JUDGMENT B. P. Singh, C. J.
1. The question, which arises for consideration in the instant writ petition is whether this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, should issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the Central Government to refund to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 3,56,69,671, which has been collected from the petitioners over a period of time by mistake, in view of the fact that the Circular under which the charges were initially made leviable had been withdrawn. While the petitioners contend that payment of the charges having been made, and collected, under a mistake, the petitioners are entitled to maintain this Writ Petition praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to refund the amount charged in excess, the respondents contend that the petitioners cannot maintain the instant writ petition for the reliefs prayed for, and must necessarily seek a remedy under the provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 for adjudication of such a claim for refund.
2. The facts of the case, which are not in dispute, are :-
Petitioners, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, are an autonomous public body, wholly owned and controlled by the State Government of Rajasthan. For the generation of electricity at their Thermal Power Station at Kota (Rajasthan), coal is transported from collieries situate in areas covered by the Eastern and South Eastern Railways to a station called Gurla, situate in Kota Division of the Western Railway. Between the 4th March, 1992 and 31st December, 1992, the Petitioners booked 248 rakes for carrying coal to Gurla. The routes on which these wagons were transported include a section of Central Railway, viz., Katni-Singrauli. In exercise of powers under Section 71 of the Railways Act. 1989, the Central Government had imposed, for movement of coal wagons over this section "inflated distance rate" of freight. Consequently, for the coal wagons moved by the petitioners, the freight included the inflated distance rate for this particular section of Katni-Singrauli. For the wagons booked by the petitioners, freight was paid at Gurla Station of Kota Division of the Western Railway. The Railway Authorities charged the petitioners freight on the basis of inflated distance rate over Katni-SIngrauli section upto 31st December, 1992, but from the 1st January, 1993, the Railways started charging freight on the basis of actual distance for Katni-Singrauli section, instead of inflated distance rate, and the petitioners paid the charges on that basis.
3. The case of the petitioners is that in August, 1995, it came to learn from the Gujarat Electricity Board that the inflated distance rate on Katni Slngraull section had been dispensed with, and had been brought back to actual distance charge from 1st March, 1992. The petitioners then realised that the Railway Authorities had, without authority of the Central Government, charged, and realised from, the petitioners Inflated distance rate, which was not only illegal, but also void ab initio, since the inflated distance rate had been abolished with effect from 1st March, 1992. The petitioners, therefore, wrote letters to the various Railway Authorities in August, 1995, including the Railway Board, the Chief Claims Officer of the Western Railway and the Senior Divisional Commercial Manager of the Kota Division. The Senior Divisional Commercial Manager of the Kota Division replied to the petitioners' communication, and observed that they had neither received any circular, nor was any such circular available in their office, regarding the withdrawal of freight of inflated distance over Katni-Singraull Section of South Eastern Railway with effect from 1st March, 1992. It therefore, appears that the Senior Divisional Commercial Manager of the Kota Division was not aware of any circular withdrawing the freight of Inflated distance over the aforesaid section with effect from 1st March, 1992. He further advised the petitioners that in case they wished to obtain a copy of the aforesaid circular, they should approach the Chief Commercial Manager, Churchgate, Mumbai. A copy of the said communication has been filed at Exhibit 'A'.
The petitioners wrote to the Chief Commercial Manager, Churchgate, Mumbai, and received a reply on 25th January, 1996 that the matter was under Inquiry. The petitioners received no further response from the Chief Claims Officer of the Western Railway, and in these circumstances, the petitioners wrote to the Railway Board. The Board by its letter dated 4th June, 1996 reiterated that no refund was permissible, as the same was time-barred and suit-barred. The petitioners thereafter took a last step to bring the matter to the notice of the Hon'ble Railway Minister through a Member of Parliament. However, the Hon'ble Railway Minister, by his letter dated 25th March, 1997, Informed that the refund was not permissible after so many years, and the claim had become time-barred and suit-barred. A copy of the letter of the Hon'ble Minister dated 25th March, 1997 has been produced as Exhibit 'E' .
