HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH A.F.R. Court No. - 28 Case :- HABEAS CORPUS No. - 381 of 2014 Petitioner :- Jagdish Singh @ Dhakku Singh Throu. Friend Rana Pratap Singh Respondent :- Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of Home Suraksha And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar Singh,R.P. Mishra Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate,A.S.G.,Ajay Kumar Singh with Case :- HABEAS CORPUS No. - 378 of 2014 Petitioner :- Udai Bhan Singh Throu His Next Friend-Rana Pratap Singh Respondent :- Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of Home Suraksha And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar Singh,K.K.Pandey,Rajendra Prasad Mishra Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate,A.S.G. with Case :- HABEAS CORPUS No. - 379 of 2014 Petitioner :- Udai Bhan Singh Throu His Next Friend-Rana Pratap Singh Respondent :- Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of Home Suraksha And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar Singh,R.P. Mishra Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate,A.S.G. with Case :- HABEAS CORPUS No. - 382 of 2014 Petitioner :- Janak Kumar Singh Throu Friend Rana Pratap Singh Respondent :- Union Of India Throu Secy.Ministry Of Home Suraksha And Ors. Counsel for Petitioner :- Sushil Kumar Singh,R.P. Mishra Counsel for Respondent :- Govt.Advocate,A.S.G.,Ajay Kumar Singh,Pawan Kr. Tiwari Hon'ble Arvind Kumar Tripathi,J.
Hon'ble Raghvendra Kumar,J.
1- Heard Shri R.P. Mishra, Advocate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr.Rajendra Kumar Dwivedi , learned A.G.A. on behalf of the State, Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi, Senior Advocate assisted by learned counsel Mr. K.K.Pandey, Mr. Ajai Kumar Singh, Senior C.G. Counsel on behalf of Union of India and perused the record. .
2- The present Habeas Corpus petition connected with abovenoted three Habeas Corpus Petitions No.378/14, No.379/14 and No.382/14 have been preferred against the detention order dated 30.9.2014 passed under section 3(5) of The National Security Act, 1980, on the basis of incident dated 24.6.2014, holding Prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. In all petitions grounds are the same, hence all the facts are being considered and decided jointly by a common order.
3- The detention order as well as continued detention have been challenged on the grounds
1.That there is no live and link in between the incident and detention order, hence ground is stale.
2. There is delay in sending the representation to the Central Government.
3. That it was a case against individual due to enmity, hence it was a case of law and order and not a public order.
4- Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that from a perusal of the record, the incident took place on 24.6.2014 and petitioner was sent to the judicial custody on 29.6.2014. The detention order was passed on 30.9.2014 i.e. after three months of the incident, hence there was no live and link in the incident and as such detention order itself is liable to be quashed.
5- Regarding delay in forwarding the representation, he submitted that the representation against the detention order was given to the Jail Authority on 9.10.2014 which was transmitted by the Jail Authority to the District Magistrate Hardoi. According to counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government it was received in concerned section of Central Government on 28.10.2014. In case of Jagdish Singh @ Dhakku Singh and Janak Singh and in case of Dharam Pal Singh and Udai Bhan Singh on 29.10.2014 but delay has not been properly explained in the counter affidavit and as such on this ground continued detention of the petitioner is illegal and is liable to be quashed.
6- Regarding third ground, that it is a case of law and order and not public order, he has submitted that from a perusal of the ground of detention it is clear that due to enmity in between two family members, the offence was committed at the door of the complainant on 24.6.2014 and whatever effect of the incident was that was only for a short period, the situation was controlled and no public order was affected, even in the village where the incident took place. It was a case of solitary incident against individual and as such in view of the fact the detention order is liable to be quashed which is non application of mind.
7- Learned counsel for the petitioners relied the following judgments:
Sanawwar Vs. State of U.P. and others, LCrR 1993 page 67 decided on September 10, 1992:
"18 We have noticed earlier that the detention of the petitioner has been based on sole incident of murder two persons in the Jungle. The alleged threatening to the witnesses in the same case and the allegation that villagers were fleeing do not amount to breach of maintenance of public order. It was individual act of the petitioner and his associates against individual and the same could not be said to be the grounds of such nature as to lead to any apprehension that the even tempo of the community at large would be endangered by this incident.
19. The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the pubic order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the Act upon the society. The test is whether it leads to disturbance of even tempo and current of life of the community so as to amount a disturbance of public order or does it affect merely an individual without affecting the tranquility of the society."
