Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Challa Vengal Reddy vs The Executive Officer, on 13 September, 2024
1
*HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI
+WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P. No.20490 of 2011
Between:
#Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
$The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 13.09.2024
THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may
be allowed to see the Judgments?
- Yes -
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
- Yes -
3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
- Yes -
___________________________________
DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
2
* THE HON'BLE DR.JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
+WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P.No.20490 of 2011
% 13.09.2024
#Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
$The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
! Counsel for the Appellant : Sri P. Vijaya Kiran
Sri Md. Saleem
Counsel for Respondents: AGP for Endowments.
Smt. Padmavai Padnavis
Sri M. Srinivasa Rao, SC for Endowments
Sri E. Sambasiva Pratap
<Gist :
>Head note :
?Cases referred :
1. http://ubduabjabiib.org/doc/45285691/
2. (2002) 3 SCC 195
3. (1985) 3 SCC 590
4. AIR 1978 AP 166
5. AIR 2010 SC 3791
6. (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 = AIR 2003 SC 459
7. Air 1995 SC 2272
8. (2008) 3 SCC 70
9. (2009) 2 SCC 689
10. (1010) 8 SCC 685
11. AIR 2011 SC 1199
12. (2012) 5 SCC 157
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APHC010746472011
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3310]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY ,THE THIRTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE K MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION Nos:: 20490
20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010
W.P. No.20490 of 2011
Between:
Challa Vengal Reddy ...PETITIONER
AND
The Executive Officer and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. P VIJAYA KIRAN
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. ...
2. GP FOR ENDOWMENTS
The Court made the following:
COMMON ORDER:
WP No.20490 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief:
"....to issue a writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for records nd to set aside the impugned order dated 16.5.2011 in I.A.No.44 of 2010 passed by 2 respondent and consequently quash Appeal No.29 29 of 2011 on the file of the 2nd respondent filed against the orders dt 16.10.2003 2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25/12/2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Regligious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also against Rule 3, 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of Limitation Act 1963 Articles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and pass..."4
WP No.20491 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief:
"....to issue a writ order or direction more specifically one in the nature of writ of Certiorari calling for records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.5.2011 in I.A.No.49/2010 passed by 2nd respondent and consequently quash Appeal No.25 of 2011 on the file of 2nd respondent filed against the orders dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25.12.2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to provisions 162 of AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also against Rule 3 and 4 of AP Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 section 5 of limitation Act 1963 aritcles 14 and 21 of Constitution of India and to pass..."
WP No.20531 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief:
"....to issue Writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.05.2011 in I.A.No. 46/2010 passed by 2nd respondent nd and consequently quash Appeal No.27 of 2011 on the file of 2 respondent filed against the orders dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25.12.2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also against Rule 3 and 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of limitation Act 1963 articles 14 and 21 of constitution of India and to pass...."
WP No.20548 of 2011 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief:
"....to issue a Writ order or direction more specifically one in nature of Writ of Certiorari calling for records to set aside the impugned order dated 16.05.2011 in I.A.No. 47/2010 passed by 2nd nd respondent and consequently quash Appeal No.26 of 2011 on the file of 2 respondent filed against the orders dated 16.10.2003 passed by the Assistant Commissioner vide Rc No A5/8113/2003 dated 25.12.2003 declaring the impugned order and exercising jurisdiction over the appeal as void unlawful and contrary to provisions 162 of A P Charitable and Hindu Regious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 and also against Rule 3 and 4 of A P Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 Section 5 of limitation Act 1963 articles 14 and 21 of constitution of India and to pass...."
WP No.32850 of 2010 is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief:
" ..... to a writ order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of certiorari call for the records relating to and in connection with the orders passed by the 1st Respondent in RP No 9 of 2009 nd dt 31.8.2010 in setting aside the proceedings of the 2 Respondent in Rc.No.A1/ 1608 /2008 dated 27.6.2008 and to quash or set aside the same by holding it as illegal, improper, incorrect, unjust, contrary to law in exercising the jurisdiction and un constitutional and to pass...."5
2. As the issue involved in all these writ petitions is one and the same, they are being taken up for hearing as well as disposed of by way of this Common Order.