4. In the above circumstances, the petitioners filed the instant writ petition on the 23rd July, 1997, contending that the ground on which the claim of the petitioners had been rejected was patently wrong and unsustainable, since the question of limitation in the Instant case could not arise at all. There is no specific period of limitation prescribed in the Railways Act, 1989 for any claimant to approach a Court of law for refund of Illegally collected charge. In the absence of any specific limitation provided under the Railways Act, 1989, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply and section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, read with Residuary Article 113 of its Schedule, would be applicable in such cases. It is, therefore, that the general period of limitation of three years applicable in such cases must be reckoned only from the date of discovery of the mistake. In the instant case, the mistake was discovered by the petitioners only in August. 1995. The respondents even thereafter were unaware of the fact that the inflated distance rate has been withdrawn in respect of the goods in question over the aforesaid section. The Railway Authorities are, therefore, not justified in rejecting the claim for refund made by the petitioners on the ground of limitation.
5. The petitioners have, therefore, prayed that this Court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the impugned orders of the respondents refusing to refund to the petitioners the amount of Rs. 3,56,69,671, which the respondents have illegally collected, contrary to the settled principles of law and contrary to their own circulars, and wholly without any authority. They have also prayed for a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to forthwith refund to the petitioners the aforesaid amount that has been illegally collected from the petitioners without any authority of law and contrary to their own circulars. The petitioners have also prayed for award of interest.
6. In the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents, and affirmed by the Deputy Chief Claim Officer in the Office of General Manager, Western Railway, Churchgate, Mumbai, it has been submitted that the petition is misconceived and not maintainable, and that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or otherwise from the Court. The respondents contend that the issue raised in the petition pertains to the refund of freight paid by the petitioners to the respondents. The subject-matter, therefore, lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Railway Claims Tribunal under Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act. 1987. Section 15 of the aforesaid Act bars the jurisdiction of other Courts and authorities to exercise Jurisdiction in matters mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. The respondents, therefore, contended that a person seeking any such relief must file an application before the Railway Claims Tribunal under the provision of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act of 1987, and the Petitioners cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction for such a relief, in view of express statutory provision. It is further submitted that the petitioners have also not served the notice with full particulars and details, as required by Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989. The respondents further submitted that under Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989, the claim has to be made within a period of 6 months, and any claim made thereafter is barred by limitation. Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act has no application to the Railway Tribunal, which has exclusive jurisdiction in the matter.
Apart from the aforesaid legal objections, the respondents have also disputed the entire claim of the petitioners, and have submitted that since the issues involve complicated questions of law and fact and examination of voluminous documents on record and witnesses to determine the alleged monetary claim, this Court ought not to entertain the instant writ petition in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The claim of the petitioners that they came to know of the withdrawal of the concerned circular some time in August, 1995 is also disputed, since several other parties, on coming to know of the withdrawal of the said circular, had preferred claims for refund within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 106 of the Railways Act, and obtained refund. It is further submitted that even otherwise the writ petition was filed only on 23rd July, 1997, and, therefore, it is apparent that the petitioners were grossly negligent, and failed to act diligently. The writ petition, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on this ground as well.
7. The fact that the inflated distance rate imposed on the Katni-Singrauli section was withdrawn with effect from 1st March, 1992 is not in dispute. Exhibit 'P-5' issued by the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Headquarters of the Western Railway, Churchgate, Mumbai, dated 27th April, 1992 is quite clear. This is not even disputed by the respondents. They, however, dispute the right of the petitioners to claim relief by Invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
8. Having regard to the submissions urged on behalf of the parties, it would be necessary to notice some of the relevant provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 and the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989 reads as under :--
" 1.06. Notice of claim for compensation and refund of overcharge. - (1) A person shall not be entitled to claim compensation against a railway administration for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods carried by railway, unless a notice thereof is served by him or on his behalf,--
(a) to the railway administration to which the goods are entrusted for carriage; or
(b) to the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration occurs, within a period of six months from the date of entrustment of the goods.
(2) Any information demanded or enquiry made in writing from, or any complaint made in writing to, any of the railway administrations mentioned in Sub-section (1) by or on behalf of the person within the said period of six months regarding the non-delivery or delayed delivery of the goods with particulars sufficient to identify the goods shall, for the purpose of this section, be deemed to be a notice of claim for compensation.
