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Udaipur Tollway Limited vs Union Of India
2021 Latest Caselaw 3965 Raj/2

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3965 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 25 August, 2021

Rajasthan High Court
Udaipur Tollway Limited vs Union Of India on 25 August, 2021
Bench: Indrajit Mahanty, Satish Kumar Sharma
     HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                 BENCH AT JAIPUR

           D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11042/2020

1.   Udaipur Tollway Limited
     Registered Office At 1101 Hiranandani Knowledge Park,
     11th Floow, Technology Street, Hill Side Avenue, Opp.
     Hiranandani   Hospital,        Powai,       Mumbai-400         076   and
     Regional Office at Barkheda Chandlai Toll Plaza, Main Tonk
     Road, NH-12, Near Shivdaspura, Tehsil-Chaksu Distt.
     Jaipur-303903 (Rajasthan)
2.   CG Tollway Limited
     Registered Office At 1101 Hiranandani Knowledge Park,
     11th Floow, Technology Street, Hill Side Avenue, Opp.
     Hiranandani   Hospital,        Powai,       Mumbai-400         076   and
     Regional Office at Barkheda Chandlai Toll Plaza, Main Tonk
     Road, NH-12, Near Shivdaspura, Tehsil-Chaksu Distt.
     Jaipur-303903 (Rajasthan)
3.   Kishangarh Gulabpura Tollway Limited
     Registered Office At 1101 Hiranandani Knowledge Park,
     11th Floow, Technology Street, Hill Side Avenue, Opp.
     Hiranandani   Hospital,        Powai,       Mumbai-400         076   and
     Regional Office at Barkheda Chandlai Toll Plaza, Main Tonk
     Road, NH-12, Near Shivdaspura, Tehsil-Chaksu Distt.
     Jaipur-303903 (Rajasthan)
     Through Mr. Ajay Kumar Dhiman, S/o Shri Ranjit Singh
     aged about 49 Years Residing at T-896, Block-24, Rangoli
     Gardens, Near Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur (Rajasthan) PIN-
     302034
                                                              ----Petitioners
                               Versus
1.   Union Of India, through Secretary,
     Ministry Of Road Transport And Highways, Transport
     Bhawan, 1, Parliament Street, New Delhi - 110 001
2.   National   Highways           Authority          Of    India    (Nhai),
     Through Chairman,
     Having Office At G-5 & 6, Sector 10, Dwarka, New Delhi-
     110075
                                                            ----Respondents




                (Downloaded on 25/08/2021 at 10:18:12 PM)
                                          (2 of 22)               [CW-11042/2020]



For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. Vikram Nankani, Senior Advocate
                                Mr. Saurabh Kripal, Senior Advocate
                                assisted by Mr. Sarthak Sachdev
                                Mr.Vinod Menon,
                                Ms. Teresa Daulat
                                (Through V.C.)
                                Mr. P.C. Sharma
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. R.D. Rastogi, Additional Solicitor
                                General assisted by Mr. C.S. Sinha
                                Mr. Sudhir Gupta, Senior Advocate
                                assisted by Mr. Umang Gupta
                                (Through V.C.)
                                Ms. Priyal Kothari



                    HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH KUMAR SHARMA

Judgment Reserved on                    ::                       28/07/2021

Judgment Pronounce on                   ::                       25/08/2021

BY THE COURT (PER HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE):

1. The petitioners have impugned Rule 4(9) of the National

Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection) Rules,

2008, issued under Section 9 of the National Highways Act, 1956,

in the peculiar facts of the case. The petitioners have also

impugned Office Memorandum dated 18.05.2020 issued by the

Central Government for implementation inter alia by the Ministry

of Road Transport & Highways and NHAI, and the consequent

Policy Guidelines/BOT (Toll)/2020 dated 26.05.2020 issued by

NHAI. That apart the petitioners have also prayed for directing the

NHAI to maintain the same time gap of six months between the

Revised Completion Date/ Date of Toll Tariff Revision and date of

commencement of payment of premium, under the respective

Concession Agreements (with the approved EOT); or in the event

this Court comes to a conclusion that aforesaid prayer cannot be

(3 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

granted, to restrict the premium amount till the end of six months

from the Revised Completion Date, to such balance amount from

the fee collected in each of the previous months, which remains in

Escrow Account after payment of monthly operation and

maintenance charges and monthly debt servicing etc. as per the

waterfall mechanism provided in Article 31 of the Model

Concession Agreement, read with Section 8A of the National

Highways Act, 1956 and Rule 7(1) of the National Highways Fee

(Determination of Rates & Collection) Rules, 2008, and to refrain

NHAI from taking any coercive action against the petitioners for

the said period.

