Telangana High Court

Konireddy Premalatha vs The State Of Telangana on 9 July, 2024

Author: P.Sam Koshy

Bench: P.Sam Koshy

             THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY

                                         AND
      THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMBASIVARAO NAIDU

                   WRIT PETITION No.12085 of 2024

ORDER:

(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P.SAM KOSHY)

Heard Mr. Pasham Trivikram Reddy, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of Ms. R. Sowmya Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner

and Mr. Swaroop Oorilla, learned Special Government Pleader for the

respondents.

2. The instant is a writ petition which has been filed challenging

the order dated 29.02.2024 (Annexure P-1) passed by respondent

No.2 putting the detenu under preventive detention for a period of

one (01) year under Sub-Section (2) of Section 3 of the "The

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits,

Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-

Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser

Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders,

Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming

Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms

Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial

Offenders Act, 1986 (for short, 'the Act of 1986'). The said order

further stands confirmed vide order dated 04.04.2024 (Annexure P-3)

passed by the Advisory Board, which is also questioned through this

petition.

3. The writ petition is one which has been filed seeking for

issuance of a Writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus with prayer for

production of the detenu before the Court and quashment of the

aforementioned two orders.

4. Challenging the said impugned orders, the learned counsel for

the petitioner contended that a plain reading of the impugned order

would reveal that respondent No.2 has taken into consideration

primarily four (04) cases which were registered against the detenu

during the period between 14.07.2023 to 14.08.2023 all of which

were not offences of very serious nature so as to invite the preventive

detention order under the aforementioned Act of 1986. It was further

contended that the proximity between the date of passing the

impugned order i.e. 29.02.2024 and the last offence from among the

four (04) cases which have been primarily relied upon by respondent

No.2 is too long a gap so as to invoke the provisions of Sub-Section

(2) of Section 3 while passing the impugned order.

5. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the nature of offences for which these four (04) crimes

have been registered are also not at all serious offences which would

have an adverse impact in maintaining public order. The nature of

offences alleged to have been committed by the detenu were

primarily those relating to the law and order situation and those

cannot be brought within the purview of maintenance of public order

and therefore the impugned order of preventive detention is bad in

law and liable to be set-aside.

6. It was the further contention of the learned counsel for the

petitioner that the impugned order is also bad in law for the reason

that the mandatory requirement in law before passing the order of

preventive detention was not available with the authority concerned,

nor have the mandatory requirements complied with while passing

the order. On this ground also, the impugned order of preventive

detention is liable to be quashed.

7. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioner that though while passing the impugned order the

authority concerned makes a categorical statement of not taking into

account the old criminal cases pending against the detenu but relies

upon only the four cases that were recently registered against the

detenu in the year 2023. The nature of offences in the said four (04)

cases which have been heavily relied by the Collector & District

Magistrate, are not sufficient enough to pass the order of preventive

detention and the same deserves to be set-aside/quashed.

8. In addition, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied

uponthe decisions of the Division Bench of this High Court in Pradip

Sarkar vs. The State of Telangana and Others 1, Sk.Nafeesa vs.

The State of Telangana and Others 2 and also the decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallada K Sri Ram vs. The State of

Telangana and Ors. 3, all of which in fact, have been taken into

account while passing the judgment in Nenavath Bujji Etc. vs. The

State of Telangana and Ors. 4.

9. On the other hand, the learned Special Government Pleader

referring to various criminal cases in which the detenu has been

accused, contended that under such circumstances, the case of the

petitioner clearly falls within the ambit of the Act of 1986 and the

impugned order therefore does not warrant any interference.

Order dated 15.06.2023 in W.P.No.5872 of 2023

Order dated 14.06.2023 in W.P.No.8486 of 2023&Batch

(2023) 13 SCC 537

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1738-39 of 2024

10. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, the

detenu has a series of cases lodged against him where he was

involved in offences related to criminal intimidation, chain snatching,

bike theft and other similar nature of cases and presently the detenu

is in jail in respect of the aforesaid offences. However, in the event if

he is released, there is all possibility of peace and tranquility so also

the law and order and public order getting disturbed and there

would also be a constant threat of the detenu repeating these very

offences detrimental to the general public at large and the society in

general.