(3) A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of goods carried by railway unless a notice therefor has been served by him or on his behalf to the railway administration to which the overcharge has been paid within six months from the date of such payment or the date of delivery of such goods at the destination station, whichever is later."
Section 13 of the RailwayClaims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides as follows:
"13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal. -- (1) The Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all such Jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act.-
(a) relating to the responsibility of the railway administrations as carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims for -
(i) compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration for carriage by railway;
(ii) compensation payable under Section 82 of the Railways Act or the rules made thereunder; and
(b) in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway.
(1-A) The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of commencement of the provisions of Section 124A of the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before that date by any Civil Court in respect of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration under Section 124A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder.
(2) The provisions of the Railways Act. 1989 (24 of 1989) and the rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, be applicable to the inquiring into or determining, any claims by the Claims Tribunal under this Act."
Section 16 provides the procedure with regard to filing of claims before the Tribunal, and Section 17 lays down the period of limitation for such claims. They reads as follows :-
"16. Application to Claims Tribunal. - (1) A person seeking any relief in respect of the matters referred to in Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 may make an application to the Claims Tribunal.
(2) Every application under Sub-section (1) shall be in such form and be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee in respect of the filing of such application and by such other fees for the service or execution of processes as may be prescribed :
Provided that, no such fee shall be payable in respect of an application under Sub-clause (if) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, Subsection (1-A) of Section 13.
17. Limitation. - (1) The Claims Tribunal shall not admit an application for any claim -
(a) under Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 unless the application is made within three years from the date on which the goods in question were entrusted to the railway administration for carriage by railway;
(b) under Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) or, as the case may be. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 unless the application is made within one year of occurrence of the accident;
(c) under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 unless the application is made within three years from the date on which the fare or freight is paid to the railway administration :
Provided that, no application for any claim referred to in Sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 13 shall be preferred to the Claims Tribunal until the expiration of three months next after the date on which the intimation of the claim has been preferred under Section 78 of the Railways Act.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), an application may be entertained after the period specified Sub-section (1) if the applicant satisfies the Claims Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."
Section 23 provides for an appeal to the High Court from every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal. Section 23 reads as follows :--
"23. Appeals. - (1) Save as provided in Sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every order, not being an Interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal, to the High Court having jurisdiction over the place where the Bench is located.
(2) No appeal shall lie from an order passed by the Claims Tribunal with the consent of the parties.
(3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of order appealed against."
Section 15 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides for bar of jurisdiction in the following terms :--
"15. Bar of jurisdiction.--On and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters referred to in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13."
9. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that Sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989 is not attracted in the facts of this case inasmuch as there was no dispute regarding the over-charge. The instant case was a case of collection of inflated distance charge without authority of law. It was submitted that there is a distinction between overcharge and a wrong charge. It was, therefore, submitted that the petitioners were not required to give notice as contemplated by Sub-section (3) of Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989, since the claim was not a claim for refund of an over-charge in respect of goods carried by railway.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that this is clearly a case where the petitioners claim refund of an over-charge in respect of goods carried by railway, and, therefore, admittedly, the petitioners claim that they have been charged more than what they should have been charged because the circular under which inflated distance charge was levied had been withdrawn, and was not operative during the period in question. Despite this, the petitioners were compelled to pay the inflated distance charge.
10. In our view, the submission urged on behalf of the respondents must prevail, and the same is clearly supported by the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Birla Cement Works v. G. M., Western Railways and Anr. The petitioner therein was manufacturer of cement at Chittorgarh in Rajasthan, had transported cement to various destinations through railway carriages. Prior to 3rd May. 1989, the petitioner got the cement transported through meter gauge from the railway siding at Chanderia. After conversion into broad gauge the railway siding was at Difthkola Chittor Broad Gauge Rail Link. Consequently, 34 kilometres' distance was added to levy freight charges. Thereafter, between May-June, 1989 and March, 1990 the petitioner had booked various consignments of cement and transported them to diverse destinations and paid the freight charges. Later, on January 21, 1991, the Petitioner had sent a notice to the Western Railway under Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, claiming refund of different amounts. Since it was rejected, the petitioner laid a claim under Section 16 of the Act before the Railway Claims Tribunal, which dismissed the petition holding the same to be barred under Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act. 1890.