2. The respondents filed their replies opposing each of the

prayers. It is submitted that the writ petition is not maintainable

being related to purely contractual obligation and the challenge to

the rules etc. is misconceived. Reliance is placed on the following

observations in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

JWS Infrastructure Vs. Kakinada Seaports Ltd., (2017) 14

SCC 170-

"thus it is apparent that in contractual matters, the writ courts should not interfere unless the decision taken is totally arbitrary, perverse or mala fide."

It is the contention of the respondents that each of the

petitioners is bound by Article 44 of the agreement providing for a

Three Tier Dispute Resolution Mechanism. The attempt of the

petitioners to link payment of premium to collection of fees is

untenable and devoid of merits. Vide Article 25.4 of the

agreement the petitioners have acknowledged and agreed to pay

each year the premium as per Article 26.2.1 of the agreement.

(4 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

They have agreed to pay premium from 03.09.2020, 04.11.2020

and 21.02.2021 i.e. after 3rd anniversay year of commercial

operation dated 03.09.2017, 04.11.2017 and 21.02.2018. Article

12.4 provides for 910th day from the appointed date to be

scheduled date for completion of six-laning. It was contended that

agreements provide for extension of completion date, but not for

date for payment of premium. The payment of premium is wholly

independent of toll fee collection. Article 27 and Rules, 2008 have

no co-relation with the payment of premium. Challenge to the

Rules is liable to the dismissed, as the presumption is always in

the favour of validity of a statute. It is further contended that

COVID-19 being a pandemic, is a non-political event as per Article

34.2, and not a political event as stated by the petitioners.

Therefore, as per Article 34.7.2, the parties have to bear their

respective force majeure costs. No grave harm, loss and prejudice

is caused towards petitioners by the impugned Office

Memorandum and Policy Guidelines. It was also suggested that

the petitioners have given up the challenge to the constitutionality

of the rule. Writ Petition aims to nullify the contract. Petitioners

have waived their past claims by signing agreement for

settlement. It is contended that petition should also be dismissed

for want of territorial jurisdiction, and for filing one common

petition. It was thus contended on behalf of the respondents that

the writ petition should be dismissed, and the petitioners should

be directed to pay the due premium with interest.

3. An "Additional Affidavit" dated 14.02.2021 was filed by the

petitioners, to bring on record that post filing of the instant writ

petition the respondents have already made appropriate revision

(5 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

in Clause 26.2.1 of the 'Model Concession Agreement for

Capacity Augmentation of Projects under Tolling (6 laning BOT-Toll

Projects) issued on 09.12.2020 on the website of Ministry of Road

Transport & Highways, Government of India. AS per the revised

Clause 26.2.1, now the obligation under such statutory contracts

to pay premium from the Toll fee collection would commence only

"after the first (1st ) anniversary of the Projection Completion

Date, for every year of the remaining Concession Period, to be

calculated on total Realisable Fee". The earlier gap of "six months"

between the completion date and date of obligation to pay

premium is thus also revised as "one year". Cash Flow Charts

certified by Statutory Auditor were also placed on record showing

that cumulatively about Rs.5,000/- crores had been invested by

them in the construction of these projects of NHAI including from

promoter's/ sponsor contribution and finances availed. It further

shows that the deposits into project account from the Toll Fee

collection is significantly lower than what was appraised in view of

impugned Rule 4(9) as well as effect of restrictions imposed on

movements vide various orders issued pursuance to the Covid

pandemic. The withdrawals from the project account, which are to

be done sequentially in the order given in waterfall mechanism

agreed between the parties, also show that till date not a single

Rupee has been withdrawn by any of the petitioners either

towards any reasonable return on investment or to gradually

recover the capital contribution. It was also submitted that the

entire capital amount already invested from the promoter's

contribution sufficiently safeguards the interests of the NHAI

towards disputed premium liability.

