Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd vs Malladi Laxminarayana, Krishna ... on 3 October, 2024
Author: R. Raghunandan Rao
Bench: R. Raghunandan Rao
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125, 1161 & 1162 of 2010
W.A.No.1753 of 2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association.
... Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.522 of 2009
Between:
The District Collector, Krishna,
Machilipatnam & others. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.125 of 2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others. ... Respondents
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 others ... Appellants
2
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
And
$ The State of A.P Rep. by District Collector,
Machilipatnam and others. ...Respondents
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi,
Vijayawada and 5 others. ... Appellants
And
$ The District Collector,
Krishna District & 3 others. ...Respondents
Date of Judgment pronounced on : 03-10-2024
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No
May be allowed to see the judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No
to Law Reporters/Journals:
3. Whether the Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No
Of the Judgment?
3
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
* HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
&
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
+ W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125, 1161 & 1162 of 2010
% Dated: 03-10-2024
W.A.No.1753 of 2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association.
... Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.522 of 2009
Between:
The District Collector, Krishna,
Machilipatnam & others. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others.
... Respondents
W.A.No.125 of 2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...Appellants
And
$ Malladi Lakshmi Narayana & others. ... Respondents
4
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 others ... Appellants
And
$ The State of A.P Rep. by District Collector,
Machilipatnam and others. ...Respondents
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi,
Vijayawada and 5 others. ... Appellants
And
$ The District Collector,
Krishna District & 3 others. ...Respondents
! Heard Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant
in W.A.No.1753 of 2008.
Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant in
W.A.No.1161 of 2010
Smt. Iswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in
W.A.No.1162 of 2010
Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, the respondent in W.A.No.1753 of 2008
W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010, who is appearing as party-in-
person.
^Counsel for Respondents : Sri P. Raj Gopal Rao, Sri P.R. Prasad, Sri J.
Ugranarasimha, G.P. for Land Acquisition, G.P for Revenue
5
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
<GIST :
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1
(2019) 10 SCC 229
2
AIR 2023 SC 2518
3
(2019) 10 SCC 229
4
.(2000) 4 SCC 322
5
1998 (3) Karnataka Law Journal 304 (Full Bench)
6
(2006) (2) SCC 416
7
(1994) 5 SCC 686
8
2009 (1) ALD 188
1
9 (2010) 4 SCC 17 (para.72)
10
(2019) 8 SCC 552 (para 6 and 6.3)
11
(2018) 7 SCC 763 (para 14)
12
(1994) 4 SCC 145 (para 2)
13
(2020) 8 SCC 129
14AIR 1987 Del 239
15
(2010) 4 SCC 17
16
(2018) 7 SCC 763
17
(2019) 8 SCC 552
6
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
APHC010053852008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3488]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
THURSDAY ,THE THIRD DAY OF SEPTEMBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE R RAGHUNANDAN RAO
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1753/2008
Between:
The Automobile Technicians Association. ...APPELLANT
AND
Malladi Laxmi Narayana 2 Others and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
2. P R PRASAD
3. VIVEK CHANDRA SEKHAR S
4. P ROY REDDY
WRIT APPEAL NO: 522/2009
Between:
The Dist. Collector, Krishna, Machilipatnam & ...APPELLANT(S)
Others
AND
Malladi Laxminarayana Vijayawada and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
7
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2. P R PRASAD
3. P RAJAGOPAL REDDY
WRIT APPEAL NO: 125/2010
Between:
Andhra Pradesh Industrial, Hyd. ...APPELLANT
AND
Malladi Laxmi Narayana Krishna District and ...RESPONDENT(S)
Others
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. P ROY REDDY
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
3. P R PRASAD
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1161/2010
Between:
Vallabhaneni Madhava Rao, Hyderabad & 4 Otrs. ...APPELLANT(S)
AND
The State Of A P Rep By Dist Collector ...RESPONDENT(S)
Machilipatnam and Others
8
RRR,J & HN,J
W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. V V SATISH
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2.
3. GP FOR REVENUE
4. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
5. J UGRANARASIMHA
WRIT APPEAL NO: 1162/2010
Between:
Malladi Venkata Ramana Devi, Vijayawada & 5 ...APPELLANT(S)
Others
AND
Dist. Collector, Krishna Dist and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Appellant(S):
1. AISHWARYA NAGULA
2. .
3. V V N NARAYANA RAO
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. P RAJAGOPAL RAO
2.
3. GP FOR REVENUE
4. GP FOR LAND ACQUISITION
5. J UGRANARASIMHA
COMMON JUDGMENT
Dt: 03.10.2024 (per Sri Justice R. Raghunandan Rao) 9 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Heard Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.1753 of 2008, Sri O. Manoher Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for appellant in W.A.No.1161 of 2010, Smt. Iswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A.No.1162 of 2010, Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, the respondent in W.A.No.1753 of 2008, W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010, who is appearing as party-in-person. Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana has submitted written arguments which have been perused by us.
2. All these Writ Appeals are being disposed of, by way of a common Judgment, as they arise out of two separate orders of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh and raise essentially the same facts and questions of law.
3. The Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation had intended to establish an automobile industrial estate at Kanuru Village, near Vijayawada, and had sought the assistance of the Government for acquiring necessary land for this purpose. The government had initiated acquisition proceedings for approximately 148 acres of land situated in Sy.Nos.181 to 184 of Kanuru Village, Penamaluru Mandal. The said acquisition process was challenged, by way of W.P.No.2370 of 1988, and the same came to be quashed by a Judgment of this Court. Subsequently, a fresh notification for acquiring 10 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch an extent of Ac.152.08 cents in Sy.No.60/2 and 61 to 63 of Kanuru Village was issued. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as „the 1894 Act‟) was published in the Gazette of 21.04.1995. The enquiry, under Section 5-A of the Act, was dispensed with and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published on 28.04.1995. The last publication of the declaration, under Section 6, was carried out in the local newspapers, on 23.05.1995. Thereafter, initially, two writ petitions came to be filed, questioning the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6, by way of W.P.No.10651 of 1995 and W.P.No.10652 of 1995. The said W.P.No.10652 of 1995 came to be filed by the petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006. Similarly W.P.No.10651 of 1995 came to be filed by one Malladi Krishna Mohan, who subsequently passed away and his legal heirs were brought on record as petitioners 2 to 4 in that writ petition. The said writ petitions were filed and interim directions of stay of further proceedings was granted, in both writ petitions, on 30.05.1995. On 28.06.1995 and 04.07.1995, these orders, in both writ petitions, were modified and the stay was restricted to stay of dispossession, with liberty being granted to the respondent authorities to complete all other formalities. Subsequently, both these writ petitions came to be dismissed on 12.08.2003. The writ appeals filed against the order of dismissal also came to be dismissed. After the 11 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch dismissal of the writ petitions and the Writ Appeals, an award, dated 05.08.2005, is said to have been passed by the Collector. The said award was challenged, by the writ petitioners in W.P.No.10651 of 1995, by way of W.P.No.24105 of 2006. It may also be noted that Writ petitioners 4 to 6 in W.P. No. 24105 of 2006 are said to be persons who had purchased the land from the Petitioners 1 to 3 in this writ petition. The writ petitioners in W.P.No.10652 of 1995 filed W.P.No.3957 of 2006 challenging the award of 05.08.2005. Apart from this another writ petition bearing No. 13970 of 1995 was filed by another land owner, who was affected by the same notification. Interim orders of stay of dispossession were obtained and remained in force till the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 16.04.2004.
