur and also one Mr. Lanjewar, Officer of the Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank. On 25-10-2005 this Court found that matter of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005, was slightly different inasmuch as she has in her reply filed in response to the show cause notice before the Divisional Joint Registrar not only denied user of the vehicle for the private purpose, but has further mentioned that amount of Rs. 40/- was paid by her on 22-03-2005 only to avoid any technical objection. Such stand was not found in the reply filed by the other three petitioners. In this view of the matter on 25-10-2005, while issuing notice this Court directed maintenance of status quo in relation to the matter of said petitioner only. Because of this on 9-11-2005, the Divisional Joint Registrar, passed final order in remaining three matters and has declared the petitioner therein as disqualified. It is necessary to point out here that all the four petitioners had filed Writ Petition Nos. 5431/2005 to 5434/2005 before the Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench of this Court granted them protection for a period of 15 days if the order under Section 78(1) of the Act was adverse to them. Hence, in view of the order of the Division Bench, these three petitioners continued in their office till 24-11-2005, thereafter while closing the present matters on 23-11-2005. This court has protected them till the delivery of judgment. Thus all the petitioners are presently continuing as Directors of District Central Co-operative Bank, Chandrapur.
2. Looking to the controversy involved and by consent of the parties, the Writ Petition have been heard finally at the stage of admission itself.
3. I have heard Advocate R.S. Parsodkar, for petitioners, learned AGP Smt, Wandile, for respondent Nos. 1 to 3, and Advocate A.M. Gordey, for intervener Shri Kadao.
4. The facts briefly stated are that, the petitioners have been elected as Directors on the Board of Director of respondent No. 4 District Central Cooperative Bank in the year 2003-04 for a period of 5 years. The respondent No. 4 is a Specified Co-operative Society, registered as Bank under the provisions of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 and one Shri Wasade is its Chairman. The petitioners contend that they belong to group of Chairman, and said chairman has conflict with M.L.A. Shri Deotale since last several years. According to the petitioners, the said MLA belongs to Congress-I Political Party while Shri Wasade belongs to Nationalist Party. In order to remove the Chairman of the Bank, some of the Directors of Bank through Shri Deotale approached the Minister and through Hon'ble Minister have exerted influence upon respondent No. 3 to initiate proceedings under Section 78(1) of the Act for removal of the petitioners. It is stated that the respondent No. 3 who is acting on the command of the Hon'ble Minister, issued show cause notice dated 15-7-2005, and started proceedings under Section 78(1) of the Act. In the said notice, it is mentioned that the vehicle belonging to respondent No. 4 Bank has been used by the petitioners for personal/private purpose and amount thereof has not been deposited with the Bank within time and thus the petitioner has incurred disqualification under Section 73-FF of the Act. It is further states that on same grounds one Shri Guru and Shri Upare, filed identical proceedings before the respondent No. 3 for . disqualifying the director of the rival groups namely Shri Kadao, Shri Deshmukh of group of MLA Shri Deotale. It is stated that the respondent No. 3 issued notice under those proceedings and on 30-9-2005, passed an order cancelling those show cause notices. It is stated that they have been subjected to S. 78 proceedings only because they do not belong to the group of the Hon'ble Minister for Cooperation and also MLA Shri Deotale. It is further stated that the proceedings under Section 78 of the Act have been initiated on 15-7-2005, and the petitioners filed their reply immediately. After submission of reply, evidence of witness for bank was recorded on 15-10-2005 and thereafter, the matter was adjourned for evidence of present petitioners. The present petitioners in this background moved application on 24-10-2005 for issuing summons to witnesses. The petitioners pointed out that the records of Chandrapur District Central Co-operative Bank were inspected by Shri Lanjewar, the officer of the State Co-operative Bank and Shri Lanjewar, did not find any personal use of the vehicles by the petitioners. The petitioners therefore, wanted to examine Shri Lanjewar, as their witness. They also wanted to examine Chairman of the Bank to show that vehicles were not used by petitioner for their personal use. However, these applications were rejected by the impugned order dated 24-10-2005, passed upon other applications i.e. one for consolidation of the cases together and the other for grant of time. However, no arguments on these applications are advanced by the petitioners.
