Telangana High Court

Koka Raghava Rao, vs The State Of Telangana on 2 May, 2025

        THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO

                + CRIMINAL PETITION No.5564 of 2025

% Dated 02.05.2025

# Koka Raghava Rao S/o.late Kota Ranga Prasad,
  Aged: 34 years, Occ: Private Job,
  R/o.H.No.3-6-312/1,
  Hyderguda, Hyderabad


                                                               ....Petitioner
          VERSUS

$ The State of Telangana
  Rep. by Public Prosecutor,
  High Court of Telangana,
  At Hyderabad and another.

                                                         ... Respondents

! Counsel for Petitioner    :     Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi

^ Counsel for Respondents :Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon (R.1)

                           Dr. J. Vijaya Laxmi (R.2)

< GIST:

> HEAD NOTE:

? CITATIONS:

  1.   (2020) 10 SCC 616
  2.   (2012) 1 SCC 40
  3.   (2021) 2 SCC 485
  4.   (2022) SCC OnLine Bom. 11566
  5.   (2024) 7 SCC 147
                                 2




     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO

            CRIMINAL PETITION No.5564 of 2025

ORDER:

This Criminal Petition is filed under Sections 480 and 483

of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) by the

petitioner/accused No.1 seeking bail in Crime No.1 of 2025 of

Central Crime Station, DD, Hyderabad, registered for the

offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471

read with 120(b) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC).

2. The case of prosecution in brief is that the de facto

complainant lodged a complaint on 03.01.2025 at 20.30 hours

stating that he is a senior designated advocate and had been

practicing law for over 70 years and acquired significant property

including plots in Munuganoor Village and flats in Ghaziabad,

Noida and Supreme Towers at Delhi. Due to his advanced age,

he reduced his travel and decided to sell his Ghazibad flat and

for that his grandson i.e., the petitioner herein, offered to help

him with the sale and on his assistance, he granted him a

General Power of Attorney (GPA) for this, purpose in December

2023. However, in July 2024, some strangers visited his house

claiming to be involved in the development of his property based

on a registered Development Agreement. On further enquiry, he

was discovered that the petitioner had fraudulently portrayed

himself as the GPA holder and executed a Development

Agreement with M/s. Devika Homes on 16.12.2023, which was

registered just a day after the original GPA. The agreement was

made without his consent or knowledge. Subsequently, the

petitioner was informed of these fraudulent activities and he

revoked the GPA in September 2024. It is further stated that his

daughter-in-law/Lakshmi Rajyam, the petitioner and his grand-

daughter/Koka Hasini accused of selling various plots in

Munuganoor Village belonging to him and his relatives, using

fabricated death certificates and Aadhar cards including his

deceased wife and other relatives. Further, large sums of money

were withdrawn from his bank accounts and Fixed Deposit

Receipts without his consent. The stolen amounts included

Rs.90,00,000/- from his FDRs at UCO Bank in New Delhi,

Rs.13,41,111/- from his savings account at Bank of India and

Rs.49,06,951/- from the sale proceeds of his Noida flat through

his account with the State Bank of India. Hence, the complaint.

3. Heard Sri. Prathap Narayan Sanghi, learned Senior

Counsel representing Mr. Avadesh Narayan Sanghi, learned

counsel for the petitioner, Dr. J. Vijaya Laxmi, learned counsel

for respondent No.2, and Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned

Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1

State.

4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that

the petitioner has not committed the offence and he was falsely

implicated in the present crime. The respondent No.2 himself

executed the General Power of Attorney in favour of the petitioner

on 15.12.2023. Pursuant to the same only, the petitioner

executed Development Agreement in favour of the Devika Homes

on 16.12.2023 in respect of the property covered thereunder.

Hence, the allegation made by respondent No.2 that the

petitioner created and forged the document does not arise.

Further, respondent No.2 had cancelled the GPA in favour of the

petitioner on 12.09.2024. The entire allegations levelled in the

complaint against the petitioner are purely civil in nature and

there are family and property disputes between the petitioner

and respondent No.2, who is none other than grandfather of the

petitoner. To dissolve the said dispute, respondent No.2 has

been implicated the petitioner in the present crime. Hence, the

ingredients of Section 409 of the IPC are not attracted against

the petitioner. The punishment for the other offences levelled

against the petitioner is below seven years.

4.1. He further submitted that respondent No.2 filed complaint

on 11.12.2024 and the crime was registered on 03.01.2025.