4. Apart from this, Sri Malladi Lakshmi Narayana, who had not filed any writ petition, earlier, assailed the award dated 05.08.2005, by way of W.P.No.2647 of 2006.
5. The petitioners in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 claimed ownership over Ac.8.37 cents of land in Sy.No.61 and 63 and challenged the award to that extent. The petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006 claimed ownership of Ac.15.59 cents in Sy.No.60/2 and challenged the award of 05.08.2005 to that extent. The petitioner in W.P.No.2647 of 2006 claimed ownership over Ac.8.37 ½ cents in 12 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Sy.Nos.61 and 63 and challenged the award of 05.08.2005 to that extent.
6. The petitioners, in W.P.No.24105 and 3957 of 2006 contended that the award dated 05.08.2005 had been passed beyond the two year period permitted under Section 11- A of the 1894 Act, in as much as the last date of publication of the notification, under Section 6, was 23.05.1995, while the award was passed on 05.08.2005. They contended that the stay granted in W.P.No.10651 and 10652 of 1995 was only a stay of dispossession and the said period of stay could not be taken into account for calculating the two years within which the award has to be passed. Apart from this, they also contended that, even if the period of stay is to be excluded, the award had been passed beyond the period of two years. Apart from this, various other grounds had also been raised. A learned single judge of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh, by a common order dated 26.10.2010 dismissed both the petitions holding that the award was within time and negatived all the other contentions raised in the writ petitions. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal, the petitioners in W.P.No.3957 of 2006 filed W.A.No.1161 of 2010 and the petitioners in W.P.No.24105 of 2006 filed W.A.No.1162 of 2010. 13
RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
7. The writ petitioner in W.P.No.2647 of 2006 took the stand that he was not party to any of the writ petitions and as such, the period between the publication of declaration under Section 6 in May, 1995 would be the starting point for calculating the period of two years prescribed under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act. This contention was accepted by a learned Single Judge who allowed the writ petition, by way of an order dated 15.10.2008, holding that the award dated 05.08.2005 was beyond the time stipulated under Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
8. The respondents in W.P.No.2647 of 2006, namely the Collector, the Land Acquisition Officer, M/s APIIC and Automobile Technicians Association filed W.A. No.1753 of 2008, W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010, assailing the judgment in W.P. No. 2647 of 2006.
9. Sri O. Manohar Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in Writ Appeal No. 1161 of 2010 contends as follows:
"Section 11 A, of the Act of 1894, prescribes a time period within which an award can be passed. This time period is 2 years from the date of publication of the declaration under section 6 of the Act. While computing this two year period, the period for which any stay of proceedings granted by a 14 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch court, was subsisting is to be excluded. Any further delay beyond the two years period would result in the entire land acquisition process lapsing. The last date of publication of the declaration, under Section 6 of the 1894 Act, was 23rd May 1995. The erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh had granted stay of proceedings on 30th May 1995 and modified it to a stay of dispossession alone. The Writ Petitions were dismissed on 12.08.2003. The award was passed on 5/8/2005. However, the prior consent of the Government required under the provisions of Section 11 of the Act was obtained only on 15/8/2005. The notice of the award was received by the appellants in September 2005. The passing of an award is complete only upon service of the award on the affected party. This would be September 2005, which is clearly beyond the period of 2 years, stipulated under Section 11 A of the 1894 Act. Even if the date of the passing of the award is to be taken as the relevant date, the said date would be 15.08.2005, as that was the date on which the government or the specified officer had given approval, as required under section 11 of the Act. This would also be beyond the period of 2 years stipulated under Section 11 A. The provisions of section 11A have to be construed strictly. Consequently, the award and the Land acquisition proceedings would have to fail. The Learned Senior Counsel relies upon various judgments, which shall be considered presently.15
RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
10. Sri V. V. Narayana, appearing for appellants 4 to 6 in Writ Appeal No. 1162 of 2010, while reiterating the contentions of Sri O. Manohar Reddy, further contends that the provisions of section 24 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act of 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 2013 Act) would be applicable as compensation was not paid before the 2013 Act came into force and no possession was taken at all and that possession was also not taken in September, 2005, as claimed by the respondent authorities.
11. Sri K.S. Murthy, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the appellants 1 to 3, in W.A. No. 1162 of 2010, contends that the last publication of the Declaration under section 6 of the Act of 1894 was on 20th May, 1995; the award said to have been passed on 5/8/2003 was only a draft award and cannot be treated as an award passed under section 11 of the Act. Even otherwise, the notice of the said award was dispatched on 9/9/2005 and received by the appellants on 14/9/2005 which is beyond the period of 2 years stipulated under section 11A of the Act of 1894; While Section 4 of the Act of 1894, stipulates the last date of publication of the notification, there is no such clarification in section 6 of the Act of 1894. In such circumstances, the first date of publication should be treated as the starting point for computation of the two year period set out in Section 11 of the 1894 Act. Since the 16 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch publication of the declaration was done in the newspaper on 20th May 1995, the said date should be taken into account.
12. Ms. Aishwarya Nagula, supplementing the contentions of Sri K.S. Murthy, would submit that the grant of approval on 15.8.2005, is highly doubtful as government offices would not be working on that day. She would also contend that the mandatory notices under section 9 of the 1894 Act were never served on the land owners as they were not residing in the addresses to which the notices were sent. She would also draw the attention of this court to the counters wherein it was stated that the land owners were not residing in those addresses. She assailed the action of the land acquisition officer in publishing the notification and declaration in a newspaper like "Pledge" which has no circulation.
