HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Court No. - 28 Case :- WRIT - C No. - 56 of 2007 Petitioner :- Chief Engineer (Distribution), Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Respondent :- Presiding Officer, Labour Court And Others Petitioner Counsel :- Rajendra Kumar Mishra Respondent Counsel :- C.S.C.,Satish Chaturvedi Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. The respondent no.2 - workman is an employee of Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., which is having its own identity, and financial liability ultimately falls upon it, but he has chosen not to approach this Court, therefore, objection was raised on behalf of petitioner workman regarding maintainability of the writ petition.
2. Looking to the nature of the dispute, I am not entering into this controversy, since, in my view, the matter can be considered on merit and decided, hence I proceed to consider the matter and decide it.
3. The writ petition is directed against the order dated 11.10.2006 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court - (IV), Kanpur in Misc. Case No.69 of 2005 under Section 33 - C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) accepting the claim of the respondent - workman Daya Shanker Sharma for reimbursement of medical expenses to the tune of Rs.2,06,500/- in respect of treatment relating to heart ailment, which he has undergone at Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur between 2.7.2003 to 23.7.2003.
4. Heard Shri Rajendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Sanjay Kumar Pandey, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-workman.
5. Shri Rajendra Kumar Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur was not approved medical hospital for the purposes of medical reimbursement in view of Office Memorandum dated 24.5.1978 and hence, the expenses incurred thereat were not permissible to be reimbursed and the labour court has acted illegally in allowing the claim of respondent - workman, in this regard.
6. It is not in dispute that there is no limit with respect to medical reimbursement in respect to respondent - workman. Regarding quantum of amount also there is no dispute. If the workman had incurred the expenses to the tune allowed by the labour court, the same were payable to him provided it is reimbursable. The seriousness of the ailment of the workman is also not disputed. It is an admitted position that during the aforesaid period the workman was implanted with pace maker and thereafter, he had to undergo heart surgery at Escort Medical Research Centre, New Delhi. The expenses incurred by the workman at New Delhi have been reimbursed, since Escort Medical Research Centre, New Delhi is in the approved list of the petitioner.
7. From a perusal of the medical report, it appears that on 1.7.2003 when the petitioner suffered serious heart problem. He was admitted at Lakshmi Devi Kisan Chand Hospital, Kanpur, which is an approved hospital in the list of the petitioner. The medical officer thereat after providing the workman initial treatment found that the respondent - workman may not be given appropriate treatment in the said hospital due to lack of facilities, and, therefore, referred him to the Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur or Institute of Cardiology, which is a department of Cardiology of G.S.V.M. College, Kanpur. Pursuant to the aforesaid reference, the workman was admitted at Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur where he was advised for implantation of pace maker immediately for protection of his life. He had to undergo heart surgery at Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur. He was released on 21.7.2003 from the said hospital. Thereafter, in August, 2003 the respondent - workman again suffered heart problem and was admitted at Escort Medical Research Centre, New Delhi where he underwent treatment i.e. Heart Surgery from 2.8.2003 to 16.8.2003, which expenses have been reimbursed by the petitioner.
8. The only ground of challenge is that Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur is unapproved, hence reimbursement is not permissible in view of para 2 of office memorandum, which reads as under: -
"(2) The reimbursement shall be admissible for the Board's officers/officials and their dependant family members (which includes wholly dependant wife/husband, legitimate children and step children but excludes husband/wife already in service and married daughters) in cases of hospitalization, including maternity cases, at the State Government Hospitals, Medical Colleges/Institutes in U.P. and at other Medical Hospital as may be specified by the Board from time to time, irrespective of the place of posting."
9. A perusal of office memorandum shows that it does not cover the situation where an employee is admitted in a Hospital/Medical Colleges/Institutes of the State Government or State of U.P. or in other medical hospitals on the approved list of the employer and therefrom is referred to another medical institution or hospital for specialized treatment. In respect to the institution out side the State where specialized medical treatment is not available in the State of U.P. Para 3 provides that such medical treatment can be availed by the employee concerned but reimbursement shall be made from an officer not below the rank of Chief Medical Officer of the State Government or professor of Medical College/Institute in the State certify that the treatment facility is not available in the State. However, there is no provision, which contemplates a situation, where medical institution/hospital in respect whereof medical reimbursement is permissible, itself refers an employee to another medical institute/hospital, which is not on the list to provide specialized medical treatment for lack of treatment facilities in its own hospital. In absence of any provision covering such situation, in my view, reasonable purposive interpretation has to be given to the provision pertaining to medical reimbursement, since these provisions are for the welfare of the employee. It is well settled that welfare legislation has to be given wider interpretation and ought to be construed, to the extent, it is possible in favour of the employee concerned.
