JUDGMENT J.N. Patel, J.
1. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking quashing the Circular dated 24-10-1986 issued by the Government of Maharashtra, Revenue and Forests Department, according to which it was clarified that narpatti, chatai, petara {bamboo carpet) are forest produce within the meaning of Section 2(4)(b)(i) read with Section 2(6) and 2(7) of the Indian Forests Act, 1927.
3. Our attention is drawn to a decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Suresh Lohlya v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 2 Mah LJ 672 : (1996 AIR SCW 4111), in which it is held that bamboo mat prepared from bamboo is not a forest produce under Section 2(4) of the Indian Forests Act, 1927. It is held that the expression 'forest produce' does not take within its fold an article or thing which is totally different from forest produce, having a distinct character. In the case of Suresh Loniya, the Apex Court was considering as to whether bamboo mat is a forest produce or not and the Court has held that bamboo mat is not a forest produce in the eye of law. The articles mentioned in the impugned circular also fail in following line and have a distinct character which is totally different from forest produce.
4. Mr. Badar, learned Special Counsel appearing for the Forest Department states that this Court has taken a different view in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Idris (Writ Petition No. 67/1996 decided on 31-8-1996) by placing reliance in the case of Forest Range Officer v. V. P. Mohammad All (Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-422/1993) and Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer (Criminal Appeal No. 423/1993) as well as in the case of Karnataka Forest Development Corporation Ltd, v. Centreads Pvt. Ltd. We find that the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Suresh Lohiya's case (1996 AIR SCW 4111) would govern the field as it is the last word in the matter and while this Court disposed of the petition, State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Idris, on 31-8-1996, probably the judgment in Suresh Lohiya's case was not brought to the attention of this Court and that is why a different view has been taken.
5. We are Informed by the learned Counsel for the respondents/Forests Department that the State Government is moving the Union of India for necessary amendment to the Indian Forests Act so as to include such articles within the definition of forest produce. But well, that may take its own time; insofar as the meaning given to the definition of forest produce by the Apex Court is concerned, wilt have to be accepted. Therefore, we quash and set aside the circular dated 24-10-1986. Rule made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.