Telangana High Court
G. Veena vs State Of Telangana, on 8 July, 2024
THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
AND
THE HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI
WRIT APPEAL Nos.766, 772, 775, 783 and 810 of 2024
COMMON JUDGMENT:
(Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Alok Aradhe) Mr. B. Nalin Kumar, learned Senior Counsel representing Mr. A. Dasharatha, learned counsel for the appellants in W.A.Nos.766, 775 and 783 of 2024.
Mr. Lingala Sudheer, learned counsel for the appellant in W.A.No.772 of 2024.
Mr. N. Vishal, learned counsel for the appellant in W.A.No.810 of 2024.
Mr. S. Rahul Reddy, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the Office of the learned Additional Advocate General for the State.
Mr. C. Haripreeth, learned Standing Counsel for the Agriculture Market Committee.
2. These intra court appeals are filed against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge by which the Writ Petitions preferred by the appellants have been dismissed 2 and the validity of Government Orders issued by the Agriculture & Cooperation (Mkt.I) Department has been upheld. The issue involved in these batch of appeals being common, they are heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. For the facility of reference, the facts from W.A.No.775 of 2024 are being referred to.
3. The appellant No.1 is the Chairman and the appellant No.2 is the Vice-Chairman and the other appellants are nominated Members of the Agriculture Market Committee, Jangoan (hereinafter referred to as, "the Committee"), which was constituted by an order dated 14.03.2023. The appellants were nominated for a term of two years i.e., up to 13.03.2025. The State Government, however, in exercise of powers under Section 5(11) of the Telangana (Agricultural Produce & Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as, "the Act"), issued G.O.Rt.No.158, dated 12.01.2024 withdrawing its pleasure from the Members of the Committee i.e., the appellants, who cease to hold the office with immediate effect. 3
4. The appellants thereupon filed a writ petition in which the validity of the said order dated 12.01.2024 was challenged. The learned Single Judge, without asking the respondents to file a counter affidavit, dismissed the writ petitions in limine. The said orders were challenged by the appellants in writ appeals. This Court, on 28.02.2024, while taking note of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal v. Union of India 1, inter alia, held that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked for valid reasons. The valid reasons must exist and must be disclosed by the respondents by filing counter affidavit. This Court, therefore, remitted the matters to the learned Single Judge. The relevant extract of the orders passed by this Court reads as under:
"8. Paragraph 34 of the decision of the Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal (supra) reads as under:
34. The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure. In other words, "at pleasure" doctrine enables the removal of a person holding office at the pleasure of an authority, summarily, without any 1 (2010) 6 SCC 331 4 obligation to give any notice or hearing to the person removed, and without any obligation to assign any reasons or disclose any cause for the removal, or withdrawal of pleasure. The withdrawal of pleasure cannot be at the sweet will, whim and fancy of the authority, but can only be for valid reasons.
9. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked for valid reasons. The valid reasons must exist and must be disclosed by the respondents by filing counter affidavit.
10. However, the aforesaid aspect of the matter has not been appreciated by the learned Single Judge. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the matter is remitted to the learned Single Judge. The respondents shall file the counter within two weeks. The learned Single Judge shall decide the writ petition afresh in accordance with law."
5. Thereafter, the respondents filed counter affidavit. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated 03.05.2024, inter alia, held that the loss of confidence is a relevant criteria for invoking the doctrine of withdrawal of pleasure. It was further held that the principles of natural justice cannot be invoked when doctrine of pleasure is exercised and if the appellants are posted on political consideration, there can be neither any violation of Constitution nor any 5 law enacted by the State Legislature while terminating such an appointment. Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. In the aforesaid factual background, these intra court appeals have been filed.
6. Learned Senior Counsel and the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, no valid reasons have been assigned for invoking the doctrine of pleasure. It is submitted that the tests laid down by the Supreme Court in B.P.Singhal (supra) have not been fulfilled. It is contended that the State action has to be informed by reason and the learned Single Judge has failed to examine the provisions of the Act. It is also contended that the order of termination results in curtailment of the term of the appellants and therefore the impugned order is arbitrary and discriminatory. In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P 2 and B.P.Singhal (supra), the Division Bench 2 (1991) 1 SCC 212 6 decision of the High Court of Judicature, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh in M.Thirupati Rao v. State of Telangana 3 and the Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Dasari Raja Master v. State of Andhra Pradesh 4.
7. On the other hand, learned Special Government Pleader submits that the validity of Section 5(11) of the Act is not under challenge and the nature of appointment being political, the doctrine of pleasure has rightly been invoked. It is also contended that the appellants were not subjected to any process of selection before they were nominated as Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the Committee. It is also contended that the principles of natural justice have no application when doctrine of pleasure is invoked. In support of the aforesaid submissions reliance has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar 3 2015 (2) ALD 372 (DB) 4 2021 (4) ALD 196 (AP) 7 Palika, Shahjahanpur 5 and Cheviti Venkanna Yadav v. State of Telangana 6.