13. Sri P. Rajagopal Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the Automobile Technicians Association, which is the appellant in W.A. No. 1753 of 2008, disputes the above contentions on the following grounds: Where more than one challenge, to a Land acquisition proceeding, is raised before the courts and stay of dispossession or stay of proceedings is obtained, It is the date on which the last stay had been vacated, that would be the starting point for computing the two year period under Section 11 A of the 1894 Act. In the present case, 17 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch stay of further proceedings had also been given, in W.P. No. 13970 of 1995, which had been filed by another land owner. This writ petition came to be dismissed on 16/9/2004. This would extend the time available for passing an award to 15.09.2006. Since the award was passed on 5.08.2005, prior approval obtained on 15.08.2005 and served on the affected persons on 14.09.2005, the entire process had been completed within the stipulated two year period; the appellants 4 to 6 in W.A. No. 1162 of 2010 have no locus to file the present writ appeal. He submits that the purchase of the land, by way of deeds of sale, dated 12.07.2004, 30.08. 2004 and 26.04.2004 from the Appellants 1 to 3 is void as any purchase of land after the Notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act has been published is null and void. They can have no further interest in the land and they cannot challenge the acquisition proceedings; the acquisition was for an extent of 152 Acres, while the acquisition was challenged by persons interested in about 30 acres. Such a challenge, by a minority of owners, cannot be maintained, when a majority of the owners have accepted the proceedings and have not challenged the same. The learned counsel relied upon a catena of judgements to support his contentions. They shall be considered presently.
18
RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT:
14. Before going into the issues that arise in this set of appeals, it is necessary to resolve the disputes around the facts of the case. The disputes arise on the dates of publication, the date of payment of compensation and the date on which possession of the land had been taken and whether possession has been taken at all or not.
15. To obviate any further controversy, on the dates of publication, passing of the award, grant of approval of the award by the concerned authority and service of notice of award, this court proposes to accept the dates set out in the award of 05.08.2005 and the dates set out in the pleadings and documents filed by the official respondents as well as the appellant in W.A. No. 1753 of 2008.
16. The relevant dates according to the award of 05.08.2005 are as follows:
1. D.N U/s.4(1) of the L.A. Act approved by the Collector, Krishna in Rc.G2/3962/94 dated 16.4.95.
In the A.P Gazette issue No :5/KST/1995, dt.24.4.1995.
Andhra Jyothi News paper on : 11/05/1995
Prajashakti News Paper on :10/05/1995
In the locality on :12/05/1995
19
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W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
2. D.D U/s.6 of the L.A Act approved by the Collector, Krishna in Rc.G2/3962/94 dated 16.04.95.
In the AP Gazette issue No :6/KST/1995, dt:28.4.1995.
Udayam News Paper on :20/5/1995
Pledge News Paper on : 23/5/1995
In the Locality on :20/5/1995
The relevant dates, after the passing of the award, are as follows:
Date of Award : 05/08/2005
Date of prior Approval : 15/08/2005
Notice of Award : 09/09/2005
Notice of Award received : 14/09/2005
Possession taken : 13/09/2005
17. There is a challenge to the locus of appellants 4 to 6 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010 in filing W.P.No.24105 of 2006. These appellants are said to have purchased the land under acquisition, from the appellants 1 to 3, under three deeds of sale dated 12.07.2004, 30.08.2004 and 26.04.2004. All these deeds of sale were executed after publication of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The Hon‟ble Supreme 20 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Court in Shiv Kumar vs. Union of India1 had held that any person who purchases land, after the notification of Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6 does not get title to the land and has no locus to challenge any of the acquisition proceedings. This Judgment was also followed by another bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Ravinder Kumar Jain and Ors2. The relevant paragraph in Shiv Kumar vs. Union of India3 is extracted below:
20. Given that, the transaction of sale, effected after Section 4 notification, is void, is ineffective to transfer the land, such incumbents cannot invoke the provisions of Section 24. As the sale transaction did not clothe them with the title when the purchase was made; they cannot claim "possession" and challenge the acquisition as having lapsed under Section 24 by questioning the legality or regularity of proceedings of taking over of possession under the 1894 Act. It would be unfair and profoundly unjust and against the policy of the law to permit such a person to claim resettlement or claim the land back as envisaged under the 2013 Act. When he has not been deprived of his livelihood but is a purchaser under a void transaction, the outcome of exploitative tactics played upon poor farmers who were unable to defend themselves.
18. In view of the above principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the appellants 4 to 6 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010 have no locus to file either W.P.No.24105 of 2006 or W.A.No.1162 of 2010.
However, these transactions, in view of the principle laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, would not take away the right or locus of 1 (2019) 10 SCC 229 2 AIR 2023 SC 2518 3 (2019) 10 SCC 229 21 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch appellants 1 to 3 to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Accordingly, W.A.No.1162 of 2010 is maintainable by Writ Appellants 1 to 3.
19. The primary dispute in the present set of cases is whether the award, dated 05.08.2005, is beyond the time stipulated in Section 11-A of the 1894 Act and whether the period of stay, which is to be excluded under the proviso, would save limitation for passing the award.
20. The provisions of Section 11 and 11-A of the 1894 Act, which are relevant, are extracted below:
11. Enquiry and award by Collector. -
[(1)] On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objection (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under section 9 to the measurements made under section 8, and into the value of the land [at the date of the publication of the notification under section 4, sub-section (1)], and into the respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of-
(i) the true area of the land;
(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and
(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, or whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him :
[Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorize in this behalf: Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such 22 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf.
[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement.
(3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-
section (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), no agreement made under subsection (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act.] [11A. Period shall be which an award within made. - The Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse:
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (68 of 1984), the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement.
Explanation: In computing the period of two years referred to in this section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a court shall be excluded.
21. Section 11-A mandates that an award, under Section 11 of the 1894 Act, would have to be passed within two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The last date of such declaration, according to the award, is 23.05.1995. The award was passed on 05.03.2005, approved on 15.08.2005 and notice of such award was sent on 09.09.2005. The two year period, de hors 23 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch the period to be excluded under the explanation to the proviso in Section 11-A, had obviously lapsed before any of the above dates had occurred.
22. The explanation to the proviso in Section 11-A of the 1984 Act provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceedings, under the 1894 Act is stayed by a Court.