Islamuddin Vs. The State, L.Cr.R. 1991 page 27 "4.The main contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri Virendra Bhatia, is that the incident, which is the basis of the order of detention, cannot be said to relate to 'Public Order' and that it related to "law and order" with the result that the petitioners could not have been detained under the provisions of the National Security Act under, which detention of a person can be ordered to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to "Public Order".
32. In view of the above we are clearly of the opinion that merely because the incident had taken place at 10-30 in the morning and that too in a congested locality on a public street it could not be treated to have disturbed the public order as the solitary incident was the outcome of personal enmity. The assault was committed against two persons, namely Aman Ilahi and Ahsan IIahi who were done to death. No other person was sought to be assaulted. The incident was directed against the members of the same community for the reason that the deceased had failed to deliver possession to the assailants on a shop and a plot of land. The incident had no potentiality for the disturbance of public order.
2012(1) JIC 681(SC) Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima Vs. State of Manipur & Ors.
"9. In support of his submissions, Mr. Parikh firstly referred to the decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Paul Manickam & Anr. [(2003) 8 SCC 342], wherein while considering the delay in disposal of a representation in the matter of preventive detention, this Court noticed that when the detenu was already in custody, the anticipated and apprehended acts were practical impossibilities, as was the case as far as the Appellant's husband is concerned. This Court further observed that as far as the question relating to the procedure to be adopted in case the detenu is already in custody is concerned, the detaining authorities would have to apply their minds and show their awareness in this regard in the grounds of detention. The necessity of keeping such person in detention under preventive detention laws have to be clearly indicated. It was further observed that the subsisting custody of the detenu by itself does not invalidate an order of his preventive detention and the decision in this regard has to depend on the facts of each case. However, preventive detention being necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or economic stability, ordinarily it is not needed when the detenu is already in custody and the detaining authority must be reasonably satisfied with cogent materials that there is likelihood of his release and in view of his antecedent activities which are proximate in point of time, he must be detained in order to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activities.
13. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the extra-ordinary powers of detaining an individual in contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitution was not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds of detention do not disclose any material which was before the detaining authority, other than the fact that there was every likelihood of Yumman Somendro being released on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, to support the order of detention. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except, according to procedure established by law. In the instant case, although the power is vested with the concerned authorities, unless the same are invoked and implemented in a justifiable manner, such action of the detaining authority cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, such a detention order is an exception to the provisions of Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution.
14. When the Courts thought it fit to release the Appellant's husband on bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested, the mere apprehension that he was likely to be released on bail as a ground of his detention, is not justified. In addition to the above, the FIRs in respect of which the Appellant's husband had been arrested relate to the years 1994, 1995 and 1998 respectively, whereas the order of detention was passed against him on 31st January, 2011, almost 12 years after the last FIR No.190(5)98 IPS under Section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. There is no live link between the earlier incidents and the incident in respect of which the detention order had been passed.
15. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature by this Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most precious and prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rights under criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention, which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as well as upon a proper appreciation of the facts as to whether such acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security of the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order, warranting the issuance of such an order. An individual incident of an offence under the Indian Penal Code, however heinous, is insufficient to make out a case for issuance of an order of preventive detention.
16. In our view, the detaining authority acted rather casually in the matter in issuing the order of detention and the High Court also appears to have missed the right to liberty as contained in Article 21 of the Constitution and Article 22(2) thereof, as well as the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure."
2004(2) JIC 116 (All) Ram Bharose Yadav Vs. District Magistrate, Deoria & Ors "6. We have given thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions. In our opinion, disturbance of this nature in such incidents are common in any area where they take place. There does not appear any disturbance to the public order of some lasting endure. It has no where been stated that the incident caused any Chakka jam, etc. organised by the public to show their repugnance to such an occurrence. Public order in itself is a phenomenon, which requires some substantive disturbance, in the even tempo of the life of the society. In the region or in whole of the township where such an incident takes place, a temporary disturbance, as a consequence to these incidents, is a normal phenomenon and is most likely to occur. The shorter the life of such disturbance is the lower would be the degree of its potential to disturb the even tempo of the life of the society. This is one serious criterion to differentiate or to draw a wedge between the public order and the law and order. The mere allegation in the General Diary etc. that police force including Circle Officer and S.P. arrived at the spot soon after the occurrence is not sufficient indication of any serious disturbance to the public order. This is a routine and normal practice that senior officers do arrive at the scene of occurrence to supervise the investigation. Therefore, this mere fact does not lead to the conclusion that the incident had any potentiality to disturb the public order or the even tempo of the social life of the concerned area. Nothing serious has been pointed out except the above said fact to disturb the public order. At least no such incident was brought on record otherwise to amplify any such circumstance. We, therefore, see no force in the contention raised by learned A.G.A. In our opinion, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner has sufficient force and is accordingly accepted. From the facts it is evident that while passing the detention order the detaining authority lacked an application of mind to the facts and circumstances brought before him.
