Telangana High Court

The Registrar vs Dr. G. Usha Lavanya on 31 January, 2022

Bench: Satish Chandra Sharma, Abhinand Kumar Shavili

 HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
                               AND
     HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI

                W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

COMMON JUDGMENT:     (Per Hon'ble Sri Justice Abhinand Kumar Shavili)


     Both these Writ Appeals are disposed of by way of

common order as the issue raised in these two Appeals

are one and the same.


      2.   Heard   Sri    V.Jagapathi,              Counsel             for   the

appellants in both the appeals, Sri S.Krishna Sharma

and Sri Hari Sreedhar, Counsel for 1st respondent in

W.A.No.917 of 2010 and Sri Mohammed Imran Khan,

Counsel for the respondent in W.A.No.838 of 2010.

3. W.A.No.838 of 2010 is filed aggrieved by the

orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.156

of 2004 dt.09-09-2010. W.A.No.917 of 2010 is filed

aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Single

Judge in W.P.No.11185 of 2004 dt.09-09-2010

4. For the sake of convenience, the facts in

W.A.No.917 of 2010 are hereunder discussed.

5. It has been contended by the appellant-

Prachar Sabha that the 1st respondent has filed Writ

Petition challenging the acceptance of his resignation by

the appellant and the learned Single Judge was pleased 2 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

to allow the Writ Petition with costs of Rs.10,000/- and

directed that the appellant shall forthwith reinstate the

1st respondent into service. Learned counsel for the

appellant had contended that the 1st respondent having

tendered the resignation on 10-11-2003 with a request to

accept the resignation on the same day, the appellant

has accepted the resignation on 10-11-2003 and the

same was placed before the Executive Committee on

18-01-2004 and the Executive Committee has approved

the action taken by the Secretary and thereafter, the

appellant has also paid the benefits to the 1st respondent

and the 1st respondent having accepted all the benefits

arising out of acceptance of resignation proceedings, the

1st respondent cannot turn around and challenge the

action of the Executive Committee in accepting the

resignation of the 1st respondent. Learned counsel for

the appellant had further contended that the learned

Single Judge has erroneously interpreted the Regulation

20 of the Service Regulations of Prachara Sabha (for

short 'the Regulations'). Regulation 20 of the Regulations

reads as follows:

"Notice of leaving Service:

(a) If any employee of the Sabha wishes to leave service on his own behalf, he should give a notice of three months if he is a permanent employee and 3 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

of one month if he is a temporary employee, in the same way Sabha also gives a notice of three months to terminate permanent employees and one month for temporary employees.

(b) Violation of this rule, entitles a candidate to repay the salary and conveyance for the stipulated period as compensation. In the same way, if the violation of rule is caused by the Sabha, the Sabha too will pay compensation to the employee.

(c) In avoidable circumstances, the compensation from the employee can be waived partially or totally as per the orders of the Executive Committee."

From the perusal of the above Regulation, it is clear that

whenever an employee wishes to leave his service on his

own behalf, he should give a notice of three months, if he

is a permanent employee and of one month, if he is a

temporary employee. Learned counsel for the appellant

had contended that the learned Single Judge has allowed

the Writ Petition stating that there is no waiver

incorporated in the Regulation 20 and the appellant

could not have accepted the resignation of the 1st

respondent, moreover, when the 1st respondent has

withdrawn the resignation submitted by him even before

it was accepted by the Executive Committee. Learned

counsel for the appellant had contended that the learned

Single Judge has relied upon the judgment rendered by

the Supreme Court in S.M.Srikantha v. M/s.Bharath 4 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

Earth Movers Limited1 and the said judgment has no

application in the instant case.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant had further

contended that the 1st respondent having accepted the

benefits in the month of March 2004, the 1st respondent

could not have challenged the acceptance of resignation

by the appellant. Therefore, appropriate orders be

passed in the Writ Appeal by setting aside the order of

the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.11185 of

2004 dt.09-09-2010.

7. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had

contended that the 1st respondent was subjected to

humiliation and in a spur of moment, tendered

resignation on 10-11-2003 and immediately. On

14-11-2003 itself, the 1st respondent submitted a letter

seeking permission to withdraw the resignation. But the

appellant has not acted upon the letter of withdrawal of

resignation and the Executive Committee has accepted

the resignation of the 1st respondent on 18-01-2004 by

which time, the 1st respondent has already given a letter

on 14-11-2003 requesting the appellant to permit the 1st

respondent to withdraw the resignation. But the

appellant has not taken into consideration of the letter of

2005 (8) SCC 314 5 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

withdrawal of the 1st respondent and accepted the

resignation vide proceedings dt.18-01-2004.

8. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relied

upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in

Punjab National Bank v. P.K.Mittal2, wherein in para

No.7, it was held thus:

"7. ............. We are of the opinion that clause (2) of the regulation and its proviso are intended not only for the protection of the bank but also for the benefit of the employee. It is common knowledge that a person proposing to resign often wavers in this decision and even in a case where he has taken a firm decision to resign, he may not be ready to go out immediately. In most cases he would need a period of adjustment and hence like to defer the actual date of relief from duties for a few months for various personal reasons. Equally an employer may like to have time to make some alternative arrangement before relieving the resigning employee. Clause (2) is carefully worded keeping both these requirements in mind. It gives the employee a period of adjustment and rethinking. It also enables the bank to have some time to arrange its affairs, with the liberty, in an appropriate case, to accept the resignation of an employee even without the requisite notice if he so desires it. The proviso in our opinion should not be interpreted as enabling a bank to thrust a resignation on an employee with effect from a date different from the one on which he can make his resignation effective under the terms of the regulation. We, therefore, agree with the High Court that in the present case the resignation of the employee could have become effective only on or about 21-4-1986 or on 30-6-1986 and that the bank could not have "accepted" that resignation on any earlier date. The letter dated 7-2-1986 was, therefore, without jurisdiction."




    1990 SCC (L&S) 143
                             6                           HCJ & AKS,J
                                            W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

The learned counsel for the 1st respondent had contended

that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court,

the 1st respondent is entitled to withdraw the resignation

before it is accepted.

9. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had

further contended that as per the Regulations, the 1st

respondent is entitled to withdraw the resignation before

it is accepted. Admittedly in the instant case, the

resignation submitted by the 1st respondent was accepted

by the Executive Committee, which is the competent

authority, on 18-01-2004. By which time, the 1st

respondent has already submitted an application seeking

withdrawal of resignation on 14-11-2003 itself and the

Executive Committee ought to have taken into account

the letter of withdrawal of resignation submitted by the

1st respondent and pass appropriate orders in accordance

with law. But the Executive Committee has mechanically

accepted the resignation of the 1st respondent and the

learned Single Judge has rightly allowed the Writ Petition

in favour of the 1st respondent. Therefore, there are no

merits the Writ Appeals and the same are liable to be

dismissed.

7 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

10. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent had

further contended that even in the judgment rendered by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shambhu Murari Sinha v.

Project & Development India3, wherein the Supreme

Court held as under:

"5. From the facts stated above, it would be seen that though the option of voluntary retirement exercised by the appellant by his letter dated 18-10-1995 was accepted by the respondent Management by their letter dated 30-7-1997, the appellant was not relieved from service and he was allowed to continue in service till 26-9-1997, which, for all practical purposes, would be the "effective date" as it was on this date that he was relieved from service. In the meantime, as pointed out above, the appellant had already withdrawn the offer of voluntary retirement vide his letter dated 7-8-1997. The question which, therefore, arises in this appeal is whether it is open to a person having exercised option of voluntary retirement to withdraw the said offer after its acceptance but before it is made effective. The question is squarely answered by three decisions, namely, Balram Gupta v. Union of India [1987 Supp SCC 228 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 126 : (1987) 5 ATC 246] , J.N. Srivastava v. Union of India [(1998) 9 SCC 559 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1251] and Power Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia [(1997) 4 SCC 280 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 941] in which it was held that the resignation, in spite of its acceptance, can be withdrawn before the "effective date". That being so, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with the direction that the appellant shall be allowed to continue in service with all consequential benefits. There will, however, be no order as to costs."

11. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent had

contended that the Supreme Court has categorically

2000 (5) SCC 621 8 HCJ & AKS,J W.A.Nos.838 & 917 of 2010

stated that voluntary retirement as well as resignation

can be withdrawn before it is accepted by the authority.

Therefore, on this ground also, the Writ Appeal is liable

to be dismissed because by the time the competent

authority accepted the resignation, the 1st respondent

has submitted letter seeking withdrawal of the

resignation letter. Therefore, there are no merits in both

the Writ Appeal and the same are liable to be dismissed.

12. This Court having considered the rival