Even after completion of statutory period of 90 days from the

date of registration of crime, the Investigating Officer has not

filed the charge sheet. Hence, the petitioner is entitled for grant

of statutory bail, as per the provisions of Section 167 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

4.2. He also submitted that the other allegations levelled

against the petitioner that the petitioner and daughter-in-law of

respondent No.2 without the knowledge of respondent No.2 sold

various flats belonging to him and the petitioner in collusion with

daughter in law of respondent No.2 had withdrawn the huge

amount of his money and fixed deposits. pertaining to the years

2020-2021 and at no point of time, respondent No.2 lodged any

complaint. Respondent No.2 with an intention to harass the

petitioner, he implicated the petitioner as an accused in the

present crime. He further submitted that the petitioner was

arrested on 11.02.2025 and since then he has been in judicial

custody. The entire investigation is completed except filing of the

charge sheet. The petitioner is ready and willing to cooperate

with the investigation and abide by the conditions, which are

going to be imposed by this Court.

4.3. He relied upon the following judgments:

1. Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab 1;

2. Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2;

3. M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence 3; and

4. Alnesh Akil Somji v. The State of Maharastra 4

5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted

that the petitioner has committed grave offence. Respondent

No.2 is an advanced age of 90 years and due to his advance age,

he reduced to travel to Delhi and decided to dispose of some of

the properties including Ghazibad flat. The petitioner, who is the

grandson of respondent No.2, came to know his intention to sell

the Ghazibad flat, offered to assist him in finding buyers

claiming that he had contacts in Ghazibad. At his instigation,

(2020) 10 SCC 616

(2012) 1 SCC 40

(2021) 2 SCC 485

(2022) SCC OnLine Bom.11566

respondent No.2 executed GPA on 15.12.2023 for limited

purpose to handle the sale of Ghazibad flat. Thereafter,

respondent No.2 came to know that the petitioner on the very

next day i.e., on 16.12.2023, without any authorization executed

Development Agreement in favour of Devika Homes represented

by Satram Shetty Suryachander. The said Satram Shetty

Suryachander and his wife is one of the individuals in whose

name substantial amounts have been transferred from the bank

account of respondent No.2 without his knowledge. Immediately,

after came to know about said fraudulent agreement, respondent

No.2 revoked the GPA on 12.09.2024.

5.1. She further submitted that respondent No.2 specifically

stated in his complaint that the petitioner with the assistance of

his mother had withdrawn huge amount from the bank accounts

of respondent No.2 by creating false documents and respondent

No.2 sustained huge financial loss of more than

Rs.1,52,48,062/- and Rs.5to 6 Crores towards loss of immovable

properties. The petitioner who is very influential person and

even before lodging the complaint, he threatened respondent

No.2 with dire consequences if he lodges the complaint.

5.2. She also submitted that the investigation is under

progress. If the petitioner is enlarged on bail, there is threat to

the life of respondent No.2 in the hands of the petitioner and also

he will influence the witnesses and also interfere with the

investigation. She further submitted that as per Section 167 of

Cr.P.C., the petitioner is not entitled for grant of statutory bail.

The petitioner was arrested on 11.02.2025 and 90 days period

has not been expired. Section 167 Cr.P.C. applies only from the

date of judicial remand. In the instant case, the petitioner was

remanded to judicial custody on 11.02.2025 and 90 days has not

been completed. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled for grant of

statutory bail.

6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submitted that the

petitioner has committed grave offence and the investigation is

under progress. There are specific allegations against the

petitioner that he involved cheating, fraudulent, criminal breach

of trust and impersonation. If the bail is granted, the petitioner

will influence the witnesses and also interfere with the

investigation. He also submitted that the petitioner is not

entitled for grant of statutory bail as per the provisions of Section

167 of Cr.P.C. on the ground that the petitioner was remanded to

judicial custody only on 11.02.2025 and 90 days period has not

been completed.

7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the

respective parties and after perusal of the material available on

record, it reveals that respondent No.2 executed GPA on

15.12.2023 for limited purpose to sell the property i.e., flat

situated at Ghazibad. The complaint further reveals that the

petitioner without the knowledge of respondent No.2 executed

Development Agreement on the very next day i.e., on 16.12.2023

with possession in favour of Devika Homes represented by

Satram Shetty Surya Chander and he is one of the individuals in

whose name substantial amounts have been transferred from the

bank accounts of respondent No.2 without his knowledge.

