Citation : 2024 Latest Caselaw 714 AP
Judgement Date : 25 January, 2024
1
GN, J.
W.P.No.30961 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH :: AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[
3462
]
THURSDAY ,THE TWENTY FIFTH DAY OF JANUARY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR
APHC010634402018
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
WRIT PETITION NO: 30961 OF 2018
Between:
Mr.K.Srinivasa Rao ...PETITIONER(S)
AND
THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S)
Counsel for the Petitioner(s):SRI. V R MACHAVARAM
Counsel for the Respondents: GP FOR REVENUE (AP)
The Court made the following:
ORDER:
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Standing Counsel-cum-Special Public Prosecutor for ACB
Cases, appearing for the 2nd respondent.
2) The petitioner is before this Court impugning the order of
sanction, dated 16.02.2018, issued vide G.O.Ms.No.77,
whereby the competent authority was pleased to grant sanction
to the 2nd respondent to prosecute the petitioner before the
designated Court for the offences punishable under the
provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short,
"the P.C.Act"). The impugned order is assailed on the short
ground of it being vitiated by non-application of mind.
GN, J.
3) The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are that,
while the petitioner was working as an In-charge Deputy
Commercial Tax Officer at Kadapa, the 2nd respondent initiated
investigations and pursuant to that it determined that the
petitioner possessed income, highly disproportionate to his
known sources of income. On the said basis, search warrants
were got issued by the Special Judge for Special Police
Establishment and Anti Corruption Bureau Cases, Vijayawada,
on 06.10.2010 and in pursuance of the warrants, the
residential and office premises of the petitioner and his relatives
were searched. The Bank Locker No.16 at Andhra Bank,
Emani Village of Duggirala Mandal, Guntur District, was also
subjected to search. Pursuant to the searches, inventories were
prepared and various articles found in the various premises
and the information gleaned from the petitioner and his family
members were drawn-up and after giving reasonable
allowances, the 2nd respondent computed the income of the
petitioner from known sources and concluded that the income
from known sources for the relevant check-period amounted to
Rs.78,53,578/- and after giving deductions towards expenses
at the rate of 33%, concluded that the assets available in the
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hands of the petitioner would amount to Rs.44,83,840/-. But,
the computation of the assets revealed that the total value of
the assets seized amounted to Rs.3,72,90,161/-, in other
words, nearly eight times more than the known sources of
income. The said materials along with the copy of the F.I.R.,
statements of witnesses, inventory proceedings and final report
were placed before the competent authority and the competent
authority, after applying its mind, has proceeded to consider it
a case which requires to be taken to its logical end, thereby
permitting the prosecution of the petitioner before the
designated Court. Paras.4, 5, 7 and 8 of the impugned order
read thus:
"4. AND WHEREAS, initially at the time of registration of the Cases, the then Inquiring Officer has taken the Check Period from 07-11-1981 to 08-10-2010 i.e, from the date of joining into service to the date of searches. But, subsequently the check period for calculation of the Assets, Income and Expenditure of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao is taken from 31.12.1995 (ie., subsequent to the previous check period in Cr.No.6/RCA-TPT/1995) till date of house searches on 08.10.2010.
5. AND WHEREAS, it is alleged that Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa acquired assets on his name and in the names of his family members to the extent of Rs.4,17,74,001-00 (RUPEES FOUR CRORES SEVENTEEN
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LAKHS SEVENTY FOUR THOUSAND AND ONE ONLY) during the said check period. The total income of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa from all the above sources during the above check period is estimated as Rs.78,53,678-00 (RUPEES SEVENTY EIGHT LAKHS FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY EIGHT ONLY). The total expenditure of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c.Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa during the check period is worked out to Rs.33,69,738-00 (RUPEES THIRTY THREE LAKHS SIXTY NINE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY EIGHT ONLY). The likely savings of Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c.Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa during the check period was Rs.44,83,840-00 (RUPEES FORTY FOUR LAKHS EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY ONLY). As such, Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c.Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa was in possession of disproportionate assets of Rs.3,72,90,161-00 (RUPEES THREE CRORES SEVENTY TWO LAKHS NINETY THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY ONE ONLY). (Total Assets of Rs.4,17,74,001-00 - Rs.44,83,840-00 likely savings) which he acquired by corrupt and dubious methods and failed to account satisfactorily.