10. Justice KrishnaIyer speaking for the Court in The Authorised Officer, Thanjavur and another v. S. Naganatha Ayyar, 1979 (3) SCC 466 said that when the Judges decode social legislation, it must be animated by the goal oriented approach. His Lordship also said that in this country in the country the judiciary is not a mere umpire, as some assume, but an activist catalyst in the constitutional scheme.
11. In Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, JT (2010) 1 SC 598 Apex Court in para 42 has said "the Judges of this Court are not mere phonographic recorders but are empirical social scientists and the interpreters of the social context in which they work. Thus, social justice, the very signature tune of our Constitution and being deeply embedded in our Constitutional ethos in a way is the arch of the Constitution, which ensures rights of the common man to be interpreted in the meaningful way so that life can be lived with human dignity."
12. In Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ajay Agarwal, 2010 (3) SCC 765 it said "it is a well known canon of construction that when the court is called upon to interpret provisions of a social welfare legislation paramount duty of the court is to adopt such an interpretation as to further the purposes of law and if possible eschew the one which frustrates it."
13. In Workman of American Express International Banking Corporation v. Management of American Express International Banking Corporation, 1985 (4) SCC 71 they said 'the principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights' legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognized and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the 'colour' then the 'content' and the 'context' of such constitutes. The law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic consideration. Any interpretation after socio welfare of necessity receives as broad interpretation. Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of 'bread and butter" statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation.'
14. In Dalco Engineering Private Ltd. v. shree Satish Prabhakar Padhye and others, JT (2010) 3 SCC 450 the Court said that the socio economic legislation should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that the Courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal statutes, and taxing statutes.
15. It is true that in giving such interpretation and construing the provision, the flexibility can be read and allowed only to the extent it is within the frame of language of relevant provision and there should not be any violence with it. Any interpretation, which by no stretch of imagination, may be included within the relevant provision, cannot be attributed or read even by applying the principle of liberal construction in a welfare legislation. This is a limit or caution, which the Court has to keep in mind while construing the socio economic statute.
16. In para 2 of the office memorandum in question I find that the interpretation of meaning 'reimbursement' assuming thereto is not inconsistent to the said office memorandum and since this is the view, which has been taken by the labour court, I find no reason to interfere with the aforesaid order.
17. Respondent - workman, in his written statement, has specifically pleaded that since he was admitted at Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur under the reference made by the recognized and approved hospital Lakshmi Devi Kisan Chand Hospital, Kanpur and, therefore, his treatment at Escort Heart Centre, Kanpur ought to be treated as having been administered at Lakshmi Devi Kisan Chand Hospital, Kanpur, which was approved. In this regard, nothing has been placed before this Court. On the contrary, the theme song of petitioner is only that the hospital, not being approved, no reimbursement is permissible.
18. The labour court has recorded a finding of fact to the following effect: -
"bu lHkh rF;ksa dks ns[krs gq, eSa bl er dk gwWa fd tc lsok;kstd ls ekU;rk izkIr vLirky ds MkDVj us oknh dh chekjh gkyr dks ns[krs gq, mls LdkVZ gkVZ lsUVj dks jsQj fd;k gS D;ksafd LdkVZ gkVZ lsUVj fof'k"V chekjh ds fy, gS oknh dk bykt ogha gks ldrk Fkk oknh ds bykt dh ftEesnkjh lsok;kstd dh gSA"
19. This finding of fact has not been challenged by the petitioner, as no averment to this effect, in the entire writ petition, has been shown by the petitioner.
20. In the circumstances, in my view, the claim of the petitioner does not go in the teeth of the office memorandum. Also it is an admitted position that the workman was seriously ill and needed immediate help. He actually had got medical treatment of an ailment of very serious nature.
21. In the circumstances, in exercise of my equitable extraordinary jurisdiction power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, I find no reason, justification or even equity to interfere with the impugned order dated11.10.2006.
22. However, this Court cannot leave this matter at this, but to observe that medical reimbursement of certain expenses actually incurred by the workman eight years back are yet unpaid, the reason of litigation by petitioner employer. On a sheer technical ground knowing it well and admitting factual position that the workman has suffered serious heart problem for which he had undergone requisite treatment in the specialized hospital meant for the purpose.
23. This attempt, on the part of the petitioner, is nothing but victimisation so as to harass this poor employee.
24. Hence the writ petition is dismissed with an exemplary cost, which I determine to Rs.50,000/- (Rs. Fifty Thousand Only).
25. It is stated at the bar that the reimbursement of an amount of Rs.2,06,500/- directed to be paid by the labour court has not yet been paid. The aforesaid amount shall be paid with interest at the rate of 10% from the date of award dated 11.10.2006 till the date of actual payment.
26. Dismissed as above. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Order Date :- 16.4.2011 Anupam