Vennelaganti Adi Anjaneya ... vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh And ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 8660 AP

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

                 I.A.No.1 of 2019
                        IN
                 I.A.No.2 of 2018
                        IN
       CRIMINAL PETITION NO.11274 OF 2018

ORDER :

The petitioner in I.A.No.1 of 2019 filed the

application, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'CrPC'), with the following

prayer:-

"Under the circumstances, petitioner prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to grant leave to proceed in Crlp.No.11274 of 2018 to re-call the order passed on 20.11.2018 and pass such other order that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit."

2. The facts that led to filing of the present petition

are as follows.

Originally, Criminal Petition No.11274 of 2018 was

filed by 2nd respondent herein-Dr. V.A.A.Lakshmi, who is

arrayed as Accused No.1 in Sessions Case No.298 of

2018 on the file of the IV Additional Assistant Sessions

Judge-cum-Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, which was

registered for the offences punishable under Sections

306 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short,

'the IPC') against her and for the offences punishable

under Sections 120B and 212 IPC against A.2 to A.6.

1st respondent herein-Dr.Chittipolu Ravi was

arrayed as 2nd respondent in the Criminal Petition, being

the defacto complainant. He is husband of deceased

Dr.B.Sandhya Rani.

During pendency of the Criminal Petition, 1st

respondent herein/defacto complainant filed a petition in

I.A.No.2 of 2018 praying this Court to pass an order to

compound the offences under Sections 306 and 120B

IPC and also to quash the proceedings in the subject

Sessions Case insofar as 2nd respondent herein/A.1 is

concerned.

It is stated in the affidavit filed by 1st respondent

herein, in support of I.A.No.2 of 2018, that basing on his

report dated 24.10.2016, a case in crime No.342 of 2016

of Nagarampalem police station, Guntur was registered

against 2nd respondent herein for the offence punishable

under Section 306 IPC and after completion of

investigation, police laid charge sheet which was taken

on file as P.R.C.No.12 of 2017 on the file of the Judicial

Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, Guntur,

and on committal, the same was numbered as Sessions

Case No.298 of 2017 and made over to the file of the IV

Additional Assistant Sessions Judge-cum-Senior Civil

Judge, Guntur. It is further stated that he realized that

the deceased did not commit suicide entirely due to the

harassment said to have been meted out by 2nd

respondent herein, as stated by him in his police report

dated 24.10.2016, and that due to agitation of medical

college students, as he found some adverse remarks

against 2nd respondent herein, who was the Head of Unit

No.3, Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, and he

misunderstood the personal diary of the deceased that

2nd responsible was responsible for death of his wife, and

hence, he decided to compromise the matter. A Joint

Memo signed by 1st respondent herein/defacto

complainant and 2nd respondent herein/A.1 was filed

along with I.A.No.2 of 2018.

Vide Order dated 20.11.2018, this Court allowed

I.A.No.2 of 2018 and also Criminal Petition No.11274 of

2018, quashing the proceedings in Sessions Case No.298

of 2017 and made over to the file of the IV Additional

Assistant Sessions Judge-cum-Senior Civil Judge,

Guntur as against 2nd respondent herein/A.1 and

consequently acquitting her of the said offences.

Thereafter, petitioner herein, who is father of deceased

late Dr.B.Sandhya Rani filed the present petition seeking

to grant leave to him to proceed in the present Criminal

Petition to recall the said order dated 20.11.2018.

3. Heard Sri Nuthalapati Krishna Murthy, learned

counsel for petitioner-implead petitioner, Sri T.S.Rayalu,

learned counsel for 1st respondent /defacto complainant,

Sri M.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel for 2nd

respondent herein and the learned Special Assistant

Public Prosecutor for 3rd respondent-State.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a

decision in Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria1, wherein it

is held that recall of an order can be done as it was an

application seeking procedural review, but not

substantial review. Relevant portion of the decision

reads thus: (paragraphs 6 to 8)

"Undeterred by the aforesaid orders, the petitioner filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.6575 of 2017 before the High Court contending that there has been a compromise between him and the respondent. This petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was allowed ex parte vide judgment dated 13.10.2017.

7. The respondent thereupon preferred an application for recall of the order dated 13.10.2017. The aforesaid order, it was stated, was passed in the absence of the respondent, and based on false information. The High Court recalled the order dated 13.10.2017 vide the impugned order dated 23.10.2021.