11. It was learned Special Government Pleader's further contention

that the matter of the detenu was also subsequently scrutinized by

the Advisory Board which in turn had reviewed the decision of the

order of detention and had found the decision to be acceptable in the

given facts and circumstances of the case which all the more

weakens the case of the petitioner and the writ petition therefore

deserves to be rejected.

12. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on

perusal of records, it is necessary at this juncture, to take note of the

impugned order which would reflect the nature of offences in which

the detenu is involved viz.,

Sl Cr.No's. U/s. Dateof FIR Date of NBW NBW Bail Police Station release issued on executed cancellation on

1) Cr.No. 1124/2023 14-08-2023 11-10-2023 12-01-2024 27-02-2024 Filed but date of U/sec 392 IPC "Conditional filing not Talakondapally PS bail" available/Pending "CC.No. 538/2023"

2) Cr.No. 116/2023 30-07-2023 11-10-2023 12-01-2024 21-02-2024 Filed on 19-02-

          U/sec 392 IPCKadthal                   "Conditional                               2024
          PS                                     bail"
          "CC.No.596/2023"                                                                  Cancelled on 26-
                                                                                            02-2024
3)        Cr.No. 181/2023         28-08-2023     05-10-2023     Not          Not            Filed on
          U/sec 379 IPC           "Occurred                     Available/   Available/     27-02-2024     /
          Nandigama PS            on    14-07-                  Not          Not Enclosed   Pending
                                  2023"                         Enclosed
4)        Cr.No.433/2023          16-07-2023     20-10-2023     Not          Not            Filed on
          U/sec 382 IPC                          "Conditional   Available/   Available/     23-02-2024     /
          Jadcherla PS                           bail"          Not          Not Enclosed   Pending
          "CC.No. 08/2024"                                      Enclosed

The above are the four (04) cases which have been primarily looked

into by the authority concerned while passing the impugned order.

13. It is also relevant that in the Counter which has been filed by

the respondents, the details of the past antecedents of the detenu are

also reflected, which again for ready reference is reproduced herein

under:

 Sl.                  Crime No.                   Section of Law                 Place of offence
 No.
  1.                  389/2021                        379 IPC                       Cyberabad
     2.               393/2021                        379 IPC                       Cyberabad
     3.               995/2021                        379 IPC                       Cyberabad
     4.                11/2022                        379 IPC                       Cyberabad
     5.                20/2022                        379 IPC                       Cyberabad




 6.         613/2022          392 & 102 IPC          Cyberabad
 7.         167/2022              382 IPC            Cyberabad
 8.         328/2022              382 IPC            Cyberabad
 9.          76/2023           356, 379 IPC          Nagakurnool
 10.        248/2023           356, 379 IPC         Mahbubnagar
 11.        514/2023              379 IPC           Mahbubnagar
 12.        142/2023              379 IPC           Mahbubnagar

The duration within which these cases have been registered

against the detenu by itself would clearly indicate the fact that not

only is the detenu a habitual offender, but the frequency at which he

has been committing the offence is very high.

14. Another aspect which is revealed from the chart given above is

that the area of operations of the detenu is in and around the same

place. Further, from the Counter of the respondents, it is revealed

that in one of the cases in respect of chain snatching instance on

30.07.2023, the bail which was granted to the detenu has also been

cancelled. It is said that the detenu is a kingpin of a gang who

commit propertyoffences and are frequently involved in chain

snatching instances and also theft of bikes. Highlighting these

aspects, the learned Special Government Pleader contended that the

nature of the crimes committed by the detenu can be safely brought

within the ambit of the definition of "Goonda" so as to attract the

provisions of the Act of 1986.

15. Before we proceed further to decide the matter on merits

contesting the veracity of the impugned order, it would be relevant to

take note of certain provisions of the Act of 1986. Section 2(a) defines

the phrase "who acting in any manner prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order"which reads as under:

"(a) "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" means when a boot-legger, a dacoit, a drug-offender, a goonda, an immoral traffic offender, 4 [Land-Grabber, a Spurious Seed Offender, an Insecticide Offender, a Fertiliser Offender, a Food Adulteration Offender, a Fake Document Offender, a Scheduled Commodities Offender, a Forest Offender, a Gaming Offender, a Sexual Offender, an Explosive Substances Offender, an Arms Offender, a Cyber Crime Offender and a White Collar or Financial Offender] is engaged or is making preparations for engaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely, or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order:"

A plain reading of the said provision would clearly indicate that

Goonda has also been brought under the said definition and anact of

a Goonda can also be brought and treated as prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order.