23. In the present case, the appellants in W.A.No.1161 and 1162 of 2010 had approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, by way of Writ Petition Nos.10651 and 10652 of 1995 challenging the notifications issued under Section 4(1) and Section 6. On 30.05.1995 the erstwhile High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh had granted stay of all further proceedings pursuant to these notifications. Subsequently, on 28.06.1995, the order granted in W.P.No.10651 of 1995 was modified wherein the stay was restricted to stay of dispossession while giving liberty to the respondents to complete other formalities. An identical modification was made in W.P.No.10652 of 1995 on 04.07.1995. There was earlier some ambiguity as to whether stay of dispossession was sufficient to exclude the period for which the stay persists. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in M. Ramalinga Thevar vs. State of T.N4 had held that even an order of stay of dispossession was 4 .(2000) 4 SCC 322 24 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch sufficient for exclusion of the said period, under the explanation to the proviso, while computing the two year period set out under Section 11- A of the 1894 Act. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
6. As per the Explanation the period of exclusion from the time is the period during which "any action or proceedings" to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed. We have no doubt that one of the actions contemplated pursuant to the declaration is taking possession of the land, though such action is a post-
award step in normal circumstances and in emergent circumstances it can as well be a pre-award step. Nonetheless, taking possession is one of the actions to be adopted as a follow- up measure pursuant to the declaration envisaged in Section 6 of the Act. The consequence mentioned in Section 11-A is a self- operating statutory process and, therefore, it can operate only when the conditions specified therein conjoin together. The consequence would step in only when there is fusion of all the conditions stipulated therein. If there is any stay regarding any of the actions to be taken pursuant to the declaration then the consequence of lapse would not happen.
10. Thus, the position is now well settled that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed. In the light of the said interpretation it is now idle to contend that the Government is debarred from proceeding with the acquisition. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
24. Both writ petitions namely W.P.No.10652 of 1995 and 10651 of 1995 were dismissed on 12.08.2003. It may also be noticed that there was no stay between 23.05.1995 and 30.05.1995 25 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch against the land acquisition proceedings. The last date by which the award would have to be passed, after taking in to account the aforesaid period of seven days, would be on or before 04.08.2005. The award is said to have been passed on 05.08.2005. Even if 05.08.2005 is treated as the last date on which the award can be passed, there is a further development that would have to be noticed by this Court. The first proviso to Section 11(1) stipulates that no award can be made by the Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate government or the authorized officer. In this case, the said prior approval is said to have been obtained on 15.08.2005 and notice of this award is said to have been served on the appellants in W.A.No.1161 and 1162 of 2010 on 14.09.2005.
25. The appellants contend that the award would have to be treated to have been passed on 15.08.2005 and in any event the award should be treated as lapsed since the prior approval had not been given on or before 04.08.2005 at the latest. The 4th respondent and the acquisition authorities contend that where prior approval is given without any modification, the said approval would date back to the date of the award and consequently it is within time.
26. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, the learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4 relies upon a Full Bench Judgment of the Hon‟ble 26 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch High Court of Karnataka in Poornaprajna House Building Co- operative Society vs. Bailamma 5and more specifically paragraph No.29 of the said Judgment. The relevant provision is extracted below:
29. Where the award is approved without, any modification it would relate back to the date on which the award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer. Different considerations may arise where the award is not accepted in its entirety by the Government and the Government thinks it necessary to make certain modification in the award.
27. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao would also contend that this Judgment has been confirmed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bailamma vs. Poornaprajna House Building Coop. Society6 and would be binding on this Court.
28. A perusal of the Judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bailamma (Smt) Alias Doddabailamma (Dead) and Ors vs. Poornaprajna House Building Cooperative Society and Ors., does not reveal any confirmation of the principle, set out by the full bench of the Hon‟ble High Court of Karnataka, which has been extracted above. In this case, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was made on 05.11.1988 and the award of the Collector was made on 13.03.1990. However, the prior approval of the government was granted on 16.11.1992. Since, this was beyond 05.11.1990 which was the last 5 1998 (3) Karnataka Law Journal 304 (Full Bench) 6 (2006) (2) SCC 416 27 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch date on which the two year period would elapse, a challenge was raised to the acquisition proceedings.
29. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court noticed that a writ petition had been filed earlier, for certain directions to be granted, and an interim order dated 29.06.1990 was granted staying operation of the declaration dated 13.06.1988 for two weeks. Thereafter, the stay was extended till further orders. Subsequently, on 17.02.1991 the order of stay was modified by clarifying that the order of stay would not prevent the government from granting approval of the award. The stay was finally vacated on 18.11.1992. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court after noticing these facts had held that the prior approval granted by the government was within the period of two years, after excluding the period of stay. There is no finding by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that the prior approval, without modification, would date back to the date of the award itself. The following extracts would make this clear:
22. At this stage, we may observe that having regard to the controversy raised before us, we required the State to produce before us the original file. Shri Sanjay Hegde, counsel for the State, produced before us the original file, from which it appears that after the award was signed by the Collector on 13-3-1990, the Society had moved the High Court by way of writ petition for a mandamus directing the State Government to approve the award.
However, after the order of the High Court dated 7-2-1991, modifying the earlier interim order of stay and permitting the Government to take a decision with regard to the approval of the 28 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch award, the Divisional Commissioner sent the award to the Government for approval on 10-6-1991. The Government granted its approval on 16-11-1992 and the record was returned to the office of the Collector. On 20-11-1992, notice under Section 12(2) was issued after the file was received by the Deputy Commissioner. He also pointed out the agreements in Form „D‟ signed by the person authorised under Article 229 of the Constitution, namely, the Special Land Acquisition Officer.
25. The award which has already been signed by the Collector becomes an award as soon as it is approved by the Government without any alteration. At best the appellants can contend that it becomes an award when notice is given to the parties interested. Viewed from any angle, having regard to the fact that there is no dispute that the Government granted its approval on 16-11-1992 and notices were issued under Section 12(2) of the Act on 20-11- 1992, it must be held that the award was made within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act. There was really no necessity for the Collector to sign the award again, nor does Section 11 requires that for the purpose of pronouncing the award notice should be given by the Collector to the persons interested. Section 11 requires notice to be given for the purpose of hearing objections. After the objections are heard, the Collector has to apply his mind to all the relevant facts and circumstances and prepare an award whereafter he is required to send it to the Government for approval. There is nothing in Section 11 which requires him to give notice to the persons interested of the date for pronouncement of the award, though, as we have observed earlier, there is also nothing which prevents him from giving such notice. We agree with the finding of the High Court that once it is shown that the award was made and signed and approved by the Government within the period prescribed by Section 11-A of the Act an award is validly made. In the instant case, we have satisfied ourselves that the award was received by the Deputy Commissioner after approval, and 29 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch notice was thereafter issued under Section 12(2) of the Act on 20-11-1992.