6. .....
7. AND WHEREAS, after completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer served notice to the accused officer on 09.04.2011 and also issued two reminder notices on 23.04.2011 and 08.05.2011 to offer his explanation and issued another notice on 22.09.2017, on receipt of the order of the Hon‟ble High Court in Criminal Petition No.5171 of 2011 dated 11.09.2017, but he did not
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offer his explanation till date, even though opportunity was given to him.
8. AND WHEREAS, the Government of Andhra Pradesh being the competent authority to remove Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, worked as I/c. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa, from service after fully and carefully examining the material i.e. copy of FIR, Inventory Proceedings, Statements of Witnesses and relevant record and Final Report placed before them in respect of the above said allegation and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, consider that Sri Kondaveeti Srinivasa Rao, formerly I/c. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Kadapa should be prosecuted in a court of law."
4) Learned counsel for the petitioner would strenuously
contend that the sanctioning authority has failed to see that the
amount listed as having been available in the Bank Accounts
has been doubled without any justification and that though the
amounts totaled only about Rs.20,00,000/-, the same has
been recorded as Rs.1,20,00,000/-; similarly, a property
document, where the value of the property has been recorded
as Rs.4,00,000/-, has been valued at Rs.19,00,000/-; and
pointing out these instances, he would submit that it has to be
concluded that the competent authority has failed to address
itself to the material on record and thereby failed in applying its
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mind and hence, the same vitiates the impugned order of
sanction.
5) In the considered opinion of this Court, the case
canvassed is one that ought to be canvassed and adjudicated
by the Courts of Law. It is no more res integra that the
sanction proceeding is an administrative act. That being so
and further in the light of the settled position, that the
delinquent has no right of audience before the sanctioning
authority, it can be safely and is accordingly concluded, that
the act of granting of permission is not an adversarial
proceeding, as the order does not also automatically result in a
conviction. It merely permits the prosecuting agency to set in
motion the proceedings before the Courts of Law.
6) The learned counsel for the petitioner would further place
reliance on the ruling of the Hon‟ble Apex Court rendered in the
case of State of Karnataka v. Ameer Jan1 and in particular
placed reliance on the observations in para.7, which read thus:
"7. We agree that an order of sanction should not be construed in a pedantic manner. But, it is also well settled that the purpose for which an order of sanction is required to be passed should always be borne in mind. Ordinarily, the
(2007) 11 SCC 273
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sanctioning authority is the best person to judge as to whether the public servant concerned should receive the protection under the Act by refusing to accord sanction for his prosecution or not."
7) This Court has no quarrel with the proposition of law laid
down by the Hon‟ble Apex Court. It is but a well settled
proposition, that the competent authority issuing the sanction
order is not required to be judgmental nor is the order of
sanction, be adjudicatory in nature. The proceeding of the
competent authority is merely required to reflect a subjective
satisfaction of the competent authority, arrived at on an
objective appraisal of the material placed before it. As noted
supra, a reading of Paras.4 to 6 and 8, clearly establishes the
fact that the competent authority has applied its mind to the
material placed before it and has concluded that the assets
available in the hands of the delinquent are disproportionate to
the known sources of income and in that view of the matter,
this Court does not find any good ground, which would enable
the Court to draw a conclusion that the order impugned is
vitiated by non-application of mind.
GN, J.
8. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Subramanian
Swamy v. Manmohan Singh2, observed as under:
"20. The learned Attorney General argued that the question of grant of sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with any of the offences enumerated in Section 19(1) arises only at the stage when the court decides to take cognizance and any request made prior to that is premature. He submitted that the embargo contained in Section 19(1) of the Act is applicable to the court which is competent to take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant and there is no provision for grant of sanction at a stage before the competent court applies its mind to the issue of taking cognizance.
34. The argument of the learned Attorney General that the question of granting sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with an offence under the 1988 Act arises only at the stage of taking cognizance and not before that is neither supported by the plain language of the section nor the judicial precedents relied upon by him. Though, the term "cognizance" has not been defined either in the 1988 Act or CrPC, the same has acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial precedents. In legal parlance cognizance is "taking judicial notice by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or matter judicially".
(2012) 3 SCC 64
GN, J.
44. We may also observe that grant or refusal of sanction is not a quasi-judicial function and the person for whose prosecution the sanction is sought is not required to be heard by the competent authority before it takes a decision in the matter. What is required to be seen by the competent authority is whether the facts placed before it which, in a given case, may include the material collected by the complainant or the investigating agency prima facie disclose commission of an offence by a public servant. If the competent authority is satisfied that the material placed before it is sufficient for prosecution of the public servant, then it is required to grant sanction. If the satisfaction of the competent authority is otherwise, then it can refuse sanction. In either case, the decision taken on the complaint made by a citizen is required to be communicated to him and if he feels aggrieved by such decision, then he can avail of appropriate legal remedy.
46. In Vineet Narain [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 264] , the Court referred to the allegations made in the writ petition that the government agencies like CBI and the Revenue Authorities have failed to perform their duties and legal obligations inasmuch as they did not investigate into the matters arising out of seizure of the so-called "Jain Diaries" in certain raids conducted by CBI. The Court took note of the allegation that the arrest of some terrorists led to the discovery of financial support to them by clandestine and illegal means and a nexus between several important politicians, bureaucrats and criminals, who were recipients of money from unlawful sources, and proceeded to observe:
(Vineet Narain case [(1996) 2 SCC 199 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 264] , SCC pp. 200-01, para 3)
GN, J.
"3. The facts and circumstances of the present case do indicate that it is of utmost public importance that this matter is examined thoroughly by this Court to ensure that all government agencies, entrusted with the duty to discharge their functions and obligations in accordance with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly the concept of equality enshrined in the Constitution and the basic tenet of the rule of law: „Be you ever so high, the law is above you.‟ Investigation into every accusation made against each and every person on a reasonable basis, irrespective of the position and status of that person, must be conducted and completed expeditiously. This is imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial working of the government agencies."
47. After examining various facets of the matter in detail, the three-Judge Bench in its final order in Vineet Narain [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] observed: (SCC p. 268, paras 55-56)
"55. These principles of public life are of general application in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in mind while scrutinising the conduct of every holder of a public office. It is trite that the holders of public offices are entrusted with certain powers to be exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office is held by them in trust for the people. Any deviation from the path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an offence, it must be promptly investigated and the offender against whom a prima facie case is made out should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty of law is upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is the duty of the
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judiciary to enforce the rule of law and, therefore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law.
56. The adverse impact of lack of probity in public life leading to a high degree of corruption is manifold. It also has adverse effect on foreign investment and funding from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank who have warned that future aid to underdeveloped countries may be subject to the requisite steps being taken to eradicate corruption, which prevents international aid from reaching those for whom it is meant. Increasing corruption has led to investigative journalism which is of value to a free society. The need to highlight corruption in public life through the medium of public interest litigation invoking judicial review may be frequent in India but is not unknown in other countries: R. v. Secy. of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement Ltd. [(1995) 1 WLR 386 : (1995) 1 All ER 611] "
48. In para 58 of the judgment in Vineet Narain [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] , the Court gave several directions in relation to CBI, CVC and the Enforcement Directorate. In para 58(I)(15), the Court gave the following direction: (SCC p.
270)
"58. (I)(15) Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly adhered to.