16. Goonda is defined in clause (g) of Section 2 and which for ready

reference is again reproduced herein under:

"(g) "goonda" means a person, who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal Code;"

17. Next it would be relevant to take note of Section 3 under which

the impugned order has been passed. Sub-Section (1) of Section 3

prescribes the requirement under which the order of preventive

detention has to be passed and which for ready reference is

reproduced herein under:

"3. (1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any boot-legger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender 9 [Land-Grabber, Spurious Seed Offender, Insecticide Offender, Fertilizer Offender, Food Adulteration Offender, Fake Document Offender, Scheduled Commodities Offender, Forest Offender, Gaming Offender, Sexual Offender, Explosive Substances Offender, Arms Offender, Cyber Crime Offender and White Collar or Financial Offender] that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained."

18. Keeping in view the aforesaid statutory provisions, particularly

the Act of 1986 and the details which are reproduced in the

preceding paragraphs, we may now refer to a recent decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nenavath Bujji (supra). In the

said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos.23, 24

and 25 dealing with the explanation attached to Section 2(a) has held

as under:

"23.The explanation attached to Section 2(a) of the Act 1986 reproduced above contemplates that 'public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. The Explanation to Section 2(a) also provides that for the purpose of Section 2, a person shall be deemed to be "acting in any mannerprejudicial to the maintenance of public order" when such person is a "GOONDA" and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. It, therefore, becomes necessary to determine whether besides the person being a "GOONDA" his alleged activities are such which adversely affected the public order or are likely to affect the maintenance of public order.

24. The essential concept of preventive detention is that the detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is the satisfaction of the executive about the likelihood of the detenu acting in a manner,similar to his past acts, which is likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order and, thereby prevent him, by an order of detention, from doing the same. A criminal conviction on the other hand is for an act already done which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between the prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act 1986. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case a person is punished on proof of his guilt, and the standard is proof beyond the reasonable doubt, whereas in the other a person is detained with a view to prevent him from doing such act(s) as may be specified in the Act authorizing preventive detention.

25. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies

on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. (See :Haradhan Saha v. The State of W.B., 1974 Cri LJ 1479]"

19. Again in paragraph No.32, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in

great detail dealt with the expression law and order and public order

and held as under:

"32. The crucial issue is whether the activities of the detenu were prejudicial to public order. While the expression 'law and order' is wider in scope inasmuch as contravention of law always affects order, 'Public order' has a narrower ambit, and could be affected by only such contravention, which affects the community or the public at large. Public order is the even tempo of life of the community taking the country as a whole or even a specified locality. The distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' is one of degree and extent of the reach, of the act in question on society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order. If a contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinct from a wide spectrum of public, it could raise problem of law and order only. In other words, the true distinction between the areas of law and order and public order lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Acts similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of law and order only, while in another it might affect public order. The act by itself, therefore, is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from other similar acts, but in its potentiality, that is, in its impact on society, it may be very different. [See: Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda, (2004) 3 SCC 75.]"

20. Now if we look into the provisions of Section 2(a) i.e. the

definition "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of

public order" one of the person's whose act can be termed to be

prejudicial for the maintenance of the public order is that of

"Goonda". Now, who can be defined as Goonda again has been

explained under Section 2(g) of the Act of 1986 which again has

already been reproduced in the preceding paragraphs. The plain

reading of the said definition would clearly indicate that it includes a

person who is habitual offender or habitually commits an offence

punishable under the provision of Indian Penal Code, those which

has been defined under Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII and Chapter

XXII.

21. If we look into the large number of cases i.e. sixteen cases in a

span of three years, they were all committed within the same

adjacent and adjoining areas. Further, it would also reflect that the

offences for which the detenu stands charged are also those which

fall within the provisions of Chapter XV, Chapter XVII and Chapter

XXII.