(6 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

4. The respondents submit that the petition is not maintainable,

inter alia, in view of arbitration agreement. It is contended that

interim protection should not be extended and the petition should

be dismissed.

5. On inquiring about possibility to explore alternate dispute

resolution, the petitioners prayed to decide the petition on merits.

However, without prejudice to the contentions made in the

petition, the petitioners have placed on record an Order dated

16.04.2019 in Writ Petition No.3415/2019- IRB Ahmedabad

Vadodara Super Express Tollway Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of

India & Ors., filed by another Group Company of the petitioners,

wherein the Bombay High Court considering prima facie case,

while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India and while relegating the parties for

arbitration, was pleased to grant the interim protection for limited

period of three months. The entitlement of the petitioner therein

to claim further appropriate interim reliefs under Section 9 and 17

of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 was also kept open. This

interim relief was subject to the undertaking to the Court by the

petitioner therein that in the event it is unsuccessful in the

arbitration, the premium for the subject period shall be payable by

it on the principle of "premium deferment scheme". Vide orders

dated 29.04.2019 and 11.09.2019 respectively, SLP (C)

No.10741/2019 filed by the petitioner therein as well as SLP (C)

No.21315/2019 filed by NHAI, against the said order dated

16.04.2019 were both dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

The interim protection granted by the Bombay High Court and the

undertaking given by the petitioner therein were thereafter

(7 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

extended by the Delhi High Court vide an order dated 14.10.2019

in OMP(I)(Comm.) No.247/2019, till the decision of the Application

under Section 17 of the Act by the Arbitral Tribunal. The

petitioners submit that the balance of convenience is in their

favour. Reliefs, if not granted/extended, would lead to undue

hardship, drastic unwarranted consequences and irreparable loss

to the petitioners. No loss would be caused to the respondents on

the other hand if the reliefs are granted or extended.

6. The respondents submit that the petitioners ought to be

relegated for arbitration. However, it is contended that no interim

protection should be granted.

7. An application for vacating ad-interim order dated

18.09.2020 was also filed. However, both sides agreed to finally

dispose of the petition itself.

8. All the parties have been heard at considerable length.

Parties were permitted to file their written submissions. We have

perused the records and carefully considered the submissions and

plethora of case cited by all the parties.

9. All three petitioners in the instant writ petition are

subsidiaries/ SPVs of the original bidder M/s IRB Infrastructure

Developers Limited (IRB). All three SPVs have entered into

respective Concession Agreement with the respondent No.2 NHAI,

for development of four to six laning of respective Highway

Projects in the State of Rajasthan. Undoubtedly these three

National Highways Projects are in the interest of people residing in

the entire State of Rajasthan. Huge investments have been made

by the petitioners from private sources or borrowings in these

projects of NHAI in the State. It is also not in dispute that regional

(8 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

office of all three petitioners is in Jaipur. We are thus satisfied that

substantial cause of action, therefore, is in State of Rajasthan to

confer territorial jurisdiction to consider this writ petition filed

jointly by teh three SPVs of IRB on its own merits.

10. As per Section 5 of the National Highways Act, 1956, it shall

be the responsibility of the Central and State Government to

develop and maintain in proper repair all national highways.

However, Section 8A of the said Act, inserted w.e.f. 16.06.1995,

private investments were permitted by entering into an agreement

with any person. Section 8A reads as under:

"8A. Power of Central Government to enter into agreements for development and maintenance of national highways.- Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government may enter into an agreement with any person in relation to the development and maintenance of the whole or any part of a national highway.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 7, the person referred to in sub-section (1) is entitled to collect and retain fees at such rate, for services or benefits rendered by him as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify having regard to the expenditure involved in building, maintenance, management and operation of the whole or part of such national highway, interest on the capital invested, reasonable return, the volume of traffic and the period of such agreement.