8. We have considered the rival submissions made on both sides and have perused the record.
9. Before proceeding further it is apposite to take note of the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act is enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to the regulation of purchase and sale of agricultural produce, livestock and products of livestock and the establishment of markets in connection therewith. Section 5 of the Act deals with composition of market committee and provides that market committee shall comprise of 14 members out of which 8 members shall be nominated by the Government in consultation with the Director of Marketing from among the categories of growers of agricultural produce, owners of livestock and products of livestock, in the notified area mentioned therein. Section 5(5) of the Act deals with power of the Government to remove the Chairman or Vice 5 (1993) 2 SCC 242 6 (2017) 1 SCC 283 8 Chairman. Section 5(5) of the Act is extracted below for the facility of reference:
"The Government may, by notification, remove the Chairman or Vice-Chairman who in their opinion wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys the provisions of this Act or any rules or bye-laws of lawful orders issued thereunder or abuses his position or the power vested in him, after giving him an opportunity for explanation, and the said notification shall contain a statement of the reasons of the Government for the action taken."
10. Thus, from a perusal of Section 5(5) of the Act, it is evident that the Government may remove the Chairman or Vice Chairman who in its opinion wilfully omits or refuses to carry out or disobeys the provisions of the Act or any Rules, bye-laws of lawful orders issued thereunder or abuses his position or the power vested in him.
11. Section 5(11) of the Act which was inserted in the Act by Amendment No.5 of 2015 with effect from 01.01.2012 reads as under:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in any provisions of this Act, members of the 9 Committee including the Chairman and Vice- chairman shall hold the office during the pleasure of the Government."
The aforesaid provision incorporates the doctrine of pleasure in the provisions of the Act.
12. In Om Narain Agarwal (supra) the Supreme Court dealt with Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916, which provides for the doctrine of pleasure and has upheld its validity. It is pertinent to note that in the instant case, the appellants have not challenged the validity of Section 5(11) of the Act. In B.P.Singhal (supra), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court while dealing with invocation of doctrine of pleasure in relation to Governors has held that the doctrine of pleasure can be invoked only for valid reasons.
13. The pivotal issue which arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the doctrine of pleasure has been invoked for valid reasons?
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14. On perusal of Section 5(1) of the Act, it is evident that the appellants are the Chairman, Vice Chairman and the Members of the Committee. In other words, the appellants have not been subjected to any process of selection before their nomination. The appellants hold the office for a term of two years. The right of the appellants to seek nomination depends on the Act and is governed by the provisions of the Act. Section 5(11) of the Act neither offends the provisions of the Constitution nor any of the law enacted by the State Legislature.
15. In paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents before the learned Single Judge, it has been pleaded as under:
8. It is humbly submitted that the petitioners were all nominated by the earlier government and their ideology is not in sync with the policies or ideologies of the present government and that the loss of confidence in them by the present government is the reason for their removal from their nominated posts and the withdrawal of pleasure does not put any stigma on their performance and character.11
16. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the doctrine of pleasure has been exercised for valid reasons, namely loss of confidence by the present Government in the nominated member as well as on the ground that the ideology of the appellants is not in sync with the policies or ideologies of the present government. The appointment to the post by way of nomination is political in nature. The aforesaid reasons furnished for invocation of doctrine of pleasure are valid grounds for passing the impugned Government Orders.
17. The contention urged on behalf of the appellants that the test laid down in B.P.Singhal (supra) has not been complied with, suffice it to state that in B.P.Singhal (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with the invocation of doctrine of pleasure in the case of Governors. The appellants do not hold any Constitutional office and are not entitled to either any constitutional protection or any statutory protection in respect of their tenure. The tenure of the appellants has been terminated in a manner known to law i.e., in accordance with Section 5(11) of the Act. The 12 exercise of doctrine of invocation in the facts and circumstances cannot be said to be arbitrary, irrational, unfair or is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the reliance placed on the ratio in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra) has no application to the factual matrix of the case.
18. So far as reliance placed on the decisions of this Court in M.Thirupati Rao (supra) and Dasari Raja Master (supra) is concerned, it is noteworthy that the Courts were dealing with the validity of the Ordinance and after examining the provisions of the Ordinance which provides for curtailment of the term of the Members, the same was struck down on the ground that it is arbitrary and discriminatory. In the instant case, the appellants have not challenged the validity of Section 5(11) of the Act. Therefore, the aforesaid decisions are of no assistance to the appellants in the facts and circumstances of the case.
19. For the aforementioned reasons, we agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge. 13
20. In the result, the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.
Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.
______________________________________ ALOK ARADHE, CJ ______________________________________ ANIL KUMAR JUKANTI, J 08.07.2024 vs