5. On 25-10-2005, this Court directed maintenance of status quo in the matter of petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005, and hence enquiry against the said petitioner stands as it is. As there were no orders in other three petitions, on 9-11-2005, the respondent No. 3 Divisional Joint Registrar, passed final order disqualifying them from Directorship.
6. After the notices were issued Shri Kadao, filed application for permission to intervene in the matter, and same came to be allowed on 14-11-2005. The petitioners in three petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 5617, 5618 and 5619 of 2005 also filed applications for amendment so as to incorporate challenge to the order dated 9-11-2005. The said application for amendment also came to be allowed on 14-11-2005. It is in this background that the petitions have been heard.
7. Advocate Parsodkar, has contended that the intervention of Hon'ble Minister Shri Kadam, has vitiated the exercise of jurisdiction by the respondent No. 3 under Section 78 of the Act. He has further stated that, because of the said influence only the orders have been passed with undue haste, and without giving any reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to prove their innocence in the matter. He contended that on 15-10-2005 only the witness of Bank was examined and cross-examined and on next date i.e. 24-10-2005, the petitioners were not even permitted to summon witness to show their innocence. He contends that the witnesses summoned were of considerable importance and petitioners would have demonstrated through their assistance that the audit note on which the respondent No. 4 Bank was relying upon to show the arrears were incorrect. He invites attention to the admission given by the witness for respondent No. 4 Bank, in his cross-examination. He further states that the respondent No. 3 even did not consult the apex society, as required under Section 78(1) of the Act, and passed the final order without obtaining its opinion/consultation in the matter. In support he relies upon the judgment of this Court reported at 7993 Mh.LJ.903 Keshav Venkatrao Sathawane v. Minister of State and Ors.. He further states that remedy of appeal or revision as available under Section 152 or Section 154 of the Act, cannot be treated as alternative remedy, in view of the abovementioned letter of the Hon'ble Minister. In support he relies upon the judgment reported at (Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar and Anr.); (The Purtabpur Company Ltd. v. Cane Commissioner of Bihar and Ors.); (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Ors.); (Harbanslal Sahnia and Anr. v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors.), (Dhari Gram Panchayat v. Saurashtra Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh and Anr.) and unreported judgment in Special C.A. No. 960/1974. He argued that the enquiry under Section 78(1) of the Act, ought to have been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and according to him the undue haste shown by the respondent No. 3 is only because of the pressure and influence of the Hon'ble Minister in the matter.
8. As against this, the learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2, has contended that the Hon'ble Minister has not been made party in this Writ Petition, and further the letter of Hon'ble Minister does not issue any specific directions to the respondent No. 3. She contends that copy of the said letter is not annexed with the Writ Petitions and if it's xerox copy is presumed to be correct it only request the respondent No. 3 to enquire in to the matter and to report. She contends that the freedom available to the respondent No. 3, under Section 78(1) of the Act has not been encroached upon by the Hon'ble Minister. She further argues that the notice under Section 78(1) has been issued on the basis of the records of the Bank, and therefore, the relevant material is only the record available with the Bank. She contends that the audit report for the year 2002-03 of the respondent No. 4 Bank and compliance report thereof submitted by the respondent No. 4 are the only relevant documents and those documents have been produced in enquiry before the respondent No. 3, and have been looked into by the petitioners. She states that the witness for Bank has been examined and cross-examined in relation to the said record. According to her the Officer of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank or the Chairman of the respondent No. 4 Bank, are neither necessary nor proper witnesses for deciding the issue in controversy. She has further stated that in view of this position, various judgment on which reliance has been placed are not applicable, and the petitioners should be asked to file Appeal under Section 152 or Revision under Section 154 of the Act, as the case may be. The learned AGP has further contended that the process of consultation as contemplated under Section 78(1) of the Act, has been complied with and the Apex bank has failed to respond to the communication issued by the respondent No. 3 in this respect. Hence process of consultation is complete and there is no lacunae in it.