(3) A person referred to in sub-section (1) shall have powers to regulate and control the traffic in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (59 of 1988) on the national highway forming subject-matter of such agreement, for proper management thereof."

11. These are the private investment projects permitted under

Section 8A of National Highways Act, 1956 and are not "public

projects" of NHAI. The Concession Agreements entered with the

(9 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

petitioners are thus pursuance to the statutory power conferred

upon the Central Government under Section 8A in larger public

interest. The fee for services or benefits rendered by the

petitioners is specified by Central Government vide notification

having regard to the expenditure involved in building,

maintenance, management and operation of the whole or part of

respective national highway, interest on the capital invested,

reasonable return, the volume of traffic and the period of such

agreement. The payment of "premium" is not envisaged in Section

8A for specifying the fee.

12. The scheme of the agreement is such that the

Concessionaire first invests its own capital and constructs the

National Highway for the respondent. The entire fee collected

thereafter from such constructed project also gets deposited into

an Escrow Account. Only permitted withdrawals already agreed in

the Concession Agreement are allowed to be done sequentially by

appropriation from the said Escrow Account. As per Article 31.3,

a waterfall mechanism is provided in the agreement for permitted

withdrawals from Escrow Account where all fee and receivables

are deposited.

13. It is not in dispute that the toll fee to be collected is

governed by the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates &

Collection) Rules, 2008.

14. As per Article 27.1.1, on and from the COD till the Transfer

Date, the concessionaire has the right to demand, collect and

appropriate fee from the users subject to and in accordance with

the Agreement and the National Highways Fee (Determination of

Rates and Collection) Rules, 2008. The fee levied at rate specified

(10 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

by the Central Government shall be appropriated by the

concessionaire in accordance with the provisions of and for the

performance of its obligations under the agreement entered into

by such concessionaire, as envisaged in second proviso of Rule

7(1) of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates &

Collection) Rules, 2008. The payment of premium is an obligation

under the Concession Agreement. Second proviso to Rule 7(1)

reads as under-

"7. Remittance and appropriation of fee:

(1) In case of public funded projects,.......

Provided that.........

Provided further that in case of "private investment projects", the fee collected under the provisions of these rules shall be appropriated by the concessionaire in accordance with the provisions of and for the performance of its obligations under the agreement entered into by such concessionaire."

(emphasis supplied)

15. Therefore, performance of obligation to pay premium under

the agreement in case of "private investment projects", is to be

discharged by appropriating the fee collected in accordance with

the agreement read with the National Highways Fee

(Determination of Rates & Collection) Rules, 2008.

16. The respondents contended that revenue share concept is

not envisaged for payment of premium. However, the Appendix

provided by NHAI at the time of Bidding, relied upon by the

petitioners states-

"I/We hereby submit our Bid and offer a premium in the form of Rs.------- (in words) out of the gross revenues of the Project as share of the Authority/require a Grant of Rs.------ (Rupees ---------only)."

(11 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

Article 25.4 of the agreement also imposes liability to pay

premium offered as per the Bid. The "revenues sharing concept"

also finds support from second proviso to Rule 7(1).

17. Therefore, prima facie, we are unable to agree with the

contention of the respondents that the payment of premium is

wholly independent of toll fee collection, and that Article 27 and

the Rules, 2008 have no co-relation with the payment of premium.

18. The impugned Rule 4(9) of the said National Highways Fee

(Determination of Rates & Collection) Rules, 2008 reads as

follows-

"(9) The rate of fee for a section of a four lance highway shall on and from the commencement of work relating to upgradation to six laning, be seventy-five percent of the fee applicable on the date of commencement of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates & Collection) Amendment Rules, 2013, till the completion of the project without any annual revision:

Provided that no user fee shall be levied for the delayed period between the date of completion as per the agreement entered into with the concessionaire and the date of actual completion of the project.

Explanation: For the purpose of this rule, any provisional completion of the project shall not be treated as completion of the project."

