Vipul Kaushik S/O Harish Kaushik vs Union Of India
2021 Latest Caselaw 3740 Raj/2

Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3740 Raj/2
Judgement Date : 16 August, 2021

Rajasthan High Court

Vipul Kaushik S/O Harish Kaushik vs Union Of India on 16 August, 2021

Bench: Indrajit Mahanty, Manoj Kumar Vyas

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
                   BENCH AT JAIPUR

                 D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 538/2021

Vipul Kaushik S/o Harish Kaushik
                                                                        ----Petitioner
                                      Versus
Union Of India
                                                                      ----Respondent

For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Parthiv K. Goswami through VC Mr. Sameer Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.D. Rastogi, ASG assisted by Mr. Akshay Bhardwaj through VC Mr. Namandeep Singh on behalf of Mr. Anand Sharma

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR VYAS

Order

16/08/2021

1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. Today, the matter has been listed on an application

(No.2/2021) filed by the Union of India seeking vacation of the

interim order dated 28.01.2021 as modified by order dated

15.02.2021 essentially on the ground of writ petitioner having

been granted leave to prefer an appeal before the PMLA Tribunal

and the Tribunal be allowed to proceed with the appeal without

waiting for a decision on the writ application challenging the

constitutional validity of Section 50 before this Court.

3. Mr. R.D. Rastogi, learned Additional Solicitor General placed

reliance on paras 179 and 180 of the judgment delivered by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Roger Mathew Vs. South

India Bank Limited reported in (2020) 6 SCC page 1, which

are quoted hereinbelow:-

(2 of 4) [CW-538/2021]

"179. This Court had earlier noted the statements of the Ld. Attorney General vide order dated 27 March 2019 in W.P. (C) No. 267/2012, wherein it was submitted that the Ministry of Law is already overburdened and cannot effectively perform the supervisory function, as a single nodal Ministry, for all the Tribunals, as was earlier suggested by this Court.

180. What appears to be of paramount importance is that every Tribunal must enjoy adequate financial independence for the purpose of its day to day functioning including the expenditure to be incurred on (a) recruitment of staff;(b) creation of infrastructure; (c) modernisation of infrastructure; (d)computerisation;(e) perquisites and other facilities admissible to the Presiding Authority or the Members of such Tribunal. It may not be very crucial as to which Ministry or Department performs the duties of Nodal Agency for a Tribunal, but what is of utmost importance is that the Tribunal should not be expected to look towards such Nodal Agency for its day to day requirements. There must be a direction to allocate adequate and sufficient funds for each Tribunal to make it self-sufficient and self- sustainable authority for all intents and purposes. The expenditure to be incurred on the functioning of each Tribunal has to be necessarily a charge on the Consolidated Fund of India. Therefore, hitherto, the Ministry of Finance shall, in consultation with the Nodal Ministry/Department, shall earmark separate and dedicated funds for the Tribunals. It will not only ensure that the Tribunals are not under the financial control of the Department, who is a litigant before them, but it may also enhance the public faith and trust in the mechanism of Tribunals."

Relying on the above, learned ASG has submitted that there

is no impediment for the Tribunal to hear the appeal in view of the

observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as noted

hereinabove.

4. Mr. Parthiv K. Goswami, learned counsel for the petitioner on

the other hand, drew our attention to various other directions

(3 of 4) [CW-538/2021]

issued by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the same judgment and in

particular the direction issued by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para

118, which reads as under:-

118.There is yet another reason why we feel the matter should be referred to a Constitution Bench of seven Judges. L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, which was decided by a Bench of seven Judges, had also interpreted on the ambit of supervision by the High Courts under Article 227(1) of the Constitution to observe that the constitutional scheme does not require that all adjudicatory bodies which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts should be subject to their onerous burden. Consequently, adding to their supervisory functions vide Article 227(1) cannot be of assistance in any manner. Thereafter, it was observed that different tribunals constituted under different enactments are administered by the Central and the State Governments, yet there was no uniformity in administration. This Court was of the view that until a wholly independent agency for such tribunals can be set up, it is desirable that all such tribunals should be, as far as possible, under a single nodal Ministry which will be in a position to oversee the working of these tribunals. For a number of reasons, the Court observed that the Ministry of Law would be the appropriate Ministry. The Ministry of Law in turn was required to appoint an independent supervisory body to oversee the working of the Tribunals. As noticed above, this has not happened. In these circumstances, it would be appropriate if these aspects has not happened. In these circumstances, it would be appropriate if these aspects and questions are looked into by a Bench of seven Judges."

Placing reliance on para 118, Mr. Goswami submits that

judgment relied upon by the petitioner i.e Union of India Vs. R.

Gandhi and Others, (2010) 11 SCC page 1 continues to be the

(4 of 4) [CW-538/2021]

law of the land and in any event, as noted in para 118 in the case

of Roger Mathew (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred

the matter to a larger Bench.

5. At the present juncture, we need not enter into merits of the

present case and the contentions raised vis-a-vis constitutional

validity of the Section 50 of challenge therein. However, we modify

our interim order permitting the PMLA Tribunal to proceed with the

appeal and pass orders thereon strictly in accordance with law.