8- Learned A.G.A. vehemently opposed the aforesaid prayer and submitted that it was a day light incident in which four persons received injuries, out of which one person died in way to the hospital. Due to the incident in question the terror was created at the place of the incident and in the village and to control the situation additional force was summoned from other Police Station and even P.A.C. was deployed. Not only they fired causing injuries to the four injured but when other villagers reached and challenged them they threatened to kill the entire members of the family they continued to fire and left the place of occurrence. Hence whether it is a public order or law and order has to be examined on the basis of potentiality of the act and in the present case, it is clear that the same has affected, even tempo of the society and as such it was clear case of breach of 'public order'.
9- Learned A.G.A. relied the following judgment:
State of U.P. and another Vs. Sanjai Pratap Gupta @ Pappu and others (2004) 8 Supreme Court Cases 591 "7.The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order. 'Public order' has a narrower ambit, and public order could be affected by only such contravention which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of the degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. It is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror wave unleashed by a particular eruption of disorder that helps to distinguish it as an act affecting 'public order' from that concerning 'law and order'. The question to ask is: "Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed"? This question has to be faced in every case on its facts.
8. "Public order" is what the French call 'ordre publique' and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current life of the community so as to amount to disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed? (See Kanu Biswas v. State of W.B.)
9. 'Public Order', 'law and order' and the 'security of the State' fictionally draw three concentric circles, the largest representing law and order, the next representing public order and the smallest representing security of the State. Every infraction of law must necessarily affect order, but an act affecting law and order may not necessarily also affect the public order. Likewise, an act may affect public order, but not necessarily the security of the State. The true test is not the kind, but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This does not mean that there can be no overlapping, in the sense that an act cannot fall under two concepts at the same time. An act, for instance, affecting public order may have an impact that it would affect both public order and the security of the State. (See Kishori Mohan Bera v. The State of West Bengal, Pushkar Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal, Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal and Nagendra Nath Mondal v. State of West Bengal)
10. The distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been pointed out succinctly in Arun Ghosh case. According to that decision the true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is "one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question upon society". The Court pointed out that "An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ but in its potentiality it may be very different". (See Babul Mitra alias Anil Mitra v. State of West Bengal and Milan Banik v. State of West Bengal).
11. The true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different.
12. The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and unorganized crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. Law and order represents the largest scale within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents the security of State. "Law and order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "public order" just as "public order" comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State". (See Kuso Sah v. The State of Bihar, Harpreet Kaur v. State of Maharashtra, T.K. Gopal v. State of Karnataka and State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub.)
13. The stand that a single act cannot be considered sufficient for holding that public order was affected is clearly without substance. It is not the number of acts that matters. What has to be seen is the effect of the act on even tempo of life, the extent of its reach upon society and its impact.
14. From the grounds of detention it is apparent that the same was not a law and order situation but a public order situation as rightly contended by learned counsel for the State. Relevant portion of the grounds of detention reads as follows:
"From the letter of the Superintendent of Police Mainpuri and the report of Incharge of the Police Station Kotwali Mainpuri annexed with report of the Additional Superintendent of Police, Mainpuri and from the records annexed therewith, this is evident that you are a person of criminal tendency and in collaboration with your associates, and by creating fear and terror on the force of illegal arms, realize forcibly and illegally money from the traders and property-dealers, you by use of criminal force, by indulging in mar-peet (physical assault) and by resorting to other criminal acts are habitual to commit crime by terrorizing that person whoever opposes these increasing criminal activities, fear and terror psychosis has gripped the minds of the common public. In this very backdrop you for establishing your hegemony, while going on a scooter, along with your other associates on 13.10.2002 at 11.00 a.m. in the busiest market of town Mainpuri, near the Bada Chauraha (crossing) in front of the Shafi Hotel on the road itself and in the day time, stopped Shri Anand Kumar Jain, property dealer and by firing bullets indiscriminately committed his heinous murder in a planned manner. When, at the time of the commission of this criminal act deceased's son Ajai Kumar Jain wanted to save his father, you fired aiming at him who any how or other saved himself by fleeing away.