19. Impugned Sub-rule(9) of Rule 4 in particular, and the Fee

Rules in general, do not define or explain the expressions "the

commencement of the work" as well as "till the completion of the

project." Fee Rules are also silent about payment of additional

concession fee or the premium to NHAI. In our prima facie view,

in case of a "private investment project", the commercial

relationship between the parties is governed by the Fee Rules and

the agreements which are to be harmoniously construed. The

(12 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

impugned Rule 4(9) prima facie appears to be in public interest

with an aim not to burden the user of the highway with fee at

100% rate, till the four lane to six lane upgradation is not

complete.

20. These agreements in "private investment projects", on Build,

Finance, Operate & Transfer (DBFOT) basis, different milestones to

be achieved with obligations and entitlements thereupon, are

categorically mentioned and computed from the Appointed

Date/Commercial Operation Date. As per Article 10.3.4 and

10.3.5, the Right of Way in respect of concerned land is to be

provided by NHAI to the concessionaire within 120 days from

COD. Thereafter, as per Article 12.4.1, the construction is to be

completed by the Concessionaire within 910 days from COD.

Thereafter, as per Article 25.4 read with Article 26.2.1, as set

forth in the Bid, the obligation to pay premium commences

immediately after the third anniversary year of COD i.e. on

completion of 3 years from COD.

21. Accordingly, the agreement read with rules envisaged "right

of way" to be provided by NHAI within 120 days from COD, to

enable the petitioners to complete upgradation of 4 lane highway

to six lane highway within 910 days from COD. The premium

payment to NHAI, under Article 26 of the Concession Agreement,

was envisaged to commence on completion of three years from

COD. Thus, prima facie, a consistent gap of about six months was

envisaged in each of the agreements between the date of

'completion' and the date of commencement of obligation to pay

premium.

(13 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

22. In the aforesaid statutory and contractual scheme in such

projects of public interest, the issue that arises for consideration is

whether NHAI compelling the petitioner to perform obligation to

pay premium on completion of 3 years from COD would be

manifestly arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution

of India, if having first failed in its obligation to give complete

"right of way" within 120 days from COD, the NHAI has itself

extended the date of completion beyond 910 days from COD.

23. It is undisputed position on record that as per the

agreements, the Appointed Date/Commercial Operation Date

(COD) in respect of the project of petitioner Nos.1 to 3 are

03.09.2017, 04.11.2017 and 21.02.2018 respectively. The Right

of Way was to be provided by NHAI in 120 days from COD i.e. on

01.01.2018, 04.03.2018 and 18.06.2018 respectively. The

upgradation of project highways from 4 to 6 lanes was to be

completed by the petitioners on 910 days from COD i.e. on

29.02.2020, 02.05.2020 and 18.08.2020 respectively. Thereafter,

as per the Concession Agreements the obligation of the petitioners

to pay premium was to commence on expiry of 3 years from COD

i.e. on 03.09.2020, 04.11.2020 and 21.02.2021, thereby

maintaining a consistent gap of about six months between the

date of 'completion' and the date of commencement of obligation

to pay premium. In the peculiar facts of the case, for various

reasons the handing over of the right of way could not be

completed by NHAI within 120 days. Consequently, the originally

scheduled "Completion Dates" were initially extended by NHAI to

30.11.2020, 31.01.2021 and 09.09.2021 respectively, and finally,

to 31.05.2021, 30.07.2021 and 09.09.2021 respectively. During

(14 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

the pendency of the petition, petitioner No.1 completed the

construction on 31.05.2021. (1st Project)

24. Respondents contend that till these revised completion dates

the petitioners are entitled to collect fee at 75% rate from the

users in view of impugned Rule 4(9), and that the petitioners

would be bound to discharge obligation to pay premium to NHAI

on completion of 3 years from COD, notwithstanding failure to

give "right to way" within 120 days and extension of completion

date by NHAI itself. According to the petitioners this approach of

the respondents is manifestly arbitrary.

