“Now when the provision even in its clarificatory notification denies an increment, then by logic such teachers cannot be given the higher pay scale.”- SC
With this pointed observation, the Supreme Court stepped into a long-standing debate on academic qualifications and their impact on career advancement in technical education. The case brought into sharp focus a contentious dispute over whether faculty members in technical institutions, lacking a Ph.D., could rightfully claim higher pay scales and re-designation under the AICTE framework. As the Court dissected overlapping notifications and competing interpretations, it addressed not only questions of statutory authority but also broader issues of academic standards and constitutional fairness.
Brief Facts:
The case concerned the eligibility of certain Assistant Professors in technical institutions for re-designation as Associate Professors and entitlement to a higher pay scale under the AICTE Regulations, 2010. The core issue was whether those appointed after the AICTE’s 2000 Notification, mandating a Ph.D. as an essential qualification, could claim these benefits without possessing a Ph.D. or failing to acquire it within seven years.
While the appellant institution relied on AICTE’s 2000 and 2005 Notifications prescribing Ph.D. as mandatory, the private respondents argued that the 2016 AICTE clarification limited the consequence of non-compliance to stoppage of increments only. The tussle thus centered around the interpretation and effect of these AICTE notifications and whether the 2016 clarification could override earlier binding norms.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The petitioner institution contended that under AICTE’s Notifications dated 15.03.2000 and 28.11.2005, a Ph.D. was made an essential qualification for eligibility to higher pay scales and re-designation. These notifications allowed those appointed without a Ph.D. to acquire it within seven years, failing which they would not be entitled to further benefits.
It was argued that the 2010 AICTE Notification reiterated this requirement and that the 2016 clarification, being merely explanatory, could not override the earlier statutory provisions. The petitioner relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh (2020), to assert that the 2016 clarification lacked statutory force and could not confer benefits contrary to the binding regulations.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The private respondents, on the other hand, argued that the 2016 AICTE clarification issued under Section 23 of the AICTE Act had statutory backing and limited the consequence of failing to obtain a Ph.D. within seven years to mere stoppage of increments, not denial of higher pay scale or re-designation.
Relying on Christy James Jose v. State of Kerala (2015), they contended that reversion or denial of benefits due to lack of Ph.D. was not permissible. They claimed that they were “incumbent Assistant Professors” under Clause (ix) of the 2010 Notification and should thus be eligible for the benefits, even if they did not possess a Ph.D. at the time of appointment or thereafter.
Observation of the Court:
The Supreme Court, in addressing the eligibility for higher pay scales and re-designation under AICTE regulations, undertook a detailed analysis of the relevant Notifications and the statutory scheme under the All-India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987 (AICTE Act).
The Court acknowledged that AICTE, as an expert body established under the AICTE Act, 1987, has the statutory authority to prescribe qualifications and service conditions for academic staff: “The powers vested with AICTE were statutory in nature under Section 23 of the 1987 Act.”
It was clarified that AICTE’s regulatory powers include issuing binding regulations “to carry out the purposes of this Act,” and cover matters such as service conditions, pay scales, and qualifications.
A major contention was whether the AICTE notification dated 04.01.2016 had the force of law or merely reiterated the position established in the 2010 Regulations. The Court held that the 2016 notification could not be treated as a statutory amendment: “There seems to be no intent to alter the position of law but instead only to simplify what the AICTE had resolved through its original regulation. The 2016 AICTE Notification is a response to the doubts put forth to AICTE by the public.”
Quoting the three-judge bench decision in Gelus Ram Sahu v. Surendra Kumar Singh (2020), the Court emphasized that a clarificatory notification cannot serve as a substitute for statutory amendment: “If there exists no ambiguity, there arises no question of making use of a clarificatory notification. Hence, in the absence of any omission in the 2010 AICTE Regulations, the 2016 AICTE Notification despite being generally clarificatory must be held to have reiterated the existing position of law.”
In interpreting Clause (ix) of the 2010 AICTE Notification, the Court observed: “The phrase ‘incumbent Assistant Professors and incumbent Lecturers’... would mean such Assistant Professors and Lecturers who have the essential qualifications including Ph.D. or those who were appointed prior to 15.03.2000 without Ph.D.”
Thus, only teachers who possessed a Ph.D. or were exempt under earlier notifications due to the date of their appointment could benefit from higher pay scales and re-designation.
Rejecting the contention that failure to acquire a Ph.D. within seven years should not affect eligibility for promotion or pay scale advancement, the Court held: “Now when the provision even in its clarificatory notification denies an increment, then by logic such teachers cannot be given the higher pay scale.”
The Court reiterated its consistent position of deference to expert bodies in academic matters: “The courts are neither equipped nor have the academic or technical background to substitute themselves in place of statutory professional technical bodies and take decisions in academic matters involving standards and quality of technical education…”
Citing All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan & Ors. (2009), it emphasized that the judiciary must be slow to interfere in academic policy unless the qualifications prescribed are arbitrary, perverse, or contrary to law.
Addressing the constitutional dimension, the Court rejected the argument of unequal treatment: “The law itself creates two different classes, an Assistant Professor with Ph.D. and another Assistant Professor without Ph.D. If the salary, designation, etc. would remain unchanged for the two... then it may have a negative fallout in the quality of teaching.”
Hence, the classification was held to be reasonable and based on intelligible differentia linked to a legitimate objective, enhancing teaching quality.
The decision of the Court:
The Supreme Court partly allowed the Civil Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 7058–7061 of 2019, modifying the impugned order of the High Court to the extent indicated in its judgment. In the connected Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 4787 of 2025, the Court directed that the amount of ₹30 lakhs deposited by the appellant before the High Court shall not be disbursed until final disposal of the review petitions pending before the High Court. The Court instructed the High Court to decide the review petitions in the light of this judgment as expeditiously as possible.
Case Title: The Secretary, All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society (Aissms) and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.
Case no: SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 7058-7061 OF 2019
Citation: 2025 Latest Caselaw 310 SC
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Vinod Chandran
Advocate for Petitioner: Adv. Arjun Garg
Advocate for Respondent: Adv. Surbhi Kapoor [R-16.1 & 16.2], Adv. Vaibhav Yeshwant Kulkarni [R-7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17 & 18], Adv. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande [R-1, 2, 5, 13, 14, 18, 19 & 20], Adv. Saurabh Mishra [Caveat], Adv. Harish Pandey [R-3 & 4]
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