30. A similar issue had come up before the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of U.P vs. Rajiv Gupta7. In this case, declaration under Section 6 of 1894 Act was published on 22.12.1990 and the award would have to be passed on or before 21.12.1992. The award, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, was dated 20.12.1992. However, no prior approval was granted before 21.12.1992, which was the last date for passing the award. Para 6, which is relevant is extracted below:
6. Section 11 postulates of conducting an enquiry and making the award by the Collector. The first proviso envisages that "no award shall be made by the Collector under sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf". It is common knowledge that exercising the power under the first proviso, the appropriate Government made rules or statutory orders or instructions whatever be the nomenclature, they have statutory operation giving authorisation to the Land Acquisition Collector to make an award up to a particular pecuniary limit without prior approval either of the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by the appropriate Government in that behalf. If the award exceeds the limit, prior approval of the State Governments or authorised officer is mandatory. Any award made in violation thereof, renders the award non est and void as it hinges upon the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector or Officer. No doubt, Mr Markandeya is right that the State had not produced before us rules or orders issued under the first proviso to Section 11 that the Land Acquisition Officer shall not make an award exceeding one crore of rupees without prior approval of the Commissioner, namely, Commissioner, Board of Revenue.
But nonetheless, there is a statutory inhibition by first proviso to Section 11 that the prior approval either of the appropriate Government or of an officer which the appropriate Government authorises in that behalf, is mandatory for making an award. It is 7 (1994) 5 SCC 686 30 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch a condition precedent. Obviously, for this reason, the Collector in his letter dated 20-12-1992, addressed to the Commissioner, seeking prior approval thus:
"Proposed award *** Thus the proposed lands are disputed lands, and therefore, it has been mentioned in the proposed award that payment of compensation shall be made after obtaining the final report of the enquiry officer and the final judgment passed in the cases pending in different courts. Since, in the present case, the award is to be made up to 21-12-1992 only, it is to request you to kindly give your prior approval on the proposed award."
Its bare reading clearly indicates that the conscience that he is required to make the award on or before 21-12-1992 and to seek prior approval and accordingly he requested the Commissioner to grant him prior approval as is enjoined in the first proviso to Section 11 to make the proposed award. The heading of the award itself clearly indicates working of his mind that it is only a proposed award and after prior approval is given, he is enjoined to make the award under Section 11 of the Act. Since prior approval was not given before the expiry of 21- 12-1992, there is no award made by the Land Acquisition Officer. In the eye of law the proposed award of the Collector under Section 11 of the Act is not the award. As seen, Section 11-A is mandatory and on expiry of two years from the date of publication of declaration, i.e., on 21-12-1992, the entire proceedings under the Act stood lapsed. We are not concerned in this case with the proviso to Section 11-A. The High Court was, therefore, not right in its construction that there was an award made by the Collector on 20-12-1992 and the direction to take further steps in that behalf are clearly illegal. The review petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated 10-12-1993 of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The writ petition stands dismissed but in the circumstances parties are directed to bear their own costs.
31. This Judgment was followed by a Division Bench of the erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of 31 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh in Mohd. Javeed vs. Union of India8.
32. As prior approval has been granted on 15.08.2005, beyond the stipulated period ending on 04.08.2005, the award, is beyond the period stipulated under the proviso to Section 11-A of the 1894 Act. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao, learned counsel for the 4th respondent, would raise another contention to support the award. He submits that where more than one challenge is made to any acquisition proceeding and stay of proceedings are obtained in different petitions, the period to be excluded on account of such orders of stay, would be the period commencing from the first order of stay till the vacation of all the orders of stay. He would submit that in such batch cases, the existence of a stay in any one case, even if the effected persons are not party to the said writ petition, would act as an order which excludes time till the order is vacated. This issue was considered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in various cases. It would suffice to mention Om Parkash vs. Union of India9, State of Maharashtra vs. Moti Ratan Estate10, Raj Kumar Gandhi vs. State (UT of Chandigarh)11, 8 2009 (1) ALD 188 9 (2010) 4 SCC 17 (para.72) 10 (2019) 8 SCC 552 (para 6 and 6.3) 11 (2018) 7 SCC 763 (para 14) 32 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan vs. State of Karnataka12. The consistent principle set out in all these Judgments is that the period of stay starting from the grant of first order of stay till all the orders of stay are vacated would have to be excluded. Sri P. Raja Gopal Rao draws the attention of this Court to W.P.No.13970 of 1995 which had been filed by one of the affected persons in the earlier round of litigation. In this case, interim direction of stay of dispossession had been granted and the same came to be vacated only upon withdrawal of the said case on 16.09.2004. He submits that the time available for passing of the award would be 15.09.2006. Even if the period of seven days, between 23.05.1995 to 30.05.1995, is excluded, the time available for passing the award would be 07.09.2006.
33. The consistent principle, set out by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases can be summarized by noticing the following extract in State of Maharashtra v. Moti Ratan Estate, (2019) 8 SCC 552 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 182 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1149 at page 560:
6.3. In the recent decision in Raj Kumar Gandhi [Raj Kumar Gandhi v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 738] , this Court had an occasion to consider the applicability of Section 11-A of the Act. After considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the applicability of Section 11-A of the Act, this Court observed and held that where 12 (1994) 4 SCC 145 (para 2) 33 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch scheme of the acquisition is one, interim stay granted in respect of one pocket of land would operate even in respect of other pockets of land and therefore the authorities were justified in not proceeding with the acquisition proceedings and consequently the acquisition proceedings would not lapse. In the same decision, this Court has considered the earlier decisions of this Court in G. Narayanaswamy Reddy [G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261] ; Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] ; Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. [Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662] ; Hansraj H. Jain [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] ; Abhey Ram [Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421] ; and Om Parkash [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] . In Raj Kumar Gandhi [Raj Kumar Gandhi v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 738] , in which one of us (Brother Arun Mishra, J.
