A Division Bench of Justice MR Shah and B.V. Nagarathna allowed the present appeal while stating the instituted by the appellant against impugned judgment of the High Court whereby the High Court upheld the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court by observing that the object and purpose of the D.V. Act is to protect a woman from domestic violence, the salutary object of Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to have the right to reside in a shared household. Hence, the said provision commences with a non-obstante clause.
The appellant in the present case instituted the miscellaneous petition in the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate wherein the appellant assailed the judgment passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand whereby the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge dated July 11, 2014 setting aside the order passed by the Special Judge Magistrate was sustained.
The facts relevant for the perusal of the present appeal were that the appellant was married to one Kuldeep Tayagi. He died in a car accident in 2005.
Basically, the circumstances that compelled the appellant to move to approach the Court of Special Judicial Magistrate were that the appellant stated that she was threatened by the matrimonial family if she ever tried to claim any right over her husband’s property. She further submitted that she was tortured consistently by the respondents and was forced to move to Dehradun to live separately.
In view of the aforesaid allegations she moved to Special Court under Section 12 in order to seek protection orders, residence orders and compensation orders under the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Prayers were also made for monetary reliefs under Section 22 of the D.V. Act.
The Trial Court partly allowed the application filed by the appellant and directed the respondents to pay Rs.10, 000/- as monetary compensation for insulting and maligning the aggrieved person.
Aggrieved by the same, the first respondent- mother- in law of the appellant preferred a criminal appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge. The First Appellate Court by judgment dated July 11, 2014 set aside the judgment of the Trial Court, dated May 12, 2011.
The same was assailed by the appellant by way of criminal revision petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The Court dismissed the same and upheld the judgment pronounced by the First Appellate Court. Hence, the present appeal.
The Court for dealing with several questions of law dealt with provisions of the Domestic Violence Act and precedents of this Court. It referred to the case of Juveria Abdul Majid Patni vs. Atif Iqbal Mansoori and Another, wherein while interpreting the definition of aggrieved person under Section 2 (a) of the D.V., Act held that apart from the woman who is in a domestic relationship, any woman who has been in a domestic relationship with the respondent, if alleged to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent comes within the meaning of aggrieved person.
Another relevant decision of V.D. Bhanot vs. Savita was preferred wherein it was held that the wife who had shared a household in the past but was no longer residing with her husband can file a petition under section 12 if subjected to domestic violence.
Another case of Saraswathy vs. Babu was referred by this Court to the definition of domestic relationship under Section 2 (f) of the D.V., Act is very wide and protection under the said provision would be given to a wife even if she is judicially separated.
The Court further noted that the expression ‘shared household’ is expansively defined in Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act but the expression contained in Section 17 namely, ‘every woman in a domestic relationship shall have the right to reside in the shared household irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in same’, requires an expansive interpretation.
It was further observed that the object and purpose of the D.V. Act is to protect a woman from domestic violence, the salutary object of Sub-Section (1) of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to have the right to reside in a shared household. Hence, the said provision commences with a non-obstante clause.
It was further held that the expression “shared household” in the context of sub- section 1 of Section 17 cannot be confined to only a household wherein the aggrieved person resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same, the Court observed. In view of the same, the Court stated that the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women in a domestic relationship is protected under sub- section 1 of Section 17. “Right to reside” in a shared household thus holds wider connotation in respect to the aforesaid categories of women, Court remarked.
Next question for consideration as to whether it is mandatory for the aggrieved person to reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled, in view of the same the Court relied on the case of Vandhana vs. T. Srikanth and Krishnamachari, wherein it was held that Sections 2(f), 2(s) and 17 of the D.V. Act ought to be given the widest interpretation possible. The Court, after observing various instances and situations, held that many a woman may not even enter into the matrimonial home immediately after marriage. Therefore, it was concluded that a healthy and correct interpretation to Sections 2(f) and 2(s) of the D.V. Act would be that the words ‘live’ or ‘have at any point of time lived’ would include in its purview ‘the right to live.
Another question of law that the Court dealt with was whether there should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed. The Court with respect to the same stated that the expression ‘domestic relationship’ is an expansive one and means the relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household when they are related by (i) consanguinity; (ii) marriage; (iii) through a relationship in the nature of marriage; (iv) adoption; (v) are family members living together as a joint family. Thus, any woman living in a domestic relationship is subject to any act of domestic violence, she is entitled to avail the remedies under the D.V. Act.
Further with respect to subsisting domestic relationship, the Court observed that the phrase ‘domestic relationship” as stated above has a wider ambit wherein any two persons who live or used to live at any point of time in a shared household when they were related by marriage fits. Therefore even when the marital ties cease and there is no subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved woman and the respondent against whom relief is claimed but the acts of domestic violence are related to the period of domestic relationship, even in such circumstances, the aggrieved woman who was subjected to domestic violence has remedies under the D.V. Act, the Court submitted.
On the question of whether the consideration of a domestic incident report is mandatory before initiating the proceedings under the D.V. Act in order to invoke substantive provisions of Sections 18 to 20 and 22 of the said D.V. Act, the Court took into account the Clause (e) of Section 2 wherein Domestic Incident Report is defined. In pursuance of the same, the Court submitted that as per Section 12 an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person including the service provider vide Sub-Section (1) of Section 10 of the D.V. Act, may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the D.V. Act. Proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 states that before passing any order on such an application, the Magistrate shall take into consideration any Domestic Incident Report received by him from the Protection Officer or the service provider.
In the light of the aforesaid observations, the Court in the instant case observed that the appellant had the right to reside in a shared- household as a daughter- in law as she had a subsisting domestic relationship owing to her marriage and the appellant being the daughter- in law had the right to reside in the share- household.
It was also observed that the High Court erred in observing that the application instituted by the appellant was not accompanied by a Domestic Incident Report and therefore under the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the Magistrate had no authority to issue orders and directions in favor of the appellant.
Thus, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court as well as the judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge were set aside and the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate was restored.
Case name: PRABHA TYAGI Vs. KAMLESH DEVI
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