8. This application for recall of the order was maintainable as it was an application seeking a procedural review, and not a substantive review to which Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be attracted. On the aspect of the difference between recall and review and when an order of recall can be passed, reference can be made to Budhia Swain and others v. Gopinath Deb and others (1999) 4 SCC 396."

1 Order dated 07.03.2022 in SLP (Crl.) No.9313 of 2021

The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on

a decision in Vishnu Agarwal v. State of U.P. and

another2 wherein it is held thus: (paragraphs 8 and 9).

"6. In our opinion, Section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid and overtechnical manner to defeat the ends of justice. As Brahaspati has observed:

"Kevalam shastram ashritya na kartavyo vinirnayah yuktiheeney vichare tu dharmahaani prajayate"

which means:

"The court should not give its decision based only on the letter of the law.

For if the decision is wholly unreasonable, injustice will follow."

7. Apart from the above, we are of the opinion that the application filed by the respondent was an application for recall of the order dated 2-9-2003 and not for review. In Asit Kumar Kar v. State of W.B. [(2009) 2 SCC 703 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 541 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 851 : (2009) 1 SCR 469] this Court made a distinction between recall and review which is as under: (SCC p. 705, paras 6-7)

"6. There is a distinction between ... a review petition and a recall petition. While in a review petition the Court considers on merits where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, in a recall petition the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party.

2 (2011) 14 SCC 813

7. We are treating this petition under Article 32 as a recall petition because the order passed in the decision in All Bengal Excise Licensees' Assn. v. Raghabendra Singh [(2007) 11 SCC 374] cancelling certain licences was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to the persons who had been granted licences.""

The learned counsel also relied on a decision in

S.Ramesh & others v. State, rep. by Inspector of Police

and others, 3wherein it is held thus: (paragraph 11)

"In our considered opinion, the effect of recalling the orders dated 1-3-2018 [S. Arun v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8924] , [S. Brathibha v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8925] , [S. Ramesh v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8926] was that the three criminal original petitions stood restored to their respective numbers for their disposal on merits in accordance with law as if the orders dated 1-3-2018 [S. Arun v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8924] , [S. Brathibha v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8925] , [S. Ramesh v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 8926] had not been passed in those cases and that they remained pending for their disposal on merits." The learned counsel also placed reliance on a

decision in Challa Venkata Rami Reddy v. Public

Prosecutor4, wherein this Court is held thus: (paragraph

6)

"The offence alleged against the petitioners, who are the police constables is extortion punishable under Section 384 of IPC, a non-bailable and non- compoundable offence. Powers exercised by this 3 (2019) 5 SCC 715 4 2014 (1) ALT (Cri.) 215 (S.B.)

Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are distinct and different from the powers under Section 320 of IPC. While exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. this Court in appropriate cases can quash the FIR/charge sheet notwithstanding the fact the offence is non-compoundable. But the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. have to be exercised with great care and caution and very sparingly. Even where there is compromise between the parties this Court shall not invoke jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR/charge-sheet without taking into consideration the nature of crime and its impact on the society at large. If the offence is not so serious and has no concern with the society at large, it can be quashed owing to compromise between the parties. The petitioners being the police constables, whose duty is to protect the citizens of their person and property allegedly raided a gambling place and forcibly seized an amount of Rs. 80,000/- to one lakh from the de facto complainant gave him back part of the amount of Rs. 45,000/-. If they seized the amount from gambling place, they have to deposit the amount in the police station along with the report. Obviously they did not do so. After filing of the quash petition, they brought the de facto complainant to the Court and the de facto complainant stated that he compromised the matter with the petitioners and therefore, he is not any more willing to prosecute the petitioners. Every case wherein the complainant or victim has no objection for quashment cannot be quashed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in a routine and mechanical way. Further in the present case, at this stage it is doubtful whether the de facto complainant voluntarily approached the Court for quashment in view of compromise or whether he is under threat or coercion by the police. It would be possible for the trial Court to ascertain the said fact after examining him at the trial."

5. In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another5, it is

held thus: (Paragraphs 52 and 58).

"52. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code.

58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the

5 (2012) 10 SCC 303

victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed."

In J.K.International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi)

and others6, it is held thus: (paragraphs 13 and 14)

"13. We may now proceed to point out the usefulness of the observations made by the three-Judge Bench in Bhagwant Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1985) 2 SCC 537 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 267] . Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) who spoke for the Bench pointed out that the informant having taken the initiative in lodging the first information report, with a view to initiate investigation by the police, for the purpose of ascertaining whether any offence has been committed (if so by whom) is vitally interested in the result of the investigation and hence the law requires that the action taken by the officer in charge of the police station on such FIR should be communicated to him. The Bench said this with reference to Section 173(2)(i) of the Code.