3. the petitioners in all the writ petitions were declared as landless poor cultivating tenants in respect of the respective lands under their cultivation belong to the respective temples by different orders of the concerned Assistant Commissioner, Endowment and cultivating the lands. Thereafter the Executive Officers of the respective temples filed appeals against the said orders along with condonation of delay. The petitioners contended that there are no cogent and valid grounds to allow the delay condonation petition except with a malafide intension to evict them form the cultivating lands. It is further stated that the 2nd respondent erred in appreciating the amended law under the Andhra Charitable & Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act 1987 w.e.f 03.01.2008, especially making the Act as special enactment with a mandatory provision of creating a separate adjudicative mechanism under Section 87 read with Section 162 of the Act. It is further stated that the exemption granted to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 87(5) of Act 33 of 2007 for short period during the intercession period till constitution of Endowments Tribunal and once the Tribunal is constituted the adjudicative powers of Deputy Commissioner or appellate authority or Regional Joint Commissioner under Rule 4 of Endowments lease of Agricultural Lands Rules 2003 are deemed to have been ousted. Hence the impugned orders are void and without any jurisdiction and are liable to be quashed. 6
3. This Court vide order dated 21.07.2011, while issuing Rule Nisi, has granted interim stay as prayed for in all the writ petitions i.e., in WP Nos.20490, 20491, 20531 and 20548 of 2011 and granted interim suspension in WP No.32850 of 2010 on 29.12.2010.
4. Counter affidavits have been filed in all the writ petitions by the 1st respondent. While denying all the allegations made in the petitions, contended that, the persons who were once declared as Landless poor persons for cultivating the agricultural lands cannot take the advantage of the orders passed by the competent authority because, the very character of the agricultural land for which they were declared as land less poor has changed due to vast developments that have taken place as per the above reasons and as such the appeal preferred by 3rd respondent is maintainable and legal. It will be a contradiction in terms under section 82 if a land less poor person not having income more that Rs.12,000/- per year is ready to buy in case the temple is willing to sell the very land which is now worth Crores of Rupees. It is further stated that the delay in filing the Appeals filed before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Multi Zone-II has occurred due to the above said reasons. Further the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments, Guntur has directed the Executive Officers/ Managers of the temples/Institutions having lands situated at Urban area or under VGTM-UDA to file the Appeals before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati against the orders passed declaring the concerned people as Land Less Poor Persons vide his proceedings Circular in Rc. No.A7/2011/10 dated 7 11-5-2010. Immediately after receiving the above orders this respondent preferred the appeals before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments Department, Multi Zone-II, Tirupati along with the condone delay applications under Section 5 of limitation Act. But as submitted in the very beginning of this counter affidavit only a delay of 35 days has occurred on the part of the 3 rd respondent temple. As such there is no illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the 1st respondent. Hence prayed to dismiss the writ petitions.
5. Heard Sri P. Vijaya Kiran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP Nos.20490, 20491, 20531 and 20548 of 2011 and Sri Md. Saleem, leaned counsel appearing for the petitioner in WP No.32850 of 2010; learned Assistant Government Pleader for Endowments; Smt P. Padmavathi, learned Standing Counsel for Endowments in WP Nos.20490, 20491, 20531 and 20548 of 2011 and Sri M. Srinivasa Rao, learned Standing Counsel for Endowments in WP No.32850 of 2010 appearing for the respondents.