Respondent No.2 revoked the GPA on 12.09.2024. There is

specific allegation against the petitioner, who is none other than

grandson of respondent No.2, that he and other accused created

the fake death certificate of the respondent Nos.2's wife and also

created Aadhar Cards illegally and sold the flats to the third

parties, who are none other than the close associates of the

petitioner and daughter-in-law of respondent No.2. In the

complaint, there is specific allegation against the petitioner that

the petitioner with connivance with his mother withdrawn huge

amount of money from the bank account of respondent No.2 and

his original fixed deposits are also in the custody of the

petitioner. There are specific allegations against the petitioner

with respect to cheating, forgery, criminal breach of trust and

impersonation. Even according to the learned Additional Public

Prosecutor, the investigation is under progress.

8. The record further reveals that the petitioner was arrested

on 11.12.2024 and since then he was in judicial custody.

Insofar as the other contention raised by the learned Senior

Counsel for the petitioner that the crime was registered on

03.01.2025 and even after expiry of statutory period of 90 days,

the Investigating Officer has not filed the charge sheet, hence,

the petitioner is entitled for grant of statutory bail as per the

provisions of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C is concerned, it is

relevant to extract Section 167 of Cr.P.C 1973 which reads as

follows:

Section-167: Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty four hours:

"(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well

founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-

inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that--

1[(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused

person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;] 2[(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in

custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;]

(c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

3[Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared

that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph

(a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.] 4[Explanation II.--If any question arises whether an accused person

was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be.]

5[Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.] 6[(2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-

section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub- inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where no order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub- section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub-section (2):

Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be.] (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.

(5) If in any case trial by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify."

9. The above said provision clearly reveals that whenever a

person arrested and detained in custody, if the Investigating

Officer is not concluded investigation and filed the charge sheet

within the prescribed time limit, the accused is entitled for grant

of statutory bail.

10. In T. Bikramjit Singh supra, Hon'ble Supreme Court held

in paragraph Nos.36 to 38 which reads as follows:

"36. A conspectus of the aforesaid decisions would show that so long as an application for grant of default bail is made on expiry of the period of 90 days (which application need not even be in writing) before a charge-sheet is filed, the right to default bail becomes complete. It is of no moment that the criminal court in question either does not dispose of such application before the charge-sheet is filed or disposes of such application wrongly before such charge-sheet is filed. So long as an application has been made for default bail on expiry of the stated period before time is further extended to the maximum period of 180 days, default bail, being an indefeasible right of the accused under the first proviso to Section 167(2), kicks in and must be granted.

37. On the facts of the present case, the High Court was wholly incorrect in stating that once the challan was presented by the prosecution on 25-3- 2019 as an application was filed by the appellant on 26-3-2019, the appellant is not entitled to default bail. First and foremost, the High Court has got the dates all wrong. The application that was made for default bail was made on or before 25-2-2019 and not 26-3-2019. The charge-sheet was filed on 26-3-2019 and not 25-3-2019. The fact that this application was wrongly dismissed on 25-2-2019 would make no difference and ought to have been corrected in revision. The sole ground for dismissing the application was that the time of 90 days had already been extended by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Ajnala by his order dated 13-2- 2019. This order was correctly set aside by the Special Court by its judgment dated 25-3-2019, holding that under the UAPA read with the NIA Act, the Special Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time to 180 days under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b). The fact that the appellant

filed yet another application for default bail on 8-4-2019, would not mean that this application would wipe out the effect of the earlier application that had been wrongly decided. We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled.

38. This being the case, we set aside the judgment [Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 5333] of the High Court. The appellant will now be entitled to be released on "default bail" under Section 167(2) of the Code, as amended by Section 43-D of the UAPA. However, we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent grounds, and upon arrest or re-arrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for the grant of regular bail which application should be considered on its own merit. We also make it clear that this judgment will have no impact on the arrest of the petitioner in any other case."

11. In Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, supra Hon'ble Supreme Court

held that the power to grant bail is discretionary and must be

exercised with care and caution, ensuring a balance between the

accused's right to personal liberty and the interest of society.that

the denial of bail should not negate the fundamental

presumption of innocence until proven guilty. An overly rigid

approach could undermine the justice system and lead to

unnecessary deprivation of liberty. By relying upon the

Judgment in "Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi [(2001) 4

SCC 280]" the Supreme Court stated that nature and gravity of

the offence, nature of evidence and strength of the prosecution's

case, severity of punishment upon conviction, character,

conduct, and status of the accused, likelihood of the accused

appearing for trial, possibility of tampering with evidence or

influencing witnesses, and larger public or state interest. The

Court also clarified that at the stage of considering bail, courts

are to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe in

the prosecution's case, not conclusive evidence of guilt.

