'Procedure must serve justice, not obstruct it': Supreme Court rules on Ex-parte Decree, Read Judgment

“Courts should not shut out cases on mere technicalities but rather afford opportunity to both sides and thrash out the matter on merits”, Apex Court expounded.

This powerful statement came as the Court reviewed a long-pending dispute regarding a fraudulent sale deed, where the Appellant, Dwarika Prasad, sought to restore a decision made ex parte by the Trial Court in 1994. The Appellant claimed he was unaware of the ex parte decree until 1994, when he was informed by a new counsel.

Respondent-Plaintiff, Prithviraj Singh, filed a civil suit (O.S. No. 81 of 1988) seeking the declaration of a sale deed as null and void, alleging that the Appellant-Defendant, Dwarika Prasad, fraudulently obtained the sale deed from the Plaintiff’s grandfather on January 16, 1979. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte in 1994, declaring the sale deed void. The Appellant filed a restoration application in 1994, claiming that he was unaware of the ex parte decree due to his illiteracy and reliance on an untrustworthy counsel. The trial court allowed the restoration application in 2000, but the Respondent challenged this decision in a revision petition. The district court ruled against the Appellant, and the High Court dismissed the Appellant’s writ petition in 2022. The Appellant sought relief before this Court.

The Appellant contended that he was unaware of the ex parte decree until October 1994, when he was informed by his new counsel, and promptly filed the restoration application on October 31, 1994. He asserted that the application was not time-barred because it was filed immediately after he became aware of the decree, and that no separate application for condonation of delay was necessary. The Appellant also argued that the District Court’s rejection of the restoration application was based on a hyper-technical approach.

Contentions of the Respondent:

The Respondent argued that the restoration application was filed after the prescribed limitation period, which expired on May 11, 1994, and therefore, it required an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Respondent further claimed that the Appellant was aware of the ex parte decree from the outset and should have filed the restoration application within the statutory period. The Respondent supported the decision of the District Court in dismissing the restoration application and the High Court’s dismissal of the Appellant’s writ petition.

The Court observed that the High Court erred in upholding the order of the Additional District Judge. It emphasized that the Trial Court rightly allowed the restoration application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC, stating, “Courts should not shut out cases on mere technicalities but rather afford opportunity to both sides and thrash out the matter on merits.” The Court further noted that a party should not suffer due to the negligence or fault of their counsel, referencing the case of Rafiq v. Munshilal, where it was highlighted that “the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening… nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate.” The Court also expressed its concern that an innocent party should not suffer due to their advocate’s default, asserting, “We cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted.”

The Court emphasized that the Additional Sessions Judge should not have interfered with the Trial Court’s discretion in setting aside the ex parte decree. Citing the case of Bhagmal and Ors. v. Kunwar Lal, the Court reaffirmed that delay in filing a restoration application was justified as the Appellant was unaware of the decree, stating, “The delay in filing the application was fully explained on account of the fact that they never knew about the decree and the orders starting the ex parte proceedings against them.”

The Court concluded that there was no need to file a separate application for condonation of delay, criticizing the High Court for taking a hyper-technical view, and reiterated, “Procedure is after all handmaid of justice.” It emphasized that endorsing such a technical approach would undermine the purpose of judicial procedures, which should aim for just and fair outcomes. The Court found the Appellant’s conduct to be bona fide and diligent, and not in violation of any rule of law.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 24.05.2022 passed by the High Court, and restored the Trial Court’s order dated 29.04.2000. The Court directed the Trial Court to proceed with O.S. No. 81 of 1988 in accordance with the law. Given the suit’s age, the Court further instructed the Trial Court to expedite the hearing and make an effort to decide the case within a year. The Court also emphasized that the parties to the suit should extend full cooperation in the disposal of the case. No order was made regarding costs.

Picture Source :