11 Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989 is a provision corresponding to Section 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890. The Supreme Court, while dismissing the appeal, observed :--
"Section 78- B of the Act provides that a person shall not be entitled to refund of over-charge or excess payment in respect of animals or goods carried by railway unless his claim to the refund has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by railway etc., within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway. The proviso has no application to the facts of this case. An over-charge is also a charge which would fall within the meaning of Section 78-B of the Act. Since the claims were admittedly made under Section 78-B itself but beyond six months, by operation of that provision in the section itself, the claim becomes barred by limitation. Therefore, the Tribunal and the High Court have rightly concluded that the petitioner is not entitled to the refund of the amount claimed."
It would, thus, appear that an overcharge is also a charge which would fall within the meaning of Section 106 of the Railways Act, 1989, and, therefore, the limitation prescribed therein must apply.
12. The submission urged before us is that the limitation under Section 106(3) starts running from the date of discovery of mistake, and the period of 6 months must be reckoned from the date on which the petitioners came to know about the withdrawal of the earlier circular imposing inflated distance rate. Such a submission was also urged before the Supreme Court, and the same was repelled in the following terms :--
-3. Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, would apply only to a suit instituted or an application made in that behalf in the civil suit. The Tribunal is the creature of the statute. Therefore, it is not a Civil Court nor the Limitation Act has application, even though it may be held that the petitioner discovered the mistake committed in paying 'over-charges' and the limitation is not saved by operation of Section 17(1)(c) of the Limitation Act."
13. The petitioners then contended that in any event, the petitioners are entitled to Invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court to claim the refund of the amount paid by way of inflated distance rate under a mistake. According to the petitioners, the petitioners as well as respondents were acting under a mistake, as neither were aware of the fact that the circular imposing the inflated distance rate had been withdrawn with effect from 1st March, 1992. Under the impression that the circular was in operation, the petitioners paid Inflated distance rate, and the respondents collected the same. Under these circumstances. It was submitted that it is settled law that a writ petition claiming refund of the charges illegally collected was maintainable. Reliance was placed on several decisions of this Court and other High Courts, as well as the Supreme Court in support of this proposition. The respondents, however, contend that the authorities relied upon by the petitioners must be viewed in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others v. Union of India and Ors. This decision by a Bench of 9 Judges, after exhaustively dealing with the authorities on the subject, has laid down the law, and, therefore, the Instant case must be decided having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision.
14. We have carefully perused the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court before which the question arose, inter alia, whether a five-Judge Bench decision in S.T.O. v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf, correctly laid down the law. In Mofatlal Industries Ltd., the decision concerning the refund of Excise and Customs Duty collected contrary to law - in all its shades -arose for consideration. The Court considered various situations in which claims for refund may arise. One of the situations considered by the Court was a case where tax was collected by the authorities under the Excise Act or Customs Act by misconstruction or wrong interpretation of the provisions of the Act, Rules and Notifications or by an erroneous calculation of the refund, i.e., an erroneous finding of fact. This class of cases was described as cases of illegal levy. In this class of cases, the claim for refund arises under the provision of the Act, and, therefore, these are situations contemplated by and provided for by the Act and the Rules. In cases of unconstitutional levy, there can be no dispute that it is open to the claimant to either file a suit for recovery of the tax collected from him or to file a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for appropriate direction for refund, though even in such cases, a question arose as to whether the petitioners are entitled to such refund where they have already passed on the burden of duty to others. However, in the case of Illegal levy, there was a specific controversy before the Apex Court as to whether such claims for refund should be put forward and determined only under and in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules, or whether even in such cases, a suit is maintainable on the ground that the tax has been collected without the authority of law, i.e., contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court after an exhaustive consideration of the 'authorities on the subject, has laid down 12 propositions, but what is relevant for our purposes is Proposition No. (i), which is as follows:--
"(i) Where a refund of tax/duty is claimed on the ground that it has been collected from the petitioner/plaintiff - whether before the commencement of the Central Excises and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 or thereafter -by misinterpreting or misapplying the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act. 1985 or Customs Act, 1962 read with Customs Tariff Act or by misinterpreting or misapplying any of the rules, regulations or notifications issued under the said enactments, such a claim has necessarily to be preferred under and in accordance with the provisions of the respective enactments before the authorities specified thereunder and within the period of limitation prescribed therein. No suit is maintainable in that behalf. While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 - and of this Court under Article 32 - cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11B (of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944). This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it."