However, additional time of one month may be allowed where consultation is required with the Attorney General (AG) or any other law officer in the AG's office."
49. CVC, after taking note of the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1996 Cri LJ 2962 (P&H)] , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp
GN, J.
(1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192] , Supt. of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary [(1995) 6 SCC 225 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1095] , framed guidelines which were circulated vide Office Order No. 31/5/05 dated 12-5-2005. The relevant clauses of the guidelines are extracted below:
"2(i) Grant of sanction is an administrative act. The purpose is to protect the public servant from harassment by frivolous or vexatious prosecution and not to shield the corrupt. The question of giving opportunity to the public servant at that stage does not arise. The sanctioning authority has only to see whether the facts would prima facie constitute the offence.
(ii) The competent authority cannot embark upon an inquiry to judge the truth of the allegations on the basis of representation which may be filed by the accused person before the sanctioning authority, by asking the IO to offer his comments or to further investigate the matter in the light of representation made by the accused person or by otherwise holding a parallel investigation/enquiry by calling for the record/report of his department.
***
(vii) However, if in any case, the sanctioning authority after consideration of the entire material placed before it, entertains any doubt on any point the competent authority may specify the doubt with sufficient particulars and may request the authority who has sought sanction to clear the doubt. But that would be only to clear the doubt in order that the authority may apply its mind properly, and not for the purpose of considering the representations of the accused which may be filed while the matter is pending sanction.
GN, J.
(viii) If the sanctioning authority seeks the comments of the IO while the matter is pending before it for sanction, it will almost be impossible for the sanctioning authority to adhere to the time-limit allowed by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain case [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] ."
50. The aforementioned guidelines are in conformity with the law laid down by this Court that while considering the issue regarding grant or refusal of sanction, the only thing which the competent authority is required to see is whether the material placed by the complainant or the investigating agency prima facie discloses commission of an offence. The competent authority cannot undertake a detailed inquiry to decide whether or not the allegations made against the public servant are true.
54. It is not possible to appreciate that even though the appellant repeatedly wrote letters to Respondent 1 highlighting the seriousness of the allegations made in his first representation and the fact that he had already supplied the facts and documents which could be made the basis for grant of sanction to prosecute Respondent 2 and also pointed out that as per the judgments of this Court, detailed inquiry was not required to be made into the allegations, the officers concerned in the PMO kept the matter pending and then took the shelter of the fact that CBI had registered the case and the investigation was pending. In our view, the officers in the PMO and the Ministry of Law and Justice, were duty-bound to apprise Respondent 1 about seriousness of allegations made by the appellant and the judgments of this Court including the directions contained in para 58(I) of the judgment in Vineet Narain case [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] as
GN, J.
also the guidelines framed by CVC so as to enable him to take appropriate decision in the matter.
55. By the very nature of the office held by him, Respondent 1 is not expected to personally look into the minute details of each and every case placed before him and has to depend on his advisers and other officers. Unfortunately, those who were expected to give proper advice to Respondent 1 and place full facts and legal position before him failed to do so. We have no doubt that if Respondent 1 had been apprised of the true factual and legal position regarding the representation made by the appellant, he would have surely taken appropriate decision and would not have allowed the matter to linger for a period of more than one year.
56. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. It is declared that the appellant had the right to file a complaint for prosecuting Respondent 2. However, keeping in view the fact that the Court of the Special Judge, CBI has already taken cognizance of the offences allegedly committed by Respondent 2 under the 1988 Act, we do not consider it necessary to give any other direction in the matter. At the same time, we deem it proper to observe that in future every competent authority shall take appropriate action on the representation made by a citizen for sanction of the prosecution of a public servant strictly in accordance with the direction contained in Vineet Narain v. Union of India [(1998) 1 SCC 226 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 307] and the guidelines framed by CVC.