was a member), this Court has dealt with and considered the earlier decisions of this Court with respect to applicability of Section 11-A of the Act in paras 11, 12, 15 and 16 as under :
(Raj Kumar Gandhi case [Raj Kumar Gandhi v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 7 SCC 763 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 738] , SCC pp. 771-75) "11. In Abhey Ram [Abhey Ram v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 421] this Court has considered the extended meaning of the words "stay of the action or proceedings" and referring to various decisions, observed that any type of the orders passed by the court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. This Court has observed thus :
(SCC pp. 428-29, para 9) '9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. Union of India [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150] are obvious with reference to the quashing of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 vis-à-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the declaration under Section 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellants. We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the court has 34 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the petitioners therein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] ; Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra [Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1993) 3 SCC 634] ; Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] ; Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan [Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 SCC 662] ; G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka [G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (1991) 3 SCC 261] and Roshanara Begum v. Union of India [Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, (1986) 1 Apex Dec 6 (SC)] . The words "stay of the action or proceeding" have been widely interpreted by this Court and mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A was put in issue and the declaration under Section 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the court holds that enquiry under Section 5-A was properly conducted and the declaration published under Section 6 was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Section 5-A enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt.‟
12. In Om Parkash v. Union of India [Om Parkash v. Union of India, (2010) 4 SCC 17 : (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] , this Court as to the effect of interim stay has observed thus : (SCC p. 44, para
72) '72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the 35 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch matter by issuing declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.‟ ***
15. The learned counsel has also relied upon Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] in which this Court has opined that the Explanation to Section 11-A is in the widest possible terms and there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11. Therefore, the period of an injunction obtained by the landholder from the High Court restraining the land acquisition authorities from taking possession of the land has to be excluded in computing the period of two years. The decision is of no help to the submission espoused on behalf of the appellant. This Court in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya [Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 531] observed : (SCC p. 535, para 8) '8. The said Explanation is in the widest possible terms and, in our opinion, there is no warrant for limiting the action or proceedings referred to in the Explanation to actions or proceedings preceding the making of the award under Section 11 of the said Act. In the first place, as held by the learned Single Judge himself where the case is covered by Section 17, the possession can be taken before an award is made and we see no reason why the aforesaid expression in the Explanation should be given a different meaning depending upon whether the case is covered by Section 17 or otherwise.
On the other hand, it appears to us that Section 11-A is intended to confer a benefit on a landholder whose land is acquired after the declaration under Section 6 is made in cases covered by the Explanation. The benefit is that the award must be made within a period of two years of the declaration, failing which the acquisition proceedings would lapse and the land would revert to the landholder. In order to get the benefit of the said provision what is required, is that the landholder who seeks the benefit must not have obtained any order from a court restraining any action or proceeding in pursuance of the declaration under Section 6 of the said Act so that the Explanation covers only the cases of those landholders who do not obtain any order from a court which would delay or prevent the making of the award or taking possession of the land acquired. In our opinion, the Gujarat High Court was right in taking a similar view in the impugned judgment.‟ 36 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
16. Reliance has also been placed on Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka [Sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 4 SCC 145] .........
In the light of these principles it would have to be held that the award dated 05.08.2005 has been passed within the period of two years stipulated under Section 11-A of 1894 Act.
34. Sri V.V. Narayana, the learned counsel appearing for appellants 4 to 6 and Ms. Aiswarya Nagula, learned counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 3 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010, had contended that the entire acquisition process has to be set aside, in view of the Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.
Section 24 reads as follows:
24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,-
(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition 37 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
35. Section 24(2) of 2013 Act has been interpreted by a Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others13. After an exhaustive review of the law, the Constitution Bench had held that the acquisitions, initiated under the 1894 Act, would lapse if an award had been passed five years prior to 01.01.2024 and possession of the land had not been taken and compensation had not been paid. The Constitution Bench clarified that both conditions should be fulfilled before it can be held that the earlier acquisition has lapsed, under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act.
13
(2020) 8 SCC 129 38 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
36. The case of the appellants, in W.A.No.1162 of 2020, is that both conditions have been fulfilled as compensation was not paid and possession of the land has not been taken.
37. On account of this submission, the acquisition authorities were called upon to show that compensation had been paid and possession of the land had been taken. The learned Government Pleader for land Acquisition filed a memo, on 27.09.2024, annexing the proceedings of the Sub Collector, Vijayawada, dated 08.09.2005, the panchanama of taking possession of the land, dated 13.09.2005 and the handing over of possession proceedings, dated 13.09.2005. The papers relating to payment of compensation were also annexed to this memo.
38. The memo gives the details of the references sent to the Court of II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada in the following manner:
A) An amount of Rs.97,02,000/- is ordered to be deposited before the Hon‟ble II Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada vide cheques bearing 075056, 075057 and 075058 belonging to Kanakadurga Grameena Bank, Vijayawada (Governorpet) Branch for amounts of Rs.15,99,000/-, Rs.34,26,000/- and Rs.46,77,000/- in total Rs.97,02,000/- for the subject lands 39 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch i.e., an extent of Ac.32.34 cents. However, the same were returned due to objections.
B) Thereafter, Revised Cheques bearing 075059, 075060 and 075061 were submitted for amounts Rs.46,77,000/- in L.G.O.P.No.773/2007, Rs.34,26,000/- in L.G.O.P.No.772/2007 and Rs.15,99,000/- in L.G.O.P.No.771/2007 and the same were filed but the same were cancelled for want of revalidation. The letter dated 16.10.2007 issued by Ld.II Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada is filed herewith.
C) Thereafter, the fresh revalidated Cheques bearing 075062, 075063 and 075062 for the aforesaid amounts respectively were directed to be filed before the Ld.II Addl. District Judge, Vijayawada. However, the status regarding as to whether said cheques were credited shall be ascertained and reported after verifying the concerned Court records.
39. The statement in this memo is inconclusive on the question of whether compensation had been deposited or not. It may also be noted that compensation was sought to be deposited in the Court because the land holders are said to have refused to receive the said compensation.
40
RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
40. In the circumstances, this Court cannot come to a finding that compensation had been paid as the details of the actual payment of compensation are not available. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition however contends that compensation had been deposited but further time is needed to give out these details.
41. On the question of possession, the appellants contend that the panchanamas, mentioned above, are mere paper transactions and physical possession of the land was not taken from the appellants. In support of this contention, the appellants have produced photographs of the land along with google pictures which show that the land of the appellants remains untouched and there is no development on that land.
