Recently, the Bombay High Court held that a convict sentenced in separate trials to fixed-term imprisonment and life imprisonment cannot automatically claim the benefit of concurrent running of sentences under Section 427(2) of the CrPC. The Court made it clear that such a benefit is not a matter of right and depends strictly on the statutory framework, observing that where convictions arise from distinct trials, “the general rule of consecutive sentences must prevail.”
Brief Facts:
The case stemmed from a convict undergoing sentences in two separate trials arising out of distinct offences, where he was first awarded fixed-term imprisonment under Sections 363, 376, and 506 of the IPC, and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment along with other terms under serious offences, including Section 302 of the IPC. Having remained in custody for a prolonged period, the petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking the benefit of Section 427(2) of the CrPC, praying that both sentences be directed to run concurrently to enable consideration of his premature release.
Contentions of the Petitioner:
The Petitioner argued that the continued incarceration beyond 19 years warranted judicial intervention, contending that Section 427(2) of the CrPC should apply to allow concurrent running of sentences. The Counsel submitted that the Court possesses wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant such relief in the interest of justice. Reliance was placed on precedents, including Benson v. State of Kerala and Vicky Alias Vikas v. State (NCT of Delhi), to argue that courts can direct concurrency to prevent excessive punishment. The Petitioner further urged that the Petitioner’s pending proposal for premature release had remained undecided since 2018, strengthening the need for judicial relief.
Contentions of the Respondent:
The State opposed the plea, contending that the petitioner’s case squarely falls under Section 427(1) of the CrPC, not Section 427(2). The Counsel argued that since the petitioner was first serving a fixed-term sentence and was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment in a separate trial, the sentences must run consecutively unless specifically directed otherwise. The State relied on Mutthuramlingam and Ors v. State to submit that courts retain discretion in such matters and that concurrency is not automatic, particularly in cases involving grave and distinct offences.
Observation of the Court:
The Division Bench of Justice Abasaheb D. Shind and Justice Sandipkumar C. More observed that “We find that it is not the case of the petitioner that he was convicted and sentenced to suffer term sentence(s) and life imprisonment in one and the same trial on the contrary, he was tried in separate trials in separate crimes which have been decided by the separate judgments. Viewed from this legal position, since the petitioner was awarded with term sentence(s) and sentence of life imprisonment respectively in two different trials, in absence of any direction for running both these sentences concurrently, we find that the case of petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 427(1) and certainly not under Section 427 (2) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to derive the benefit under Section 427 (2) of Cr.P.C.”
The Court observed that Section 427 of the CrPC creates a clear statutory distinction between situations where a convict is already undergoing a fixed-term sentence and those where the convict is serving life imprisonment. It explained that sub-section (1) governs cases where a person already serving a term sentence is subsequently sentenced, in which case the later sentence ordinarily begins after completion of the earlier one. The Bench clarified that concurrency in such situations is not automatic and depends on a specific judicial direction.
The Bench emphasised that Section 427(2) of the CrPC operates as a narrow exception and applies only when a convict is already undergoing life imprisonment at the time of subsequent sentencing. In such cases, the subsequent sentence necessarily runs concurrently because a life sentence, by its very nature, extends for the remainder of the convict’s life. The Court made it clear that this provision cannot be expanded to cover cases where the sequence of sentencing is reversed. By doing so, the Bench rejected any attempt to blur the legislative distinction between the two sub-sections.
The Court held that the petitioner’s reliance on precedents such as Benson v. State of Kerala and Vicky Alias Vikas v. State (NCT of Delhi) was misplaced, as those decisions were rendered in materially different factual contexts. It noted that those cases involved either term sentences or situations where the legal framework of Section 427(2) of the CrPC was directly applicable. The Bench carefully distinguished these authorities, underlining that judicial precedents must be applied in light of their factual matrix and cannot be mechanically extended to dissimilar cases.
Further, the Bench observed that the nature and gravity of the offences committed by the petitioner are a significant factor in deciding whether discretion for concurrent sentencing should be exercised. It highlighted that the petitioner was convicted in separate cases involving heinous offences, including rape of a minor and the murder of a young child. The Court cautioned that in such circumstances, granting concurrency would undermine the seriousness of the crimes and the intent of sentencing. This reflects a broader judicial principle that sentencing must proportionately respond to the severity of the offence.
The Court emphasised that where convictions arise out of distinct trials, separate crime numbers, and independent factual scenarios, the general rule is that sentences run consecutively. It reiterated that concurrency cannot be claimed as a matter of right merely because the convict has undergone a substantial period of incarceration. The Bench further clarified that the absence of a specific direction for concurrency at the time of sentencing is decisive, and courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be slow to alter such outcomes retrospectively.
The decision of the Court:
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition, holding that the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of concurrent sentences under Section 427(2) of the CrPC. It ruled that in cases involving separate trials and distinct offences, fixed-term sentences must ordinarily be served first, followed by life imprisonment, unless a specific direction to the contrary exists.
Case Title: Kailas Shankar Navekar Vs. The State of Maharashtra
Case No.: Criminal Writ Petition No. 1657 of 2025
Citation: 2026 Latest Caselaw 3325 Bom
Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Abasaheb D. Shinde, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandipkumar C. More
Advocate for the Petitioner: Adv. Kiran D. Jadhav
Advocate for the Respondent: AAP P.K. Lakhotiya
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