Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati

Smt. Kodamala Mariamma vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 13 September, 2022

    THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE BATTU DEVANAND

             WRIT PETITION No.29374 of 2022

ORDER:

Heard Sri D. Krishna Murthy, learned counsel for

petitioner and learned Government Pleader for Civil

Supplies appearing for the respondents. Perused the

record.

2) Learned counsel for petitioner submits that the

petitioner was appointed as a fair price shop dealer of Shop

No.0744023 of Murthujapuram village of Nuzendla Mandal,

Guntur District. She is discharging her duties as fair price

shop dealer without any complaints and she is distributing

essential commodities to the card holders attached to her

shop.

3) Learned counsel further submits that basing on

the report of the 3rd respondent to take disciplinary action

against the petitioner, the 2nd respondent issued

proceedings in Rc.M.1505/2021-B, dated 09.10.2021,

suspending the authorization of the petitioner pending

enquiry on certain allegations. Thereafter, enquiry is not

conducted and the petitioner was kept under suspension

pending enquiry. The learned counsel for the petitioner

further submits that suspending the authorization of the

petitioner pending enquiry for more than 90 days is illegal

and against to the law declared by this Court and as such,

the 2nd respondent has to revoke the suspension order and

to restore the authorization of the petitioner to enable the

petitioner to continue as fair price shop dealer as usual by

allowing this Writ Petition.

4) On the other hand, learned Government Pleader

for Civil Supplies, on instructions, submits that basing on

the report of the Tahsildar, Nuzendla to take disciplinary

action against the petitioner, the 2nd respondent has issued

a show-cause notice dated 23.07.2021 to the petitioner

calling her explanation within seven days from the date of

receipt of the notice. She submitted explanation on

07.08.2021. Subsequently, the authorization of the

petitioner was suspended pending enquiry on 09.10.2021.

The learned Government Pleader submits that in view of

the charges levelled against the petitioner, she is not

entitled to continue as fair price shop dealer and sought to

dismiss the writ petition.

5) The grievance of the petitioner is that even after

lapse of eleven months, the alleged enquiry is not

completed by the 2nd respondent, which is illegal and

unjust.

6) Having heard the submissions of learned counsel

appearing for both sides and upon perusal of the material

available on record, it is an admitted fact that basing on

the report of the 3rd respondent, the 2nd respondent has

issued show-cause notice to the petitioner. In the

suspension order, it is mentioned that the petitioner has

submitted her explanation on 07.08.2021. After submission

of the explanation, the 2nd respondent issued the impugned

proceedings dated 09.10.2021 suspending the

authorization of the petitioner pending enquiry.

7) In the considered opinion of this Court, the

competent authority vested with power as disciplinary

authority is bound to complete the disciplinary proceedings

initiated against the petitioner/fair-price shop dealer

alleging certain allegations within reasonable time. There

should be no unreasonable delay in concluding the

disciplinary proceedings. Though, as contended by the

respondents that no time limit is prescribed in relevant

Control Order to complete disciplinary proceedings, in the

considered opinion of this Court, the period of 90 days is

reasonable safeguard for limiting the period of suspension,

as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M/s.Sukhwinder Pal

Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab1 without deciding the

truth or otherwise of the allegations made against the

petitioner/fair-price shop dealer and keeping them under

AIR 1982 SC 65

suspension under the guise of pending enquiry, for an

unreasonable period, would definitely violates the right to

life of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 21 of the

Constitution of India, as the source of income for survival

of him and his family is the commission, that he gets by

running the fair-price shop. As such, the disciplinary

authority is under legal obligation to complete the enquiry

and appropriate decision has to take to cancel the

authorization or otherwise of the petitioner within

reasonable period.

8) The issue involved in the present writ petition is

squarely covered by the Judgment of this High Court in

A.Neelima v. Joint Collector, Kurnool and others2. A

learned single Judge of this Court held at para No.13 as

extracted hereinunder:

13. Nevertheless, the power of suspension pending enquiry being one which is exercisable by the Appointing authority pending enquiry into or in contemplation of the suspension or cancellation of the authorisation, the ratio

1996 (1) APLJ 266

laid down by the Apex Court with regard to the exercise of the said power as in the passage quoted above would apply with equal force to the Control Orders, subject matter of consideration in these proceedings. Though no time limit is prescribed during which the authorisation of a fair price shop dealer can be suspended in the Control orders, it must be held as declared by Supreme Court in the passage quoted above, that the period of 90 days is reasonable safeguard for limiting the period of suspension. During this period the Appointing authority is expected to complete the enquiry and take a decision as to cancellation or otherwise of the authorisation. If for any reason the enquiry is not completed within the said period of 90 days the order of suspension is liable to be revoked and should be revoked either by the appointing authority or the Appellate authority or the Revisionary authority.

9) Against the said Judgment rendered by the

learned single Judge, an appeal was preferred by the

Respondents therein, and while disposing the Writ Appeal

by its Judgment in Joint Collector, Kurnool vs. A.

Neelima3, a Division Bench of this High Court observed at

para No.2 as extracted hereinunder:

2. We have gone through the impugned judgment which is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s.Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab (1) AIR 1982 (S.C.), 1965. In that case, the prescribed form of licence contained the clause for the period of suspension to be maximum for 90 days. A perusal of the order of the learned Single Judge shows that in essence and substance

1996 LawSuit (AP) 956

what was meant by him is that the period of 90 days is a reasonable period to conclude the enquiry and the continuance of it beyond 90 days would be unreasonable and shall be, hence, taken as quashed. As we see it was in the nature of a direction to complete the enquiry within 90 days than laying down a general proposition of law that the maximum period of suspension could be only for 90 days. We agree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the order of suspension cannot be used as a pretext for indefinite postponement of the operation of the fair price shop dealership making it in effect cancellation of the dealership. An order of suspension, like every executive and administrative act, has to be founded upon fair play and lack of arbitrariness. The continuation of order of the suspension indefinitely is whole arbitrary and cannot be countenanced. But we must also rush to add that what is reasonable period of suspension will vary from case to case depending upon various factors, though more often than not, a period of 90 days should ordinarily be sufficient to conclude the enquiry.

10) In the light of the observations of the Division

Bench, as extracted supra, in the considered opinion of this

Court, as the enquiry is not completed by the respondents

in the present case for more than 300 days, it has to be

construed that the enquiry is not completed within the

"reasonable period" and accordingly, this Court is holding

that the 2nd respondent failed to conclude the enquiry

within "reasonable period" and the suspension order passed

against the petitioner on 09.10.2021 shall be revoked and

the authorization of the petitioner shall be restored.

11) For the reasons stated above, this writ petition

is allowed directing the 2nd respondent to revoke the