42. Ms. Aiswarya Nagula, learned counsel for the appellants 1 to 3 in W.A.No.1162 of 2010 would also contend that the Deputy Zonal Manager, APIIC had filed a counter affidavit on behalf of M/s. APIIC in the writ petition filed by the appellants. In this counter affidavit it was stated in paragraph 23 that the land had been handed over to M/s. APIIC and awaits future development. However, the Revenue Divisional Officer, in his counter affidavit, at paragraph 16 in page 104 of the paper book had stated that possession of the land was taken and handed over to APIIC which had developed the land with basic 41 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch infrastructure facilities and different small scale entrepreneurs had been allotted plots and are conducting business in the land. She would contend that the present state of the land makes it amply clear that no development has taken place on the land and consequently the entire contention of the respondent authorities of having taken possession of the land having developed the land would have to be rejected.
43. The question of how possession of land, under the 1894 Act, is to be taken has been the subject matter of pronouncements by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. All these pronouncements were reviewed by the Constitution Bench, in Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, at paragraphs 261 to 276. After a review of these judgments, the Constitution Bench in paragraph 366.7 had set out the mode of taking possession in the following manner.
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
44. It may also be noted that one of the Judgments referred by the Constitution Bench is the case of Velaxan Kumar Vs. Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC 325 where, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, on the basis of photographs, produced by the land holders, had held that the 42 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch possession of the land had not been taken, though panchanama proceedings that such possession was taken, were available. The Constitution Bench in, Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and Others, however, held in the following manner:
272. The decision in Velaxan Kumar [Velaxan Kumar v. Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC 325 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 599] cannot be said to be laying down the law correctly. The Court considered the photographs also to hold that the possession was not taken. Photographs cannot evidence as to whether possession was taken or not. Drawing of a panchnama is an accepted mode of taking possession. Even after re-entry, a photograph can be taken; equally, it can be taken after committing trespass. Such documents cannot prevail over the established mode of proving whether possession is taken, of lands. Photographs can be of little use, much less can they be a proof of possession. A person may re-enter for a short period or only to have photograph. That would not impinge adversely on the proceedings of taking possession by drawing panchnama, which has been a rarely recognised and settled mode of taking possession.
45. In view of the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench, this Court, which is bound by the said authoritative pronouncement, would have to hold that the possession taken under the panchanama dated 13.09.2005 would have to be accepted as taking over of possession for the purpose of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
46. As this Court would have to hold that possession has been taken, under the 1894 Act, the benefit of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is not available to the appellants.
47. However, the facts relating to W.A.Nos.1753 of 2008, W.A.No.522 of 2009 and W.A.No.125 of 2010 have certain significant differences.
43
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48. In this case, the land owner Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana had never challenged the acquisition proceedings. However, his brother had challenged the same in W.P.No.10652 of 1995 and after his demise, his children were brought on record as petitioners. The learned counsel for the appellants, in these appeals, contend that the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court would be applicable to the present case also. They contend that even if the land owner, in these set of appeals, had not challenged the acquisition proceedings, he would not be entitled to contend that the award had been passed beyond the stipulated period of two years. They contend that the stay granted in other cases would apply to him also. In addition to this contention, it is also contended that the land owner in these appeals and Sri M. Krishna Mohan, who was the petitioner in W.P.No.10652 of 1995, are brothers and had equal undivided interest in the land admeasuring Ac.5.33 cents in Sy.No.61 and Ac.11.42 cents in Sy.No.63, as they had not separated and divided the land between themselves. The order of stay, obtained by Late Sri M. Krishna Mohan in W.P.No.10652 of 1995, would enure against the land owner in this set of appeals.
49. The material papers filed in W.A.No.1753 of 2008 show that the land owner in these appeals and late Sri M. Krishna Mohan 44 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch along with their father had partitioned their property, whereby each of them was allotted certain shares of land and were put in exclusive possession of their respective shares. This partition was by way of a deed of partition, dated 27.09.1957, registered as document No.3559 of 1957 in the office of the Sub Registrar, Vijayawada. This deed of partition shows that Ac.5.33 cents of land in Sy.No.61 was split into two parts of Ac.2.66 ½ cents each and the extent of 11.42 cents of land in Sy.No.63 was split into two parts of Ac.5.71 cents each and fell to the respective shares of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana and Sri M. Krishna Mohan. The schedules attached to the partition deed show that the boundaries of these extents of land had also been fixed and described in the deed of partition.
50. The common order dated 12.08.2003, in W.P.No.10651 and 10652 of 1995 would show that late Sri M. Krishna Mohan had challenged the land acquisition proceedings in relation to Sy.Nos.61 and 63 to the extent of Ac.8.32 cents which fell to his share under the deed of partition of 1957. There was no challenge to the remaining Ac.8.32 cents in Sy.Nos.61 and 63 falling to the share of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, the owner of the land in these appeals. The stay granted in W.P.No.10651 of 1995 did not pertain to or apply to the land of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, the owner of the lands in these appeals. 45
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51. Though, there was no order of stay relating to the land owned by Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana, the question of whether the stay granted in W.P.Nos.10651 and 10652 of 1995 and in W.P.No.13970 of 1995, would be applicable to Sri M. Lakshminarayana, remains to be seen.
52. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in the Judgments stated above, had held that an order of stay available in any one of the cases was sufficient to extend time for passing of award or for publication of declaration under Section 6 on the ground that such orders raise confusion for the acquiring authorities and the forbearance of the acquiring authorities in proceeding with further steps, in relation to acquisition of a large area of land belonging to different people, due to the stay obtained by even one person, would have to be condoned and it should be treated that such forbearance would extend time against all the persons affected in that scheme of acquisition.
53. Another issue raised, in this case, was the principle that, in cases of acquisition of large parcels of land, the objections of a minority of the land holders, even if well founded, can be ignored if the majority of the land holders accept the acquisition proceedings. The ratio behind this principle, as can be abstracted from the following judgments, is that where a large extent of land is being acquired for 46 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch execution of a comprehensive project and the majority of the land holders accept the scheme, it would not be permissible to stall the entire scheme for the sake of a few landholders who are holding very little land. This is because, the entire land is needed to implement the object of the acquisition and deletion of a small part of the land would render the scheme unimplementable. Such a course of action should not be taken, even if the objections of the minority of the land holders are tenable and well founded.
54. This initial consideration of this issue appears to be by a Full Bench of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi, in the case of Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India, 14, in the following manner:
27. We, therefore, think that, in proceeding to interpret the scope of the Explanation, we should keep in mind the nature of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and the nature of the proceedings in which stay orders are obtained. So far as the first of these aspects is concerned, while it is possible for the Government to issue notifications under Section 4 in respect of each plot of land sought to be acquired, it is not feasible or practicable to do so, particularly in the context of the purpose of many of the acquisitions at the present day. It is common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as many other capital cities, vast extents are being acquired for „planned development‟ or public projects.