Nobody dared, in the said busy market who could save the deceased from you and your associates. Consequent on the resorting by you and your associates to the firing publicly and the show of your criminal force, the atmosphere of fear and terror was created in the entire market. On account of the firing resorted to in busy market and the show of your criminal force therein, pandemonium prevailed among the visiting people who fled away and hid themselves in safe places. The entire market became empty and the public order was totally breached. The dead body of the deceased remained lying on the road and bleeding continued profusely. A very awful scene was created. Nobody dared to approach the dead body of the deceased. The deceased's son Ajai Kumar Jain by saving his life anyhow or other, fled away and informed the Kotwali Mainpuri about this murder case and the occurrence and lodged a written report with Police Station, whereupon the first information report was recorded at 11.45 a.m. on the basis of which Crime No.1475/2002 was registered under Section 307/302 of the Indian Penal Code. The particulars of this crime were recorded in brief in the General Diary at Report No.22 at 11.45 a.m. True copies of the FIR and report of the G.D. are annexed herewith as Annexures 1 and 2."
10- Learned A.G.A. further submitted that though there was tension in the area before detention order was passed, however, action could not be taken earlier because the petitioners were in judicial custody. As soon as when the bail application was moved before the court of sessions and there was possibility of being released on bail, only then detention order was passed on 30.9.2014.
11- He further contended that considering the impact of the incident, which affected even tempo of the society and the fact that he was in judicial custody, there is no delay in passing the detention order. However, when there was possibility of release on bail then detention order was passed, and the detention order was served through Jail Authority.
12- In respect of third ground regarding delay in sending the representation to the Central Government it was submitted that though in the counter affidavit no complete details has been placed on behalf of the District Magistrate. However, from original record it is clear that the representation was submitted by the petitioner to Jail Authority on 9.1-0.2014 and report was called for from S.P. Hardoi on 10.10.2014 for preparation of parawise comments before sending to the Central Government, State Government and Advisory Board for consideration of the representation. The police report sent by S.P. Hardoi was received with letter dated 14.10.2014. Thereafter parawise comments was prepared on 16.10.2014 which was finally dispatched through speed post on 17.10.2014 to the Central Government. Hence there is no delay in sending the representation to the Central Government.
13- Considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties.
14- In the present case the detention order under section 3(5) of the National Security act, 1980 was passed by the District Magistrate, Hardoi against all the above-noted four petitioners on 30.9.6.2014. The incident took place on 24.6.2014. The detention order was approval by the State Government on 10.10.2014. After report of the Advisory Board the detention order was confirmed for a period of 12 months from the date of detention i.e. 30.9.2014. The representation have been rejected by the Central Government as well as by the State Government.
15- The first ground of challenge is that the ground is stale as there is delay in passing the detention order. There is no fixed period within which period, the Detention order has to be passed after the incident. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. What is effect of the incident and period for which tension is prevailing in and around the area and if it is found by the detaining authority that due to act of the detenue, 'even tempo of the society was affected the detention order can be passed. However, if detenue is in judicial custody, no preventive action has to be taken unless there is possibility of release on bail and further that after release on bail the Detenue would indulged in similar activity prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order, otherwise the preventive action would become punitive. In the present case the detention order was passed after three months but after bail application was moved before the court of sessions. The application was placed before him and if he was satisfied that there was possibility of release in near future and after release on bail the detenue would further indulge in similar activities, prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order, then preventive action can be taken by passing the detention order. However, in the present case whether rightly the Detention order was passed after three months, will be considered alongwith third point raised by the counsel for the petitioners.
16- In the present case, according to police report situation was controlled and was maintained, then he left the village for search of the assailants. Further as per report tension was prevailing in the village for 3-4 days. The petitioners were already in jail.
17- The second ground is regarding delay in sending the representation to the Central Government though the delay has not been explained in the counter affidavit, however, original record of the District Magistrate was summoned. Admittedly the representation was handed over by the petitioner to Jail Authority on 09.10.2014 and the same was received in the office of District Magistrate, Hardoi and on 10.10.2014, the police report was called for. Whether parawise comment is required for disposal of the representation or not, normally it has to be decided by the authority concerned, who has to examine and decide the representation, but to avoid delay, as as per direction of the authorities concerned the representation are being forwarded to the State Government, Central Government and Advisory Board with parawise comments. Normally the parawise comments are necessary for proper disposal of the representation but the representation has not to be withheld for a long period and there should not be unnecessary delay in forwarding the representation to the concerned authority to whom the representation have been addressed. If there is delay at any stage in disposal of the representation the same has to be explained.