25. After filing of the instant petition impugning the Rule 4(9),

the respondents have themselves issued revised Model Concession

Agreement, wherein the premium obligation under Article 26.2.1

would commence only after expiry of one year from the Project

Completion Date. The petitioners contend that such revision in the

model contract, which is statutory in nature, is clarificatory and

shall apply retrospectively. The respondents have argued that the

same applies only prospectively and has no impact on the

agreements already entered.

26. So far as the initial period of 910 days from COD is

concerned, the petitioners have not raised any grievance raised

any grievance regarding the levy of fee at 75% rate under the

impugned Rule 4(9). The grievance raised is for reduced rate of

fee for the agreed extended period beyond 910 days. This

grievance is raised particularly in the light that on one hand

without any default on their part even after completion of 910

days from COD, by virtue of impugned Rule 4(9) the petitioners

are being permitted to levy toll fee only at rate reduced to 75%

(15 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

with extension of completion date by NHAI, and on other hand

premium is being demanded on completion of 3 years from COD,

without maintaining the envisaged gap of six months from the

Completion Date or excluding the period of extension in

completion date.

27. We find prima facie merit in the submission that the

agreement envisaged that on timely completion of project as per

the originally agreed completion date i.e. from 910 th day from

COD, the petitioners would have levied and collected 100% Toll

Fee for a period of six months. The premium would have been

appropriated from such Toll Fee collected as per second proviso to

Rule 7, only after 3 year from COD. This six months gap between

date of completion and date of premium envisaged in the

Agreement would have generated fund flow of fee at 100% rate

for six months, before commencing appropriation of premium

from such Toll Fee collected. The payment of "premium" would

have commenced only on revenue sharing concept, after having

collected substantial fee revenue .There would have been much

higher balance in the Escrow Account wherein fee gets deposited,

after appropriation towards monthly Operation and Maintenance

charges, monthly debt servicing, taxes etc., to appropriate

premium, as per the waterfall mechanism provided in Article 31.

28. The agreed completion date is revised by NHAI beyond 910

days from COD, for reasons such as delay in handing over the land

which was envisaged within 120 days of COD. Despite the same,

the petitioners are being compelled to pay premium from 3 years

from COD, without maintaining a gap of about six months from

the completion date. On one hand, in view of Rule 4(9), the

(16 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

petitioners are permitted to levy Toll Fee reduced to 75% in the

agreed extended period, on the other hand they are being

compelled to not only appropriate the fee collected for payment of

premium, but are being asked to bring more funds only to pay

premium without actual collection of adequate fee. In the aforsaid

peculiar circumstances, prima facie, we are of the view that such

action of the respondents would be wholly unfair, unreasonable,

discriminatory and manifestly arbitrary on the vice of Article 14

and 19 of the Constitution of India and would cause palpable

injustice to the petitioners.

29. During the pendnecy of this petition, the respondents have

themselves issued revised Model Concession Agreement by

clarificatory and beneficial revision in Clause 26.2.1 and have not

only linked the commencement of premium obligation with the

date of completion of the project, but have also extended the gap

between the two dates to 1 years from earlier six months.

30. Various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court viz. Tata

Cellular Vs. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651, Jamshed

Hormusji Wadia Vs. Board of Trustee, Port of Mumbai,

(2004) 3 SCC 214, ABL International Ltd. Vs. ECGC, (2004)

3 SCC 553, Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi Vs. State of U.P.,

(1991) 1 SCC 212 and Unitech Ltd. Vs. Telangana State

Industrial Infrastructure Corporation, 2021 SCC Online SC

99, permit judicial review in writ jurisdiction even in contractual

matters, if the State or its Instrumentality acts in such arbitrary

manner which are in breach of Article 14 of the Constitution of

India. None of the judgments relied upon by the respondents

completely oust exercise of writ jurisdiction in contractual matters

(17 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

in such peculiar circumstances. Further, in Nabha Power Ltd. Vs.

Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. , (2018) 11 SCC

508, it was held to the effect that a contract must be read to give

effect to the bargain between the parties in a commercial sensible

manner.