9. Advocate Gordey, appearing for intervenor, has contended that the provisions of Sections 152 and 154 of the Act, provides remedy of appeal and revision respectively. He states that the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005, where no final orders are passed under Section 78(1) of the Act, must approach in Revision under Section 154, while the other three petitioners have to assail the orders by filing Appeal under Section 152 of the Act. In order to substantiate his contention, he relies upon the judgment reported at (Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa and Ors.); (U.P. Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Nareshwar Sahai Mathur and Anr.); (Chandrika Jha v. State of Bihar and Anr.); (Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. and Ors.). He further states that the judgments on which the petitioners have placed reliance to show that the remedy of appeal or revision will only be a illusory remedy and not applicable, because according to him in those cases the issue before the Lower Authority was foreclosed by directions issued by such Revisional/Appellate or Higher Authority. He contends that such is not the position in the facts of the present case. He further states that in any case the issue of mala fides is not open for challenge in these proceedings, because earlier Writ Petitions i.e. Writ Petition Nos. 5431 to 5434 of 2005 have already been disposed of finally by the Hon'ble Division Bench. He further contends that the said issue of mala fide cannot be reopened now in the present Writ Petition. He further points out the provisions of Section 73-FF(1)(i)(c)(ii) of the Act, to point out what is exact disqualification, and states that the petitioners were duty bound to pay the amount within 30 days the date on which they availed service. He further points out that the dates on which the vehicle has been used by the respective petitioners and also date on which amounts have been paid by them, he says in almost all the cases the amount has been paid after more than 2/3 years, and as such the petitioners have already incurred disqualification. He therefore, contends that this is not the matter for interference in Writ jurisdiction. He contends that the petitioners are trying to unduly enlarge the scope and nature of enquiry under Section 78.
10. Before beginning the scrutiny of the Writ Petitions on merit, it will be proper to find out what is the effect of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Writ Petition Nos. 5432/2005 to 5434/2005. Xerox copies of those petitions are made available by the learned Counsel for the petitioner for perusal and it appears that, only after finding that the petitioners therein were praying for directions of not giving effect to the adverse orders for 15 days, the Hon'ble Division Bench issued that directions and disposed of those Writ Petitions. It is thus apparent that the Hon'ble Division Bench has not considered any other issue or grievance about mala fides as expressed by the petitioners in the present petitions. Thus the arguments of learned AGP or Advocate Gordey, regarding issue of malafides being no longer open for consideration is liable to be rejected.
11. The other objection is about the availability of alternative remedy. In this respect perusal of Section 152 of the Act, shows that an appeal against the order under Section 78 of the Act, as contemplated and if such orders is made by the Registrar or the Joint Registrar, the appeal lies to the State Government. It is also prescribed that such appeal has to be filed within a period of two months from the date of communication or order. Perusal of Section 154 of the Act, shows that the State Government has revisional powers in matters in which no appeal lies, and it can call for records and satisfy itself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision or order, and as to irregularity of the proceedings. Thus prima facie it appears that the remedy of filing appeal or revision is available to the petitioners.
12. The learned Counsel for petitioners has relied upon various judgments as mentioned above, to contend that said remedy is not available because of the influence and pressure of the Hon'ble Minister Shri Kadam. Perusal of the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (supra), relied upon by him, shows that the Hon'ble Apex Court there found that the Cane Commissioner did not make any order and did not apply his mind because the Chief Minister directed the Cane Commissioner to divide the reserved area into two portions and allot one portion to the 5th respondent. In pursuance of that direction, the Cane Commissioner prepared two lists "Ka" and "Kha", under the orders of the Chief Minister, the villages contained in list "Ka" were allotted to the appellant and in list "Kha" to the 5th respondent. The Cane Commissioner merely carried out the orders of the Chief Minister and abdicated his responsibility.