22. What is necessary at this juncture is to appreciate the fact that

of late there has been a series of decisions rendered by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, most of which have travelled from the State of

Telangana and where detention orders were passed under the same

Act of 1986. The conclusion arrived at, or the gist of those

judgments is that every act or assault or an injury to specific person

or persons does not lead to public disorder. Such cases are to be

dealt with under the ordinary criminal law, but those culprits cannot

be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. In

order to bring it under the purview of public order, the effect has to

be upon the community or the public at large. Mere disturbance of

law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient

for drawing an action under the Preventive Detention Act. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in very categorical terms, held that it is

not open for the detaining authority to simply refer to stale instance

of the past and hold them as the basis of order of detention. Such

stale material should have some bearing on the probability of the

detenu engaging in prejudicial activities. Otherwise, these materials

will have no bearing on the detenu engaging in prejudicial activities

after he is released on bail or if he is on bail. It was also the verdict

of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that habitual commission of offence

cannot in isolation be taken as the basis of any detention order

rather it has to be decided on the matrix of "public order". It is only

those cases where such habituality creates disturbance to public

order that could qualify as a ground to pass orders of detention. It

was more emphatically laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

repeatedly that even in cases where these culprits repeat their

offences of similar nature after their release in one of these offences

or indulges in such nefarious activities, in such cases the State,

instead of proceeding to pass an order of preventive detention,

should immediately approach the concerned Court which has

enlarged the culprit on bail and seek for cancellation of the same by

highlighting his misdeeds that he has committed after he is released

on bail.

23. It is pertinent to note that in the aforesaid context the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Shaik Nazeen vs. State of Telangana 5

held at paragraph Nos.11 and 19 as under, viz.,

"11. The detention order was challenged by the wife of the detenu in a habeas corpus petition before the Division Bench of the

5 (2023) 9 S.C.C. 633

Telangana High Court. The ground taken by the petitioner before the High Court was that reliance has been taken by the Authority of four cases of chain snatching, as already mentioned above. The admitted position is that in all these four cases the detenu has been released on bail by the Magistrate. Moreover, in any case, the nature of crime as alleged against the petitioner can at best be said to be a law and order situation and not the public order situation, which would have justified invoking the powers under the preventive detention law. This, however, did not find favour with the Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the petition, upholding the validity of the detention order.

... ... ....

19. In any case, the State is not without a remedy, as in case the detenu is much a menace to the society as is being alleged, then the prosecution should seek for the cancellation of his bail and / or move an appeal to the Higher Court. But definitely seeking shelter under the preventive detention law is not the proper remedy under the facts and circumstances of the case."

24. The facts of the case in the above judgment (supra) are similar,

if not identical to the facts of the present case where also the major

criminal acts committed by the detenu are those of chain-snatching.

Further, what also seems to be the view of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court is that the fact that the detenu is getting detained and sent to

jail for a period of one year even though it is termed to be preventive,

but in fact it is punitive. Further, when such punitive actions,

though termed as "preventive", are passed by the authorities of the

State Government without there being any judicial scrutiny, or

subjecting the proceedings under the safeguards of a Court Trial, it

would be too drastic a step.

25. According to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the definition of

"public order" under Section 2A of the Act encompasses situations

which could otherwise cause harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of

insecurity among the general public. It could also be a situation

where there is a grave widespread danger to public order and for

which there has to be some material in this regard either general

complaint from the public or a group of persons or a society or at

least there should be discussion in the order.

26. However, in the instant case, except for the reference of the

repeat misdeeds of the detenu for which he has already been

prosecuted under the ordinary criminal law, there does not seem to

be any further material available on record.

27. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia vs. State of Bihar 6, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the concept of public order

made the following observations:

1966 SCR (1) 709

"A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances. It will thus appear that just as "public order" in the rulings of this Court (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of less gravity than those affecting "security of State", "law and order" also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting public order". One has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect law and order but not public order just as an act may affect public order but not security of the State".

28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in the case of Kanu Biswas

vs. State of West Bengal 7 dealing with the difference between law

and order and public order in paragraph No.7 has held as under:

"7. The question where a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance,of the public order, according to the dictum laid down in the above case is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call "order publique" and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above ,,case, is : Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as

1972 3 SCC 831

to amount to a disturbance of the public order ,or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?"