6. On hearing, learned counsel for the petitioners reiterated while reiterating the averments made in the petition, submits that, the 2 nd respondent ought to have rejected the petition to condone the delay applications in filing appeals as the 1st respondent has no locus standi to file appeals against the order of Assistant Commissioner. He further submits that, the Regional Joint Commissioner failed to see that the rules framed under the Endowments Act 2003 does not provide for condonation of delay applications and Regional Joint Commissioner has erroneously exercised jurisdiction not vested in it. Further, the 2nd respondent ought to have dismissed the delay 8 condonation petitions by observing that the 1st respondent has committed willful laches even though he received the orders and that no reasons are stated by the respondent for condonation of inordinate delays and the orders of Regional Joint commissioner deserve to be set aside. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners prayed to allow these writ petitions by setting aside the impugned orders.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on a decision of High Court of Madras reported in Kapil and others vs. Union of India and others1, wherein it was held that :
To summarize, it is stated that in the absence of any specific exclusion of the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, either in the form of a specific provision or by necessary intendment or inference in the Claims Tribunal Act which is not a complete code in itself, specifically in view of the fact that the provisions of sections 4 to 24 are not directly or indirectly in conflict with any provisions relating to filing of an appeal before the High Court contained in the Claims Tribunal Act nor do the provisions of sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act render any provision relating to the filing of an appeal contained in the Claims Tribunal Act otiose or redundant, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the filing of an appeal under section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act by virtue of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Act.
67. We are also of the considered opinion that reading the provisions of section 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act in terms of section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act into the provisions of the Claims Tribunal Act, which we have held is not a complete code in itself, would in fact further the object and purpose for enacting the Claims Tribunal Act which is a benevolent beneficial and welfare legislation & Bunch matters and is enacted with the avowed purpose of providing adequate and speedy remedy for decision in respect of claims arising out of untoward incidents and railway accidents and other disputes.
68. In the light of the above discussion we hold that the decision of the learned single Bench in the case of Kunjmati (supra) does not lay down the correct proposition of law and is accordingly overruled and in answer to the question referred to us we state that in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act is included in and has to be read into the provisions of the Claims Tribunals Act as it has not been expressly excluded therefrom either by a specific statutory provision or by necessary intendment or inference and, therefore, the High Court has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal filed under Section 23 of the Claims Tribunal Act in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, on sufficient cause being shown by an appellant.
8. Whereas, the learned Assistant Government Pleader and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently opposed for grant of any relief in the present writ petitions.
1 http://ubduabjabiib.org/doc/45285691/ 9
9. To support their contentions, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Ram Nath Sao Alias Ram Nath Sahu and others versus Govardhan Sao and others2, wherein the Apex Court held that :
".......The Court further observed in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 which run thus:-
"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words "sufficient cause"
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari (1969) 1 SCR 1006 and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality (1972) 1 SCC 366.
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. "
[ Emphasis added] Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependant upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal an exception more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hyper technical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, 2 (2002) 3 Supreem court Cases 195 10 causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.
In view of the foregoing discussions, we are clearly of the opinion that on the facts of present case, Division Bench of the High Court was not justified in upholding order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby prayers for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement were refused and accordingly the delay in filing the petition for setting aside abatement is condoned, abatement is set aside and prayer for substitution is granted...."
10. The facts of the above case are not applicable to the present set of facts of these cases.
11. The point for consideration arise for consideration in these writ petitions are whether the condonation of delay in filing the appeals is factually or legally justified or not and if not, whether the impugned orders are sustainable?
12. The Apex Court was considering the question of condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the Collector under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in Sakuru v. Tanaji3; K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao 4 by a Division Bench was referred to, wherein this Court held that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a civil or criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an appeal is filed under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is not a civil or criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings before him unless there is express provision in the special enactment, whereunder the Collector is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any particular section of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to 3 (1985) 3 SCC 590 4 AIR 1978 AP 166 11 such proceedings. The Division Bench, in fact, did not even consider Section 93 of the said Act, which made the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 apply for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation for filing appeal or application for revision under that Act, to be making the provisions of Section 5 applicable, as only Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act fall within the group of the sections relating to the computation of the period of limitation. The Apex Court unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that the view taken by the Division Bench in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao (3 supra) is perfectly correct and sound and referred to the precedents from the Apex Court holding that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to the proceedings in Courts and not to appeals and applications before Bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such Bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. In fact, the Apex Court also repelled the contention that subsequent amendment of the Tenancy Act by the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act 1979, A.P. Act 2 of 1979 expressly made the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to appeals and revisions under the said Act and that the amendment is clarificatory in nature and held that the provisions of Section 93 as they stood prior to the amendment were free from any ambiguity and called for no clarification and the Legislature did not give any indication of any intention to clarify, but has only amended the section with prospective effect.