13. Coming to the another ruling i.e. (supra), again the position is identical. Perusal of para Nos. 14 and 15 of this Judgment reveals that, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the Registrar had powers to reconstitute the first Board of Directors under Bye-law No. 29 or to curtail the extended term and also to nominate such Board for a period not exceeding one year at a time and not exceeding three Co-operative years in aggregate. In this background, the Hon'ble Apex Court noted that the Minister for Industry exceeded his own authority in directing the manner in which the new Board of Directors was to be constituted by the Registrar' under bye-law No. 29 by forwarding a list of 7 names to be nominated by him in the reconstituted Board and further list of 8 names indicating that if the Committee of Management was superseded under another provision, it should consist of those 15 persons. Thus, these facts demonstrates that the jurisdiction and discretion available to Registrar under bye-law No. 29 was clearly encroached upon and disturbed by the Hon'ble Minister.
14. The Judgment at (supra), is followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the subsequent judgment reported at (supra). Both these judgments are relied upon by the petitioners to point out that alternative remedy is no bar. Perusal of these judgments reveals that the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that alternative remedy is not a bar at least in three contingencies i.e. where the Writ Petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the Act is challenged. Paragraph Nos. 14, 15, 19 and 20 of this judgment are important in this respect. The Hon'ble Apex Court has concluded that though there have been some subsequent judgments the Apex Court the basic approach has remained the same and availability of an alternative remedy does not take away the right of High Court to issue appropriate writs under certain circumstances. In Judgment at (supra), in para No. 7 the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the same view.
15. In (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the case of workman and his mala fide retrenchment. The workman approached the Special Labour Court and his employer (Gram Panchayat) contended that octroi department of Panchayat was not an Industry. The Labour Court found on merits that action of Gram Panchayat was mala fide, but at the same time held that reference of dispute to it was incompetent as octroi department was not an Industry. The High Court in Writ Petition upheld the finding that action of Gram Panchayat in terminating the services of the employee was mala fide. The High Court also found that octroi department was an industry within the meaning of Section 20 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court therefore, directed reinstatement of workmen with backwages. The issue raised before the Hon'ble Apex Court was that the octroi department was not an industry. The Hon'ble Apex Court found it unnecessary to express any opinion on the said question because it found that after recording a finding that action of termination of workman by Panchayat was mala fide, the High Court could have directly interfered with the retrenchment of workman under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that merely because the workman raised Industrial Dispute he does not become disentitled to relief ultimately given by the High Court. The contention of the petitioner is therefore, that if on merits this Court finds that injustice has been done to petitioners, this Court should taken direct cognizance of the matter.
16. Reference to the unreported judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 960/1974 dated 7-8-1974 and 8-8-1974 reveals that the Hon'ble Division Bench there found that interference in the issuance of the show cause notice was warranted because the Division Bench found that decision to issue notice was not taken by the respondent No. 2 who was competent to take that decision and grounds mentioned in the show cause notice did not support the action under Section 78 of the Act. It also found that the grounds have been mentioned to a large extent only mechanically and effort was to fix the liability and responsibility on the Board of Director then functioning with respect to the position of the Co-operative year 1972-73. Thus again the facts reveal that the authority competent to take decision in the matter abdicated its jurisdiction in favour of its superior and therefore, the Hon'ble Division Bench interfered in the matter.
17. From perusal of the case law cited above, it is apparent that the availability of alternative remedy will not be a bar for exercise of writ jurisdiction by this Court, at least in 4 situation mentioned above. Here the petitioners are not approaching this Court for enforcement of any of their fundamental rights and it is not their contention that action initiated under Section 78(1) of the Act, is without jurisdiction. They have also not challenged the vires of any Act. They are only complaining violation of natural justice influence by Hon'ble Minister. The issue will be required to be considered in this light.