31. NHAI was unable to perform its obligation concerning Right

of Way within 120 days from COD, and thus the date of

completion was extended by it beyond 910 days from COD. In

such circumstances, the demand of premium from 3 years from

COD, while restricting the petitioners' entitlement to collect fee at

75% rate, prima facie appears to be manifestly arbitrary,

discriminatory, unreasonable and violative of Article 14.

32. For the above reasons, we find prima facie merit in the

contention of the petitioners that six months gap would have to be

maintained between Completion Date and commencement of

obligation to pay premium. Thus, prima facie, if NHAI extends the

completion date, the period of such extension shall be excluded

while computing three years from the COD for commencement of

obligation to pay premium. We are of the prima facie view that

while computing three years from Appointed Date/Commercial

Operation Date for commencement of obligation to pay premium

under Article 26.2.1, the number of days between the originally

agreed completion dates and the revised completion dates

subsequently agreed by NHAI, would have to be excluded, so as

to maintain six months gap between the completion date and

commencement of obligation to pay premium.

33. The impugned Rule 4(9) is statutory in character, and the

presumption is always in the favour of validity of a statute. The

(18 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

petitioners have impugned Rule 4(9), and the challenge to

thesame was never given up expressly or impliedly, in writing or

orally. Alternate prayer to read down the rule to save it from

unconstitutionality, do not amount to giving up the challenge. The

impugned Rule 4(9) appears to be in public interest with an aim

not to burden the user of the highway with fee at 100% rate, till

the four lane to six lane upgradation is not complete. It has been

brought to our knowledge that the respondents have themselves

introduced during the pendency of this petition, a revised Model

Concession Agreement, which removes the peculiar situation in

which the instant petition has been filed. The respondents now

during pendency of this petition have themselves revised the

statutory contracts by clarificatory and beneficial revision in

Clause 26.2.1 and have not only linked the commencement of

premium obligation with the date of completion of the project, but

have also extended the gap between the two dates to 1 year from

earlier six months. We, therefore, find that now the challenge to

the Rule no more survives. Accordingly, the challenge to Rule 4(9)

is dismissed.

34. The Office Memorandum dated 18.05.2020 and the

consequent Guidelines dated 26.05.2020 are challenged on the

touchstone of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

Certain directions are also sought by the petitioners for

consideration by NHAI. We do not find anything in the impugned

OM or the Guidelines which can come in the way of claiming any

compensation for the material adverse impact of force majeure

provided in Article 34 of the Concession Agreement on its own

merits. In-fact, Para (v) of the impugned guidelines issued by

(19 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

NHAI for the relief measures inter alia records that, if provisions in

the Concession Agreement are different, the provisions of the

Concession Agreement shall prevail. It would be for the authority

to consider as to for what period any Order or Instructions of

Government or its authority curtailed the traffic, and for what

period the traffic was curtailed only because of pandemic, but not

for any such Order/Instructions. Merely because OM or Guidelines

issued thereafter are silent on this aspect, it would not mean that

the request for adjudication of entitlement already provided in the

Agreement would not be considered on its own merits. We,

therefore, do not find any infirmity in these Office Memorandum

dated 18.05.2020 and the consequent Guidelines dated

26.05.2020. If after the Authority communicates its view and the

petitioners are aggrieved with the same, the petitioners can have

recourse to arbitration.

35. In view of being satisfied with the prima facie case, we are

persuaded to deem it appropriate to exercise writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 in the aforesaid peculiar circumstances for the

limited purpose of interim protection while relegating the parties

to arbitration. With the above prima facie observations, we are

inclined to direct the petitioners and NHAI to explore the

arbitration for final decision on merits of their case. To secure the

ends of justice, and for reasons recorded herein, we deem it just

and expedient to protect the petitioners in the meanwhile.

36. We are of the view that apart from having prima facie case in

their favour, the petitioners have already invested huge amounts

in their respective projects. They have also shown bona fides by

offering adequate security by way of their proposed undertaking

(20 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

to secure the interests of NHAI. The respondents have even

previously for various stressed projects agreed to defer even the

undisputed premium payment obligations, on the condition of such

deferred premium being repaid at the end of the deferment period

with interest. Vide an order dated 16.04.2019, a Division Bench of

the Bombay High Court in a Writ Petition No.3415/2019, had

observed as under:-

"10. The matter though requires detailed adjudication of facts, it is very much apparent that the petitioner is suffering huge losses in view of the actual volume of traffic being far less than projected. The possible diversion of traffic as framed by the petitioner, therefore, prima facie cannot be ruled out.