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13. In Om Prakash v. Ahswani Kumar Bassi5 the Apex Court held that the Rent Controller under the East Pubjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is a creature of statute and can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by the statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power. Referring to Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fer nandes6 and Mukri Goipal v. Cheppilat Puthanpuraji and other precedents 7, the Apex Court distinguished between a Court discharging the functions of an appellate authority and a statutory authority discharging such functions as a persona designata.
14. The long title of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987, A.P. Act 30 of 1987, specified the Act to be to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and governance of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments in the State of Andhra Pradesh, thus, clearly signifying that the enactment was intended and designed to be a complete code in itself so far the administration and governance of such institutions and endowments are concerned. Even the statement of objects and reasons for the said Act referred to the report of Sri Challa Kondaiah Commission, the examination of the recommendations of the Commission by the Government and their acceptance with certain modifications. It was specifically stated that the Government proposed to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu 5 AIR 2010 SC 3791 6 (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 = AIR 2003 SC 459 7 AIR 1995 SC 2272 13 Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams Act, 1979 and in their place proposed to enact a comprehensive law providing better management of the properties and utilization of funds of the institutions and endowments, etc. It was specifically stated that a provision is also made to terminate the leases held by the persons other than landless poor persons and to enable landless poor persons to purchase the lands held by them on lease. The statement of objects and reasons for A.P. Act 33 of 2007, by which Section 82 was amended, stated that the land in urban areas being more precious, the amendment to Section 82 is intended to protect the interests of endowment institutions located in urban areas by not allowing sale of endowment lands in these areas. One of the salient features of the amending legislation was, therefore, safeguarding valuable endowment lands in urban areas and major Gram Panchayats by excluding them from the possibility of sale to lease holders. The Act being a comprehensive and consolidated legislation, did not undergo any change in its character by any subsequent amendments also.
15. A 'Court' for the purpose of the Act has been defined in Section 2(8) which did not include any statutory authority beyond the Courts specified in its meaning. The powers and functions of Regional Joint Commissioner defined by Section 9 do not clothe any exercise of powers or performance of functions by the Regional Joint Commissioner with any colour of such exercise of powers or performance of functions by a Court. None of the provisions of the enactment providing for any appeals or reviews or revisions 14 specified the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Section 5 of the Limitation Act in particular to be applicable and Section 149, which governs the procedure and powers at enquiries under the Act including hearing of appeals, prescribes about the applicability of the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits and the further applicability of the Evidence Act and Oaths Act, but not the Limitation Act, 1963. Deeming the officers under Section 149(3) to be persons acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers' Protection Act, 1850 can be considered no indication of treating such officers as Courts for any other purpose and the beneficiary provision should be considered available only to the specific extent provided therein to the officer, but cannot be stretched to make the officer a judicial officer/Court for all purposes.
16. Section 82(1) of the Act provided exemption to leases held by landless poor persons from the general cancellation of all leases of agricultural lands subsisting on the date of commencement of the Act and the Rules under G.O.Ms. No.379 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated 11-03-2003 were made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 82 read with the general rule making power under Section 153(1). While Rule 3 thereof provides for determination of landless poor person, Rule 4 provides for an appeal to the Regional Joint Commissioner having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision or order made or passed under Rule 3 by any person aggrieved by such decision or order and the decision or order of the Regional Joint Commissioner is made final. The period of 30 days 15 from the date of the receipt of the decision or order by the aggrieved person, within which the appeal has to be, thus, filed under the statutory rules, is not expressly or impliedly impressed with any elasticity either by the statutory rules or by the statute under which the rules were made. The above background may clearly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals.
17. Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for extension of prescribed period in certain cases like any appeal or any application, enabled admission of such an appeal or application only if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the "Court" that he had a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The word "Court" itself, not defined by the Limitation Act, 1963, but defined by A.P. Act 30 of 1987 for its purposes, does not include the Regional Joint Commissioner of Endowments in any view. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provided that the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, where any such special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a different period of limitation than prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. A.P. Act 30 of 1987 being a complete code in itself may, thus, make any applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appeals provided by the statutory rules above referred to, not arise with reference to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, apart from Section 5 specifically referring to satisfaction of the Court in this regard. The principles laid down by 16 a Division Bench of this Court in K. Venkaiah's case (3 supra) upheld by the Apex Court in Sakuru's case (6 supra) and the ratio decidendi of the other precedents above referred to, make Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 inapplicable to appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules in the absence of any express or even an implied provision under A.P. Act 30 of 1987 to consider such application even remotely possible. The limitation on exercise of such power by a statutory authority, who is a persona designata, is circumscribed by the very statutory provisions, which conferred quasi-judicial powers and any other equitable considerations cannot provide shelter to exercise of any such power against the unambiguous letter of the statute and if so, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not have been taken aid by the Regional Joint Commissioner to entertain applications for condonation of delay in filing the appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules and condone the delay by allowing any such applications on any ground.
18. Even otherwise, whether there was any basis for the statutory authority to arrive at any satisfaction on the appellants having sufficient cause for not preferring the appeals within the prescribed period, also appears to be a question to be answered against the appellants. In all the appeals, the petitions for condonation of delay and the appeals were filed on the instructions of the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments directing the Executive Officers/Managers/Executive Authorities of the temples/Institutions having lands situated at urban area or under Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority and who got the landless poor 17 declaration orders previously from the very office of the Assistant Commissioner, who gave instructions to file revision petitions before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments, Multizone-II, Tirupati for cancellation of the landless poor declarations immediately, since the tenants for the urban lands cannot be declared as landless poor tenants. While it is strange that the very person who declared the tenants as landless poor for the purposes of Section 82(1) himself instructed the temples/institutions to file revision petitions (?) before the Regional Joint Commissioner questioning his own orders (even if it were an individual who is successor in office to the individual who gave such declarations), the affidavits of the executive officers of the temples in support of their applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay only referred to the factual background of the lands being of commercial value and in urban area, the tenants having no registered lease deeds in their favour, the change in the master plan and the absence of any other remedy against the impugned orders except an appeal under Rule 4, but did not allege any cause, leave alone sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeals beyond the prescribed period. The inclusion of the land in question in the urban development zone alone was claimed to be justifying preferring the appeals at that distance of time, which was attempted to be construed as indicating practically the absence of any delay. The petitions were filed in 2010. The orders of the Assistant Commissioner declaring the tenants as landless poor for purposes of Section 82 were in 2003/2004. G.O.Ms. No.695 and G.O.Ms. No.679 referred to about the lands 18 coming under the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas Development Act, 1975 were in 1977 and 2006. The amendment of Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 excluding lands situated in municipalities and municipal corporations in sub- section (2), etc., by A.P. Act 33 of 2007 came into effect from 03-01-2008. The instructions of the Assistant Commissioner to file the appeals were in May, 2010 and the appeals along with petitions for condonation of delay were much later. Even assuming that the amendment by A.P. Act 33 of 2007, which came into force with effect from 03-01-2008, either activated or provided justification for the appellants to file the appeals along with petitions for condonation of delay, why the Assistant Commissioner or the appellants did not act from 03- 01-2008 till May, 2010/July, 2010 was never stated. Apart from the question whether the subject lands herein, which are not claimed to be situated within the territorial limits of any municipality or municipal corporation, can be considered exempt by Section 82(2) as amended with effect from 03-01-2008, even the counter-affidavits filed along with vacate stay petitions did not attempt even to remotely state the causes for not preferring the appeals against the orders of the Assistant Commissioner declaring the writ petitioners herein as landless poor, within the prescribed period or thereafter till July, 2010, though even the last of the events, which is claimed as providing the justification for filing the appeals due to the amendment of Section 82(2) with effect from 03-01-2008, was more than two and half years earlier to filing of the appeals and the delay condonation petitions. Even if the statute provided 19 no other remedy as claimed, that cannot justify any condonation of delay in the absence of satisfaction of the Court about the requirements of Section 5.
19. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and the Apex Court not only noted the law of limitation to be the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities, but also took note of the very nature of governmental functioning which makes procedural delay implicit and incidental to the decision making process. While certain amount of latitude is not impermissible, the expression 'sufficient cause' was directed to be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. However, it is to be noted that it is evident that even in such a case some cause should exist and in no event non- existence of any cause will help the defaulter.
20. In Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others 8 is a case where any strait-jacket formula for accepting or rejecting an explanation furnished for delay is not adopted, but the causes shown for condonation have to be of acceptable value.
21. The test of 'sufficient cause' was stated in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B.Bhvaneswari9 to be purely individualistic test and not an objective test. Hence, no two cases can be treated alike. It was pointed out that the concept of 'sufficient cause' was left delightfully undefined and each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such.
8 (2008) 3 SCC 70 9 (2009) 2 SCC 689 20
22. The Apex Court further held in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others10 after an exhaustive review of the precedents, that even if the term 'sufficient cause' has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. The normal behaviour of a common prudent person was referred to and it was cautioned that liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. The word 'sufficient cause' was stated to mean adequate enough and the party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay.nThe decisive factor is the sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation.
23. The later view of the Supreme Court was clarified in Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P. & Ors. 11 , wherein it was asserted that the concepts such as 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach', 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It was also stated that all discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law and the discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by 10 (2010) 8 SCC 685 11 AIR 2011 SC 1199 21 reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.
24. The latest declaration of law on the subject is by Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai12 , wherein the Supreme Court stated that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. It was laid down that no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. In fact, in the case before Their Lordships, the cause shown for the delay of more than 7 years was treated as wholly unsatisfactory and as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
25. Thus, the principles are well settled and the application of the principles to the facts of the case does not disclose any reason being assigned for the delay that occurred in filing the appeals at least since the amendment to Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 coming into force with effect 12 (2012) 5 SCC 157 22 from 03-01-2008 and the filing of the appeals in or after July, 2010, even assuming that the subsequent statutory amendment can provide justification for reopening of closed and stale matters. The circumstances relating to the absence of registered lease deeds and urbanization of the lands were in existence even since earlier, but were not acted upon and the inaction since inception up to filing of the appeals cannot be considered to be providing any reasonable basis for condonation of delay even assuming the question to be answerable with the broadest of liberality to be adopted. As such, even on facts, the judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on satisfaction about the existence of sufficient cause for the delay cannot be considered to have been exercised in accordance with sound judicial principles and the rights of the writ petitioners herein were obviously very lightly interfered with, even without the existence of any cause, leave alone sufficient cause justifying any condonation of delay.
26. Many other questions were raised by either parties about the relevancy of the subsequent change in the contents of the statute or the nature of the land providing any reasonable basis for reopening a closed chapter by way of an appeal against an order which had become final by efflux of time and about the jurisdiction or otherwise of the Regional Joint Commissioner to entertain the appeals or petitions for condonation of delay after the Endowments Tribunal has been made part of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. 23
27. Even in the writ petitions where the final orders in the appeals are challenged, there is no need to go into the orders in appeals further in view of the legal basis for entertaining such appeals being found to be non-existent.
28. In view of the foregoing discussion and by following the decision of Alladi Nageswara Rao's case, this Court is of the view that, the impugned orders in all the writ petitions entertaining the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing appeals, without any jurisdiction and accepting the requests for condonation of such delay even without the existence or proof of any sufficient cause, are declared as illegal. Therefore, this Court is inclined to allow the writ petitions by setting aside the impugned orders in all the Writ Petitions.
29. Accordingly, all the Writ Petitions are allowed. The impugned orders in all the writ petitions are hereby set aside and quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.
30. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.
______________________________ DR. K. MANMADHA RAO, J.
Date : 13-09-2024
Note : L.R copy to be marked.
(b/o)
Gvl
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HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE K. MANMADHA RAO
WRIT PETITION Nos: 20490, 20491, 20531, 20548/2011 and 32850/2010 Date : 13.09.2024 Gvl 25