29. Similarly, in the case of Mallada K. Sri Ram v. The State of

Telangana 8, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at paragraph No.12 as

under:

"12. There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that the facts and circumstances of the case as alleged in the detention order dated 28.10.2021 though does reflect a law and order situation which can be dealt with under the ordinary law of land, and there was absolutely no occasion for invoking the extraordinary powers under the law of Preventive Detention. The reasons assigned by the authority in its detention, justifying the invocation of the provisions of the detention law are that the detenu has been granted bail in all the four cases and since he is likely to indulge in similar crime, hence the order of preventive detention."

30. In the case of Khaja Bilal Ahmed vs. State of Telangana 9, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

23.***If the pending cases were not considered for passing the order of detention, it defies logic as to why they were referred to in the first place in the order of detention.The purpose of the Telangana Offenders Act 1986 is to prevent any person from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public

2022 SCC Online SC 424

(2020) 13 SCC 632

order. For this purpose, Section 3 prescribes that the detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to indulge in illegal activities in the future and act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority must not be based on irrelevant or invalid grounds. It must be arrived at on the basis of relevant material; material which is not stale and has a live link with the satisfaction of the detaining authority.

The order of detention may refer to the previous criminal antecedents only if they have a direct nexus or link with the immediate need to detain an individual. If the previous criminal activities of the appellant could indicate his tendency or inclination to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, then it may have a bearing on the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. However, in the absence of a clear indication of a causal connection, a mere reference to the pending criminal cases cannot account for the requirements of Section 3. It is not open to the detaining authority to simply refer to stale incidents and hold them as the basis of an order of detention. Such stale material will have no bearing on the probability of the detenu engaging in prejudicial activities in the future."

31. In yet another land mark decision inAmeena Begum vs. The

State of Telangana 10, a judgment which has been pronounced

under the same provision of law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held at

paragraph Nos.34 to 37 as under:

(2023) 9 SCC 587

"34. In Kuso Sah vs. The State of Bihar 11, Hon'ble Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as the Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Bench held that:

"4.*** The two concepts have well defined contours, it being well established that stray and un-organised crimes of theft and assault are not matters of public order since they do not tend to affect the even flow of public life. Infractions of law are bound in some measure to lead to disorder but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. ***

6. ***The power to detain a person without the safeguard of a court trial is too drastic to permit a lenient construction and therefore Courts must be astute to ensure that the detaining authority does not transgress the limitations subject to which alone the power can be exercised. ***"

(underlining ours, for emphasis)

35. Turning our attention to section 3(1) of the Act, the Government has to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that a goonda (as in the present case) has to be detained, in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Therefore, we first direct ourselves to the examination of what constitutes 'public order'. Even within the provisions of the Act, the term "public order" has, stricto sensu, been defined in narrow and restricted terms. An order of detention under section 3(1) of the Act can only be issued against a detenu to prevent him "from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". "Public order" is defined in the Explanation to section 2(a) of the Act as encompassing situations

(1974) 1 SCC 195

that cause "harm, danger or alarm or a feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave wide- spread danger to life or public health".

36. Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) is an authority to rely upon for the proposition that if liberty of an individual can be invaded under statutory rules by the simple process of making of a certain order, he can be so deprived only if the order is in consonance with the said rule. Strict compliance with the letter of the rule, in such a case, has to be the essence of the matter since the statute has the potentiality to interfere with the personal liberty of an individual and a Court is precluded from going behind its face. Though circumstances may make it necessary for ordering a detention without trial, but it would be perfectly legitimate to require strict observance of the rules in such cases. If there is any doubt whether the rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must be resolved in favour of the detenu.

37. Rekha too (supra) provides a useful guide. It is said in paragraph 30 that:

"30. Whenever an order under a preventive detention law is challenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding its legality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal with the situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detention order will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against the detenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels. Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation. Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in question was illegal."

32. Under the given legal dictum in a series of decisions of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to in the preceding paragraphs, we

have no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that in the instant

case also only because the detenu has been charged with similar

type of offences in an around sixteen cases in a span of around three

years by itself cannot be said to be actions which can be brought

under the purview of the detention "acting in any manner prejudicial

to the maintenance of the public order". All these specific cases for

which he has been charged are cases which are otherwise subjected

to trial for the offences punishable under the provisions of Indian

Penal Code and cannot be generalized and brought within the

purview of public order.