12. In M. Ravindran v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence,

supra Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph No.25 which

reads as follows:

"25.1. Once the accused files an application for bail under the proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have "availed of" or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time-limit for investigation. Thus, if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2) Cr.P.C read with Section 36-A(4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the Public Prosecutor, as mentioned supra. Such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigating agency.

25.2. The right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding

pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the charge-sheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the court; or filing of the charge-sheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher court. 25.3. However, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a charge-sheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. The Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the Cr.P.C. 25.4. Notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent court granting bail. If the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the court, his continued detention in custody is valid."

13. In Alnesh Akil Somji, supra Hon'ble Bombay High Court

held in paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 which reads as follows:

"21. The Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) has held thus in para 38 and 39 of the judgment, thus:

"38. This Court also dealt with the decision rendered in Sanjay Dutt and noted that the principle laid down by the Constitution Bench is to the effect that if the charge sheet is not filed and the right for 'default bail' has ripened into the status of in- defeasibility, it cannot be frustrated by the prosecution on any pretext. The accused can avail his liberty by filing an application stating that the statutory period for filing the charge sheet or challan has expired and the same has not yet been filed and therefore the indefeasible right has accrued in his or her favour and further the accused is prepared to furnish the bail bond.

39. This Court also noted that apart from the possibility of the prosecution frustrating the indefeasible right, there are occasions when even the court frustrates the indefeasible right. Reference

was made to Mohamed Iqbal Madar Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra wherein it was observed that some courts keep the application for 'default bail' pending for some days so that in the meantime a charge sheet is submitted. While such a practice both on the part of prosecution as well as some courts must be very strongly and vehemently discouraged, we reiterate that no subterfuge should be resorted to, to defeat the indefeasible right of the accused for 'default bail' during the interregnum when the statutory period for filing the charge sheet or challan expires and the submission of the charge sheet or challan in court."

22. I thus find that the indefeasible right accrued to the applicant on expiry of 60 days on account of failure to file the chargesheet cannot be defeated by mere invocation of section 409 of IPC claiming that the period for completion of the investigation and filing of the chargesheet is 90 days."

14. In the case on hand, the petitioner was arrested on

11.02.2025 and 90 days period has not been completed. Hence,

the petitioner is not entitled to seek statutory bail as per the

provisions of Section 167 Cr.P.C.

15. It is pertinent to mention that the Full Bench judgment of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Enforcement Directorate v.

Kapil Wadhawan 5, held in paragraph Nos. 61 and 62 which

reads as follows:

"61. Since there exists vacuum in the application and details of Section 167CrPC, we have opted for an interpretation which advances the cause of personal liberty. The accused herein were remanded on 14-5-2020 and as such, the charge-sheet ought to have been filed on or before 12-7-2020 (i.e. the sixtieth day). But the same was filed, only on 13-7-2020 which was the 61st day of their custody. Therefore, the right to default bail

(2024) 7 SCC 147

accrued to the accused persons on 13-7-2020 at 12.00 a.m., midnight, onwards. On that very day, the accused filed their default bail applications at 8.53 a.m. ED filed the charge-sheet, later in the day, at 11.15 a.m. Thus, the default bail applications were filed well before the charge-sheet.

In Ravindran [M. Ravindran v. Revenue Intelligence Directorate, (2021) 2 SCC 485 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 876] and Bikramjit [Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 85] , which followed the Constitution Bench in Sanjay Dutt [Sanjay Dutt v. State, (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433] it was rightly held that if the accused persons avail their indefeasible right to default bail before the charge-sheet/final report is filed, then such right would not stand frustrated or extinguished by any such subsequent filing.

62. We therefore declare that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period under Section 167CrPC ought to be computed from the date when a Magistrate authorises remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand period, as we notice will extend beyond the permitted 60/90 days' period resulting in unauthorised detention beyond the period envisaged under Section 167CrPC. In cases where the charge-sheet/final report is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused."

16. As per the above said judgment, when there is ambiguity

exists in Section 167 Cr.P.C, it must be interpreted to protect

personal liberty. The 60/90-day remand period begins from the

date of the Magistrate's remand order and includes that day. If a

charge-sheet is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the accused is

entitled to default bail, provided the application is made before

such filing. Once the right to default bail accrues, it cannot be

defeated by the subsequent filing of the charge-sheet.

17. It is already stated supra that there are specific allegations

levelled against the petitioner in respect of cheating, forgery,

criminal breach of trust and impersonation in the complaint.

Even according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the