14. This Court further said in the decision that if the Magistrate finds that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the FIR was lodged by him. After adverting to different clauses of Section 173 of the Code learned Judges laid down the legal proposition in para 5 of the said judgment. The law so laid down is

6 (2001) 3 SCC 462

that though there is no obligation on the Magistrate to issue notice to the injured person or to a relative of the deceased in order to provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the final report of the police (except when the final report is to the effect that no offence had been made out in the case), the informant who lodged the FIR is entitled to a notice from the Magistrate. In other instances, the injured or any relative of the accused can appear before the Magistrate at the time of consideration of the police report if such person otherwise comes to know that the Magistrate is going to consider the report. If such person appears before the Magistrate it is the duty of the Magistrate to hear him. It is profitable to extract the relevant portion of that ratio: (SCC p. 543, para 5)

"The injured person or any relative of the deceased, though not entitled to notice from the Magistrate, has locus to appear before the Magistrate at the time of consideration of the report, if he otherwise comes to know that the report is going to be considered by the Magistrate and if he wants to make his submissions in regard to the report, the Magistrate is bound to hear him. We may also observe that even though the Magistrate is not bound to give notice of the hearing fixed for consideration of the report to the injured person or to any relative of the deceased, he may, in the exercise of his discretion, if he so thinks fit, give such notice to the injured person or to any particular relative or relatives of the deceased, but not giving of such notice will not have any invalidating effect on the order which may be made by the Magistrate on a consideration of the report."

6. In Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi

Mukherjee and another, 7it is held thus: (paragraphs 5

and 7)

"5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.

7. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked to override bar of review under Section

362. It is clearly stated in Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal [(1981) 1 SCC 500 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 188] , that the inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code. The law is therefore clear that the inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which cannot be done on account of the bar under other provisions of the Code. The court is not empowered to review its own decision under the purported exercise of inherent power. We find that the impugned order in this case is in effect one reviewing the earlier order on a reconsideration of the same materials. The High Court has grievously erred in doing so. Even on merits, we do not find any compelling reasons to quash the proceedings at that stage."

7 (1990) 2 SCC 437

7. In Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & others,8 it is held

thus: (paragraphs 22, 37, 38, 49 and 50)

"22. The High Court rightly found, in effect, that it had the inherent power to recall a judgment and/or order which was without jurisdiction or a judgment and/or order passed without hearing a person prejudicially affected by the judgment and/or order. The High Court, however, fell in error in not recalling the order dated 20th October 2020. The High Court did not address to itself, the question of whether it had jurisdiction to quash a criminal complaint under Section 306 of the IPC, which is a grave non- compoundable offence, entailing imprisonment of ten years, on the basis of a settlement between the parties.

37. Offence under Section 306 of the IPC of abetment to commit suicide is a grave, non-compoundable offence. Of course, the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and can even be exercised to quash criminal proceedings relating to non-compoundable offences, to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of Court. Where the victim and offender have compromised disputes essentially civil and personal in nature, the High Court can exercise its power under Section 482 of the CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings. In what cases power to quash an FIR or a criminal complaint or criminal proceedings upon compromise can be exercised, would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.

38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint and/or criminal proceedings, the High Court, as observed above, has to be circumspect and have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not

8 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936

private in nature and have a serious impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is serious and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against society.

49. In exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegation in the complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence.

50. In our considered opinion, the Criminal Proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased. As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan (supra), Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of heinous and serious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence under section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR under Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else. It is clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been compromised."

In the above judgment, it is held that the High Court

fell in error in not recalling the order dated 20.10.2010,

and it did not address to itself, the question whether it

had jurisdiction to quash a criminal complaint under

Section 306 IPC, which is a grave non-compoundable

offence. It is further observed that the said order has

been passed without hearing the wife of the deceased,

only because the original informant/complainant, a

cousin brother and an employee of the deceased, had

been heard. The Apex Court further observed that

hearing a cousin-cum-employee of the deceased cannot

and does not dispense with the requirement to give the

wife of the deceased a hearing.

8. There is any amount of ambiguity with regard to

the aspect whether this Court has got power to review

its own order for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme

Court categorically held that it is really not necessary to

dwelve deeper into the question whether a final order

passed under Section 482 CrPC quashing an FIR could

have at all been recalled by the High Court in the

absence of any specific provision in the Code for recall

and / or review of such order. However, in exceptional

circumstances, such orders can be recalled in exercise

of inherent powers of the High Court to prevent

injustice.