11. However, since we have noted that the petitioner is in arduous situation on account of existing statutory scheme which we have set out briefly in above paragraph, we deem it appropriate to exercise our jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and for limited period we protect the petitioner Company from being faced with an action of termination of agreement in the contingency of default in payment of premium to the NHAI for the period of three months subject to the petitioners undertaking to the Court within the period of one week that in the event the petitioner is unsuccessful in the arbitration, the premium for above period shall be payable by the petitioner on the principle of "premium deferment scheme" of the Central Government earlier agreed in supplementary agreement dated 06.06.2014 with applicable interest. Needless to state that the petitioner would be entitled to claim further appropriate interim relief under the provisions of Sections 9 and 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

We make it clear that we have not deliberated on the issue on the merits of the matter and the opinion expressed by us is prima facie and the Board of Arbitrators would be at liberty to resolve the dispute strictly within the four corners of the agreement and the existing Statutory Scheme. As regards the challenge of the petitioner to Rule 7(1) of the National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and

(21 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

Collection) Rules, 2008, we leave the said challenge open without going into the merits of the same at this stage. In the light of the aforesaid directions the Writ Petition stands disposed of."

37. Vide an order dated 11.09.2019, the said order of Bombay

High Court was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while

dismissing SLP(C) No. 21315/2019 filed by NHAI.

38. Accordingly, we pass the following order:-

(i) The challenge of the petitioners to Rule 4(9) of the

National Highways Fee (Determination of Rates and Collection)

Rules, 2008 is dismissed.

(ii) Challenge to the Office Memorandum dated 18.05.2020

and Policy Guidelines dated 26.05.2020 is dismissed.

(iii) The petitioners are permitted to invoke arbitration

proceedings within a period of four weeks, and parties are free to

raise all contractual disputes before the Arbitral Tribunal for their

decision on merits.

(iv) NHAI shall within two weeks communicate to the

petitioners their decision on petitioners' claim for compensation for

force majeure or extension. If aggrieved with the same, the

petitioners would have remedy in arbitration, wherein all

contentions of the parties in this regard would remain open.

(v) Considering prima facie case, for a limited period of

three months from issuance of this order or till the date of

completion of the project whichever is earlier, the alleged

obligation of the petitioners to pay premium under Article 26.2.1

shall remain stayed. This stay is subject to the petitioners

furnishing undertaking to this Court within a period of one week

that in the event the petitioners are unsuccessful in the

(22 of 22) [CW-11042/2020]

arbitration, the disputed premium shall be payable by the

petitioners with interest on the principle of "premium deferment

scheme" (referred in the aforesaid order dated 16.04.2019 of the

Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.3415/2019, upheld by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 11.09.2019 dismissing

SLP(C) No.21315/2019 filed by NHAI. The petitioners would also

undertake that after appropriating the monthly liabilities

sequentially towards taxes, payment towards construction, O&M

Expenses and Debt Servicing in the order already given in Article

31, entire balance amount from the Toll Fee collected would

remain available in the Escrow Account, which would be subject to

the decision in Section 9 and/or 17 of the Arbitration &

Conciliation Act, 1996, as the case may be.

(vi) Needless to state that the petitioner would be entitled

to claim further appropriate interim relief under the provisions of

Section 9 and/or 17 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

39. We make it absolutely clear that the observations made

hereinabove are only prima facie and we have not deliberated on

the issue on the merits of the matter. The Arbitral Tribunal would

resolve the disputes in accordance with law and the observations

made herein would not bind the Arbitral Tribunal.

40. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly.

41. In view of the disposal of the writ petition, all pending

applications hereby stand disposed of.

(SATISH KUMAR SHARMA),J (INDRAJIT MAHANTY),CJ

KAMLESH KUMAR /Reserved

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