61. In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa [(1998) 6 SCC 411 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] , this Court compared Section 19 of the PC Act with Section 197 of the Code. After considering several decisions on the point and also considering Section 6
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of the old PC Act, 1947 which is almost identical with Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 and also noting the Law Commission's Report, this Court in para 13 of Kalicharan [(1998) 6 SCC 411 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] came to the following conclusions:
(SCC pp. 415-16)
"13. ... The sanction contemplated in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who „is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty‟, whereas the offences contemplated in the PC Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code."
62. The above passage in Kalicharan [(1998) 6 SCC 411 :
1998 SCC (Cri) 1455] has been quoted with approval subsequently by this Court in Lalu Prasad v. State of Bihar [(2007) 1 SCC 49 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] SCC at p. 54, para
9. In para 10, this Court held in Lalu Prasad [(2007) 1 SCC 49 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] that: (SCC p. 54)
"10. ... Section 197 of the Code and Section 19 of the Act operate in conceptually different fields."
9) That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner would
make a further attempt, to draw the Court into an exercise of
computation and would endeavor to point out that a certain
assets have been excessively valued or over-valued. For
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instance, the balance available in the bank accounts and the
value of a particular immovable property, are pointed out as
illustrations. Even assuming for argument sake, credit can be
given to such an argument and even if the said amounts are
discounted, still the amount in the hands of the petitioner/
delinquent is highly disproportionate to his known sources of
income. In that view of the matter, this Court does not find
any merit in it.
10) At this juncture, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd
respondent would submit that the petitioner had preferred a
petition invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
canvassing the merits of the case and a Co-ordinate Bench,
after considering the matter on merits, has been pleased to
reject the same.
11) It is seen that the F.I.R. was registered on 06.10.2010.
Despite the passage of nearly fourteen years, the prosecution is
yet to reach its logical end. If such state of affairs is permitted,
it would only sound the death knell of the A.C.B.‟s efforts to
curb corrupt practices in the State machinery. In that view
also, this Court deems it necessary to direct the concerned
Court i.e., the Special Judge for Special Police Establishment
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and Anti-Corruption Bureau Cases, Vijayawada, to expedite the
hearing and disposal of the case. The 2nd respondent shall take
all steps to co-operate for early disposal of the case. At any
rate, the Special Court shall endeavor to hear and dispose of
the case within a period of one year from the date of receipt of a
copy of this order.
12) It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove
are for the purpose of disposal of the instant Writ Petition and
the trial Court shall consider the material placed before it
independently and pass appropriate orders and not construe
the observations as a pronouncement on the merits of the case.
13) Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.
Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, pending if any,
shall stand closed.
________________________ JUSTICE G.NARENDAR Date:25.01.2024.
Note:
1) Mark a copy of this order to the jurisdictional trial Court.
2) L.R. copy to be marked.
B/O cs
GN, J.
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDAR
+ Writ Petition No.30961 of 2018
% Dated 25-01-2024
# K.Srinivasa Rao ..... Petitioner Vs.
$ 1.The State of A.P., rep. by its Special Chief Secretary, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Dept., Velagapudi, A.P. & Anr.
..Respondents
! Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri V.R. Machavaram
^ Counsel for the 1st Respondent : Ld.G.P. for Revenue
Counsel for the 2nd Respondent : Smt.A.Gayathri Reddy, Ld.Standing Counsel-cum-
Spl. P.P. for ACB
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred :
1. (2007) 11 SCC 273
2. (2012) 3 SCC 64
GN, J.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
+ Writ Petition No.30961 of 2018
K.Srinivasa Rao ..... Petitioner Vs.
1.The State of A.P., rep. by its Special Chief Secretary, Revenue (Vigilance-II) Dept., Velagapudi, A.P. & Anr.
..Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 25-01-2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G.NARENDER
1) Whether Reporters of Local newspapers -Yes- may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2) Whether the copies of judgment may be marked -Yes- to Law Reporters/Journals
3) Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to see the -Yes- fair copy of the Judgment?
JUSTICE G. NARENDAR
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