18. Perusal of letter dt. 21-6-2005, written by MLA Shri Deotale, to Hon'ble Minister Shri Kadam reveals that the intervener Shri Kadao, and two other persons lodged grievance about abusing power and irregularity committed by Shri Wasade, Chairman of the respondent No. 4 Bank and he forwarded that complaint to Hon'ble Minister, In the said letter he had requested the Hon'ble Minister to direct the respondent No. 3 to take action in the matter. The Hon'ble Minister has placed his remark in the margin asking the respondent No. 3 to enquire into the matter and to report. It is apparent that the respondent No. 3 has not been directed to remove the petitioners by taking action under Section 78(1) of the Act. The said instructions do not show that there is any encroachment by the Hon'ble Minister upon the rights and discretion or jurisdiction of the respondent No. 3 in the matter. It is therefore, difficult to hold that the respondent no. 3 has acted or has been acting under pressure or influence of the Hon'ble Minister on the basis of this letter or has abdicated his powers and jurisdiction.
19. In this background when the case law cited by Advocate Gordey on the point of alternate remedy is looked into, perusal of (supra), particularly para No. 11 reveals that in view of the availability of hierarchy of authorities under the scheme of the Act before which the petitioner can get adequate redress against the wrongful act complained of, the Hon'ble Apex Court found that the alternative remedy was available to him and High Court was therefore, justified in dismissing the writ petition in limine. The Hon'ble Apex Court has noted that the petitioner had right to prefer appeal and if he was dissatisfied with the decision in the appeal, he can also prefer further appeal and then also ask for reference of a question of law to the High Court under Section 24 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. The Apex Court held that it is well settled that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided for by that statute only must be availed of.
20. In (supra), again the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the same issue and it has been held that provisions of Article 226 are not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. The Hon'ble Apex Court has stated that it was not necessary for High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 ignoring as it were the complete statutory machinery. The Hon'ble Apex Court has infact repeated its adomination as mentioned above, and has further observed that it is only where the statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situation, the High Court can exercise writ jurisdiction, and the Court must have good and sufficient reasons to bye-pass the alternative remedy provided by the statute.
21. In (supra), para No. 4, the Hon'ble Apex Court has again made similar observations and has held that when two Division Benches of High Court had rightly declined to entertain the writ petition and directed the parties to avail statutory remedy, another Division Bench was wholly unjustified in entertaining the writ petition under the impugned order.
22. In the background it is apparent that this Court has to direct the petitioners to exhaust the alternative remedy of appeal under Section 152 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 available to them. Any observation on merits in W.P. 5616/05 will prejudice these appeals and hence said petitioner should also file appropriate proceedings against the order dt. 24-10-2005.
23. The argument of learned Counsel for petitioners that there was no consultation before passing of the impugned order of removal and reliance upon judgment of this Court at 7993 (1) Mh.LJ. 903, (supra) therefore, need not be considered at this stage. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out the evidence adduced on behalf of the bank to show how such evidence is infact exhonerates the petitioners. However, I find that all these issues are to be considered by the Appellate Authority and any comment upon it by this Court shall definitely prejudice either of the parties before the said forum.
24. Learned AGP as also Advocate Gordey, further contended that the evidence of Chairman of the Bank and Shri Lanjewar, officer of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Bank was not at all relevant. However, the said issue can also be gone into by Appellate or Revisional authority.
25. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 5617 to 5619 of 2005 are protected by the orders dated 22-11-2005, by this Court till today. No order of removal is passed against the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005. Under the circumstances, these three petitioners are given further time of three weeks to file appropriate appeal before the competent authority in this respect, and to seek appropriate orders protecting their tenure during the pendency of the said appeal. Similarly time is also given to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005 to file appeal or revision before the competent authority and to seek appropriate interim orders. The protection given to the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 5616/2005 by directing maintenance of status quo as on 25-10-2005 shall remain in operation for further period of three weeks. Similar protection is given to three petitioners vide order dated 22-11-2005, by this Court and the same shall remain in operation for a further period of three weeks. Interim order of this Court shall cease to operate automatically after the said period.
26. Under the circumstances, I find that no case is made out for interference in Writ jurisdiction. Writ Petitions are accordingly dismissed, subject to as above. No costs.