The acquisition is generally part of an integrated scheme or plan and, though, technically speaking, there can be no objection to individual plots being processed under Sections 5-A, 6, 9, 12, etc., particularly after the amendment of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands that at least substantial blocks of land should be dealt with together at least up to the stage of the declaration under Section 6. To give an example, if a large extent of land is to be acquired for the excavation of a canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into operation unless the whole land can be eventually made available. If even one of the landowners anywhere along the line applies to court and gets a stay of the operation of the notification under Section 4, in practical terms, the whole scheme of acquisition will fall through. It is of no consolation to say that there was no stay regarding other lands covered by the 14 AIR 1987 Del 239 47 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch scheme. To compel the Government to proceed against the other lands (by refusing the benefit of the Explanation in such a case on the ground that there is no stay order in respect thereof) would only result in waste of public expenditure and energy. If, ultimately, the single owner succeeds in establishing a vitiating element in the Section 4 notification and in getting it quashed by the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of acquisition will fail and the Government will have to retrace the steps they may have taken in respect of other lands (see Shenoy & Co. v. CTO [(1985) 2 SCC 512 : AIR 1985 SC 621] and A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur [(1986) 2 SCC 709 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 249 : AIR 1986 SC 1440] ). Assuming that where such final order is by a High Court the position is not free from difficulty, the debate as to whether, in law, the quashing of the order enures only to the benefit of the party who filed the writ petition and obtained the order is futile, for the moment the Government seeks to enforce the acquisition against the others, they would come up with similar petitions which cannot but be allowed. In other words, in many of the present day notifications, the acquisition scheme is an integral one and the stay or quashing of any part thereof is a stay or quashing of the whole. This aspect should not be lost sight of.
28. It is true that the object of having contiguity of all plots sought to be acquired may fail for various reasons. For instance, there may be items of properties exempt from acquisition in between. Again, it may happen that a particular person may have been able to stave off acquisition of his land for one reason or other, particularly since dates of declarations under Section 6, awards and taking of possession may vary from plot to plot. Moreover, it is not in all cases that the object of acquisition needs a number of contiguous plots and may be workable even without some of the intervening lands. However, in considering a question of interpretation, one should not go only by one particular situation but must consider all eventualities to the extent possible. It is only on a broad perspective of the scheme of present day acquisitions in large measure that we say that any hurdle in regard to any one plot of land can hold up an entire acquisition, all promptness and expedition on the part of the Government notwithstanding.
55. The ratio of the judgment of the Full bench, was approved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Om Parkash v. Union of India, 15, after extracting the above passage and other parts of the judgment, in the following manner:
15
(2010) 4 SCC 17 48 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch
70. Perusal of the opinion of the Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I [Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Del 239] would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the word "any" in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in one case of landowners to be automatically extended to all those landowners, whose lands are covered under the notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or not as regards their lands. The logic assigned by the Full Bench, the relevant portions whereof have been reproduced hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper.
72. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted in one of the matters of the landowners would put complete restraint on the respondents to have proceeded further to issue notification under Section 6 of the Act. Had they issued the said notification during the period when the stay was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for committing contempt of court. The language employed in the interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely restrained the respondents from proceeding further in the matter by issuing declaration/notification under Section 6 of the Act.
56. This judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Om Parkash v. Union of India, was followed in Raj Kumar Gandhi Vs. State (UT OF CHANDIGARH) 16and State Of Maharashtra Vs. Moti Ram Estate17, essentially approving the ratio of the Full Bench decision of the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi.
57. In the present case, there is one significant departure which needs to be considered. The acquisition proceedings had been initiated for acquisition of Ac.152.00 cents of land in various survey numbers of Kanuru Village. The said acquisition was initiated by way of a common notification issued under Section 4(1) of 1894 of the Act. Thereafter, some of the land owners had approached the Court and obtained 16 (2018) 7 SCC 763 17 (2019) 8 SCC 552 49 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch orders of stay on 30.05.1995. After receipt of these orders, the acquisition authorities had not stopped acquisition proceedings, in relation to all the land, under the said notification. They went ahead with acquisition of those lands which were not the subject matter of W.P.Nos.13970 of 1995, W.P.No.10651 of 1995 and W.P.No.10652 of 1995. The Acquisition Authority had acquired all the remaining land by passing an award dated 12.05.1996. Thereafter, possession of the land was taken and handed over to M/s. APIIC. The said land was utilized for creating an automobile industrial area. The sketch plan of the land under acquisition shows that the land of the land owners, covered under the present cases were to one side and in a corner. It appears that the authorities, went ahead with the acquisition of the remaining 115.94 acres as they were able to make a layout, even without the remaining land of 32.34 Acres, which is the subject matter of the present cases. The google pictures, filed by the parties to this litigation, including the acquisition authorities, show that the land, admeasuring 115.94 acres, has been fully developed and built up while the land of 32.34 acres remains untouched.
58. In these circumstances, it cannot be held that the authorities had held their hands, on account of the orders of stay obtained in the three writ petitions mentioned above, in relation to land 50 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch belonging to persons who had not moved these writ petitions. Having acquired all the other lands, it would not be open to the acquisition authorities to contend that they had not acquired the land of Sri M. Lakshmi Narayana on account of the orders passed in the above three writ petitions. Further, the purpose of acquisition was not affected by the stay of dispossession, given to the land holders of these lands, as M/s APIIC went ahead with the development of the layout and establishment of the Automobile industrial area because the remaining land was to one side of the entire extent and the industrial area could be developed even without the remaining land. Consequently, the ratio of the judgments cited by Sri Rajagopal Rao would not be applicable.
59. The learned Single Judge had, after taking into consideration the Judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court which stipulated that period of stay in any one matter was sufficient to extend period of exclusion, held that the said Judgments would not be relevant for the present case in as much as other lands, which had been notified under the same notification had been acquired.
60. We are in agreement with this view of the learned Single Judge and do not find any reason to uphold the award, dated 05.08.2005, as it has been passed beyond the time stipulated under Section 11 A of the 1894 Act.
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61. For all the aforesaid reasons, all the Writ Appeals are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
________________________ R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J ______________ HARINATH.N,J RJS 52 RRR,J & HN,J W.A.No.1161 of 2010 & batch HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO & HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE HARINATH.N WRIT APPEAL Nos.1753 of 2008, 522 of 2009, 125 of 2010, 1161 of 2010 and 1162 of 2010 Dt: 03.10.2024 RJS