Telangana High Court
K. Ramadevi vs Vadla Veeraswamy on 11 June, 2025
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.3796 OF 2023
ORDER:
This Civil Revision Petition is filed assailing the order dated 02.06.2023 in I.A.No.966 of 2022 in O.S.No.49 of 2013 passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Sangareddy.
2. Heard Sri P. Venkat Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners and Ms. Bandugula Alekhya, learned counsel for respondent No.1.
3. The petitioners herein are the plaintiffs and respondents herein are defendants before the Trial Court.
4. Brief facts of the case are that petitioners herein filed O.S.No.49 of 2013 for partition and separate possession of agricultural land in Sy.No.120/B to an extent of Ac.6-02 gts, situated at Indrakaran Village of Sangareddy Mandal, Medak District (hereinafter referred to as 'schedule property'). Respondents herein entered appearance and filed written statement and during the pendency of the suit, petitioners filed application to implead subsequent purchaser as party to the suit vide I.A.No.745 of 2013 and the same was coming up for issuance of notice to proposed party. It appears that the petitioners herein failed to deposit LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 2 process and the suit was adjourned from time to time and was finally posted to 28.07.2017 and on that date, there was no representation on behalf of plaintiff, therefore, the trial Court dismissed the suit for default. Plaintiffs filed I.A.No.966 of 2022 under Section 5 of Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1696 days in filing the application to restore the suit. Trial Court vide impugned order dated 02.06.2023, dismissed the same with an observation that no specific reason is mentioned for condonation of huge delay of 1696 days and further observed that petitioners are not interested in prosecuting the case and in the absence of proper reasons, delay application cannot be allowed. Aggrieved by the same, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that along with the suit, application for interim injunction was filed and the same was granted restraining the respondents from alienating the schedule property, however, respondent No.3 alienated the schedule property, therefore, petitioners filed I.A.No.745 of 2015 to implead transferee as party to the suit and the said application was dismissed on 28.07.2017, for non payment of process and suit was also dismissed for default. Learned counsel further contended that effect of dismissal of suit came to light only when the petitioners approached counsel for impleading one Sri Bollan Nagesh, who was interfering with the possession of the LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 3 schedule property, and that the counsel of the petitioners instead of filing implead application, returned the bundle along with No Objection Certificate on 17.12.2021 and that on verification, petitioners came to know that suit was dismissed for default on 28.07.2017 and the said fact was neither informed to the petitioners nor their earlier counsel took any steps to restore the suit. Hence, the delay of 1969 days in filing the application to restore the suit occurred.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that substantial rights of the petitioners in immovable properties are involved, and for no fault of the petitioners, they cannot be deprived of the legitimate share in the schedule property. The trial Court instead of considering application liberally, dismissed the same. Learned counsel further contended that the Courts have constantly held that where substantial rights of parties in immovable properties are involved or affected, Courts have to take a liberal approach in condoning the delay. Learned counsel further contended that matters involving immovable properties should be decided on their merits rather than throwing out the rights of the litigants on technicalities and prayed to allow the Revision.
LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 4
7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.1 contended that petitioners failed to explain the inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing the application to set aside the orders dated 02.06.2023, and therefore, the trial court has rightly dismissed the application. Learned counsel finally contended that the revision is devoid of merits and the same is liable to be dismissed.
8. In support of his contention, learned counsel for respondent No.1, placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Indistries Limited Vs Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Another 1, wherein it is held as follows:
15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate..."
9. It is also apt to refer to the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP (Civil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha 1 (2010) 5 SCC 459 LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 5 Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others [(2013) 12 SCC 649], held as under:
"delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party".
10. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer 2, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has 2 2013 (14) SCC 81 LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 6 consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. xxx
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
11. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another 3, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another 4, held as hereunder:
"17....... The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats 3 (2012) 3 SCC 563 4 (2008) 17 SC 448 LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 7 equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and "do not slumber over their rights".
12. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 5, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches."
13. Perusal of the record would disclose that petitioners filed application for condonation of delay of 1696 days in filing application to restore the suit only on the ground that dismissal of suit came to light only when the petitioners approached their counsel for filing implead application and the said counsel instead of filing implead application, returned the bundle along with No Objection Certificate on 17.12.2021 and that on verification, petitioners came to know that suit was dismissed for default on 28.07.2017 and thus delay of 1696 days occurred in filing the application. It is relevant to note that though their counsel returned the bundle on 17.12.2021, application for delay was 5 (2021) 6 SCC 460 LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 8 filed on 19.03.2022. Therefore, it is clear that further delay of about 3 months occurred even after bundle was returned by the petitioners' counsel. Petitioners, except blaming their earlier counsel, failed to assign any proper reason for inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing the application. It is pertinent to note that the approach of the petitioners is very casual in nature and the petitioners are not diligent in persuing the case, and as such, they are not entitled to seek indulgence of this Court, more so, when there is inordinate delay of 1969 days in filing the application.
14. The reasons offered by the petitioners for condonation of delay are contrary to record and infact factually incorrect, and does not inspire the confidence of this Court. Since, no plausible explanation has been offered for inordinate delay of 1696 days in filing application and no sufficient cause has been shown for such delay, the application does not deserve any consideration.
15. In view of the above discussion and legal position, in considered opinion of this Court the petitioners failed to point out any irregularity or illegality in impugned order warranting interference of this Court. Therefore, the Civil Revision Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
LNA,J, CRP No.3796 of 2023 9 Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed.
__________________________________ LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY,J Date: 11.06.2025 Tssb/dr