18- In the present case the report was called for on 10.10.2014 from the S.P. Hardoi which was received in the office of District Magistrate with letter dated 14.10.2014 of the S.P. Hardoi. Thereafter parawise comments was prepared on 16.10.2014 which was sent to the Central Government on 17.10.2014 through speed post. It is well settled that normally speed post is one of the fast mode of communication and service. According to counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government, the representation received by the Central Government was dispatched on 17.10.2014. Hence in view of the fact, it cannot be said that there was unreasonable delay in forwarding the representation.
19- Third and first ground raised are whether it is law and order or 'public order' and whether ground of detention is stale. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The same offence committed at a different situation and at different place, will have an different impact on the society. Even the case of the murder due to personal enmity and personal grudge may not be a case of breach of public order. However, merely a slapping or speech to Disturb communal harmony may be a case of breach of public order which affected the even the tempo of the society.
20- For example if a man slapped other person at a public place due to some altercation that will be a case of 'law and order' problem and not a problem 'public order'. However, if a person slap to a person of different community, especially during religious function or in the area where communal tension was prevailing that shall affect the peace and tranqulity of the society at large. However, if a person slaps to a member of B.S.F./personnel of Arms Forces who was on duty at the boarder(L.O.C.), then that may will affect the security of the State. This controversy have been considered and decided in numerous judgment by the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court. The expression 'law and order' is wider in scope as it always affects 'order', but 'Public Order' has a narrower ambit, which could be affected by the such activities which affects community or the public at large. 'Public Order' is synonymous with 'Public safety and tranquility. Hence 'Public Order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the State as a whole or even a specified area or locality.
21- The distinction between the 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree, impact and the reach of the activity/act, in question, on society. So it is the potentiality of the act in question to disturb tempo of life of the community/society, which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the 'Public Order' Qualitatively the acts which affect 'Law and Order' are not different from the acts which affect 'Public Order'. If the effects of the act in question is confined only to an individual and its family, directly involved, it would be problem of 'law and order' . However, if the acts complained of, affected the even tempo of the society it would be a problem of 'Public Order' 22- In case of Aram Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, AIR 1970 SC 1228, it was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that it is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of 'Public Order' and that if the contravention in its effect is confirmed only to a few individual directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the Public, it would raise a problem of 'law and order' only.
23- Hence in view of the aforesaid discussion effect of each acts in question has to be considered and decided on the basis of fact and circumstances of each case.
24- In the present case accordingly to the ground of detention on 24.6.2014, when the informant Shatrughan Singh alongwith his brother Udai Bhan Singh, nephew Amar Bahadur, Ram, Pratap Singh, Ajay Pratap Singh were sitting at the door and having some conversation at that time, due to village 'parti- bandi; with pre plan, Raj Kumar Singh with licensed DBBL gun Guddu Singh with country made pistol, Janak Singh with single barrel gun, Rana Pratap with country made pistol, Dharampal and Udai Bhan having lathi, Jagdish Singh alias Dhakku Singh armed with country made pistol(Addhi) came at about 2.00 P.M. They abused and exhorted to kill and they started firing causing grevious injuries to Udai Pratap Singh, Amar Bahadur, Rana Pratap and Ajay Pratap Singh. When Kallu and Rajpal of the same village dared to challenge, they threatened to finish the entire family, again they fired and left the place of the occurrence. Subsequently Amar Bahadur succumbed to injuries. Due to firing people started running helter-skelter to take shelter and closed their doors. The peace and tranquility of the society was affected . The additional force was deployed to control the situation and there was tension for 3-4 days in the area, hence it is clear that there was tension only for 3-4 days.
25- According to police when the situation was controlled, peace was maintained then Sub Inspector left the place of the incident to search and apprehended the assailants. Though it was a case against individual due to enmity but even if there was any tension and effect of the incident has affected the tempo of the society that was temporary for short period.. Offience was committed in a pre planned and organised manner due to village parti bandi, but in the present case two accused were released on. No preventive action was taken against them and 'Detention order' was passed after three months against the petitioners who were in jail, though in the present case seven persons were involved in the incident in question. There was no material before the Detaining Authority to show that the tension was prevailing in the area and after release they would indulge in similar activities prejudicial to the maintenance of 'Public Order'. Hence even if the acts in question affected the peace of the society, that was for a short period. There was no live and link in between the act in question and Detention order,, Hence it was not a fit case to take preventive action on the basis of incident in question.
26- In view of the aforesaid discussion all the four impugned Detention orders dated 30.9.2014 passed by District Magistrate, Hardoi under section 3(5) of the National Security Act, 1980 against the petitioners are hereby quashed.
27- Accordingly the present petition and abovenoted three connected petitions, are hereby allowed. No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 1.9.2015 RK