15. Applying the said principles to the facts of the instant case, we find that under the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, the Claims Tribunal has been established, and its jurisdiction, powers and authority clearly defined. Section 13(1)(b) provides that the Claims Tribunal shall exercise all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exerclsable immediately before the appointed day by any Civil Court or a Claims Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act in respect of the claim for refund of fare or part thereof or for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. Having established the Railway Claims Tribunal, Section 15 bars the jurisdiction of the Courts or other authorities by providing that on and from the appointed day, no Court or other authority shall have, or be entitled to, exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to the matters referred to in Sub-sections (1) and (1-A) of Section 13. The language of Section 15 is specific in respect express and unambiguous. It clearly bars the jurisdiction of Courts in respect of a claim for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway. The constitutional validity of Section 13 has not been challenged before us. The Act, therefore, in clear words, provides a remedy as well as forum before which such remedy may be claimed. The section, therefore, creates a special right or liability, and also provides the procedure for determination of the rights and liabilities by the Tribunal, constituted in that behalf, and provides further that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunal so constituted, and resort to Civil Court is not available. It, therefore, follows that any and every claim for refund of freight under Section 13(1)(b) can be made only in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. No suit can be filed for refund of frieight. No doubt, the Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution - and that of the Supreme Court under Article 32 - cannot be barred, but. as laid down by the Apex Court, while exercising the power under Article 226. the High Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act, and would exercise its Jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.
16. Section 17 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 provides different periods of limitation for different types of claims which may be made under Section 13 of the Act. In a case covered by Clause (b) of subSection (1) of Section 13, the claim must be made within three years from the date on which the fare or freight is paid to the railway administration. Sub-section (2) of Section 17, however, provides that if the applicant satisfies the Claims Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period, the Tribunal may entertain such an application even after the period specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 17. The Tribunal has, therefore, been vested with the power of condonation of delay in the making of an application under Section 16 of the Act. Moreover, an appeal has been provided to the High Court under Section 23 of the Act against every order, not being an interlocutory order, of the Claims Tribunal. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, we are satisfied that it provides a complete mechanism for correcting any error, whether of fact or law. and that not only a remedy is provided by way of claim before a Tribunal, but also a further appeal to this Court, which is a Civil Court. It would, therefore, not be appropriate for this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, to give relief, which authority, in law, has been vested in the Claims Tribunal under Section 13 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987.
17. We may observe that the decisions relied upon by learned Counsel for the Petitioners were rendered by the High Courts, as well as the Supreme Court, before the decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. It is, therefore, not necessary to consider each of the decisions separately, in view of the fact that we have followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. The decisions relied upon by the petitioners are :-
(1) Shalimar Textile Mfg. Put. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.
(2) Insurance Company of the U.S.S.R. (Ingosstrakh) Ltd v. U.O.I.
(3) Mahabir Kishore and Ors. v. State of M.R.
(4) Union of India and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India Ltd.
and (5} The Associated Cement Co. Ltd., v. Union of India,.
The decision of the learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in The Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, deals with the meaning of the expression "overcharges". In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Birla Cement Works v. G.M. Western Railways, and Anr. it must be held that the aforesaid judgment of the learned Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court does not correctly lay down the law. So far as the other decisions are concerned, they do relate to maintainability of a writ petition or suit for refund of money paid under a mistake of law. Many of the judgments have in fact followed the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in STO v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf, which has, to some extent, been modified by the Apex Court in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. We have, therefore, not considered it necessary to deal with each of the decisions separately.
18. We, therefore, find no merit in this Writ Petition, and the same is accordingly dismissed, and Rule discharged, but without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to seek remedy before the appropriate forum, if so advised.