Recently, the Supreme Court held that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest elections is a fundamental right, while restoring the validity of eligibility conditions prescribed under cooperative bye-laws. The Court made it clear that electoral participation in cooperative bodies is entirely governed by statute and can be reasonably regulated, observing that such rights “exist only to the extent conferred by statute.”
Brief Facts:
The case arose from a challenge to certain bye-laws framed under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001, which prescribed eligibility conditions for contesting elections to the Board of Directors of District Milk Unions. These bye-laws imposed criteria such as minimum operational activity and performance benchmarks for member societies. A batch of writ petitions questioned their validity, leading a Single Judge, and later a Division Bench, of the High Court to strike them down as ultra vires. The Appellants, who were not parties to the original proceedings but were directly affected, approached the Apex Court through a civil appeal, contesting both the maintainability of the writ petitions and the legality of the High Court’s findings.
Contentions of the Appellant:
The Appellants argued that the writ petitions were not maintainable as the dispute related to internal governance and electoral processes of cooperative societies, which are not “State” under Article 12. The Counsel submitted that the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001, provides a complete statutory mechanism for resolving such disputes, including election-related grievances, and therefore, recourse to writ jurisdiction was improper. The Appellants contended that the impugned bye-laws merely prescribe eligibility conditions, not disqualifications, and are well within the statutory framework. The Appellants emphasised that the right to vote and the right to contest elections are distinct statutory rights, both subject to regulation.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The Respondents contended that the impugned bye-laws imposed arbitrary restrictions that effectively curtailed democratic participation in cooperative elections. The Counsel argued that these provisions acted as disqualifications in disguise and were inconsistent with the parent statute. The Respondents maintained that such restrictions undermined the principles of fair representation and equal participation within cooperative structures, thereby justifying judicial intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Observation of the Court:
The Division Bench of Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan observed that “It is well settled that neither the right to vote nor the right to contest an election is a fundamental right. In Jyoti Basu and others v. Debi Ghosal and others23 and Javed and other v. State of Haryana and others 24, this Court authoritatively held that these rights are purely statutory in nature and exist only to the extent conferred by statute. While the right to vote enables a member to exercise franchise in accordance with the statutory scheme, the right to contest an election or to be elected is a distinct and additional right which may legitimately be made subject to qualifications, eligibility conditions, and disqualifications.”
The Court emphasised that the right to vote and the right to contest elections are purely statutory rights and not fundamental rights. The Bench clarified that electoral participation in cooperative institutions does not stem from constitutional guarantees but is entirely governed by statutory provisions. It noted that while the right to vote allows a member to exercise franchise within the statutory scheme, the right to contest elections is a separate and additional right. This latter right can be validly subjected to qualifications, eligibility criteria, and regulatory conditions. The Court stressed that treating these rights as absolute or fundamental would be legally incorrect and contrary to settled precedent.
The Bench held that the High Court erred in equating eligibility conditions with disqualifications. The Bench observed that the impugned bye-laws merely prescribed minimum performance-based criteria for participation in elections and did not introduce any new disqualifications beyond the statute. It highlighted that eligibility and disqualification operate in distinct legal domains, and conflating them leads to an incorrect application of law. The Court pointed out that the High Court’s approach failed to appreciate this distinction, resulting in an unsustainable conclusion. It further noted that such eligibility norms are essential to ensure effective governance within cooperative institutions.
The Court emphasised that writ jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked in matters relating to the internal governance of cooperative societies. The Bench observed that cooperative societies are autonomous bodies and do not fall within the definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. It held that disputes concerning elections, management, and internal affairs are primarily governed by the statutory framework under the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 2001. The Court emphasised that where a complete and efficacious alternative remedy exists, parties must exhaust such remedies before approaching constitutional courts. Entertaining writ petitions in such cases, it noted, would undermine the legislative scheme.
The Bench held that the High Court violated principles of natural justice by rendering a judgment affecting multiple entities without hearing them. The Bench observed that the impugned judgment had wide-ranging consequences across several cooperative societies, yet many affected parties were not impleaded or heard. It emphasised that a determination operating in rem must adhere strictly to the principle of audi alteram partem. The failure to provide an opportunity of hearing to all impacted entities, the Court noted, strikes at the root of fairness in the judicial process.
The decision of the Court:
The Apex Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court’s judgment, upholding the validity of the impugned bye-laws. It held that electoral rights in cooperative societies are purely statutory and can be reasonably regulated through eligibility conditions, and that disputes concerning such internal matters must ordinarily be resolved within the statutory framework rather than through writ jurisdiction.
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