9. Section 362 CrPC reads thus:

"Court not to alter judgment: Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error."

From a bare reading of the aforesaid provision, it is

clear that when once this Court passed a final order

quahsing the proceedings, this Court has no power to

review its own judgment. Time and again, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court and this Court held in catena of

judgments to the extent that when this court passed its

judgment on merits, despite of absence of the lawyer on

behalf of the petitioner, even in such a case, this Court is

not competent to review its own judgment at a later point

of time. Therefore, when once a judgment or final order

has been passed on merits, review application is not

maintainable.

10. Further more, in the present case, the defacto

complainant (1st respondent herein) is none other than

husband of the deceased. He is the person, who filed the

present police report as against the accused. At no point

of time, the implead petitioner has come forward by filing

any complaint in respect of the said incident. It is the

husband of the deceased, who is the informant herein,

who has come forward with the compromise. When

such is the position, this Court has no power to review

its own order. On the said ground alone, this Court is

not inclined to interfere with the said proceedings.

11. Section 2 (wa) CrPC defines 'victim' as a person

who has suffered any loss or injury caused by reason of

the act or commission for which the accused person has

been charged and the expression 'victim' includes his or

her guardian or legal heir. Husband of the deceased

would squarely come within the purview of 'victim' as

defined under Section 2 (wa) CrPC.

12. A perusal of Section 320 (4) (b) CrPC makes it clear

that when the person who would otherwise be

competent to compound an offence under this Section is

dead, the legal representative, as defined in the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) of such person may,

with the consent of the Court, compound such offence.

A bare reading of the abovesaid provision goes to show

that the competent person who can compound the

offence would be the immediate family member of such

person, who is dead. In the event of an immediate

family member, who is competent enough to compound

the offence is dead, then such other person would

compound such offence, that too with the consent of the

Court.

13. In the present case, there cannot be any dispute

with regard to the fact that husband of the deceased,

who happens to be immediate family member of the

deceased, came forward to compound the offence. When

the immediate family member is still surviving, question

of entertaining other person would not arise, more so,

when this Court has given a categorical finding in

quashing the proceedings and by acquitting the

accused.

14. Section 2 (11) CPC defines 'legal representative' as

a person, who, in law, represents the estate of a

deceased person, and includes any person who

intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where

a party sues or is sued in a representative character, the

person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the

party so suing or sued. Dissolution of the estate of a

female hindu is stated Section 15 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956. Firstly, it devolves upon sons and

daughters and the husband; secondly, upon heirs of

husband; thirdly upon the mother and father. A perusal

of the above said provision goes to show that the

immediate family member would be the husband, and

without a blink of eye lid, it can be safely inferred that

husband is the victim as per Section 320 (4) (b) CrPC.

1st respondent herein is the legal representative of the

deceased. As per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession

Act, 1956, in the absence of the husband, it would be

the sons and dauthters of the deceased. The implead

petitioner would not come in picture anywhere.

15. When such is the position, this Court has signed

its judgment or final order, disposing of the Criminal

Petition, the same can be altered or reviewed only to the

extent of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors.

Section 362 CrPC is based on an acknowledgement

principle of law that once the matter is finally disposed

of, by a Court, the said Court, in the absence of a

specific statutory provision, becomes functus officio and

is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same

relief, unless the former order is set aside by a court of

competent jurisdiction in the manner prescribed by law.

This Court has become functus officio immediately the

order disposing of the Criminal Petition is signed. Such

an order cannot be altered except to the extent of

correcting a clerical or arithmetical error.

16. It is also relevant to refer to a decision in Narinder

Singh v. State of Punjab9, wherein it is held thus:

"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compoud the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

9 (2014) 6 SCC 466

...

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases."

In view of the compromise arrived at, between the

respondents 1 and 2 herein, the chances of conviction is

remote and bleak. Therefore, continuation of the

impugned proceedings against respondent No.2 is

oppresssive and continuation of the impugned

proceedings is nothing but abuse of process of Court.

17. In the circumstances, this Court is not

inclined to entertain the petition to review the order

passed by this Court. Accordingly, I.A.No.1 of 2019 in

I.A.No.2 of 2018 in Criminal Petition No.11274 of 2018

is dismissed.

___________________________________ JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY .11.2022.

DRK

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. SREENIVASA REDDY

I.A.No.1 of 2019 IN I.A.No.2 of 2018 IN CRIMINAL PETITION NO.11274 OF 2018

.11.2022 DRK