Telangana High Court
K. Ramadevi vs Vadla Veeraswamy on 11 June, 2025
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.3796 OF 2023
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed assailing the order dated
02.06.2023 in I.A.No.966 of 2022 in O.S.No.49 of 2013 passed by the
Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy.
2. Heard Sri P. Venkat Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners
and Ms. Bandugula Alekhya, learned counsel for respondent No.1.
3. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs and respondents herein
are defendants before the Trial Court.
4. Brief facts of the case are that petitioners herein filed O.S.No.49 of
2013 for partition and separate possession of agricultural land in
Sy.No.120/B to an extent of Ac.6-02 gts, situated at Indrakaran Village
of Sangareddy Mandal, Medak District (hereinafter referred to as
'schedule property'). Respondents herein entered appearance and filed
written statement and during the pendency of the suit, petitioners filed
application to implead subsequent purchaser as party to the suit vide
I.A.No.745 of 2013 and the same was coming up for issuance of notice to
proposed party. It appears that the petitioners herein failed to deposit
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process and the suit was adjourned from time to time and was finally
posted to 28.07.2017 and on that date, there was no representation on
behalf of plaintiff, therefore, the trial Court dismissed the suit for
default. Plaintiffs filed I.A.No.966 of 2022 under Section 5 of Limitation
Act to condone the delay of 1696 days in filing the application to restore
the suit. Trial Court vide impugned order dated 02.06.2023, dismissed
the same with an observation that no specific reason is mentioned for
condonation of huge delay of 1696 days and further observed that
petitioners are not interested in prosecuting the case and in the absence
of proper reasons, delay application cannot be allowed. Aggrieved by
the same, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that along with the
suit, application for interim injunction was filed and the same was
granted restraining the respondents from alienating the schedule
property, however, respondent No.3 alienated the schedule property,
therefore, petitioners filed I.A.No.745 of 2015 to implead transferee as
party to the suit and the said application was dismissed on 28.07.2017,
for non payment of process and suit was also dismissed for default.
Learned counsel further contended that effect of dismissal of suit came
to light only when the petitioners approached counsel for impleading
one Sri Bollan Nagesh, who was interfering with the possession of the
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schedule property, and that the counsel of the petitioners instead of
filing implead application, returned the bundle along with No
Objection Certificate on 17.12.2021 and that on verification, petitioners
came to know that suit was dismissed for default on 28.07.2017 and the
said fact was neither informed to the petitioners nor their earlier
counsel took any steps to restore the suit. Hence, the delay of 1969 days
in filing the application to restore the suit occurred.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that
substantial rights of the petitioners in immovable properties are
involved, and for no fault of the petitioners, they cannot be deprived of
the legitimate share in the schedule property. The trial Court instead of
considering application liberally, dismissed the same. Learned counsel
further contended that the Courts have constantly held that where
substantial rights of parties in immovable properties are involved or
affected, Courts have to take a liberal approach in condoning the delay.
Learned counsel further contended that matters involving immovable
properties should be decided on their merits rather than throwing out
the rights of the litigants on technicalities and prayed to allow the
Revision.
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7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that
petitioners failed to explain the inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing
the application to set aside the orders dated 02.06.2023, and therefore,
the trial court has rightly dismissed the application. Learned counsel
finally contended that the revision is devoid of merits and the same is
liable to be dismissed.
8. In support of his contention, learned counsel for respondent No.1,
placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental
Aroma Chemical Indistries Limited Vs Gujarat Industrial Development
Corporation and Another 1, wherein it is held as follows:
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in
dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has
justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay
of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate..."
9. It is also apt to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in
Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR
(SLP (Civil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024), wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha
(2010) 5 SCC 459
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Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy &
Others [(2013) 12 SCC 649], held as under:
"delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party".
10. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to
the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002)
1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao
[(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision
may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but
it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has
2013 (14) SCC 81
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consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
xxx
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
11. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India
Limited and another 3, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena of
decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs. Executive
Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 4, held as hereunder:
"17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right
for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into
belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats
(2012) 3 SCC 563
(2008) 17 SC 448
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equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber
over their rights".
12. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and
Contractors Private Limited 5, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide
and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can,
in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind
that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have
acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first
party's inaction, negligence or laches."
13. Perusal of the record would disclose that petitioners filed
application for condonation of delay of 1696 days in filing application to
restore the suit only on the ground that dismissal of suit came to light
only when the petitioners approached their counsel for filing implead
application and the said counsel instead of filing implead application,
returned the bundle along with No Objection Certificate on 17.12.2021
and that on verification, petitioners came to know that suit was
dismissed for default on 28.07.2017 and thus delay of 1696 days
occurred in filing the application. It is relevant to note that though their
counsel returned the bundle on 17.12.2021, application for delay was
(2021) 6 SCC 460
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filed on 19.03.2022. Therefore, it is clear that further delay of about 3
months occurred even after bundle was returned by the petitioners'
counsel. Petitioners, except blaming their earlier counsel, failed to
assign any proper reason for inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing the
application. It is pertinent to note that the approach of the petitioners is
very casual in nature and the petitioners are not diligent in persuing the
case, and as such, they are not entitled to seek indulgence of this Court,
more so, when there is inordinate delay of 1969 days in filing the
application.
14. The reasons offered by the petitioners for condonation of delay
are contrary to record and infact factually incorrect, and does not
inspire the confidence of this Court. Since, no plausible explanation has
been offered for inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing application and
no sufficient cause has been shown for such delay, the application does
not deserve any consideration.
15. In view of the above discussion and legal position, in considered
opinion of this Court the petitioners failed to point out any irregularity
or illegality in impugned order warranting interference of this Court.
Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.
There shall be no order as to costs.
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Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.
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LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY,J
Date: 11.06.2025
Tssb/dr
